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November 2008 Issue . . . |
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| On July 13, 2008 a high-level summit meeting was held in Paris attended by representatives – almost all either presidents or prime ministers – from 43 states, mainly EU member states and their southern Mediterranean partners. The purpose of the summit was to launch French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s idea for a new Mediterranean Union . . . view article |
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After the Georgia War
Part One: U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cooperation Disrupted |
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Russia’s military intervention in Georgia and U.S. opposition to the decision has led many Russians and Americans to urge a reassessment of the key pillars of the strategic relationship between the two nations, including in the realm of arms control. As of late September, the Georgia War appears to have had a diverse impact on the Russian – U.S. arms control relationship
. . . view article |
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After the Georgia War
Part Two: Regional U.S. Nonproliferation Programs Complicated |
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Many observers feared that the Georgia War would disrupt Russian-American collaboration on diverse nonproliferation issues, such as dealing with Iran over its nuclear weapons and addressing the continuing WMD legacy of the Soviet Union. Thus far at least, CTR programs in the Russian Federation appear unaffected by the recent clash. Even so, the conflict has had an indirect effect on U.S.-funded threat reduction and nonproliferation activities in Georgia, which has long been a priority target of U.S. nonproliferation programs . . . view article |
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After the Georgia War
Part Three: Eurasian Missile Defense Dispute Intensifies |
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Even before the August 2008 Georgia War it was evident that Russian and U.S. officials continued to differ sharply over a global missile defense architecture. The war, however, promoted growing East European acceptance of the desirability of the proposed BMD deployments, despite continuing Russian protests, threats, and diplomatic initiatives.
. . . view article |
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The views expressed on this website are those of the authors only and do not represent the official policy or position of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Defense,
or the U.S. Government. |
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