|
||||||||
| Dec 2005 / Jan 2006 Issue | ||||||||
As the September 2005 Coalition offensive on Tel Afar continued, the “Army of the Victorious Party” (a faction of Al-Qaeda in Iraq) threatened to retaliate. On September 11, 2005, the group issued a communiqué stating that American and Iraqi troops would be attacked with chemical weapons within 24 hours, if the Tel Afar offensive did not cease immediately. [1] On September 13th, the “Army of the Victorious Party” claimed to have carried through its threat. It stated that it had launched a chemical missile attack from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m. that morning against the Iraqi Interior and External Affairs Ministries, the Green Zone, and the Security Academy, which the group referred to as the “Den of Collaborators.” [2] The following day, a second Iraqi insurgent group, the Islamic Army in Iraq, claimed to have launched ten 120mm chemical artillery shells at a joint American and Iraqi military base. The group also claimed to have witnessed troops escaping the base in response to the attacks. [3] Coalition Forces in Iraq did not detect the use of chemical agents and discounted the insurgents’ claims of the chemical attacks. Nonetheless, the communiqués from the two groups are not without significance, in that they provide additional evidence that such organizations remain interested in acquiring unconventional capabilities. Their claims, moreover, were made at a time when various manuals for the preparation of chemical agents had been circulating regularly on media outlets linked to insurgent and terrorist organizations, especially those affiliated with Al-Qaeda. These manuals portray easy-to-produce formulations for various chemical agents including cyanide, hydrogen sulfate, and even the biological toxin ricin. While insurgent elements often seek to exaggerate their capabilities and effectiveness by publicizing fictional operations or by taking credit for attacks carried out by others, the claims of chemical weapons use may, potentially, have some meaning behind them. It is possible, although unlikely, that these insurgent groups are, in fact, attempting to manufacture crude chemical agents and that the communiqués were intended to test Iraqi and U.S. reactions to such a deployment, and equally important, the reaction of the Jihadi community.
|
||||||||