Chinese analysts and media are paying close attention to the evolving debate in Japan over whether that country should alter its long-standing policy against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The debate in Japan, which has become increasingly open over the past year and has seen several important political figures express a readiness to reexamine Japan’s traditional stance, has intensified in the wake of North Korea’s first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. Chinese observers appear to be well aware of the key factors influencing Japanese thinking in this area and to have a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of the nuclear debate – even to the point of recognizing the value of the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a means of reinforcing Japan’s non-nuclear status.

A number of recent statements by Japanese officials and parliamentarians have undoubtedly heightened China’s concerns. On September 5, 2006, following North Korea’s July missile tests, but prior to its nuclear detonation, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, for example, suggested that Japan needed to consider the option of acquiring nuclear weapons. [1] Less than a week after the North Korean nuclear test, on October 15, 2006, Shoichi Nakagawa, Chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) policy research council, similarly suggested that Japan needed to discuss its nuclear options in response to North Korea’s nuclear demonstration. He further argued that Japan’s constitution did not prohibit the country from possessing nuclear weapons. Three days later, in a similar vein, Foreign Minister Taro Aso told a parliamentary committee that it was important to discuss the matter, which had long been considered off-limits. [2] While both Nakagawa and Aso later avowed that Japan would continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles (not to produce, possess, or import nuclear weapons), which have been its policy for many decades, and while newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared the debate on the issue to be over and that no change of policy was appropriate, the ripple effect of these and earlier statements has already attracted much attention from China. [3]

Chinese analyses of the issue are generally focused on two factors: (1) Japan’s technological capabilities, material base, and motivations for reconsidering its long-standing non-nuclear principles; and (2) the obstacles, both domestic and international, to Japan’s taking this course, especially the role of the United States.

Japan as a Virtual Nuclear Power: Capabilities and Motivations
Beijing has been closely watching Japan’s growing “virtual” nuclear weapon capabilities. In an article published in the 2006 Yearbook on International Arms Control and Disarmament, before the debate in Japan reached its current intensity, three analysts from the Beijing Institute for Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) carefully examined Japan’s civilian nuclear program. Among the many issues raised, they questioned the motives behind Japan’s pursuit of the full “nuclear fuel cycle,” including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation (reprocessing), the two processes that can produce materials suitable for nuclear weapons. They pointed out that Japan is the only non-nuclear-weapon state to possess this spectrum of capabilities.

The authors also noted Japan’s substantial plutonium stockpiles and pointed out that by the end of 2004, Japan had accumulated an excess inventory of over 43 tons of the material, enough for 5,000 nuclear warheads. In addition, the article noted that Japan is planning a new spent fuel reprocessing facility in Rokkasho-mura, which will separate additional quantities of plutonium before existing stocks are exhausted. The analysis also discussed Japan’s plans for introducing fast-breeder reactors, which not only produce more plutonium than they consume, but typically produce “super-grade” plutonium, which is ideal for nuclear weapons. Finally, the authors argued, at a time when both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Bush Administration are calling for a moratorium on additional countries’ acquiring complete nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, Japan’s plutonium policy seems to reflect a double standard, which is not conducive to maintaining the integrity of the nonproliferation regime and adds to the difficulty of addressing the nuclear challenges posed by Iran and North Korea. [4] (Note: Because Japan is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the nuclear Nonproliferaton Treaty (NPT), all of the activities referred to in this analysis are or will be subject to IAEA inspection and accounting safeguards.)

Other Chinese analysts have made similar points, suggesting that a consensus on Japan’s latent nuclear weapon capabilities is emerging. An April 3, 2006 article in Junshi Wenzhai [Military Digest], for example, argued that Japan has the necessary nuclear technologies, excessive quantities of plutonium potentially usable in making nuclear weapons, and computer techniques to simulate tests to derive relevant data for nuclear weapon designs, all of which would allow Japan to make nuclear weapons at very short notice. [5]

Chinese media reports have also focused on the motivations that may be prompting some in Japan to begin to reexamine the country’s nuclear policies, leading to the current debate. One prominent Japan specialist in China points out that pressures for reopening the nuclear question are stimulated by a combination of factors: Japan’s desire to achieve greater independence from the United States; its ambitions for great power status; the growing global emphasis on the importance of military power; Japan’s fears of nuclear and missile threats in the region; the rise of neighboring countries (such as China); and a revisionist approach to history, which minimizes the impact of Japan’s past militarism on Japanese society and other nations. [6] Chinese analysts point out that Japan sought to develop nuclear weapons in the past (apparently a reference to Japanese efforts during World War II), and conducted special studies in the 1960s and 1990s on whether to acquire nuclear arms. A number of Chinese analysts have suggested that North Korea’s nuclear test provided a convenient excuse for Japan to reconsider its nuclear options, including abandonment of its non-nuclear principles. [7]

Obstacles to Japan’s Nuclearization
However, Chinese analysts also suggest that whether Japan would seek nuclear weapons would also be affected by a number of factors that create strong pressures against such a decision. These include:

• The U.S.-Japan security alliance. Washington has strongly opposed any Japanese intention to acquire nuclear weapons and this will likely remain U.S. policy.
• The international environment. While the international nuclear nonproliferation regime has experienced significant strain in recent years, the international community remains united in opposing further nuclear proliferation. Given Japan’s reliance on overseas markets and resources, the consequences of it “going nuclear” could be very severe.
• Domestic factors. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, there is strong sentiment in Japan against acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Nakagawa/Aso comments incurred immediate rebukes from the opposition parties and victims of the 1945 nuclear bombings. Other Liberal Democratic Party officials and cabinet members, including the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency and the Chief Cabinet Secretary, expressed concerns over the Nakagawa/Aso statements, considering them contradictory to Japan’s domestic laws and international commitments and as having the potential to send the wrong signal to other countries.
• Japan’s core strategic interests. The ultimate consideration would be whether acquiring nuclear weapons, given the constraining factors listed above, would ultimately enhance Japan’s security. If Tokyo remains confident in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it is likely to hesitate before weakening its alliance with the United States and instead relying on an independent deterrent for its security. [8]

Indeed, Chinese observers view Washington’s disapproving attitude toward Japan’s nuclear debate and the U.S. role in reining in Japanese nuclear ambitions as critical to Japan’s continued nuclear abstinence. Some Chinese media reports stress that the central purpose of U.S. Secretary of State Rice’s recent trip to Japan was not to consult on sanctions against North Korea, but to shore up Tokyo’s confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, as well as to secure pledges from the new administration of Prime Minister Abe that Japan will not renege on its three non-nuclear principles. In fact, Foreign Minister Aso pledged to Secretary Rice that Japan had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, saying that Japan “is absolutely not considering” building a nuclear arsenal in response to the North Korean nuclear test. [9]

This has not passed unnoticed by the Chinese media, which apparently sees the U.S. nuclear umbrella, as well as the U.S.-Japan security alliance, in a positive light because of their role in restraining Japan’s nuclear aspirations. Chinese analysts note that the U.S. military presence in Japan serves an important function in U.S. strategy for East Asian security, both allowing Japan to play a more active role in regional security matters, but at the same time providing a measure of control over possible Japanese ambitions for greater influence. In this context, a nuclear Japan would be viewed to be detrimental to fundamental U.S. strategic interests in East Asia – a reality that appears to provide a measure of comfort to observers in Beijing. [10]

Jing-Dong Yuan – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies