In 2007, South Africa will serve as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and will also serve as Chair of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). A staunch advocate of the right of all states to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, South Africa joins the Security Council as the body is considering how to enforce unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 1696, demanding that Iran suspend work on certain sensitive nuclear activities that Tehran claims it is pursuing for peaceful ends. As chair of the NSG, South Africa will lead the group responsible for developing and implementing nuclear export control rules that many developing states believe improperly curtail their access to nuclear technology; South Africa will also be leading the group as it weighs whether to end its 14-year nuclear trade embargo against India.

This article examines the central nonproliferation challenge South Africa can expect to confront as it joins the Security Council. The next issue of WMD Insights (February 2007) will explore the questions it will likely face as Chair of the NSG.

In October 2006, South Africa was elected to assume a two-year seat on the 15-member Security Council, beginning January 1, 2007, thereby granting it the ability to influence the body’s consideration of issues related to international peace and security, including nuclear proliferation. A senior South African government official noted that South Africa’s seat “will be a nonpermanent seat and the permanent five [China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States] obviously set the agenda, but this is in many ways the opportunity of a lifetime for South Africa to show what it can do.” [1]

According to one South African analyst, this opportunity represents a double-edged sword. On the one hand, he observes, South African officials “are regarding this as a rare opportunity to prove [South Africa’s] foreign policy mettle, which mainly means helping the South.” [2] However, he adds, “The danger may
be that, in defining its global positions more clearly, SA [South Africa] alienates some of its friends in the North without making any real impact on the outcome of Security Council decisions.” Given the likelihood that the issue of Iran’s nuclear program will still remain before the Council at the beginning of the year, South Africa will likely need to determine how to promote its goals and those of Africa, which it will represent, without rapidly alienating key states in the North, particularly if it continues to posture itself for a permanent seat on the Council, which will need the latter states’ approval.

South Africa has clearly drawn the line against Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, given South African President Thabo Mbeki’s statement that there should be “no nuclear weapons for Iran, absolutely.” [3] This stand is consistent with the credibility that South Africa has established regarding nuclear nonproliferation, as evidenced in its selection to be chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2007, and South Africa can be expected to support efforts to maintain this red line against Iran becoming a nuclear power.

However, South Africa’s approach to finding solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue are likely to diverge from current efforts by the United States and EU to impose strict sanctions on Iran to enforce Resolution 1696. For example, during a May 2006 meeting of the foreign ministers of the 118-developing nation Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Malaysia, South African Deputy Foreign Minister Sue van der Merwe highlighted her country’s close cooperation with Iran and reiterated South Africa’s long-standing defense of the right of states to develop nuclear technology, stating, “South Africa’s approach to Iran is based on support for its nuclear issue and right to access nuclear energy for peaceful use.” [4] She added that South Africa hopes that the issue “will be settled diplomatically and within the framework of IAEA,” a reminder of South Africa’s previous reluctance to refer the issue from the IAEA Board of Governors to the Security Council in February 2006. (South Africa abstained when the matter came to a vote at the IAEA Board. See “Non-Aligned Realigning to Confront Iran,” in the March 2006 Issue of WMD Insights.)

Moreover, South Africa appears unlikely to support the imposition of harsh sanctions on Iran for failing to suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, arguing that such a suspension is a voluntary confidence-building measure and not a legal obligation. Thus, it is possible that it will align with Russia and China, which have favored limited punitive measures to obtain Iranian compliance with Resolution 1696, rather than with the United States, which has pressed for stronger and more comprehensive measures.

According to South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, “Although South Africa recognizes the importance of confidence-building measures, South Africa has, together with members of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as other [IAEA] board [of governors] members, including Russia and China, continually emphasized the importance of distinguishing between the legal obligations of Iran (the implementation of its safeguards agreement with the agency) and the voluntary confidence-building measures that Iran has adopted to demonstrate its good faith....” [5] Given that the matter currently pending before the Security Council is how to enforce Resolution 1696, which “demanded” that Iran cease its development of proliferation sensitive uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities (because its past failure to disclose some of them to the IAEA has created doubts regarding their peaceful nature), it appears that South Africa will confront difficult decisions on this issue.

The apparent bolstering of relations between South Africa and Iran may also make it unlikely for South Africa to agree to significant punitive measures against Tehran. During meetings between South African President Thabo Mbeki and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2006, both emphasized the importance of strengthening ties between the two countries. [6] These ties have already been marked by significant increases in bilateral trade over the last two years, with a 13.5 million rand (1.9 million USD) trade imbalance in Iran’s favor, primarily due to South Africa’s imports of Iranian oil. [7]

While South Africa’s defense of the right of states to pursue nuclear technology and its growing ties to Iran make it more disposed to argue against tough sanctions, its strong committment to nonproliferation means that its position will depend on Iran’s actions as well. It has been South Africa’s position that it is “the special responsibility of States owning the capability that could be used to develop nuclear weapons to build confidence with the international community that would remove any concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation.” [8] Therefore, in light of Iran’s desire to develop nuclear fuel cycle capabilities which could be used for a nuclear weapons program, South Africa can be expected to defend Iran’s access to proliferation-sensitive technologies only as long as Iran takes no further actions contrary to NPT rules and the IAEA does not find evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Conclusion
South Africa will have to continue to strike a balance between supporting the right of all nations to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, while working to stop the progress of those that would use these technologies for the development of nuclear weapons. The Security Council position that South Africa assumes next year will be a significant test of South Africa’s ability to find this balance and it is clear that Pretoria hopes to use its new position to bridge differences among the Council’s other members. Given its stature, South Africa’s stance on nonproliferation issues will likely have significant influence on the way serious nuclear proliferation challenges will be addressed in the near future.

Jack Boureston and Jennifer Lacey, FirstWatch International and Peter Crail, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies