Following the successful November 1, 2005, test of a new defense-penetrating strategic nuclear warhead, Russian officials announced that deployment of road-mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would begin in 2006. They also declared that in the future, Russia would outfit certain Topol-M ICBMs with multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), while others would carry the maneuverable defense-penetrating warhead. These announcements help clarify previously uncertain aspects of Russia’s strategic nuclear posture and its projected capabilities.

On November 1, 2005, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) conducted a flight test of a road-mobile ICBM with a maneuverable warhead known as Igla. Igla can travel at the speed of Mach 6 (six times the speed of sound) and uses service engines that switch on and off randomly, making its flight path unpredictable. Also, Igla reportedly utilizes “stealth” technology—a special coating that makes it “invisible” to thermal or electromagnetic detection. All this is intended to give it the capability to penetrate any existing or foreseeable missile defense system. [1, 2]

In a departure from standard procedure, the missile was launched from a test range at Kapustin Yar, in the Astrakhan region, rather than from Plesetsk, in northern Russia, and the end point of the test was the “10th test range,” at Lake Balkhash (also known as Priozersk) in Kazakhstan, instead of Kura, on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Reportedly, the unusual trajectory was designed to deny the United States the opportunity to observe the new warhead. [3, 4, 5]

The successful test of the defense-penetrating warhead, together with progress in other strategic modernization programs, appears to have helped the Russian Ministry of Defense finalize its plans for the country’s future strategic nuclear posture.

Deployment of road-mobile Topol-Ms will begin next year with the deployment of the first wing (“divizion”) of three launchers at the 54th division in Teykovo (Ivanovo oblast). Beginning in 2007, up to nine road-mobile Topol-Ms will be deployed each year. It was announced earlier this year that deployment of silo-based Topol-Ms would take place at a rate of at least four per year. [6, 4]
The Igla maneuverable warhead will be deployed both on some Topol-Ms (it was not specified whether silo- or mobile-based) and on the future submarine launched ballistic missile Bulava, whose first flight test was conducted in September 2005. [2]

The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which designed both Topol-M and Bulava, is working on MIRVing Topol-M missiles. [2] Although details have not been spelled out, the announcement seemed to imply that silo-based Topol-Ms – currently a single warhead system – will carry more than one warhead, while the road-mobile variety will be equipped with a single, defense-penetrating, maneuverable warhead.

If this is indeed the approach Russia adopts, it would appear to confirm long-standing predictions that Russia would consider MIRVing additional classes of ICBMs. Although Russia had agreed not to take this step when it signed the 1993 START II Treaty with the United States, that treaty never entered into force, and Russia declared it null and void in June 2002, immediately after the United States formally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Nonetheless, Russia may be constrained from moving forward with MIRVing the Topol-M system under the terms of the 1991 START I Treaty, which expires in December 2009. Under Article V(12)(b) and (c) of START I, the United States and Russia are prohibited from increasing the number of warheads on types of ICBMs declared under that treaty. The Topol-M was declared under that pact as a single-warhead system. To declare silo-based Topol-M to be a new, previously undeclared type of missile, rather than a previously declared type, Russia might need to change some of the system’s characteristics to legally differentiate the missile from the original Topol-M, an effort that would require, among other steps, an expensive series of tests. It is also possible that Russia might defer MIRVing the Topol-M until START I expires or seek to amend the treaty to permit this step, as a condition of its extension.