Morocco’s plans to build a nuclear power program, first announced in April 2006, appeared to take an important step forward in early September during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Rabat. In the course of that visit, a spokesman for Russia’s nuclear export agency, AtomStroyExport, declared that Russia would bid on a contract to build Morocco’s first nuclear power station. [1] The development adds to a rapidly changing nuclear situation in the Middle East, where Iran is pursuing a nuclear program with the potential to produce nuclear weapons, Egypt has recently announced plans to reactivate its nuclear power program, and Turkey is accelerating a similar nuclear power initiative. (See “Renewed Egyptian Ambitions for a Peaceful Nuclear Program,” and
“U.S. – Turkey Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Stirs Debate in Turkey, Sets Benchmarks for Anticipated U.S. – India Nuclear Accord,” in the November issue of WMD Insights.)

While nuclear developments in Egypt and Turkey appear to be at least partially a response to Iran’s nuclear advances, Morocco’s decision appears to be guided more by domestic energy needs than by such strategic considerations. Indeed, as the westernmost Arab country, Morocco has largely been insulated by distance from the repercussions of the rivalries in the Persian Gulf, as well as from Arab-Israeli tensions. Nonetheless, competition with Algeria for leadership and prestige in Northern Africa may have been an unstated factor in Morocco’s nuclear decision-making. Algeria launched a nuclear program with ambiguous goals in the late 1980s. Although Algeria allayed international concerns by subsequently joining the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), its program may remain a source of residual concern for Rabat.

In the last six years, Morocco’s relations with Russia have grown substantially. The new relationship was launched in 2000, when the two countries established a political consultation mechanism that has served as the framework for expanded bilateral cooperation. The new links are part of a broader international campaign by Moscow to spread “Russia’s reach beyond its traditional Soviet-era partners.” [2] Morocco and Russia have exchanged visits of numerous business delegations focusing on tourism, industry, and technology-related investments in Morocco, and the two states have signed a number of trade agreements, including a February 2002 agreement “on technical cooperation in matters of fisheries.” [3] By opening new business opportunities for Russia, Morocco may be seeking to offset the legacy of close Soviet-Algerian ties, which has led Russia to support Algeria on the issue of Western Sahara, the former Spanish colony claimed by Morocco where Algeria is said to support an indigenous independence movement. Indeed, in early 2002,

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared that “Russia will be using the high level of its relations with both Algeria and Morocco to contribute to settling” the issue. [4] The initial phase of Morocco-Russia bilateral cooperation culminated with the visit of Moroccan King Mohammed VI to Moscow in October 2002.
Putin’s September 2006 visit to Rabat, in addition to advancing nuclear ties between the two states, also included the signing of a series of agreements on subjects including banking, the treatment of returned prisoners, fisheries, and cultural exchanges, as well as the establishment of a joint business council, which will take charge of strengthening economic cooperation and trade exchanges between the two countries. The wide range of new understandings highlighted the growing links between the two states in recent years. [5]

The adequacy of electricity supplies has been a major concern for Moroccan industries. While Morocco has not experienced repeated blackouts, local production of electricity has not been able to keep pace with increasing domestic demand, which is growing at a rate of eight percent annually. This has forced Morocco to import electricity from Algeria and Spain. The use of nuclear energy for electricity production is attractive because the Kingdom lacks alternative domestic energy resources. Despite intensive oil exploration efforts, for example, no major oil resources have been found in the country, and currently Morocco must import oil from the Persian Gulf and Russia. [6] Indeed, as one analyst noted in Middle East Newsline, “Moroccan energy spending lies behind 50 percent of its trade deficit.” [7]

With such a burden on its economy, Morocco sees a nuclear program as an efficient means for reducing energy costs and achieving further diversification of its energy supplies. Highlighting the importance of this option shortly after Putin’s visit, the Director of the Moroccan National Bureau of Electricity, Youness Maamar, noted, “The nuclear option is now part of our investment program. The decision has been taken but it takes a very long time for a nuclear project to get under way.” [8] Moulay Abdellah Alaoui, president of the Moroccan Energy Federation, echoed this view stating that, “The nuclear option is vital for a country like ours. It will allow us cheap energy and will put us among the most competitive countries.” [9] Morocco hopes to bring its first nuclear power station on line in 2016. Currently, Morocco’s nuclear program consists of a small (two megawatt (MW)) U.S.-supplied research reactor, which is undergoing commissioning at Marmora Center for Nuclear Studies near Rabat. In the late 1990s, China and Morocco reached an advanced stage of negotiation for the construction of a 10MW nuclear reactor at Tan-Tan on Morocco’s Atlantic Coast to be used to desalinate water for agricultural purposes, but the project has been delayed because of environmental concerns. [10]

For the moment, Morocco appears interested only in acquiring a modern nuclear power plant, for which fuel would presumably be purchased abroad. Thus, unlike Iran, it has not indicated any intention to develop nuclear facilities for enriching uranium or for the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, technologies which can support a civil nuclear power program, but can also provide access to nuclear weapon material. Because Morocco has been a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT since 1970, all nuclear activities on its territory, including any nuclear power plants it may build and their fuel, would be placed under the accounting and inspection system (“safeguards”) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Morocco has also worked with the IAEA to develop the legal framework for regulating domestic nuclear energy activities. [11] In addition, Morocco is among the few Arab countries that have traditionally enjoyed strong ties with the West, and with the United States, in particular. These factors suggest that Morocco’s decision to acquire a nuclear power plant will not raise significant proliferation concerns in Washington.

Given Morocco’s long-standing rivalry with Algeria, however, it is possible that the former’s emerging nuclear energy program has the unstated goal of providing a counterweight to Algeria’s nuclear program. That program, centered around two research reactors (rated at 15 MW and 1 MW), has been active since the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, before Algeria had joined the NPT, its secret acquisition of the larger reactor from China raised suspicions because of fears that the unit might be intended to support the development of nuclear weapons. [12] Although these concerns were eased when Algeria placed the reactor under IAEA safeguards and then, in 1995, joined the NPT, rumors of questionable activities within Algeria’s nuclear program have resurfaced as recently as 2004. [13]

While it is not known whether such rumors may have contributed to Morocco’s decision to pursue a nuclear power program, for the moment the Moroccan initiative appears to have exclusively peaceful intentions. The interplay between the two states’ nuclear activities, however, is a subject that will deserve continued attention.

Sammy Salama – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies