Shortly after the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta announced the reconstitution of the Spanish influenza virus, which killed an estimated 40 million people worldwide in 1918-19, U.S. analysts publicized a number of security-related concerns arising from this development. Surprisingly, however, the international media paid little attention to the event, including press outlets in those countries most ready to accuse the United States of violating arms control treaties.

The CDC results were published in a paper entitled, “Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus,” in the October 7 issue of Science. [1] This publication was the culmination of more than a decade of effort by scientists at the CDC, the U.S. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (Bethesda, MD), the Department of Agriculture, and the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (New York, NY) to determine the complete DNA sequence of the extinct Spanish flu virus, fragments of which were extracted from preserved tissue samples of pandemic victims.

Even before the Science article was formally published, the Sunshine Project, a U.S. biological weapons watchdog group, charged on October 5, 2005, that “the 1918 experiments will be replicated and adapted, and the ability to perform them will proliferate, meaning that the possibility of man-made disaster, either accidental or deliberate, has risen for the entire world."[2] In 2003, the Sunshine Project had charged that the Spanish flu research, if conducted “in a Chinese, Russian, or Iranian laboratory, might well be seen as the smoking gun of an offensive bio-warfare program.”[3] Barely a week after the Science piece appeared, the New York Times published an op-ed warning that posting the complete DNA sequence of the 1918 influenza virus on the Internet was misguided and would provide terrorists with a “recipe for destruction.”[4]

The CDC offered a strong defense of its decision to reconstitute the 1918 flu virus. On its website, the agency stated, “While there are concerns that this approach could potentially be misused for purposes of bioterrorism, there are also clear and significant potential benefits of sharing this information with the scientific community: namely, facilitating the development of effective interventions, thereby strengthening public health and national security."[5]

The CDC also argued that its work was squarely within the bounds of permitted research under the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC):

Article I of the [BWC] specifically allows for microbiological research for “prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.” Article X of the BWC encourages the “fullest possible exchange of ... scientific and technological information” for the use of biological agents for the prevention of disease and other peaceful purposes. Further, Article X of the BWC provides that the BWC should not hamper technological development in the field of peaceful bacteriological activities. Because the emergence of another pandemic virus is considered likely, if not inevitable, characterization of the 1918 virus may enable us to recognize the potential threat posed by new influenza virus strains, and it will shed light on the prophylactic and therapeutic countermeasures that will be needed to control pandemic viruses.[6]

Despite the active debate on these issues in the United States, other countries said little on the subject. Indeed, a scan of foreign media reveals that few if any questions were raised about the impact of the Spanish flu experiments on the threat of BW terrorism or the BWC, with the British press being the principal exception.

The left-leaning The Guardian of London, for example, noted the potential security risks posed by the publication on the Internet of the complete DNA sequence of the Spanish flu virus. The article quoted Ronald Atlas, co-director of the Center for Deterrence of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, who said, “This will raise clear questions among some as to whether they [the U.S. researchers] have really created a biological weapon.”[7] Similarly, The Telegraph of London quoted experts criticizing the CDC project for bringing one of history’s most deadly viruses back to life.[8] In India, The Hindu, a national daily, raised concerns in the U.K. press that any molecular biologist could now recreate the Spanish flu virus in the laboratory.[9]

Somewhat surprisingly, Pyongyang remained silent on the Spanish flu paper. Only weeks earlier, on September 12, 2005, North Korea had accused the United States of deliberately violating international disarmament treaties, including those on biological weapons.[10] This denunciation came as a response to the latest U.S. Department of State Noncompliance Report, issued on August 30, 2005, which concluded that the DPRK had developed and produced BW agents in violation of the BWC.[11] “Our republic is not a violator of the agreement but a victim of biological weapons,” a state-run North Korean daily said, referring to the long-standing North Korean allegation (now known to be based on falsified evidence) that the United States used biological weapons against it during the Korean War.[12] Although subsequent DPRK news coverage addressed influenza, the focus was on avian flu, not the U.S. reconstitution of the causative agent of the 1918 pandemic.

China, Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Syria, whose biological activities were also identified in the State Department Noncompliance Report as raising concerns, likewise had nothing to say about the U.S. breakthrough.

On October 20, 2005, the CDC added the reconstituted 1918 influenza virus to the Department of Health and Human Services’ list of “select agents and toxins,” thereby limiting access to the virus to authorized U.S. scientists and laboratories, and requiring a high level of biosafety and security in handling it.[13] The select agent list contains pathogens and toxins identified by the Department as posing the greatest risk of bioterrorist use.

SOURCES: [1] Terrence M. Tumpey, Christopher F. Basler, Patricia V. Aguilar, Hui Zeng, Alicia Solórzano, David E. Swayne, Nancy J. Cox, Jacqueline M. Katz, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, Peter Palese, Adolfo García-Sastre, “Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus,” Science, October 7, 2005. [2] “Disease by Design: 1918 ‘Spanish’ Flu Resurrection Creates Major Safety and Security Risks,” The Sunshine Project News Release, October 5, 2005. [View Article] [3] Unıted States: Military resurrects deadly flu virus,” Greenleft.Org, October 22, 2003. [View Article] [4] Ray Kurzweil and Bill Joy, “Recipe for Destruction,” New York Times, October 17, 2005. [5] Questions & Answers: Reconstruction of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic Virus,” Official Centers for Disease Control website, October 7, 2005. [View Article] [6] Ibid. [7] Ian Sample, “Researchers Fear Escape of Lethal Flu Strain,” The Guardian, October 6, 2005. [8] “Scientists Bring Back Deadliest Virus in History,” The Telegraph, October 6, 2005. [View Article] [9] “Scientists Resurrect Virus that Killed 50 Million,” The Hindu, October 7, 2005. [View Article] See also “U.S. Scientists Resurrect Deadly 1918 Flu”, New Scientist, October 5, 2005. [View Article] [10] “U.S. State Department's Report Attacking DPRK Refuted,” Korean Central News Agency, September 12, 2005. [View Article] [11] “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” U.S. Department of State, August 30, 2005. [View Article] [12] “Pyongyang Denies Having Biological Arms,” September 12, 2005. [13] “Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins- Reconstructed Replication Competent Forms of the 1918 Pandemic Influenza Virus Containing Any Portion of the Coding Regions of All Eight Gene Segments,” Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 202 / Thursday, October 20, 2005 / Rules and Regulations, 42 CFR Part 73.