 The international community closely observed the November 7, 2006, U.S. mid-term elections, in which the Democratic Party gained a majority in both chambers of the U.S. Congress after twelve years in the minority. Many foreigners perceived the change in the political balance in Washington as having a direct bearing on future U.S. nonproliferation policies, and a number of states are watching to see whether the change will cause the Republican Bush Administration to modify its tactics for halting Iran’s development of sensitive nuclear facilities and addressing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
Although a diversity of views can be seen in foreign commentary, the dominant theme in these
analyses was the likelihood that pressure from the Democratic Congress would lead the Bush Administration to adopt diplomatic approaches towards Iran and North Korea focused more heavily on bargaining with and engaging the two states, rather than on confronting and isolating them. Many of these analyses also saw the Democrats’ focus on diplomacy as preventing, or at least significantly lessening, the prospect of the United States resorting to military action in support of its nonproliferation goals.
India is following developments in Washington with a somewhat different focus: it is watching to see whether the U.S. elections will lead to changes in the U.S.-India nuclear deal. That deal, based on the Joint Statement signed by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005, would end a decades-long U.S. and international embargo on civil nuclear trade with New Delhi.
Iran
Iranian officials reacted with guarded satisfaction at the elections’ results, which raised expectations that the United States would adopt a more
conciliatory approach in dealing with bilateral issues, including the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program. Speaking on November 10, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamane’i, declared, “The winning of the Democrats in the U.S. elections is not solely a domestic event in America. It means the failure of the pro-war and aggressive policies of the President of America.” [1]
On the same day, Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and the country’s top nuclear negotiator, implied that the elections could make Washington more ready to pursue negotiations with Iran in this area; negotiations are currently blocked because of U.S. insistence that, as a precondition for talks, Iran must first suspend the most sensitive elements of its nuclear program. Larijani stated, “Some Democrats have a more logical approach towards Iran’s peaceful nuclear issue.” But he also noted that the Democrats were themselves divided on this question. [2]
Mohsen Reza’i, the current Secretary of the Expediency Council (responsible for determining the macro policies of the Iranian political system), was somewhat more cautious. He told reporters, also on November 10, that, “The American type of democracy has returned to that country. But it is not clear how much it will affect the foreign policy of America.” [3] He went on to declare that Iran’s nuclear program will proceed as planned and stated his expectation that Russia and China will be able to moderate the resolution currently being negotiated in the UN Security Council, intended to pressure Iran to suspend sensitive aspects of its nuclear activities. [4]
In a contemporaneous report, the Guardian (London) quoted a former senior Iranian diplomat who is close to Iran’s theocratic leadership as stating that with the elections and subsequent resignation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the United States will be less likely to use military force against Iran because of a perceived “decline of legitimacy” of the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, and because of the removal of one of the most vocal hawks in the Administration and the increasing influence of “those favoring diplomacy.” [5] Others quoted by the paper stressed that the changes in Washington made the danger of U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear sites increasingly remote and noted the growing influence of those who may be more supportive of direct negotiations, such as Rumsfeld’s replacement, Robert Gates. [6]
Some independent Iranian analysts, however, thought little would change in U.S.-Iranian nuclear relations because the Democrats view the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program much the same as their Republican counterparts. [7] A similar view was apparently held by conservative Iranian political parties and the country’s religious leadership, who anticipated no tangible change in U.S. policy. They argued that because Democrats support Israel as strongly as Republicans, they would act in a similar manner where Iran was concerned. However, as an editorial in the Iranian paper Keyhan pointed out:
The victory of the Democrats in America’s election was very good news, not because the Democrats are better than the Republicans, but because it will create tensions in the American system. When the Americans don’t have problems inside their country, they create problems for other countries, so it is very good if they bite each other for a while. [8]
By November 14, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appeared to conclude that the outcome of the U.S. elections would strengthen Iran’s ability to pursue its nuclear ambitions by leading the United States to moderate its opposition to this effort. Declaring that, “… time is completely running in our favor in terms of diplomacy,” he announced that by March 2007, Iran would install 3,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges, technology potentially able to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. [9] The recent election results in the United States, he said, “marked the failure of U.S. policies, based on imposition of its will on others, [and] support for bullying, plunder, unilateralism and humiliating other governments.” [10]
Israel
