On November 25, 2006, Algerian Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Shakib Khalil announced that Algeria would launch a nuclear energy program in order to exploit the country’s substantial uranium deposits. [1] Three days later on November 28, Khalil visited Tehran, where Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad offered to provide assistance to Algeria’s new nuclear undertaking, stating that Iran was willing “to share its expertise in different fields with Algeria, including peaceful nuclear technology.” [2] Khalil was quoted as replying that Algeria “is very interested in Iranian expertise in various fields, especially in oil, gas, and nuclear energy” and that it “is prepared to establish relations with Iran based on common interests.” [3]

Significant Iranian involvement in the Algerian nuclear program could trigger international concern because Iran is suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons and is under UN sanctions for its refusal to suspend certain nuclear activities with potential military applications. The UN sanctions, imposed in December 2006, prohibit Iran from openly transferring sensitive nuclear technology to any UN member state, and ban all member states from procuring such technology from Iran. [4] Concerns about Algerian intentions could be heightened by the suspicions Algeria raised in the early 1990s, before it joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), that it was seeking the capability to produce nuclear arms.

Algerian Plans
In discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) several weeks prior to the November 25 announcement of Algeria’s new nuclear plans, Khalil stated that Algeria’s goal was the “integrated development of the entire nuclear sector and its applications: seawater desalinization, industry, agriculture, medicine, the environment and, in particular, electricity.” [5] He added that “the increasing demand for energy in the world and the rise in the price of [crude] uranium… gave Algeria the opportunity to contemplate the development of nuclear energy.” [6] In the late 1990s, Algeria’s exploitable deposits of uranium were thought to be limited and to pose an obstacle to the country’s development of a self-sufficient nuclear energy program. However, in his comments in Tehran on November 28, Khalil noted that significant new deposits of uranium had recently been discovered. [7] The rising price of uranium may also make it possible to successfully exploit deposits previously considered unprofitable. In the meantime, the Algerian government is also drafting a law that will define the legal environment for the use of nuclear energy and its technologies for the purposes of economic and social growth. [8]

In his various statements, Khalil did not disclose whether Algeria hoped to develop the capability to enrich uranium or to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel, technologies with peaceful applications that can also provide weapons-usable nuclear materials. Iran’s pursuit of these technologies in secret for nearly two decades, in violation of its obligation to disclose such activities to the IAEA, triggered a UN demand in July 2006 for it to halt further work on enrichment and plutonium separation and, when Iran refused to comply, led to the imposition of sanctions in December 2006. [9]

Ties to Tehran
Algeria has consistently supported Iran in its confrontation with the international community over its pursuit of a full nuclear fuel cycle. Algiers has, for example, remained silent on Tehran’s history of nuclear concealment and repeatedly echoed Tehran’s defense that the pursuit of enrichment and plutonium separation for peaceful purposes is an inalienable right protected under the NPT. [10] Similarly, Algeria abstained in two key votes at the IAEA, which, respectively, found Tehran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA inspection agreement and referred the Iran case to the UN for further action. [11] Indeed, during Khalil’s November 28, 2006 meeting with Ahmadinejad, the latter thanked the Algerian authorities for supporting Iran’s right to develop its civilian nuclear industry. Khalil is quoted by one source as responding: “Certain super powers, which possess mass destruction weapons, try to obstruct our scientific activities, but they will not come through.” [12]

Close nuclear ties between Algeria and Iran could complicate international nonproliferation efforts in a number of ways. Of particular concern is that Iran might clandestinely assist Algeria in developing a uranium enrichment capability. [13] Even if Algeria were to claim it had developed this capability indigenously and placed it under IAEA safeguards, however, the result would still be the emergence of an additional state possessing at least the latent capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and known to have regional leadership ambitions. At a time when the United States and many other nations are seeking to slow the further spread of this sensitive technology, such a development would be a setback to international nonproliferation efforts, even if Algeria never misused this capability. [14] Concerns about the potential for misuse, however, could arise given Algeria’s nuclear history. In 1991, prior to joining the NPT, Algeria secretly acquired a 15-megawatt research reactor from China, raising suspicions about the possible development of nuclear weapons. [15] These suspicions were significantly eased when Algeria agreed to place the reactor under IAEA inspections and, in 1995, joined the NPT. Nonetheless, as recently as 2004, rumors circulated that Algeria was engaged in nuclear activities with military overtones. [16]

Iran, it may be noted, obtained clandestine support for its uranium enrichment program from the nuclear smuggling network established by Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. [17] It has been reported that Khan also sought to sell enrichment technology to Algeria, although no evidence has emerged to indicate that Algeria took up this offer. [18]

Looking Ahead
Algeria’s decision to pursue a nuclear power program follows similar recent decisions in Morocco and Egypt. [19] A major question is whether Algeria plans to develop a domestic uranium enrichment capability, either indigenously or with Iranian help, or rely on foreign suppliers of nuclear fuel (possibly including Iran). The fact that Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika has defended the right of every country to possess the full range of technology necessary to exploit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could make it politically costly for him, or any future president, to refrain from exercising that right. [20]

While it is possible that Iranian assistance will never materialize and that Algeria will adhere strictly to its international nonproliferation obligations, sufficient questions remain about the direction of its program that the country is likely to find itself on global and regional proliferation “watch lists” for some years to come.

In the meantime, some analysts have suggested that Ahmadinejad is seeking Algeria’s aid in serving as a mediator with the West on the Iranian nuclear controversy. They speculate that Ahmadinejad sees Algiers, having recently built closer ties with Washington, as an intermediary that both sides trust. [21] With the UN Security Council having imposed sanctions on Iran and Ahmadinejad refusing to slow Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium production activities, it remains to be seen whether Algeria will step into this role and what it might accomplish, if it does so.

Khalid Hilal - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies