Iranian-North Korean relations have remained steadfast in the wake of the DPRK’s October 9, 2006, detonation of a nuclear device. Far from joining in the widespread international condemnation of the test, Iranian officials have chosen instead to criticize the United States for provocations that gave rise to North Korea’s nuclear weapon ambitions. As expressed during a recent state visit to Tehran by the leader of the North Korea’s People’s Assembly, Iranian political figures have portrayed North Korea’s actions as a “lesson” for the United States that threats of sanctions or saber-rattling will not succeed in dissuading a country from pursuing nuclear technologies deemed essential for its future development.

Speaking on the day after the DPRK test, the Islamic Republic’s government spokesman Ghulam Hossein Elham, rather than condemning or condoning North Korea’s actions, focused the blame on the United States and other “big powers” as the root of the problem. He argued that worldwide nuclear disarmament was necessary for “global peace and security” and, referring to Israel’s presumed nuclear weapons capability, declared that such disarmament should begin with “the Zionist regime.” [1] The following day, he also underscored the theme that American policy had provoked the North Korean the test: “The root cause of this test should be sought in the policy, behavior and method adopted by the rulers of the United States.” He stressed that North Korea’s actions were “a reaction to America’s threats and humiliation.” [2]

Javad Jahangirzade of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee also blamed the United States and other Western powers for North Korea’s actions, claiming that the former states had fueled the nuclear arms race by “their frequent nuclear tests and possession of thousands of nuclear warheads and other arsenals.” [3] Alluding to the fact that UN sanctions did not effectively hinder Iran or North Korea’s nuclear programs, he added that “the West” should be mindful of prohibiting other nations from realizing their “potential.”

Jahangirzade also declared his praise for North Korea’s scientific achievement, stating, “Almost no one in the world could imagine that an isolated and restricted North Korea could go beyond its known boundaries of nuclear science.” His enthusiasm had a message for local Iranian constituents: “The event proved that different world states can push the boundaries of science and technology merely through relying on their own people and experts.” [4] His comment was an indirect affirmation of pride in Iran’s growing self-sufficiency in the nuclear field, a sentiment repeated on numerous occasions by other Iranian officials and shared by a wide segment of the Iranian public, regardless of their support for the clerical regime.

In the aftermath of the nuclear test, the Iranian press adopted a stance similar to that of Iranian politicians, reserving condemnation explicitly for the United States. An editorial in Resalat, Iran’s leading conservative daily, stated that “America’s expansionist policies make the world a dangerous place,” and concluded that countries like North Korea developed nuclear weapons as “deterrence” to these potential threats. [5] The more moderate paper Etemad-e Melli, however, distinguished Iran’s peaceful nuclear program from North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, stating that for “political analysts” of the situation, the wiser course would be for the United States to show flexibility towards Iran and mobilize world support in dealing with North Korea, rather than to ignore North Korea and continue threatening Tehran for its nuclear activities. [6]

More generally, both Iranian political figures and the Iranian media did not seek to use the North Korean nuclear test to divert attention from the Iran’s nuclear endeavors, but rather sought to use the example of North Korea’s defiance as reinforcing Iran’s own insistence on its right to pursue an open-ended nuclear program in the face of international criticism. Given the long-standing ties between Iran and North Korea in such sensitive areas as the development of medium-range missiles, Iran’s failure to condemn North Korea’s nuclear test is not entirely surprising. (See “Special Report: Challenges of Iranian Missile Proliferation, Part I, Partnership with North Korea,” in the October 2006 issue of WMD Insights.)

In the weeks after the North Korean test, Iran adopted a policy of waiting to see how the North Korea issue would be addressed internationally, particularly by Pyongyang’s allies Russia and China. It seemed Iran intended to “play its cards” according to their verdict. Apparently observing that Moscow and Beijing had succeeded in tempering UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which condemned the DPRK nuclear test, but imposed only limited economic sanctions, Tehran judged that it could continue its ties with North Korea, without injuring relations with Russia or China.

Indeed, on November 19, 2006, barely a month after the nuclear test and in an evident step to end North Korea’s isolation, Tehran warmly welcomed the head of North Korea’s People’s Assembly, Choe Thae Bok. During his visit, Choe met the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ghulam Ali Haddad Adel, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. During these meetings, Choe expressed the sentiment that North Korea would not have needed even “a single nuclear bomb,” if the United States had ceased threatening it, statements that echoed what Iranian officials themselves had declared shortly after the October 9 nuclear detonation. [7] The North Korean state media emphasized the Iranian President’s statement of support for the DPRK, when he declared: “All the progressive countries of the world should resolutely confront with united power the imperialists’ division and alienation maneuvers.” [8]

The meeting between the North Korean Assembly Speaker and Iranian officials took place in the context of the 7th General Meeting of the Association of Asian Parliaments for Peace that was being held in Iran at the time. There were no indications that talks were held on nuclear- or missile-related issues, specifically, but the high-profile meetings between the two sides were portrayed in both the North Korean and Iranian media as a show of bilateral solidarity, intended for consumption by domestic and international audiences.

Indeed, rather than emphasizing the contrast between Iran’s energy-focused nuclear activities as legitimate and permissible under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons outside that treaty, Tehran appears to have used the North Korea nuclear test as a means for making common cause with Pyongyang in defending itself against international pressure to restrain its nuclear activities. Moreover, Iranian rhetoric since early October 2006, appears to suggest that Iran and North Korea share the status of members of an “Axis of Victimization,” whose nuclear programs are a product of perceived threats emanating from the United States – a focus implying that Iran has begun to justify its nuclear program not merely in terms of the country’s energy needs, but also in terms of its military requirements.

Ibrahim Al-Marashi - Koc University