Israeli analysts appear to have immediately concluded that the Democrats’ victory could create the appearance abroad that the United States would be less likely to take forceful action to halt the Iranian nuclear program. Israeli analyst Alon Pinkas, quoted two days after the U.S. elections, stated, “The President’s ability to do anything militarily in terms of Iran has been somewhat diminished as a result of the Democratic victory, because the Democrats will be much more vigilant that the president does not do anything
unilateral.” [11]
The Israeli government reacted swiftly to offset Iranian perceptions that the elections might weaken U.S. resolve on the nuclear issue and sought to shore up the credibility of past threats that military force might be used to halt the Iranian program. On November 9, 2006, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh released a statement declaring that Israel had not ruled out military action against Iran, a point that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert reiterated several days later, following talks in Washington with President Bush. [12] Iran immediately responded, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammed Ali Hosseini declaring that Iran would destroy Israel if it mounted any such military strike. [13]
North Korea (DPRK)
The DPRK reacted neutrally to the change of power in Congress. A broadcast by North Korea’s state-controlled television stated that “irrespective of the final election results, the results will not be able to eliminate ill will and distrust, which precisely describes today’s American politics.” [14] The report went on to suggest that Pyongyang saw the political developments as making consensus more difficult to achieve in Washington, and thus possibly weakening the ability of the United States to
advance its nonproliferation objectives effectively.
A separate report posted on the official North Korean news agency website ridiculed the response to the elections by the opposition South Korean Grand National Party, which has strongly objected to the South Korean government’s policy of engagement with the DPRK. The North Korean report declared that the Grand National Party was “grieving” at the Republicans’ losses and had convened a “Supreme Council meeting” to decry the possibility that a “North-U.S. dialogue will be held, and [that] the sanctions against the North will be lifted” as a result of the U.S. mid-term elections.
South Korea
Although the South Korean media did not carry a report of such activity by the Grand National Party as described above, television and Internet postings took the view that the changes in Washington, including the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld, would lead the Bush Administration to adopt less aggressive measures towards North Korea. [15] In a similar vein, one newspaper report emphasized statements from Democratic Party leaders, such as Congressman Tom Lantos (expected to become chairman of the House International Relations Committee) and former President Bill Clinton, both
of whom have favored direct talks with North Korea
and offers of financial incentives in exchange for Pyongyang’s abandonment of its missile and nuclear programs. [16]
The Korea Herald, which generally supports the policies of the current South Korean government, reported, however, that it was unlikely the United States would offer a similar incentives package to that which it provided under the 1994 “Agreed
Framework,” even with the Democrats controlling Congress. [17] (Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze its plutonium production capabilities and to eventually allow intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in return for receiving two large nuclear power reactors, to be completed following the inspections. The United States withdrew from the arrangement in 2002, after concluding that North Korea was secretly pursuing a second route to nuclear weapons based on the enrichment of uranium.)
Notwithstanding expectations that changes in Washington might lead to a revision in U.S. policy vis-à-vis the DPRK that might be more in line with the engagement-oriented approach of South Korean president Roh Moon-Hyun, no modification to the U.S. stance was noted publicly by the South Korean representative in talks held with the United States and Japan on November 15, 2006. The discussions took place on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Hanoi. [18]
Japan
The key question for Japanese analysts appeared to be whether the mid-term U.S. elections would weaken the underlying security relationship between Tokyo and Washington, the importance of which was underscored by North Korea’s October 9, 2006, nuclear test. Most Japanese coverage supported the view that defense ties with the United States would be unaffected, citing the assurances provided by the Bush Administration before and after the U.S. elections that U.S. security guarantees to Japan remained strong. [19] The possibility that the changes in Washington might bring alterations in U.S. policy towards North Korea received relatively little attention. Indeed, one analyst declared that a significant change of direction in this area would not be likely until after the 2008 U.S. presidential election. [20]
China
Chinese reactions to the results of the U.S. mid-term elections focused more on their potential impact on overall Sino-U.S. relations than on proliferation matters, although some Chinese analysts also predicted possible changes in U.S. policy toward North Korea. In particular, these observers believed that the Democratic-controlled Congress might pressure the Bush Administration to engage in more active diplomacy to resolve the nuclear issue. [21]
A Democratic-controlled Congress is also predicted to press harder on Beijing for reform in the areas of human rights, trade, and the valuation of Chinese currency at levels disadvantageous to U.S. exporters. Some Chinese analysts are already expressing concern that the elevation of California Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi could put the current bilateral relationship to a serious test given her past record as an ardent critic of China. (Representative Pelosi is the current House Minority Leader and has been chosen to lead the House of Representatives as Speaker beginning in January 2007.) These analysts fear that such strains could be exacerbated by the elevation of Congressman Tom Lantos, another China critic, to the chairmanship of the House Committee on International Affairs.
However, many expect that U.S. policy toward China will remain basically unchanged, in part because of the emerging common interests of the two countries in fighting global terrorism, addressing the North Korean nuclear weapons program,
and, to a lesser extent, working together to slow Iran’s nuclear advances. This group also believes that Pelosi can be expected to be more pragmatic and less ideological now that she is sharing in the governance of the United States, rather than speaking as a member of the opposition. Moreover, this group notes, although Bush has lost control
of Congress, as chief executive he will continue
to play the dominant role in crafting U.S. foreign policy, a factor fostering stability in U.S.-China relations. [22]
Western Europe and Russia
Typical coverage of the U.S. elections in Europe tended to focus on potential changes in U.S. policy regarding Iraq, rather than on nonproliferation. However, one repeated theme seen in European coverage, that the changes in Washington would likely lead
the Bush Administration to place greater reliance on multilateral approaches in its foreign policy, would be applicable to the area of nonproliferation. [23] Additionally, some European analysts noted that a Democratic Congress would be likely to increase criticism of Russia’s human rights record, a step that could damage U.S.-Russian relations at a time when Washington has been seeking
Russian support for intensified diplomatic pressure on Iran. [24]
Statements by Russian officials did not echo this concern, and generally assumed that bilateral relations would be unaffected by the Democrats’ victory. Nongovernmental experts, however, shared the view prevalent in Western Europe that Democrats are likely to pay considerably more attention to the issues of human rights and democracy in Russia, which would likely have a negative impact on overall US-Russian relations. [25] Another concern was that at least some ascendant figures in the Republican Party (Senator John McCain, in particular) are likely to take an equally tough approach toward Moscow. Overall, it was expected that the positive personal relationship developed between Presidents Bush and Putin would be of less relevance than in the past. [26]
Andrei Kokoshin, a well-known member of Russia’s lower house, the State Duma, noted, however, that the appointment of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense indicated the growing importance in the Republican Party of traditional conservative figures. In the past, Kokoshin noted, these individuals had “usually demonstrated attention to the problems of ensuring strategic stability on a mutual basis.” The phrase seemed to refer to traditional approaches to strategic arms control through treaties that tried to carefully balance U.S. and Russian nuclear forces so as to foster crisis stability. By implication, he appeared to be suggesting that the Bush Administration might become more open to approaches to arms control treaties that rely on detailed undertakings and elaborate verification provisions. [27] In its first six years, the Bush Administration had shunned this approach in favor of simpler agreements that could be quickly negotiated, such as the 2003 Treaty of Moscow, which will reduce the operational strategic forces on each side to between 2200 and 1700 nuclear warheads by 2012.
India
 The key focus of analysts in South Asia was on whether the advent of a Congress controlled by Democrats would lead to significant changes in the terms of the U.S.-India nuclear deal. A November 8, 2006, analysis on the India Times website suggested that pending legislation to implement the deal would be passed by the Congress, but only after the leading Democrats made significant changes to it in the hopes of advancing their 2008 presidential bids. [28] Another analysis expressed the fear that the needed legislation might not pass in the brief time remaining before the current Congress ends its term in December 2006; this would necessitate starting the legislative process anew under
the Democratic-controlled Congress in 2007. [29] A statement by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs shared this pessimism, arguing that too little time remained for the current Congress to complete work on the legislation and that a Democratic-controlled Senate would press for additional changes and stall any progress. [30]
However, by mid-November, the U.S Senate had, in fact, passed the implementing legislation by a margin of 85 to 12, rejecting amendments by several Democratic members that might have made the final text unacceptable to India, which would have killed the deal. [31] A “conference committee” of members of both chambers must now reconcile the Senate-passed version of the legislation with the version previously adopted by the House of Representatives, and the reconciled law must then be adopted in both chambers. It is not clear whether this can be accomplished before the end of the current Congressional term.
Conclusions
The potential impact of the U.S. mid-term elections on U.S. nonproliferation goals appears to be most pronounced with respect to Iran, where the perception that the Bush Administration will be subject to new domestic political constraints may embolden Tehran to be more aggressive in its pursuit of sensitive nuclear technologies and more recalcitrant in its rejection of steps that would slow this program or open it to increased oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Israeli government appeared particularly concerned about this possibility and the perception that the U.S. elections made the use of military force to destroy Iranian nuclear sites increasingly unlikely.
In East Asia, some observers anticipated that U.S. efforts to isolate North Korea might be eased
infavor of a policy of more active engagement. However, with Pyongyang having agreed roughly a week prior to the U.S. elections to return to the Six Party talks on its nuclear program (which also include China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea), Washington was already giving increased attention to negotiations, suggesting any impact on this issue from the U.S. elections may be overshadowed by other factors.
Strong support for the U.S.-India deal, including by a majority of Democrats in both houses of Congress, suggests that the U.S. elections will have little impact on this initiative.
With the U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty due to expire in 2009, strategic arms control may be one area, however, where Democratic control of Congress could place pressure on the Bush Administration to abandon the informal approach seen in the 2003 Moscow Treaty and return to the traditional style of such agreements, with detailed accounting rules and verification procedures.
Jack Boureston and Jason Risdal – FirstWatch International
|
|
|
 |
|
 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “Iran Reacts to U.S. Election,” CNN video feed, accessible at http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/14/iran.nuclear/index.html. [View Article]
[2] “Iran’s Larijani: Democrat’s Victory Will Hopefully Affect Bush’s War Policies,” Iranian Students News Agency in Persian, November 10, 2006. OSC document IAP20061110950031.
[3] “Former Commander Predicts ‘Bright Future’ For Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Iranian Students News Agency in Persian, November 10, 2006, OSC document IAP20061110950074.
[4] Ibid.
[5] “Iran Sources Believe Rumsfeld’s Exit Lessens U.S. Military Threat to Nuclear Sites,” The Guardian, November 10, 2006. OSC document EUP20061110031007.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] “BBC Monitoring: Middle East, Arab Media Reaction to U.S. Mid-Term Elections,” BBC Monitoring in English, November 9, 2006, OSC document GMP20061109845002.
[9] “Iran: Nuclear Program Will be Operating by February,” CNN, 14 November 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/14/iran.nuclear/index.html. [View Article] (Note: The story refers to Ahmadinejad’s statement that 3,000 centrifuges will be operating by the “end of the year.” The current year ends in March 2007 on the Iranian calendar.)
[10] Ibid. Quoted material is CNN’s paraphrase of Ahmadinejad’s comment.
[11] “Israeli Defense Official Says Israel May Attack Iran,” Malaysian Sun, November 10, 2006, http://story.malaysiasun.com/index.php/ct/9/cid/b8de8e630faf3631/id/e70f562c134db500/cs/1/. [View Article]
[12] Ibid; Aluf Benn and Shmuel Rosner, “Olmert Draws Fire in U.S. Over Praise of Iraq War,” Haaretz, November 14, 2006, http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/787238.html. [View Article]
[13] Frances Harrison, “Israel Warned Off Nuclear ‘Folly’,” BBC, November 12, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6141180.stm. [View Article]
[14] “DPRK TV Reports on ‘Crushing Defeat’ of U.S. Republicans, DefSec’s Resignation,” Korean Central Television in Korean, November 10, 2006. OSC document KPP20061110024003.
[15] “ROK TV, Internet Foresee ‘Change’ in U.S. Policy Following Democratic Victory, Rumsfeld ‘Removal,’” Report in Korean, November 9, 2006, OSC document KPP20061109051004.
[16] “ROK Daily Cites Democrat Lawmaker: Democrats to Outline New Path for U.S. DPRK Policy,” Chosun Ibo in English, November 10, 2006, OSC document KPP20061110971009.
[17] “RO Daily: Don’t Expect Democrats to Rebuild 1994 Deal,” The Korea Herald in English, November 15, 2006, OSC document KPP20061115971096.
[18] “ROK Nuclear Envoy Says ‘Good Progress’ Being Made in Meeting with U.S., Japan,” Yonhap in English, November 15, 2006, OSC document KPP20061115971072.
[19] “Japan-US: Media Air Concerns Over Impact of US Domestic Politics, But Cautiously Positive,” Open Source Center Analysis, November, 19, 2006, OSC document JPP20061120326001; Kwan Weng Kin, “Japan Security Ties ‘Won’t be Affected’,” The Straits Times (Singapore), November 9, 2006, “World” Section.
[20] “Japan: DPRK Nuclear Issue Discussed on NHK Sunday Talk Show,”
NHK General Television, November 19, 2006, OSC document JPP20061119036001.
[21] “Democrats Take Over Congress: U.S. May Change Policy toward North Korea,” China News Agency, November 9, 2006.
[22] “Guohui bianse xinfa caice: meiguo duihua zhengce huibianma [Congress Changing Color Triggers Speculation: Will the U.S. Change Its China Policy]?” Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], November 13, 2006, p. 7.
[23] US Will Expect Europe to Share Burden; Diplomats Outside the U.S. are Realizing that the Likely Shift Away from Unilateralist Policy Will Cut Both Ways,” Financial Times, November 13, 2006; “UK Commentary: Rumsfeld’s Departure Marks Shift in Bush’s Foreign Policy Style,” The Guardian, November 9, 2006, OSC document EUP20061109015001.
[24] Molly Moore and Peter Finn, “Relief Suffuses World Views of U.S. Vote,” Washington Post, November 10, 2006.
[25] “Margelov Says Democrats’ Victory Will Not Influence Russia-U.S. Ties,” Interfax, November 8, 2006, OSC document CEP20061108950159; Natalia Gevorkyan, “Tsena Voprosa” [The Bottom Line of the Issue], Kommersant-Daily, November 9, 2006; Dmitri Gornostaev, “Demokraty Gotovy k Pobede” [Democrats are Ready for a Victory], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 3, 2006; Dmitri Gornostaev, “Tyazhelyi Triumf” [A Hard Triumph], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 9, 2006; Yulia Petrovskaya, ‘Velikaya Depressiya Dzhordzha Busha’ [George Bush’s Great Depression], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 13, 2006; Darya Yurieva, “Demokraty Usilyat Kritiku Moskvy” [Democrats Will Criticize Moscow More], Rossiiskaya Gazeta, November 9, 2006.
[26] “Vrag Makkein na Smenu Drugu Bushu” [Enemy McCain to Replace Friend Bush], Gazeta.Ru, November 16, 2006; Yevgenia Bai, “Dzhordzh Bush-Starshii Pytaetsya Spasti Dzhordzha Busha-Mladshego” [George Bush-Sr. Tries to Save George Bush-Jr.], Novaya Gazeta, November 16, 2006; Nadezhda Sokorina, “Uroki Gostepriimstva” [Lessons of Hospitality], Rossiiskaya Gazeta, November 20, 2006.
[27] “Russia: New U.S. Defense Minister May Bring Changes to Defense, Foreign Policy,” ITAR-TASS in English, November 9, 2006. OSC document CEP20061109950261.
[28] “U.S. Mid-term Polls -- Implications for India and Right of Center Poltics,” India Times Blogs, November 8, 2006.
[29] “Indian Article Discusses U.S. Mid-term Election’s Ramifications for Nuclear Deal,” New Delhi Outlook in English, November 20-26, 2006, OSC document SAP20061111342002.
[30] “India: ‘Growing Concern’ in MEA Over US Election’s Impact on Nuclear Deal,” India Today in English, November 20-26, 2006, OSC document SAP20061111342005.
[31] Amelia Gentleman and Somini Sengupta, “India Sees Progress in Nuclear Deal with U.S.,” New York Times, November 17, 2006, [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/17/world/asia/17cnd-india.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.]
|
|
