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SOUTH KOREAN UAVs: U.S. REJECTS SALE OF GLOBAL HAWK, AS ROK DOMESTIC CAPABILITIES GROW

Dec 2005 / Jan 2006 Issue
 

In July 2005, South Korean media reported that ROK officials reacted with frustration and disappointment to the U.S. rejection of their June request to purchase Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). [1] Meanwhile, South Korean efforts to develop more limited, indigenous UAV capabilities for national defense and the international marketplace are making significant progress.

According to U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Director Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kohler, ROK officials made the request to purchase the Global Hawk UAV when U.S. and ROK defense officials met in Hawaii during June 21-23, 2005, for a sub-panel session of the annual Security Consultative Meeting. [2] Kohler stated Global Hawk exports were unlikely to be approved because of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrictions.

The Global Hawk, which can conceivably be used as a delivery system for WMD, is considered a Category I system (technologies of greatest sensitivity) under the MTCR Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers. [3] The Global Hawk is a high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAV, available in two models: the RQ-4A has a ferry range of 22,236 km (13,500 miles) and a payload capability of 907.2 kg (2,000 lb), while the newer RQ-4B has a ferry range of 22,780 km (13,838 miles) and a payload capability of 1,360 kg (3,000 lb). [4] Thus, both easily surpass the MTCR Category I threshold, which classifies missile systems, including cruise missiles and UAVs, as Category I if they are capable of carrying a 500 kg (1,100 lb) payload to a distance of 300 km (187 miles) or more. [5] Under MTCR rules, member countries must apply a “presumption of denial” to export license applications for Category I systems. In addition, MTCR practice discourages member countries from acquiring or developing new Category I systems. South Korea is an MTCR member country.

When told of the denial of Global Hawk sales during a visit to the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) test facility in T’aean-kun, South Ch’ungch’ong Province, assemblyman Hwang Chin-ha of the Grand National Party (Hannaradang, the conservative opposition party), was quoted to have demanded an explanation from ADD Director An Tong-man, asking “What is the reason the United States will sell to Japan and not to South Korea?” [6] (While the United States has not sold Global Hawks to Japan, Hwang’s comment is noteworthy in that it highlights the sensitivity in some quarters of the South Korean defense community to the possibility that the United States might treat the ROK less favorably than Japan in the area of sensitive defense technology transfers.) ADD Director An is quoted as having replied that the U.S. officials explained their rejection of South Korea’s bid by referring to the restrictive rules of the MTCR. [7] Another high-ranking ROK defense official was separately quoted as stating, “It appears the U.S. Department of Defense rejected the sales to South Korea due to concerns about the potential outflow of core technologies.” [8]

While Washington’s rejection of the Global Hawk sale will restrict the ROK’s UAV capabilities, the country has made important strides in developing UAV technology indigenously. South Korea’s ADD and Korea Aerospace Industries, Ltd. (KAI) began developing the Night Intruder 300 (initially called Pijo, literally, “flying bird”) reconnaissance UAV in 1990 and conducted its first flight test in 1993. [9] Although there were problems during the development of the Night Intruder 300 (a model crashed during a test flight in June 1997), it was later successfully tested and, in 2000, deployed by South Korea, along with the Israel Aircraft Industries’ Harpy anti-radar-system UAV. The Night Intruder 300 is a fixed-wing UAV with a 200 km range and 45 kg (99 lb) payload capability (devoted to infrared sensors and synthetic aperture radar), placing it well below the MTCR Category I threshold. [10] Most recently, the ROK Army Intelligence School on June 10, 2005, established a unit to specialize in training UAV systems operators. [11]

In addition, while military interests triggered South Korea’s initial UAV development, Seoul has been aggressively pushing to become a key player in the global UAV market with the creation in May 2002 of the Smart UAV Development Center (SUDC) under the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute. The SUDC has been leading a consortium of government agencies, private firms, and academic research institutes in a three-stage plan to complete development of the Smart UAV by 2010. [12]

In 2004, Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy official Lee Sang-joon stated that South Korea is aiming to become the world’s eighth largest aerospace powerhouse by 2015, increasing Korea’s aerospace-related production to over US$5 billion by 2010. [13] In addition, the SUDC website lists as one of its identified goals, “Join Top 5 Advanced Countries in UAV Technology in 2010s.” Seoul has also revealed that KAI and ADD are working to launch a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV to replace the Night Intruder by 2007 or 2008, to be followed by a fully autonomous HALE UAV. [14]

It remains to be seen whether the United States, following its practice in the area of ballistic missiles, will attempt to discourage South Korea from developing UAVs with capabilities that exceed the MTCR Category I threshold. The U.S. initiative regarding ballistic missiles, which began in the 1970s, was prompted by South Korea’s exploitation of technology from the U.S.-supplied Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile in developing the 180-kilometer range surface-to surface Paekkom missile, which was later improved and renamed Hyonmu.[15] This history, among numerous other factors, will inform U.S. consideration of future advanced UAV transfers to South Korea.

