China published its fifth Defense White Paper on December 29, 2006. Unlike China’s previous four white papers, the 2006 document for the first time openly discusses specific steps and target milestones in building a modern, information-age military force; the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force structure; the strategic mission of the Second Artillery Force; China’s greater emphasis on naval development and force projection; and new requirements for the country’s defense industries. Most importantly, the White Paper contains two paragraphs specifically describing China’s nuclear strategy, a topic never addressed before in a white paper. [1] The first paragraph covers China’s rationale for maintaining nuclear weapons, its commitment to a no-first-use (NFU) policy, and its commitment to avoiding a nuclear arms race. The second sets out the role of the Second Artillery Force in building and deploying China’s nuclear and conventional forces.
As translated, the two paragraphs read:
China’s nuclear strategy is subject to the state’s nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China’s nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.
The Second Artillery Force is striving to build a streamlined and effective strategic force with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. It is quickening its steps to raise the informationization level of its weaponry and equipment systems, build an agile and efficient operational command and control system, and increase its capabilities of land-based strategic nuclear counterstrikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles. It is improving the construction of its battlefield system, and associated logistics and equipment, and raising the cost-effectiveness of integrated support. It is deepening the reform of training, enhancing integrated training, and using scientific and technological achievements to raise training quality. It is strengthening the safety management and control mechanism of nuclear missiles, and improving the relevant rules and regulations and technical preventive measures as well as emergency steps for handling nuclear accidents. The Second Artillery Force is equipped with surface-to-surface strategic missiles and tactical operational missiles of various types. [2]
 The White Paper’s discussion of Chinese nuclear strategy reaffirms China’s long-standing NFU policy. However, the paper also emphasizes the importance of maintaining an effective and reliable strategic force composed of both nuclear and conventional weapon capabilities. Nuclear weapons would be used for strategic retaliation and counterstrikes, while conventional weapons would be used for precision attacks, presumably in an offensive posture. The White Paper emphasizes developing land-based strategic capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, but provides no specifics on the existing arsenal,
the structure of the
Second Artillery Force order of battle, or the projected size of China’s nuclear force. It indicates only that China will continue to maintain and build a lean and effective nuclear force. Thus the report offers little to support either side in the debate emerging in the United States as to the threat posed by China’s on-going modernization of its nuclear forces. [3]
The White Paper also highlights China’s commitments to international arms control and nonproliferation agreements. While Beijing has yet to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which it signed in 1996, the paper notes the coordinated activities among the PLA and other government agencies in preparation for that treaty’s implementation. China’s signature of the CTBT means that Beijing continues to accept the constraints imposed on its ability to test, a critical step in the development of new nuclear weapons, especially the miniaturization of nuclear warheads for new ballistic missiles currently under development. The White Paper also reaffirms China’s opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its support of the United Nations in playing a more active role in this area. This paragraph suggests that China wants its recent nonproliferation efforts to be recognized by the international community.
The White Paper is consistent with earlier analyses of China’s nuclear policy by leading Chinese scholars. Li Bin, a well-known Chinese nuclear strategist and arms control analyst, argues in a September 2006 article published in World Economics and Politics (a flagship publication of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) that China’s nuclear doctrine is best described as defensive counter-nuclear coercion. Thus, in his view, China seeks the ability to counter the threat of nuclear weapons use against it. Such a doctrine requires that China adopt a nuclear retaliatory strategy that depends on the development of effective and survivable nuclear forces. This strategy explains China’s measured nuclear weapons modernization programs, which focus on mobility, precision, and the ability to penetrate missile defenses. [4] Li concludes that China “endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force.” [5]
Similarly, in an article published in the same issue of World Economics and Politics, Sun Xiangli, an arms control analyst affiliated with the Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, argues that Chinese nuclear doctrine remains one of defensive posture, small arsenal size, and no first use. This assessment dismisses predictions by the U.S. government and Western analysts that, technology and resources permitting, China’s nuclear arsenal is bound to increase and that the threshold of use may be lowered given the continuing gap in conventional capabilities between China and the United States. [6] Sun suggests that rather than simply trying to decide whether Chinese nuclear doctrine is “minimum” deterrence or a somewhat more robust “limited” deterrence, it is better to employ a more holistic approach
to understanding a country’s nuclear doctrine
that looks at the following components:
declaration, development, deployment, use, and disarmament. [7] She points to China’s consistent decision to refrain from expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal, regardless of the security environment it has faced over the years. However, while China has never engaged, nor will ever engage in a nuclear arms race with any country, she states, the changing security environment and the revolution in military affairs do require adjustments in nuclear weapons development and deployment. She argues that to remain credible, China must enhance its nuclear arsenal’s overall survivability, including weapons security and safety, reliability, and penetration capabilities. [8]
Perhaps the most noticeable departures from previous Defense White Papers are the clear targets for modernizing the Chinese military by mid-century, with the strategic goal of building a modern force that uses new information capabilities, and the emphasis on implementing the military strategy of active defense. This strategy includes the offensive use of force and force projection beyond the traditional confines of national territories. Indeed, Rear Admiral Yang Yi, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the PLA National Defense University, maintains that a defensive military strategy does not rule out the development of offensive military capabilities. [9] Thus, while the White Paper confirms a strategy based on deterrence and NFU, it implicitly recognizes that, as Chinese power projection capabilities increase, this deterrent capability will serve Chinese interests on a wider stage than in the past.
