As the international community responds to the October 9, 2006, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear test, one country outside northeast Asia that may be significantly affected by the nuclear detonation is India -- one of the last states to test nuclear weapons (in 1998) prior to the DPRK. In particular, Indian analysts and the Indian press have expressed concern regarding the potential for the North Korean test to negatively impact the conclusion of the U.S.-Indian agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. That agreement is poised to grant India an exemption from the international rules prohibiting transfers of nuclear technology to states outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a treaty that India has never joined.
India reacted to the North Korean test by immediately condemning it, and pointing out differences between the manner in which India obtained its nuclear weapons capability and the secretive and clandestine means used by the DPRK – and Pakistan – to acquire their nuclear arsenals. While Pakistan also criticized Pyongyang’s decision to test as “regrettable,” there appeared to be little concern in the Pakistani press regarding possible repercussions of the event for Islamabad. Senior columnists in the Indian press, however, wrote extensively on its potential adverse impacts for New Delhi. [1]
Strong Indian Stand Against North Korean Test
Responding on the day of the North Korean detonation, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in a joint news conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in London, expressed India’s “deep concern” over the test. [2] Although, India has refused to join the NPT and has, in the past, criticized the Treaty as a discriminatory regime, Singh stressed that the test was, “a violation of [North Korea’s] international commitments,” and stated that, “a further erosion of the non-proliferation regime is not in our interest.”
In holding Pyongyang directly and solely accountable for the test and the resulting damage to the nonproliferation regime, India diverged from the stance of the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of which it is a prominent member. The group expressed concern regarding the test, but also asserted that the test, “underscores the need to work even more vigorously toward the movement’s goals of disarmament, including the elimination of nuclear weapons.” [3] While India has also been critical of the discriminatory nature of the NPT regime and historically has shared the NAM’s promotion of global nuclear disarmament, it refrained from making the linkage between the DPRK’s test and the stimulus for new states to acquire nuclear arms provided by the arsenals of the existing nuclear powers. [4] Moreover, by couching its condemnation, in part, on North Korea’s undermining of the non-proliferation regime, India also demonstrated its slow but unmistakable shift from a defiant nonproliferation-regime outlier country -- the status it reaffirmed when it tested nuclear weapons in 1998 -- to a country that seeks to uphold the integrity of the regime and perceives itself as benefiting from it. It remains to be seen, however, how far India will take its new attitude and, in particular, whether New Delhi will take as principled a pro-nonproliferation stand with respect to halting the Iranian nuclear program, as it has with North Korea, given the economic ties between India and Iran.
Limiting Impact on the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement
North Korea’s test came at a time when the U.S. Congress was considering legislation to implement the Joint Statement signed by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on July 18, 2005, which would end a decades-long embargo on U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with New Delhi and pave the way for the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to end a similar embargo imposed in 1992. By causing the international community to condemn and stigmatize the entrance of another state into the small group of countries possessing nuclear weapons beyond the five original “Nuclear Weapon States” recognized by the NPT, a group of late arrivals that includes India, the North Korean test inevitably undercuts New Delhi’s efforts to legitimize itself as an accepted nuclear-weapon power. [5]
In an October 11, 2006, Op-Ed in the Hindu, Siddharth Varadarajan made the point directly, arguing that, “Pyongyang’s test of a nuclear weapon has immensely complicated India’s quest for assimilation in the existing nuclear order.” [6] Writing two days earlier, former Indian diplomat M.K. Bhradrakumar detailed some of these complications, positing that, because of the DPRK test, “The likelihood is that the nuclear non-proliferation lobby in the U.S. which opposes the [U.S.-India] nuclear deal will get a further fillip.” [7] Bhradrakumar further asserted that the challenge from North Korea will limit the Bush
Administration’s ability to push the deal through the U.S. Congress. He therefore called for India to harmonize its stance on North Korea with that of the United States in order stave off criticism of India from non-proliferation advocates. Similarly, other Indian press accounts have expressed the fear that in light of heightened proliferation concerns following the test, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) may be unwilling to approve changes in its rules sought by the United States to permit nuclear trade with India. [8]
In order to allay Indian fears regarding any hindrance the North Korean test might pose for the U.S.-India deal, on October 12, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns reaffirmed the Bush Administration’s commitment to carrying out the agreement with India, drawing sharp distinctions between India and North Korea:
India is a peaceful, democratic, law-abiding leader of the international community. North Korea is the reverse of all that, and so there is great trust in commitments that the Indian government made to us will be fulfilled and we are very confident that the India deal will be approved by a substantial margin [in the U.S. Senate]. [9]
This distinction between India and North Korea was also made by other countries that have been supportive of opening nuclear trade with India. During his October 9 press conference with Prime Minister Singh, Prime Minister Blair, for example, highlighted that, “[The North Koreans] are in very clear breach of their international obligations and whereas a country like India has been very strong on counter-proliferation, North Korea is going in the opposite direction.” [10] Likewise, when asked whether Pyongyang’s test may have an adverse effect on India’s civil nuclear cooperation with the international community, French ambassador to New Delhi, Dominique Girard, asserted that India and North Korea could not be compared. On the contrary, Girard suggested that the test may highlight distinctions between the two countries, commenting, “What the [North Korean test] can do is to enhance the perception that India has a perfectly clean behavior.” [11]
Such differences between North Korea’s behavior as a proliferation concern and India’s more responsible adherence to non-proliferation norms were also underlined when India tested its intermediate-range Agni III ballistic missile five days after North Korea’s July 5, 2006 (local time) test of its 5,000-6,000 kilometer range Taepodong II missile, prompting analysts and policymakers to compare the strategic implications of the two tests and their perpetrators. (See “India’s Agni III Missile Test Makes Few Waves Abroad, More at Home,” in the September 2006 issue of WMD Insights.) From these two cases, it appears that there is a growing willingness on the part of some countries to respond to the development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery on the basis of the actor undertaking the development, rather than on the basis the capability itself. It is not yet clear what impact this reorientation may have on the various WMD nonproliferation regimes, which are focused on the inherent destructiveness of certain types of weapons.
“Clandestine Proliferators:” India Highlights DPRK-Pakistan Link
As India and several friendly states sought to distance India’s track record on proliferation from that of North Korea, Indian officials and analysts also responded to Pyongyang’s test by calling attention to the linkages and similarities regarding proliferation between North Korea and Pakistan. This connection was first implied by Prime Minister Singh during his condemnation of the DPRK test. Noting that the test demonstrated the threats posed by clandestine proliferation, he added that, “In fact India’s own security has suffered due to clandestine proliferation linkages relating from our neighbors.” [12] A senior official accompanying Prime Minister Singh in the UK made this connection more explicit, stating, “Our immediate concern relates to this association with Pakistan.” [13] As Siddarth Varadarajan remarked in his October 11 Op-Ed, “The one silver lining Indian diplomats have latched on to is the ‘Pakistani connection’ to North Korea’s ‘clandestine’ status….” [14]
The association referred to is that between Pakistan’s extensive and well-documented reliance on nuclear smuggling during the 1980s to support its own nuclear weapons program and the subsequent sharing of Pakistani nuclear technology with North Korea via a parallel nuclear smuggling network set up by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. That network (which also supplied Libya and Iran) operated secretly for some fifteen years, before being exposed. In effect, New Delhi was reproaching North Korea for using underhanded means (as Pakistan had done) to advance its nuclear weapons program, as distinct from the presumably more above-board and acceptable means that India claims to have employed. (In fact, India has also resorted to nuclear smuggling to support its program, though to a considerably lesser degree than Pakistan.) [15]
Indian analysts have also sought to differentiate India from other states of proliferation concern, including Pakistan, on the grounds of their links to terrorist groups. C. Uday Bhaskar of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi argued that, “The further danger posed by North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan is that the nuclear know-how may fall into the hands of non-state players,” adding, “these are not issues in the case of India, and that is why its case stands on its own.” [16] Other Indian analysts asserted that the U.S. failure to address clandestine Pakistani and Chinese support for North Korea’s nuclear weapon program emboldened Pyongyang. Naresh Chandra, India’s ambassador to Washington at the time of India’s 1998 nuclear tests, argued:
Pakistan got off lightly even after the A.Q. Khan network was exposed. The U.S. believed their version of the story and they were let off easily.... There was also a bit of a cover up when China helped Pakistan and North Korea with nuclear and weapons technology and the U.S. turned a blind eye to this. Perhaps North Korea thinks the U.S. will look the other way again. [17]
Conclusions
By immediately condemning the North Korean nuclear test and drawing attention to the linkages between North Korea and Pakistan, India has
aligned itself with the major powers and the nonproliferation regime, deflected potential questions regarding the wisdom of the U.S.-India deal, and simultaneously put pressure on Pakistan by holding it partially responsible for North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability. Judging from reactions so far, it appears that India’s strategy is enjoying a degree of success and that the DPRK’s test may have little impact on the U.S.-India deal. The U.S. Congress, which has been in recess since September 29, 2006, pending the November 7
U.S. Congressional elections, will not act on legislation to implement the new U.S.-India nuclear relationship until it reconvenes in mid-November.
Peter Crail—Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “Pakistan Condemns Korea Nuke Test,” BBC News, October 9, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6032843.stm. [View Article]
[2] “Press Conference with Prime Minister of India,” Press Conference Transcript, Office of the Prime Minister, United Kingdom, http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10184.asp. [View Article]
[3] Non-Aligned Nations Ask Moderation on N Korea,” Channel News Asia, October 14, 2006, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/235439/1/.html. [View Article]
[4] A detailed explanation of India’s motivations to test in 1998 and its position on the NPT can be found in: “Brief on India’s Nuclear Tests,” Ministry of External Affairs, Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division, http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclear/briefonnucleartests.htm. [View Article]
[5] The five NPT nuclear weapon states are those that had detonated a nuclear explosion before January 1, 1967, namely (in order of their first tests): the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), Great Britain, France, and China. The treaty seeks to halt proliferation beyond these five states. India detonated its first nuclear device in 1974, which it termed a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” It formally declared its possession of nuclear weapons after its next nuclear tests, which occurred in May 1998. Pakistan, along with India and, now, North Korea, has declared its possession of nuclear weapons, and Israel is widely assumed to possess them. None is a party to the NPT, although the legal status of North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty in January 2003, at a time when it was in violation of the pact, remains unsettled.
[6] Siddharth Varadarajan, “For India, North Korea’s Test Poses Key Challenge,” The Hindu, October 11, 2006, http://www.thehindu.com/2006/10/11/stories/2006101101751100.htm. [View Article]
[7] M. K. Bhradrakumar, “North Korea May Hit India-US N-Deal,” Rediff India Abroad, October 9, 2006, http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/oct/09korea4.htm. [View Article]
[8] Aloke Tikku and Nilova Roy Choudhary, “Pak Link in N Korea Test Worrisome: India,” Hindustan Times, October 9, 2006, http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1816216,0008.htm. [View Article]
[9] “US Administration ‘Determined’ to Push Through Nuke Deal,” Daily News & Analysis, October 12, 2006, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1058137. [View Article]
[10] See Source in [2].
[11] “North Korean Test Can Prove Helpful to India,” IndiaExpress.com, October 17, 2006, http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=75678. [View Article]
[12] See Source in [2].
[13] See Source in [8].
[14] See Source in [6].
[15] See, e.g., “Testimony of David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security,” before the House International Relations Committee, October 26, 2005, http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/alb102605.pdf; [View Article] David Albright and Susan Basu, “Neither a Determined Proliferator Nor a Responsible Nuclear State: India’s Record Needs Scrutiny,” Institute for Science and International Security, April 5, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/indiacritique.pdf.
[View Article] Khan transferred technology for enriching uranium to weapons grade to North Korea. It is not known whether Pyonyang has succeeded is producing nuclear weapons material with this technology. The device used in its nuclear test relied upon plutonium, the second material that has been used as the core of a nuclear weapon, which is produced using different technology which appears to have been largely developed by North Korea, indigenously. Thus while it is accurate to say that Pakistani technology is contributing to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, any implication in New Delhi’s comments suggesting that the Khan network (and, by inadvertence or design, Pakistan) contributed directly to the October 9, 2006, North Korean test would not be well founded.
[16] Parsa Venkateshwar Rao, “Expert Justifies Delhi Stand on N. Korea,” Gulfnews.com, October 16, 2006, http://archive.gulfnews.com/world/India/10075181.html. [View Article]
[17] “N Korea Test More Worrying than Indo-Pak Blasts: Analysts,” Daily Times, Pakistan, October 10, 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2006%5C10%5C10%5Cstory_10-10-2006_pg7_20. [View Article]
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