 


SOURCES:
[1] Ko Kyoung-tae, “U.S. Refuses to Sell Spy Aircraft to South Korea,” Korea Herald, September 30, 2005; Pak Pyŏng-jin, “Mikuk Muinchŏngch’algi Han’gukp’anmae Kŏpu [U.S. Denies UAV Sales to South Korea],” Segye Ilbo, September 30, 2005, in KINDS; “S. Korea Considers Buying U.S. High-flying Pilotless Spy Planes,” Yonhap News Agency, July 12, 2005, in Lexis-Nexis; Yun Sang-ho, “Kukpangbu ‘Kokoto Mimuinchŏngch’algi Sako Sipta’ P’anmae Yoch’ŏng [MND: ‘Want to Purchase U.S.’ High-Altitude UAV’],” Donga Ilbo, July 12, 2005, in KINDS; Stephen Trimble, “Arms Agreement Means No Global Hawk for South Korea,” Flight International, July 19-25, 2005, p. 7.
[2] Stephen Trimble, “Arms Agreement Means No Global Hawk for South Korea,” op cit.
[3] Ibid.; MTCR Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, Missile Technology Control Regime webpage, accessed on November 21, 2005.

[4] Global Hawk Tech Specs, Northrup Grumman webpage [View Article]; “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 4, 2005, p. 6.
[5] Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, September 16, 2005, in Missile Technology Control Regime webpage.
[View Article]
[6] Choe Hyŏn-su, “Hannaratang Hwang Jin-ha ‘Mi, Ilbon’e’nŭn Kŭllo’pŏlho’k’ŭ P’almyŏnsŏ Han’guk’e’nŭn P’anmaepulga T’ongbo’ [Assemblyman Hwang: ‘U.S. Sells Global Hawks to Japan; Why Not to South Korea?’],” Kukmin Ilbo, September 29, 2005, in KINDS.
[7] Ko Kyoung-tae, “U.S. Refuses to Sell Spy Aircraft to South Korea,” Korea Herald, September 30, 2005.

[8] Pak Pyŏng-jin, “Mikuk Muinchŏngch’algi Han’gukp’anmae Kŏpu [U.S. Denies UAV Sales to South Korea],” Segye Ilbo, September 30, 2005, in KINDS. Regarding ROK export control capabilities, see, “South Korean Export Control Awareness on Rise, but Compliance Lacking,” International Export Control Observer, November 2005, p. 18, [View Article]; “South Korean Company Allegedly Assisted Iran in 2004 and 2005 in Acquiring Nuclear Material,” International Export Control Observer, October 2005, p. 4.
[9] An Sŭng-bŏm, editor, 2002 Han’gukkun changbiyŏn’gam (Seoul: Kunsajŏngbo, 2001),
p. 200.

[10] Aviationnow.com, “UAV Specs v2,” [View Article] ; Yun Sang-ho, “Kun, Sŏhae NLL Muinhanggonggiro Kamshi Kŏmt’o [Army Conducts Surveillance Tests near Western Northern Limit Line],” Donga Ilbo, April 20, 2005, in KINDS.
[11] FBIS Report, June 19, 2005, “ROK Military Websites, 11-17 June,” FBIS Document KPP20050616000052.
[12] Hwang Su-chŏng, “Muinhanggonggi Kisulgaepal Tonghyang [UAV Technology Development Trends],” Hanggong’ujusan’ŏp Kisultonghyang, Korea Aerospace Research Institute, Issue 1, No. 1, 2003, pp. 60-65; Smart UAV Development Center webpage.
[13] Kim Sung-jin, “Korea Aims to Be Aerospace Power by 2015,” Korea Times, February 18, 2004; Smart UAV Development Center webpage.
[14] Hwang Su-chŏng, “Muinhanggonggi Kisulgaepal Tonghyang [UAV Technology Development Trends],” Hanggong’ujusan’ŏp Kisultonghyang, Korea Aerospace Research Institute, Issue 1, No. 1, 2003, pp. 60-65; Smart UAV Development Center webpage.
[15] “South Korea Profile – Missiles,” Nuclear Threat Initiative. [View Article]