The White Paper also specifically mentions that the “Navy aims at gradual extension of
the strategic depth for offshore defensive
operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.” [10] Developing an offshore, or even near sea if not blue sea, navy seems to be one of the major thrusts of current Chinese defense modernization efforts. President Hu Jintao recently remarked that China is a major maritime power and needs to develop the capabilities to project its
power beyond its territorial waters. Taiwan aside, a strong Chinese navy would be better positioned to protect China’s growing maritime interests, including providing security for its imports of oil and other resources from the Middle East. Chinese officials have also indicated for the first time that China now has the capability to build aircraft carriers. [11]
Thus, the 2006 Chinese Defense White Paper, while continuing the tradition of highlighting China’s peaceful intentions and emphasizing that its military modernization is non-threatening, also contains unprecedented statements about China’s nuclear strategy and the mission of its strategic nuclear force. Moreover, the paper highlights the implementation of a military strategy of active defense that increasingly is oriented toward power projection, the offensive use of force, and nuclear counterattacks beyond the protection of the homeland.
Jing Dong Yuan – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] Xinhuawang, “Guofang baipishu jiemi zhongguo junshi, shouxian gongkai xuanshi hezhanlue” [Defense White Paper Demystifies China’s Military, First Time Publicizes Nuclear Strategy], Guoji xianqu daobao [International Herald Leader], January 7, 2007.
[2] The Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” December 29, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/29/content_771191.htm. [View Article]
[3] Compare, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China Annual Report to Congress, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf, [View Article] with “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 2006), pp. 60-63 and with Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning,” Washington, D.C., Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006, http://www.nukestrat.com/china/chinareport.htm. [View Article]
[4] Li Bin, “Zhongguo hezhanlue bianxi [Analyzing China’s Nuclear Strategy], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 313 (September 2006), pp. 16-22.
[5] Ibid., p. 21.
[6] U.S. House of Representatives, “Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,” 105th Congress, 1999, H.R. 105-851; National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate,” Washington, D.C., December 2001; David E. Sanger and Erik Eckholm, “Will Beijing’s Nuclear Arsenal Stay Small, or Will it Mushroom?” New York Times, March 15, 1999; Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, “China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment,” New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 2000.
[7] Sun Xiangli, “Zhongguo hezhanlue xingzhi yu tedian fenxi” [An Analysis of the Nature and Characteristics of China’s Nuclear Strategy], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], pp. 23-28.
[8] Ibid.; “Jianchi ziwei fangyu de hezhanlue” [Upholding a Self-Defense Nuclear Strategy], Jiefangjun Bao [People’s Liberation Army Daily], December 31, 2006.
[9] Tao Dulan, “Zhongguo jiangjun cheng fangyuxing zhanlue bingfei bufazhan jinggong nengli” [Chinese General Maintains a Defensive Strategy Does Not Rule Out Developing Offensive Capabilities], Zhongguo xinwenwang [Chinanews Net], January 10, 2007.
[10] “China’s National Defense in 2006.”
[11] “Why China Wants a Bigger Navy?” Economist, January 4, 2007; Ren Yan et al., “Zhongguo you nengli zaohangmu” [China Is Capable of Building Aircraft Carriers], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], January 10, 2007, p. 1. The White Paper, in particular its emphasis on enhanced Chinese naval capabilities, received considerable attention in India. See, C. Raja Mohan, “Hu’s Navy,” Indian Express, January 2, 2007; Bhartendu Kumar Singh, “Whither China’s Defence?” Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, Article 2179, January 5, 2007, http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2194&status=article&mod=b; [View Article] C. Raja Mohan, “Visit of the Rising Ties,” Indian Express, December 14, 2006, www.indianexpress.com/story/18476.html; [View Article] Deep K. Datta-Ray, “Looking Seaward,” Times of India, January 18, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/OPINION/Editorial/Looking_seaward/articleshow/1258073.cms.
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