IRAN AND GULF STATES: FOES OR SECURITY PARTNERS?
December 2006/January 2007 Issue
 

Continuing advances in Iran’s nuclear program and the uncertain commitment of the major international powers to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1696, which demands that Iran suspend sensitive aspects of that program, have intensified the security concerns of many other states in the Persian Gulf region. Some recent commentaries published in Arab academic journals and in the Arab media, for example, have been highly critical of Iran’s nuclear program because of the political influence it has brought Tehran as it seeks to advance its hegemonic aspirations in the region. A minority of Arab analysts have argued, however, that a nuclear Iran could provide an element of stability to the Middle East. In early November, Iran responded to these cross currents by introducing a new tactic to assuage its neighbors’ security concerns: it proposed a defense treaty that would include the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and bring them under Tehran’s de facto protection. [1] (The members of the GCC are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.) These smaller Gulf states possess a limited number of options for addressing the Iranian challenge, none of them wholly satisfactory.

Direct Threat From Iran
During the summer of 2006, as the UN Security Council sought to restrain the Iranian nuclear program and as conflict erupted between Israel and the Iranian-backed armed political group Hezbollah, Arab analysts expressed increasing anxiety over Iran’s expanding influence. (For earlier reports on Arab thinking regarding the Iranian nuclear threat, see “Arab Attitudes Toward Iran’s Nuclear Program: Government Views Vs. Public Opinion,” in the March 2006 issue and “Critics Urge More Active Arab Role in Iranian Nuclear Negotiations to Counter Tehran’s Growing Influence, While Learning from Iran’s Example,” in the September 2006 issue of WMD Insights.)

A major theme that echoes through Arab writings on the subject is that Iran is attempting to use its growing military capability and the influence it brings to dominate Arab states in the region through a combination of intimidation and subversion. Abdelwahed Al-jassani, a contributor to the Saudi-based Arab nationalist newspaper Attajdid al-Arabi, wrote on July 7, 2006, for example, that “Iran aspires to military supremacy both at the conventional and nuclear levels to become the first regional power, starting from the Arab [Persian] Gulf and expanding to all Arab countries.” [2]

On September 29, 2006, Abdelkhaleq Abddellah, an analyst affiliated with the London-based Emirates Media and Studies Center, expanded on this theme in the moderate UAE-based newspaper al-Khaleej:

The strategic goal of Iran is to spread its revolution project and extend its beliefs worldwide, and Arab countries are the first step, the closest and the easiest for such an endeavor. It is no secret that Iran aspires to rise as a regional player with an international role and there is no region better to implement such regional and international aspirations than Arab countries especially after the godly victory of Hezbollah. [3]
Abddellah added that “the Iranian infiltration of Arab political systems has reached unprecedented and disturbing dimensions thanks to the victory of Hezbollah in its thirty-three-day battle with Israel.” [4]

The similarities that Iran and the other Gulf states share in terms of cultural heritage and geography – and the presence of significant Shi’a populations in some of the latter countries – have paradoxically been a source of contention rather than rapprochement. In July 2006, Samih Hammam Ahmed, an analyst at the Cairo-based al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, stated in the Center’s academic journal Iranian Selections that the similarities between the Arabs and the Iranians have made the Arab states targets of Tehran’s efforts to expand its influence and have led to the “fear that small Gulf states would be dominated by a larger and stronger neighbor.” [5]

The Iranian nuclear threat is also perceived as a tool that Tehran can exploit to erode domestic support for current Arab regimes. On September 21, 2006, Mohammed Sayyed Saeed, Deputy Director of the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, wrote in the independent, London-based daily al-Hayat that instead of merely attempting to export the Islamic Revolution, Iran “currently challenges Arab regimes in their public legitimacy by showing its capacity to deal on a daily basis with issues that are important to Arab people, such as the issue of Israel and the U.S.” [6]

Threat to Gulf States From Military Confrontation
There is also mounting concern among Gulf states regarding a U.S. military confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program. [7] Such a confrontation might have a devastating impact both on the region’s economy and on the security of the GCC states. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, which has access to the Red Sea, other Gulf states’ access to international markets would be significantly reduced if navigation through the Straits of Hormuz were restricted, a measure Iran has threatened if its nuclear sites are attacked by the United States or Israel. In his contribution to the July issue of Iranian Selections, Samih Hammam Ahmed noted that, “The theatre will be inflicted with damage from residues of destroyed weapons systems used in the fighting,” in particular, vessels sunk in the shallow waters of the Straits of Hormuz. [8] He also made clear the dilemma confronting the smaller Gulf states: “A confrontation between the U.S. and Iran will make the Gulf the battle theatre, while a reduction of the U.S. role in the Gulf will increase Gulf states’ fears of Iranian hegemony especially since Iran is opposed to any regional role for major Arab powers.” [9]

Such dangers were discussed in a meeting of top military officers from the Gulf states’ armed services in Abu Dhabi on September 19, 2006. The following day, the moderate London-based Asharqalawsat reported that this meeting took place amidst “circumstances fraught with changes and challenges both regionally and internationally…. Such circumstances require examining the expected dangers in the region and worldwide, identifying appropriate options to deal with all new challenges, and setting foundations for a military strategy that will strengthen collective security of the GCC countries.” [10]

It should be noted that the GCC states’ positions with respect to Iran’s nuclear program are not monolithic. In his July 2006 article in Iranian Selections, for example, Samih Hammam Ahmed wrote that the United Arab Emirates has “clearly expressed its concern over an Iranian nuclear capability.” [11] He added that Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, appeared to link the elimination of Iran’s nuclear program to the elimination of Israel’s nuclear weapon capability by focusing on the fact that “Iran must side with Middle Eastern countries to eliminate WMD from the region and not continue the proliferation of them.” [12]

Pro-Iranian Positions
Some commentaries, however, conveyed views at odds with the growing chorus of concern about Iran’s emerging power. They criticized the outcry over the Iranian threat to the Gulf region as exaggerated and misfocused. In his September 21 al-Hayat article, for example, Mohammed Sayyed Saeed discussed the fact that the presumed Iranian threat affects only the interests of the ruling families and national bureaucracies. He wrote:
The proponents of the alleged Iran threat portray it as directed to the entire population and to the Arab nation and its interests. They focus on the fact that the aspiration of Iran to own an atomic weapon threatens these countries and puts them under Iranian nuclear blackmailing…. If Arab countries managed to coexist with the nuclear weapons of Israel…wouldn’t it be more acceptable if they coexisted with the idea that Iran is developing atomic weapons? [13]
He added that a nuclear Iran would serve as a balance to Israeli military might in the region. “The Iranian threat,” he stated, “will have less impact if perceived from the perspective of a relative nuclear balance if Iran develops its own bomb.” [14]

In his July 2006 article in Iranian Selections, Samih Hammam Ahmed wrote in a similar vein that the stance held by the Gulf states made others perceive their opposition to the Iranian nuclear program as a “tacit acceptance of the right of Israel to have a monopoly over nuclear technology and nuclear weapons in the region.” [15] Such positions stress the idea that Iran can play a constructive role in Gulf security.

Defense Treaty
Against this background, Iran is attempting to position itself as a reliable partner in the region. It has tried to extend its assistance to its neighbors and ease their concerns. Indeed, the quasi-official Iranian news agency Mehr reported on November 7, 2006, that Iran’s defense minister, General Mustafa Mohammed Najjar, offered “a regional defense pact as a guarantor of the Persian Gulf security.” [16] He added that such a treaty will ensure “defense, military, and technical cooperation, joint maneuvers, campaigns against terrorism and arms and drug trafficking, and the provision of regional security.” [17]

Iran’s call for a defense treaty with the GCC states took place during recent Iranian military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf that included a number of missile launches, initiatives through which Iran is attempting to inflate its military influence in the region. The call for the defense treaty is a way for Iran to consolidate its position in the Gulf and impose itself as a decisive player in the area. Moreover, the new initiative aims to limit the influence of foreign powers in the region. As Iranian Defense Minister Najjar stated, “Indigenizing Persian Gulf security is the only way to establish security and lasting peace in this strategic area.” [18] Limiting foreign interference in the region would strengthen Iranian security, position it as the most nfluential local player, and establish it as the sole interlocutor with foreign powers regarding Gulf security issues.

Conclusions
Despite occasional commentaries with differing views, reporting appears to indicate near unanimity that a nuclear Iran is a threat to the security of other Persian Gulf states. The Iranian nuclear program is perceived as emboldening Iran vis-à-vis its neighbors and making it more likely to interfere in other Gulf states’ domestic affairs. These states, however, have only a limited set of options for curbing Tehran’s rising influence, none of which is free from significant drawbacks.

Samih Hammam Ahmed has identified several courses that the GCC states might follow. First, these states could, “establish a mechanism of military cooperation especially with the availability of necessary resources for acquiring weapons systems and developing a defense regime. This will be assisted by the presence of a central country, Saudi Arabia, which can lead this regime given its strategic depth, human, material and geographical resources.” [19] However, this option will prove difficult to implement given the traditionally cautious attitude toward cooperation among the GCC countries. Nonetheless, Abdelwahed Al-jassani stated in Attajdid al-Arabi that these states could at the least work together more assertively in another arena, by backing the efforts of the UN Security Council and the “International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to reach a technical solution to this crisis through the implementation of all IAEA [Board of Governor] decisions,” which call for the suspension of all sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and implementation of an inspection regime to demonstrate the peaceful nature of Iran’s remaining nuclear activities. [20]

A second option offered by Ahmed is for other Gulf states to continue to rely on the extensive U.S. presence in the region for their defense. This approach, he noted, also carries risks, however, because if the United States were to take military action against Iran – a decision over which the GCC states might have little influence – the conflict could spill over into their territories and, at a minimum, would be likely to impact their ability to export oil through the Straits of Hormuz.

A third option that Ahmed identifies is for the GCC states to seek support from larger countries in the wider region, beyond the Persian Gulf, who might take on a more aggressive role in establishing security in the area. This could be achieved, he suggests, by giving Syria and Egypt a more influential role in the security of the Gulf and perhaps involving Turkey in a comprehensive dialogue with Iran that would help dissipate
concerns and build trust. The limitation of this option is that Iran is thoroughly opposed to any Arab role in maintaining security in the Persian Gulf. [21] It is also unclear whether Egypt or Syria possesses the military resources and political influence to carry out this role.

A final option, offered by Iran, proposes that the GCC states join Iran in a defense treaty. Gulf states, however, hold a long-standing suspicion of Iran’s hegemonic intentions in the region as well as a deeply rooted mistrust of Iran’s political leaders. This is likely to keep any possibility of a defense treaty in abeyance. As one Asharqalawsat reader commented: “If Iran is interested in a security agreement with the Gulf states, it must first build confidence with Arab governments and people and stop resorting to policies that spread destruction and mayhem in Arab countries in order to weaken them and subsequently impose its influence upon them.” [22]

While Iran does not need nuclear weapons to intimidate the GCC states, a nuclear capability would provide Iran with an aura of prestige and invincibility that could reinforce its hegemonic leanings and cause it to believe that it could pursue its disruptive activities in the Arab world with impunity – both in the Gulf region and beyond. With few, if any, practical options for meeting this challenge, the other Persian Gulf states would appear to have little choice but to retain close defense ties with the United States, even though this option, itself, may carry certain unavoidable risks.

Khalid Hilal – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies





SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “Tehran taqtarihu 3ala duwal alkhaleej mu3ahad difa3iyya wa munawart 3askariyya” [Tehran offers Gulf states a defense treaty and military maneuvers], Asharqalawsat, November 8, 2006.
[2] Abdelwahed Al-jassani, “Hal yuhadidu al barnamaj annawawi alirani al amn alqawmi alarabi?”[Will the Iranian nuclear program threaten Arab national security?], Attajdid al-Arabi, July 7, 2006.
[3] Abdelkhaleq Abddellah, “Attamadud al iranini fi asha’n al 3arabi” [Iran’s interference in Arab affairs], al-Khaleej, September 26, 2006.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Samih Hammam Ahmed, “Al milaf annawawi al irani moutaghayyar jadeed fi mo3adalat amn al khaleej” [The Iranian nuclear issue: a new factor in the gulf security equation], Iranian Selections, Vol. 72, July 2006.
[6] Mohammed Sayyed Saed, “Iran alghaamida wa al arab alghuraba’ fi 3alam mo7ak min 7ujaj kha’iba” [Mysterious Iran and estranged Arabs in a world of fallacy], al-Hayat, September 21, 2006.
[7] Salah Awad, “Annan: Qadat al mintaqa yakhshouna harban fi iran” [Annan: the region leaders are worried about a war with Iran], Asharqalawsat, September 14, 2006.
[8] See source in [5].
[9] Ibid.
[10] “Ru’assa’ al arkan alkhaleejiyoon yabhatoon tathleel 3aqabat attakamul al 3askari” [Heads of Gulf armed services discuss removing impediments for military complementation], Asharqalawsat, September 20, 2006. Environmental hazards are also among Gulf states’ worries over the Iranian nuclear program. Gulf states are concerned that the nuclear facility of Bushehr “in southern Iran is an environmental risk,” especially because the facility is closer in distance to the Gulf states than to Tehran. See “Iran to Continue Its Peaceful N-activities: Majlis Speaker,” Islamic Republic News Agency, October 11, 2006 available at [http://www.irna.ir/index2.php?option=com_news&task=print&code=061011866916220]. Their nightmare is a Chernobyl-like accident in the nuclear reactor and the spread of high levels of radiation to the entire region. Gulf states have also called on the IAEA to “provide guaranties to neighboring Arab countries that they will not be exposed to environmental risks resulting from the Iranian program.” See Abdelwahed Al-jassani, “Hal yuhadidu al barnamaj annawawi alirani al amn alqawmi alarabi?”[Will the Iranian nuclear program threaten Arab national security?], Attajdid al-Arabi, July 7, 2006.
[11] See source in [5].
[12] Ibid.
[13] See source in [6].
[14] Ibid.
[15] See source in [5].
[16] “Tehran taqtarihu 3ala duwal alkhaleej mu3ahad difa3iyya wa munawart 3askariyya” [Tehran offers Gulf States a defense treaty and military maneuvers], Asharqalawsat, November 8, 2006.
[17] “Iran: Defense Minister Renews Call for Regional Pact to Guarantee Gulf Security” Mehr News Agency, November 7, 2006, OSC document IAP20061107950101.
[18] See source in [17].
[19] See source in [5].
[20] See source in [2].
[21] See source in [5].
[22] See source in [1].