NATO’s November 2006 summit in Riga, Latvia, provided Russian government officials and strategic analysts with an opportunity to repeat longstanding complaints about the alliance’s treatment of Russia. During the last few months, Russian observers have expressed concern about NATO’s further expansion, the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, and the alliance’s failure to stem the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan into Russia. Russian officials have also complained about proposals to deploy U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in eastern Europe, and Moscow renewed those complaints after recent U.S. announcements offering greater detail as to the specifics of these proposed deployments.
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Failed Efforts at Collaboration
Although BMD has been a long-standing source of tension between Russia and the United States, during the first years of the Vladimir Putin administration, Russian officials expressed guarded optimism that Russia might collaborate with NATO to develop theater-wide missile defense (TMD) systems designed to intercept short- and medium-range missiles. [1] In June 2002, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) established an Ad-Hoc Working Group on Theatre Missile Defense. Its five Support Working Teams, composed of experts from the NATO staff and the member countries, have focused on terminology, experimental concepts, joint concepts of operations, systems capabilities, and training and exercises. [2] Since 2003, Russian and NATO military personnel have conducted annual command post exercises simulating joint BMD operations against third-country threats. [3] Current plans envisage a joint BMD field exercise in the fall of 2007. [4] In March 2005, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov even offered to contribute Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air defense systems to a future European TMD system, including one directed against cruise missiles. [5]

NATO countries are considering three separate multilateral BMD initiatives. First, in March 2005, NATO announced its decision to develop an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system by 2010. Its purpose is to protect NATO military forces and installations, wherever they operate, from short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks.

Second, governments are considering a missile defense system to protect the national territories and population centers of NATO’s European members from missile attacks. In May 2006, an eighteen-month “NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study” concluded that the alliance could construct such a BMD system capable of defending against growing missile threats from Iran, Syria, and North Korea. [6]

Third, the United States is pursuing bilateral initiatives with select NATO members to deploy a small number of U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Interceptors at forward locations in eastern Europe. These systems would defend against long-range ballistic missiles that could be developed and deployed in the Middle East, in particular by Iran. The interceptors would be part of U.S. global defenses against such threats, but would provide some additional protection to Europe. In December 2006, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency announced plans to award the Boeing company a contract to help locate, design, and deploy a European ground-based BMD interceptor field, with as many as 10 interceptors, as well as a complementary radar site. [7] Boeing is the prime contractor for the U.S. ground-based midcourse defense system being deployed in Alaska and California.

Thus far, several factors have discouraged NATO governments from pursuing opportunities for collaboration with Russia in any of these areas. First, NATO and Russia have developed air and missile defense systems that employ different technical standards, command-and-control procedures, and operational doctrines. The parties have only recently undertaken initiatives to overcome these interoperability problems. Second, NATO governments had been cooperating for many years on BMD projects before they decided, primarily for policy reasons, to consider a Russian contribution. Longstanding ties among NATO defense firms have limited their interest in working with Russian companies. [8] Third, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of defense firms and officials interested in multilateral cooperation on BMD, restrictive technology transfer policies regularly impede cooperation among NATO countries; the barriers between these countries and Russia are even greater. Russia’s growing military cooperation with China, while not yet a major consideration, could reinforce these concerns. Not only could China use any technical knowledge it obtains in this area to overcome U.S. and Japanese missile defenses, but Chinese experts might (as could their Russian counterparts) share such insights with North Korea, Iran, or other proliferant states.

Russian Fears
Among the most serious obstacles to NATO-Russian cooperation has been the inability of Americans and Europeans to persuade their Russian interlocutors that NATO’s various BMD initiatives will not seek to intercept Russian missiles. Despite more than a decade of dialogue, in late July 2006, General Yury Baluyevskiy, Chief of the Russian General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, published under his own name a comprehensive critique of U.S. BMD plans in Russia’s leading defense weekly, Voenno-Promishlenniy Kur’er. Among other points, he accused U.S. officials of seeking to use missile defenses to negate the nuclear deterrents of both Russia and China in a quest for strategic superiority. [9]

The issue of Western ballistic missile defenses in Europe became prominent during the run-up to the alliance’s summit in Riga at the end of November 2006. In late October, Baluyevskiy indicated that Russia would only fully support a NATO BMD system that was developed in collaboration with Moscow. NATO had to choose, he argued, “whether the missile defense system in Europe will be developed jointly with Russia, or whether it will be a segment of the U.S. national system without Russia’s participation.” [10] The same month, Yevgeny Buzhinsky, head of the international military cooperation department of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), told the daily Izvestia that Moscow would consider the deployment of U.S. BMD systems near Russia’s borders as “a real threat to our deterrent forces” and “as an unfriendly gesture on behalf of the United States, some eastern European nations, and NATO as a whole.” He cautioned: “Such actions would require taking adequate retaliatory measures of a military and political character.” [11]

Although the United States currently is considering the deployment only a few interceptors in eastern Europe, Russian analysts seem to fear that larger numbers of interceptors, and other BMD assets, such as missile tracking radars, may soon follow. They also argue that the United States probably would station large ground and air forces in countries hosting BMD systems in order to defend them. [12] In addition, Russian officials challenge the notion that the systems’ main purpose would be to intercept long-range missiles from Middle Eastern rogue states capable of reaching the United States. Russian military leaders argue that no state in the region, including Iran, will soon have such intercontinental-range missiles. [13] Russian analysts claim, however, that U.S. interceptors stationed in Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic could target Russian ICBMs shortly after their launch. [14] Such a “boost phase” interception could in theory destroy a Russian strategic missile before it could deploy any of its defense-evading warheads. Russia’s large strategic arsenal could easily overcome the proposed deployment of less than a dozen interceptors in eastern Europe. Russian strategists may worry, however, that certain developments—such as Iran’s growing missile capabilities or a sharp downturn in NATO-Russian relations—could cause these numbers to increase considerably in the future.

Russian Countermeasures
In this light, it is not surprising that certain members of the Russian military might seek the capability to destroy these U.S. systems before they could launch their interceptors. In September 2006, two Russian submarines—one based at the North Pole and the other in the Pacific Ocean—each successfully launched a ballistic missile towards the Kizha missile range in northwest Russia rather than the traditional Kamchatka test range in the Russian Far East. If the Russian Navy sought to attack targets in Poland or other eastern European countries, this is the general trajectory such missiles would follow. [15] The same month, Interfax quoted retired Maj. Gen. Vladimir Belous as stating that his country’s “military doctrine envisages that Russian armed forces are allowed to attack installations in foreign countries that threaten its security.” [16] Another Russian defense analyst, Alexander Pikayev, acknowledged that Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons to ensure the elimination of threatening BMD systems in eastern Europe. [17]
Several Russian strategists have promoted a less risky approach reestablishing Russia’s arsenal of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and arming them with conventional warheads. Although these missiles principally would facilitate Russia’s implementation of its new doctrine regarding preemptive strikes against foreign-based terrorists, Russian defense analysts note they could also provide Russian decision makers with the option to attack NATO (presumably U.S.) BMD systems stationed in eastern Europe. [18]

Moscow and Washington renounced these weapons in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans both sides from developing, manufacturing, or deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 kilometers. Ivanov discussed Russia’s possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty when he met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Washington in January 2005. [19] Although Ivanov later said that Moscow did not yet plan to abrogate the treaty, he complained that the accord placed Russia and the United States in a uniquely unfortunate position as the only countries in the world legally prohibited from possessing intermediate-range missiles. Ivanov remarked: “When we signed the treaty, nobody besides the U.S. and USSR possessed these missiles. I don’t think anyone even in their worst dreams could imagine missile technology could spread so quickly....I think you may see all countries have them except Russia and the U.S.” [20]

Ivanov again raised the possibility of Russia’s withdrawing from the INF Treaty when he met with Rumsfeld in Alaska in August 2006. When Rumsfeld commented that conventionally armed ICBMs could allow either country to attack transient terrorist targets that might be holding nuclear weapons, Ivanov replied that other delivery systems would prove equally effective at inflicting prompt conventional strikes. Ivanov stated: “Theoretically, one could use long-range cruise missiles with conventional warheads…. One could even consider a theoretical possibility of using intermediate- range missiles, although the United States and Russia cannot have them, unlike many other countries, which already have such missiles.” [21] In contrast to these and other statements by leaders of the MOD and the Russian defense industry, representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, along with other Russian strategic analysts, have insisted that Russia would not withdraw from the INF Treaty because it continues to promote Russian security interests. [22]

Prospects
In mid-January 2007, U.S. officials formally proposed to the new Czech government establishing a BMD radar system, to be operated by American personnel, in the Czech Republic. U.S. officials also announced that the United States and Poland would soon begin formal discussions about the possible deployment of U.S. BMD interceptor missiles on Polish territory. According to State Department spokesperson Edgar Vasquez, who offered the most comprehensive public description of the proposal, “Depending on the result of the discussions, the U.S. will seek to field a limited number of ground-based missile-defense silo launchers, with their associated interceptors, similar to those currently fielded at Fort Greely, Alaska, and to deploy an X-band radar for midcourse tracking and discrimination of ballistic-missile threats out of the Middle East.” [23] These negotiations will involve legal and financial issues, as well as political-military questions. Even if Poland, the Czech Republic, or other candidate countries (e.g., Hungary) agree to these proposals, however, it will take several years before such U.S. BMD systems become operational, most likely in 2011 or 2012.

The initial Russian response to the formal U.S. deployment proposal was predictably negative. The Russian Foreign Ministry called the offer “a move in the wrong direction.” [24] Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin, commander of Russia’s Space Forces, warned that the deployment threatened Russia because “our strategic nuclear forces will be visible.” [25] Elaborating on his concerns, Gen. Popovkin told journalists: “It is doubtful that Iranian or North Korean rockets would go across Poland or the Czech Republic. The radar in the Czech Republic would be able to monitor rocket installations in central Russia and the Northern Fleet.” [26]

Russian complaints and threats have contributed to unease in Europe, especially the potential host countries, about the proposed BMD deployments. [27] Nevertheless, the United States and other NATO governments insist that Russian fears are misplaced. General Pavel Stefka, chief of staff of the Czech armed forces, called Russian claims that the BMD deployments would threaten Russia “absolute nonsense.” He insisted that the physical properties of terrain for the proposed U.S. radar system would prevent it from monitoring military activities inside Russia. [28] A spokesperson for the Czech Defense Ministry, Andrej Cirtek, noted that the U.S. BMD interceptors would rely on kinetic force rather than explosive detonations to destroy their targets, making them unsuitable as first-strike weapons. [29]

The United States and the NATO allies in question now need to decide whether to deploy U.S. BMD systems in Europe despite Russian objections. One option would be for them to delay a decision, in an effort to address Russian concerns. The head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, recently suggested that, with the consent of the host governments, Russian government representatives might be allowed to visit the BMD sites. [30] The creation of such a de facto inspection arrangement would, presumably, reassure Russian officials that the systems lacked the capacity to threaten Russia’s vast strategic arsenal.

Alternatively, NATO governments might decide to move forward with the deployments without Russia’s explicit acquiescence. In 2002, the United States pursued such an approach in withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Despite fears at the time of provoking a major confrontation with Moscow, Russian officials merely expressed regret at the U.S. decision. [31]

Defense Minister Ivanov has already indicated Russia’s expectation that the Czech and Polish governments will in the end accept the U.S. proposals to demonstrate their loyalty to NATO and to the United States. More importantly, Ivanov also indicated Moscow could afford to adopt a tempered response: “We have long been aware of these plans of the United States…. I would not rush to respond, as our strategic nuclear forces are capable of ensuring Russia’s security in any scenario.” [32]

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute