Although it was initially anticipated that Iran’s new Strategic Council on Foreign Relations (Shora-ya-Rashordi-yi Ravabet-1 Khareji) might serve as a moderating influence on Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s stand-off with the West over the country’s nuclear program, these expectations have not been realized. [1] According to recent reports, the Council, composed largely of officials who served under former Iranian president Mohammed Khatami, appears to have been relegated to an advisory role on long-term strategic issues and prevented from shaping policy in the sensitive nuclear area, leaving Ahmadinejad and his supporters in charge. [2]
The Council was established on June 25, 2006, by a decree issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene’i. [3] Reports suggest that the Council was conceived and promoted by former President Khatami. According to various sources, Khatami made the suggestion to Khamene’i during a debriefing upon the former president’s return from a visit to Germany in March 2005. [4] During that meeting, Khatami emphasized Iran’s right to pursue nuclear technologies and raised the idea of setting up a council for making use in this arena “of the capabilities of the experienced and expert personalities in diplomatic decision-making and consultation.” [5] However, it may have been the long-standing intention of Supreme Leader Khamene’i, who served as Iran’s president in the late 1980s, to establish a more broadly chartered council that would consult with society’s elite to plan overall, strategic policies in the foreign relations sphere and not merely those related to the nuclear program. [6] With Ahmadinejad’s ascension to the presidency, Khamene’i may have decided it was time to implement his plan.
The Purpose, Role, and Duties of the Council
In Iran, at least five institutions play a part in determining the direction of the country’s foreign policy. They include the Majles (the Iranian parliament); the State Expediency Council (responsible for determining the macro policies of the political system); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (responsible for developing and implementing day-to-day foreign policy decisions), the Supreme Council of National Security (SNSC, which includes senior leaders of the Revolutionary Guards, and is responsible for establishing fundamental defense and national security policies); and the new Strategic Council on Foreign Relations. [7]
Views of the new council’s role within this structure vary widely. Initial reporting on the council provided only vague indications of its responsibilities. An analysis made days after the new council was formed stated that the council is to “help global decision-making and to seek new horizons and scopes in the foreign relations of the Islamic republic and to make use of the opinion of experts in this domain.” [8] On July 2, 2006, a foreign ministry spokesman said, “This is a consultative council.” [9] On the same day, the state-run Tehran Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television reported that the new council would be primarily involved in political, economic, and cultural issues dealing with foreign policy. [10] Some outside analysts argued that the council would, “facilitate the country’s decision-making process, find new foreign policy approaches and make use of foreign policy experts, according to the decree,” implying a more direct role in actual policy-making. [11] However, officials within the SNSC, foreign ministry, and Majles apparently sought to confine the new council to an advisory role, so
as to limit its impact on their own policy-making authority. [12] A statement in early September by Mohammad Shari’atmadari, the chairman of the Strategic Council on Foreign Policy’s Economic Committee, seemed to create added uncertainty, suggesting that the council would focus on long-term issues, but would simultaneously have a role in “coordinating” Iranian foreign policy, suggesting a more direct involvement in policy-making:
The Supreme Leader has assigned the council three functions: 1) To produce strategies, policies and solutions that help achieve favorable results in foreign policy; 2) To review the dealings of the government and the private sector that concern foreign relations and compare them with the 20-Year Outlook [Iran’s long-term strategic economic plan] and report back to the leader from a long-term point of view of course; 3) To coordinate all activities pertaining to foreign relations with strategies that help achieve our goals. As you know, there are various sectors involved in foreign policy and it is extremely important to coordinate and guide their efforts. [13]
It is becoming clear that the council’s main audience will be the Supreme Leader. In an interview published October 18, 2006, in the Tehran daily Sharq, council member and former defense minister Ali Shamkhani pointed out that the council was set up exclusively by the order of the Supreme Leader and will present its reports to him directly. From there it is up to the Supreme Leader whether or not to take action: “If the grand leader so decides, he will give the suggestions to the related system [i.e., to appropriate Iranian officials].” [14]
A second explanation of the council’s intended role was that it was established specifically to assess and promote a domestic consensus on proposals then being offered by France, Germany, and Great Britain (the “EU-3”) and by Russia, under which, in return for suspending elements of its nuclear program that could provide access to weapons-grade nuclear materials, Iran would receive various benefits, such as access to nuclear power reactors and fuel manufactured abroad and entry into the World Trade Organization. [15] Subsequent events, however, made clear the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations would not have the opportunity to play this role: in late July, Iran declared it would not continue negotiations on these initiatives if the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, requiring the suspension of the country’s sensitive nuclear activities, a step the Council took on July 31, 2006, in passing Security Council Resolution 1696. Iran subsequently refused to comply with the resolution which called upon it to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities by August 31, 2006. With negotiations on the EU-3 and other proposals stalled (and the Security Council currently considering the imposition of economic sanctions), how the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations may contribute to Iran’s nuclear decision-making remains unclear.
It has also been speculated that Supreme Leader Khamene’i established the Strategic
Council on Foreign Relations as a means of
balancing President Ahmadinejad’s power (and, in the case of the nuclear question, that of Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief negotiator on nuclear matters). Although Khamene’i has expressed his support for Ahmadinejad since the latter came to office, Khamene’i has also made certain political decisions that indicate a distrust of the president’s domestic and foreign policy practices. For example, just after Ahmadinejad was inaugurated in mid-2005, the Supreme Leader ordered the Expediency Council to report to him on the performance of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, a step that will allow Khamene’i to monitor Ahmadinejad’s activities, as well as those of other governmental actors. [16] Complicating this relationship, Ahmadinejad shares foreign policy authority with the Supreme Leader. As president, Ahmadinejad appoints both Iran’s foreign minister and secretary of the Supreme Council of National Security, while the Supreme Council of National Security, itself, is under the direct control of the Supreme Leader, as are the armed forces and the decision to declare war. This division of responsibility may create an uneasy relationship, even though, in the view of some leading scholars, “It is still the Supreme Leader, not the president,
who directs the overall thrust of Iranian foreign policy.” [17] Khamene’i’s establishment of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations and his direction that it to report only to him might thus be a reflection of his distrust of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy-making and an effort by the Supreme Leader to reinforce his own authority. As one journalist for Worldpress.org wrote on July 18, 2006, “Some observers hope that the council will supplant the executive branch in foreign affairs.” [18]
Yet another theory regarding Khamene’i’s decision to establish the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations is that he sought to create a means by which to hold talks with the United States without involving current governing officials. Although he has publicly disavowed any interest in holding such talks with Washington, Khamene’i may believe that they will be necessary to resolve the current nuclear impasse. [19] The council, one analyst suggested in June, might be in a position to hold such talks, “away from the limelight that an official diplomatic delegation would attract.” [20]
Another view of the underlying purpose of the new council is that it was established to help build a national consensus to stand up to sanctions and other punitive measures, as the international community intensifies pressures on Iran to abandon elements of its nuclear program that could provide access to the materials needed for nuclear weapons. Rather than serving as a counter to Ahmadinejad, the council would serve as a means for encouraging more moderate political leaders to support Iran’s right to pursue all facets of what it claims are the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a position that has widespread popular support and to which Khamene’i, as well Ahmadinejad, appear firmly committed. [21]
Composition
The council is comprised of four former ministers, including Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Ali Shamkhani, and Mohammad Shari’atmadari, and a cleric, Mohammad Hosseyn Tarumi. The first three are considered moderates; the latter two, conservatives. [22]
Dr. Kamal Kharrazi heads the new council. He is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs under the moderate President Khatami and a recognized advocate of reformist policy. Kharrazi has extensive experience representing the Iranian government in the international community. He once served as Iran’s ambassador to the UN and had a hand in sending other moderate ambassadors to China, the United Kingdom, and the United States to further then President Khatami’s policy of détente. [23] He also plays a major role in the media. Apart from being president of the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency from 1980 to 1989, Kharrazi has made appearances on international news programs and at Western universities to comment on Iranian foreign policy. [24]
Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati was Iran’s Foreign Minister for 16 years in the governments of presidents Mir Hosseyn Mussavi and Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanji. Later during the Rafsanji administration, after leaving office as Foreign Minister, Dr. Velayati was appointed Advisor to the Supreme Leader in International Affairs. He is considered a moderate on policy matters and has experience that, in the
view of some observers, could make him an
effective participant in helping to steer Iran’s nuclear policy. [25]
Ali Shamkhani was previously Khatami’s defense minister and an ex-commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He was an influential commander, who broke ranks with his fellow generals in the IRGC to support Khatami, showing that the Guard Corps are not always united. He was a top commander in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, and at one time, albeit briefly, was placed in charge of the IRGC. Particularly noteworthy is Shamkhani’s role as advisor to ex-SNSC head, Hassan Rohani, and his other current position as director of Iran’s Center for Strategic Defense Studies, which deals extensively with Iran’s nuclear energy ventures. [26] (In late 2005, the center’s debut publication, National Interest, featured an interview with Dr. Rohani entitled “Peaceful Nuclear Activity and Our Constructive Interaction with the World.”) [27]
Mohammad Shari’atmadari was Iran’s
commerce minister through both terms of Khatami’s presidency. During his tenure, he appointed reformist deputies at the Ministry of Commerce, worked to expand trade relations with various countries, and began to lay the foundation for Iran to join the World Trade Organization.
Mohammad Hosseyn Tarumi (sometimes listed as “Taromi” or “Taremi-Rad”) is a member of the clergy. He studied at the Haqqani Seminary in Qom. During the era of Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, Tarumi served two terms as Iran’s ambassador to China and Saudi Arabia.
An observer writing in Sharq’s Analytical Reporting noted that the choice of the members of the council is similar to that of a complete cabinet, with a military figure (Shamkhani), an economic expert (Shari’atmadari), and a politico-cultural personality (Velayati). [28] Perhaps to satisfy others and to provide additional diplomatic insight, the Supreme Leader also added Mohammad Tarumi to the council. Another assessment of the council noted that, “The cumulative experience of this council surpasses that of the youthful and inexperienced foreign policy team under President Ahmadinejad.” [29]
The Council’s Organizational Position in the Government Structure
Available sources do not disclose the exact position of the council within the
Iranian government’s organizational structure.
However, as noted earlier, it was established by the Supreme Leader, and various officials have commented that the council provides its reports directly to him. This might indicate that it is directly subordinated to the Supreme Leader, independent of all other organizations, and perhaps only serving and influencing Ayatollah Khamene’i.
Whatever its formal relationship to other Iranian government organizations, its members are apparently seeking to avoid confrontation. This year, during the month of Ramadan (September 23, 2006 through October 22, 2006), the council met with officials from the government ministries of interior, foreign affairs, commerce, Islamic culture and guidance, intelligence, and roads and transportation, and with the director of the planning and budget organization to exchange views about the intentions, goals, and methods of their interactions with the council. In addition, Shamkhani has emphasized in a number of statements that the Strategic Council on Foreign Policy will not contest the power of the executive branch of government, stating for example, that “Parallel work [between the council and the government] will cause alienation and negative competition [which will] diminish the nation’s potential and capabilities.” [30] This may be seen as a way to alleviate any concerns that government officials may have, and perhaps obtain their cooperation regarding the council’s work and role in governing. [31]
A recent article in E’temad-e Melli provided insights into the operations of the new council and its function within government. According to the publication, the council holds regular weekly meetings and has developed committees that meet with officials from the government organizations mentioned above, perhaps to obtain a better understanding of these organizations’ strategic concerns. In addition, the council has developed an organization that will interact with universities and other centers of learning to “take maximum advantage of the existing knowledge in the
society.” [32]
The Nuclear Question
Confusion remains over how the Strategic
Council on Foreign Policy fits into Iran’s
management of the nuclear issue. In a recent interview, Shamkhani explained the role of the council, emphasizing that it does not make decisions about “everyday issues” on the nuclear agenda; rather, it is meant to focus on Iran’s long-term nuclear strategies. He went on to say, “ ‘The future Iran’ is the most important issue on the Strategic Council of Foreign Relations’ agenda.” [33] Another report explained that “regarding the issues of the day, such as the nuclear issue, decisions are made in the related organizations; but when the nuclear strategy of the Islamic Republic is within a framework beyond the routine, such as beyond the Security Council and 5+1, the Council will deal with it.” [34] (The 5+1 are the five permanent members of the Security Council – China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States – and Germany.) Some suggest the new Iranian council will operate on a level even more removed from policy making, interacting mainly “at the level of the universities and the society.” [35]
Conclusion
Even after four months of operation, during
which Iran’s confrontation with the international community over its nuclear program has intensified, it is difficult to determine the new council’s role and assess what influence it may be exerting. For the moment, it appears to be playing only an advisory role with respect to long-term strategic matters, suggesting that Ahmadinejad has successfully isolated it from participating more directly in Iranian foreign affairs. As the confrontation between Iran
and the international community continues,
however, it is possible that Khamene’i will turn to the council for a more balanced, experienced voice on handling the crisis than the heated and more nationalistic advice he can expect from Ahmadinejad. It is also possible that the council could serve as a “back-channel” conduit for communications with the West, if the Supreme Leader decides it is time for a compromise. Whether the council will gain influence of this kind or fade into obscurity remains to be seen.
Jack Boureston -- FirstWatch International (FWI)
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 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “Iran Nuclear Highlights, 28 Jun 06,” OSC Report FEA20060705024883, June 28, 2006.
[2] “Selection List -- Persian Press Menu via Internet,18 Oct 06,” OSC document IAP20061018011007, October 18, 2006.
[3] Bill Samii, “Iran: Foreign Policy Council Could Curtail Ahmadinajad’s Power,” RFE/RL, June 29, 2006, [http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/ae0c686d-4809-4809-4f2d-938e-883f0ff6714.html].
[4] “The Unsaid Things About the Formation of the Foreign Policy Strategic Council,” Tehran Mardom-Salari, June 29, 2006, OSC document IAP20060629950047.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Khatereh Vatankhah and Behnaz Sadeqpur, “The Missions of the Foreign Relations Council,” Tehran Sharq, September 6, 2006, p. 1, OSC document 13IAP20060908011005.
[7] Mohammad Reza Sardari, “Some Speculations about the Strategic Council,” Tehran Sharq, July 3, 2006, OSC document IAP20060705950011.
[8] “Sharq’s Analytical Report Regarding Composition and Status of Iran’s Foreign Affairs Strategic Council; The Return of Moderates to Foreign Policy,” Tehran Sharq, June 27, 2006, pp. 1, 2, OSC document IAP20060702011001.
[9] “FYI-Iran: Foreign Ministry Says Foreign Affairs Council Has Consultative Role,” Tehran Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television , July 2, 2006.
[10] “FYI -- Iran: Foreign Ministry Says Foreign Affairs Council Has Consultative Role,” Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN), July 2, 2006, OSC document IAP20060702950023.
[11] See source in [3].
[12] See sources in [8] and [10].
[13] Khatereh Vatankhah and Behnaz Sadeqpur, “The Missions of the Foreign Relations Council,” Tehran Sharq, September 6, 2006, pp. 1, OSC document 13IAP20060908011005.
[14] Ibid.
[15] See source in [7]; “Better Carrots, Not Centrifuges: Why Iran Must Halt Enrichment and How the U.S. Can Make It Happen ,” David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, Institute for Science and International Security, July 10, 2006.
[16] See source in [3].
[17] “Iran After the Election: A Long-Term Perspective”, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, June 28, 2005, http://www.brook.edu/fp/saban/events/20050628.htm. [View Article]
[18] Niusha Boghrati, “President Ahmadinejad’s First Year,” Worldpress.org, July 18, 2006, http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/2417.cfm. [View Article]
[19] See source in [3].
[20] Ibid.
[21] See source in [7].
[22] Dr. Farhang Jahanpour,“ Iran’s Nuclear Threat: Exploring the Politics,” Oxford Research Group, June 2006, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/IransNuclearThreat.htm. [View Article]
[23] “Sharq’s Analytical Report Regarding Composition and Status of Iran’s Foreign Affairs Strategic Council; The Return of Moderates to Foreign Policy,” Tehran Sharq, June 27, 2006, pp. 1,2, OSC document IAP20060702011001.
[24] “Biography of H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs”, Salam Iran, 1998, http://www.salamiran.org/IranInfo/State/Government/Foreign/kharazi.html. [View Article]
[25] Ibid.
[26] “Iran: Admiral Says Will Cause Any Striking Force to Pay Heavily for Attack,”Tehran E’temad, June 8, 2006, OSC document IAP20060615950002.
[27] “Peaceful Nuclear Activity and Our Constructive Interaction with the World: An Interview with Dr. Hassan Rohani,” National Interest, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 2005.
[28] “Iran Nuclear Highlights, 28 Jun 06,” OSC Report FEA20060705024883, June 28, 2006.
[29] See source in [3].
[30] Ibid.
[31] “Strategic Council on Foreign Relations Agenda: The Future Iran”, E’temad-e Melli, October 18, 2006, OSC document IAP20061019513003.
[32] Ibid; see also source in [13].
[33] See source in [2].
[34] See source in [31].
[35] Ibid.
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