On December 8, 2006, the Sixth Review Conference of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) concluded with agreement on a Final Declaration that reviewed the operation of each article of the Treaty and decided on measures to strengthen it. [1] It was the first time in ten years that the 156 states parties have been able to agree on such a review. Negotiations during the previous review conference in 2001 collapsed due to U.S. objections to the development of an international verification mechanism. Despite the recent agreement, the gains from the 2006 conference were modest. [2] The parties left to future meetings critical steps regarding compliance with BW nonproliferation obligations, national implementation measures to secure biological materials, the submission of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and issues related to peaceful and technical cooperation. Therefore, while reactions to the Conference outcome were generally positive, many states expressed disappointment with key omissions from the agreed Final Declaration.

Sixth Review Conference Final Declaration
The Final Declaration of the Conference included both an updated understanding of each article of the BWC and a series of steps to be taken to strengthen the Treaty. States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty’s prohibitions applied to all relevant fields of science and technology. This statement ensures that new developments in the biosciences will fall under the BWC’s restrictions against misuse. It includes advances under the Treaty’s general prohibition, which “bans biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” [3] Decisions and recommendations contained in the second part of the document included an agreement on a process of annual meetings of states parties and experts, who will be tasked to discuss, but not negotiate, specific aspects of the BWC. Because the BWC lacks a permanent secretariat or an implementation monitoring mechanism, the states parties also agreed to create a three-person implementation support unit (ISU) within the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva to carry out administrative tasks associated with the Treaty, such as accounting for CBM submissions, and promoting the universal adoption of the BWC.

While the states parties also hoped to adopt action plans on gaining universal acceptance of the Treaty and for full implementation of the BWC within individual states parties, they were able to agree only on steps to promote the former. The proposed action plan on national-level implementation, including the adoption of legislation criminalizing the production of biological weapons, met serious resistance. A number of states from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), led by Iran, linked agreement on the national implementation action plan to an action plan on Article X to promote the greater sharing of biotechnology and advances in the biosciences. [4] The Conference President, Ambassador Mosood Khan of Pakistan, proposed a compromise action plan for comprehensive national implementation that combined the two proposals. However, differences over Article X, with the developing world seeking greater access to biotechnology and the major supplier states seeking to prevent such technology from spreading too widely, prevented this compromise from being adopted.

A Welcome Result with Some Reservations
As is usual for multilateral negotiations that operate by consensus, official responses to the outcome of the Conference were generally positive. Many of the closing statements delivered to the Conference welcomed the fact that an agreement was reached, and expressed optimism that work would continue to strengthen the BWC in the future. Praise for the role of Ambassador Khan was also significant, with most delegations and groups observing that the outcome was largely due to his efforts. Ambassador Khan’s success led the government-sponsored Pakistani press to generalize the importance of his role and declare: “The successful outcome of the Conference is also indicative of Pakistan’s contribution to the evolving international consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation issues.” [5] A number of delegations, in particular Russia, the NAM, and the Group of Latin American Countries, looked beyond the BWC and suggested that the cooperative spirit of the Conference demonstrated that multilateral disarmament negotiations can be productive. In this regard, the success of the Sixth BWC Review Conference was contrasted with recent failures in multilateral arms control, such as the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

At the same time, official praise was tempered by the observation that states parties were unable to agree on actions regarding several critical aspects of the Treaty because of the need to reach a consensus outcome.

The European Union delivered one of the most comprehensive closing statements, observing that the outcome broadly met the objectives it had set for the Conference, but noting as well that two of its key objectives still needed to be addressed. [6] Because enhancing both the number and quality of CBM submissions was a key EU goal for the Conference, the EU regretted the inability of states parties to strengthen the Treaty’s CBM mechanism. In addition, given the EU’s commitment to the establishment of an international verification mechanism under the BWC, the EU concluded by expressing its hope that it will “be possible to identify effective mechanisms to strengthen and verify compliance” with the BWC in the long term. The EU, among other U.S. allies, is likely to pressure the next U.S. administration to reconsider opposition to a Treaty verification mechanism prior to the next Review Conference in 2011.

A recently created informal group under the BWC called the JACKSNNZ (Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand) credited the Conference for addressing aspects of the Conference President’s proposed action plan for comprehensive national implementation, but regretted the inability of the states parties to adopt an action plan itself. [7] The group therefore stressed the need for states to take necessary measures to carry out their national obligations under the Treaty. Coverage in the Swiss press noted that the Swiss Foreign Ministry welcomed the adoption of the Final Declaration but focused on the lack of a legally binding enforcement mechanism. [8]

India, in its closing statement, also expressed disappointment with the lack of agreement on the action plan for comprehensive national implementation, adding that it hoped this omission would encourage further efforts to agree on such a plan. [9] Responding to a question from the Indian press regarding the outcome of the Conference, Jayant Prasad, India’s Ambassador to Geneva, stated that, “after a succession of failures, you had a review conference now which was successful in harmonizing the position of the states and agreeing on a forward-looking agenda for the next five years.” He also stressed the roles of Articles VII (regarding state assistance in response to the use of biological weapons) and X (on technology sharing) in this agenda. [10]

Conclusion
The Sixth BWC Review Conference was able to achieve consensus on a Final Declaration, a positive development in light of previous divisions that prevented agreement in the 2001 Review Conference. However, as many states and observers recognized, what was agreed did not significantly strengthen multilateral efforts to address biological and toxin weapon threats, but simply provided a framework for the international community to tackle those threats in the future.
Peter Crail—Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies