China’s January 12, 2007, test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, the first by any country in two decades, triggered extensive international comment, with U.S. allies, Russia, and India all expressing distinctive concerns. An anxiety repeated in all of these settings was the potential for China to interfere during a crisis with other countries’ space-based assets that are essential for military reconnaissance and operations, including missile defenses. Heightening concerns was that such crises might involve the implicit or explicit threat to use nuclear weapons.

Given the level of international attention, WMD Insights is covering reaction to the Chinese ASAT test in three parts. Part I focuses on the response of U.S. friends and allies (see below). Part II focuses on Russia’s response (“Russia Walks a Fine Line in Assessing Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Test”). Part III focuses on India’s response (“Cautious Reactions from India Following China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test”).

PART I: U.S. ALLIES CRITICIZE CHINA’S ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON TEST; MEDIA NOTES CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. SPACE POLICIES

The reaction among officials and the media in key U.S. allies was strongly critical of China’s January 12, 2007, ASAT weapon demonstration. Common criticisms included complaints about China’s lack of advanced notification, Beijing’s subsequent unresponsiveness to requests for information about the character and purpose of the test, concerns that the Chinese action might stimulate an arms race in space, and fears that the debris from the collision would damage other satellites. Nevertheless, many Western media commentators, unlike their governments, also blamed U.S. military space programs and the American position of refusing to negotiate a ban on the “militarization” of outer space for encouraging China’s decision.

Background
On January 18, 2007, the Bush Administration confirmed media reports that China had used a kinetic kill vehicle carried aboard a ballistic missile to destroy one of its older weather satellites. A kinetic kill vehicle is one that attacks targets by colliding with them rather than exploding in their vicinity. The test occurred in the early morning of January 12 Beijing time. The test was the first kinetic kill ASAT interception by any country in more than 20 years.

On January 23, 2007, during a regular news briefing, the Chinese Foreign Ministry finally confirmed that it had conducted the test. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao insisted, however, that, “This test was not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat to any country.” [1] On February 1, 2007, perhaps to deflect criticism about the test, another Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu, reaffirmed China’s proposal that the international community should cooperate to avert the militarization of outer space. [2] On February 12, 2007, Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan reportedly told former Japanese defense chief Fukushiro Nukaga that China has no plans to conduct another ASAT test. [3]

Although the Chinese government has not offered a detailed explanation for the test, several articles that have appeared in the Chinese media in recent years – in both the mass media and in specialized journals – suggest that many Chinese analysts believe historical trends will invariably lead to increased military activities in outer space. [4] Despite the government’s reluctance to clarify its motives, a senior Chinese military officer, Col. Yao Yunzhu, suggested after the test that the Chinese national security community considered the weaponization of space inevitable. [5]

After the Chinese ASAT test, the United States effectively suspended almost all the cooperative space programs agreed to by Presidents George Bush and Hu Jintao during their April 2006 summit meeting. Before that meeting, the U.S. government had declined to engage in such collaboration because of China’s poor human rights record and suspicions that China was seeking access to dual-use civilian technologies that would also assist its military programs. Commenting in early February 2007, NASA spokesperson Jason Sharp said, “We believe China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our presidents have outlined, including on civil space cooperation.” [6]

Japan: Test Highlights Lack of PRC Military Transparency, Chills Bilateral Relations, Shows Vulnerability of Tokyo’s Space Reconnaissance Assets
Like other governments, the Japanese government criticized China for its failure to notify countries in advance about its ASAT test and then for delaying its subsequent confirmation of the event. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso complained that China should have given Japan advanced notice. [7] Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki warned that Beijing’s lack of openness about the incident could reinforce doubts about China’s peaceful motives. [8] Calling China’s explanation for its actions “insufficient,” Shiozaki said the Chinese Foreign Ministry informed the Japanese Embassy in Beijing shortly after the test that China had "conducted one experiment in space recently," but had provided no further information. [9]

The most serious complaint came from Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who suggested that the Chinese action might have violated international law. He told the Japanese Diet: "I believe it would not be in compliance with basic international rules such as the Outer Space Treaty." He maintained that the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty, which bans weapons of mass destruction in space, requires all countries to avoid contaminating space with debris. [10]

The incident occurred at an inopportune time for the Abe government. Since assuming office in September, the prime minister had made a vigorous effort to improve bilateral relations with Beijing from the low point reached during the tenure of his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi’s controversial visits to the Yakasuni shrine, where a number of Japanese World War II figures are honored, and other policies had resulted in a freeze in the bilateral dialogue with the Chinese leadership. Japan and China resumed high-level defense meetings in November 2006 after a three-year interruption. In addition, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is scheduled to visit Japan in April 2007. [11] The two governments had even anticipated resuming military exchanges later in 2007, with the goal of holding mutual naval visits that would bring Japanese warships into Chinese ports for the first time since World War II. [12]

Tokyo is seeking to engage with China's military in part to push Beijing towards greater transparency on its defense policies. Japan, the United States, and other countries have repeatedly called on the Chinese government to make its military budget, planning, and activities more transparent in order to minimize misunderstandings about China’s defense programs. They caution that China’s excessive military secrecy has alarmed its neighbors and impeded China’s integration into regional security institutions.

In response to these complaints, the Chinese government has published periodic white papers on its national defense strategy and programs. It released the latest version, China’s National Defense in 2006, on December 29, 2006. Among other points, the document stresses China’s commitment to avoiding the militarization of space. [13] The ASAT test probably dissipated whatever goodwill Beijing might have achieved through this publication, which itself conveyed only a limited amount of new information. [14] After the Chinese government confirmed the test, Shiozaki complained, “Unless there is transparency, there will be suspicions. It’s not enough for China to just say there was one test.” [15]

When Abe visited Europe a week after the Chinese test, he urged European Union (EU) governments not to lift their embargo of arms exports to China, arguing such a move would adversely affect the security situation in East Asia. Chinese Foreign Ministry Liu Jianchao criticized Abe’s intervention, arguing that the arms embargo “is something that is between China and Europe, with which Japan has no connection.” Liu added, “It constitutes no threat to Japan, and we express strong dissatisfaction toward Japan's obstructing" EU actions on the issue. [16]

Some Americans are urging the Japanese government to take even stronger action. Senator Jon Kyl from Arizona said that since both Japan and the United States rely heavily on vulnerable space systems, the two countries needed to pursue “joint action” to counter the Chinese ASAT threat, just as the two countries were working together to develop ballistic missile defenses against North Korea. [17] Indeed, the test may reinforce the position of those in Japan who are already pushing Tokyo towards a more robust defense posture in space. Yasunori Matogawat, a professor at the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, part of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, warned that the Chinese test might “fuel the argument that Japan should develop space technology for national defense, especially as it came in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis.” [18]

Since 2003, Japan has launched its own reconnaissance satellites. [19] Although their professed purpose is to monitor military developments in North Korea, China might suspect that another function is to gather information on China. For this reason, David Baker, the editor of the prestigious Jane's Space Directory, has argued that the Chinese ASAT test aimed more to impress Japan than the United States. Baker said the Chinese want to demonstrate to Tokyo that they could disable Japan’s satellite reconnaissance systems if necessary. [20] Several major newspapers, including the Mainichi Shimbun and the Sankei Shimbun, published editorials in late January warning that a Chinese ASAT capacity would also allow China to threaten the surveillance satellites underpinning the missile defense systems that the United States and Japan are now jointly developing. [21]

Taiwan: Believes Island is Prime Target of ASAT Demonstration; Fears Impact on U.S. Capabilities During Crisis
Taiwanese Cabinet spokesperson Cheng Wen-tsang argued that the ASAT test “showed that China has expanded its arms race to space and that its so-called ‘peaceful rise’ is merely an illusion.” Cheng urged Beijing to “stop this stupid competition very soon.” He also called on “the international community to express their concerns over China’s move, which would have negative impact on peace in the Taiwan Strait and in the region.” [22] Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Joseph Wu argued that the test “demonstrated that China has been trying to militarize the use of space and it is clearly against international interest, not just the interest of Taiwan.” [23]

Many Taiwanese interpreted Beijing’s action as directed primarily against them, as well as their closest military allies. The media cited the subsequent deployment of Chinese Jian-10 fighter jets to an air base only a few hundred miles from Taiwan as confirmation that Taiwan was indeed the main target of China’s test. [24] The test also came in the context of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-Bian’s repeated warnings about the growing number of ballistic missiles that China has deployed against the island. [25] The Taiwanese Ministry of Defense acknowledged that Taiwan had become less secure as a result of the ASAT test, the almost 1,000 missiles on the mainland aimed at Taiwan, and the dozens of new Jian-10 fighters based within range of Taiwanese airspace. [26]

Taiwanese military analysts feared that China’s successful ASAT test demonstrated all too vividly that Beijing possesses the ability to threaten the space-based assets that the U.S. military would depend on heavily to counter any Chinese intervention against Taiwan. They expressed alarm that, by neutralizing U.S. overhead reconnaissance capabilities, the Chinese military could now conduct a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan with minimal interference from a blinded U.S. military. In addition, Taiwan relies heavily on U.S. intelligence sources, including reconnaissance satellites, for information regarding military developments on the mainland. Pessimistic Taiwanese military analysts worried that these recent developments exposed Washington’s inability to protect the island from Chinese aggression. [27]

The English-language daily Taipei Times published an editorial arguing, “This incident demolishes the suggestion that the Chinese military and its Communist Party bosses can behave in an accountable, let alone responsible, manner in military and space affairs. In the wake of the North Korean nuclear test, this missile test suggests that Beijing has, if anything, taken on Pyongyang as a role model.” The editorial also claimed that China was "playing the Pentagon for a pack of fools" by not informing the United States in advance of its test. [28]

Taiwan’s Deputy Defense Minister, Ko Cheng-en, speculated that the missile test represented in part a warning to both Japan and the United States to avoid interfering in Taiwan-related security issues. He noted that the test and the Jian-10 redeployment that occurred soon after could be seen as a response to the latest “2+2” meeting between the U.S. secretaries of defense and state with their two Japanese counterparts. [29] Chinese analysts have expressed concerns that the United States and Japan are expanding the scope of their alliance, especially through plans to develop a cooperative ballistic missile defense system, to encompass the defense of Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry maintained that these concerns for Taiwan’s security were exaggerated. Maj. Gen. Wang, deputy chief of general staff for intelligence, stressed that China’s ability to destroy one of its own satellites does not necessarily equate with a capability to target other countries’ satellites, since China would be expected to know the trajectory of its own satellites with much greater precision. In addition, attacking other countries’ satellites was fraught with the risk of escalation. [30]

Australia: Cites Impact on Space Arms Race, Missile Defenses
Australia assumed a particularly high profile in seeking an explanation from the Chinese government for the ASAT test. After learning of the launch, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade summoned the Chinese Ambassador to Canberra confirm and explain the incident. Ambassador Fu Yin claimed she was unaware of the test and only offered to seek further information from Beijing. [31]

At the time of the test, Australia Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer was meeting with the new U.N. Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in New York. Offering his own assessment, Downer said that “a capacity to shoot down satellites in outer space is not consistent with . . . the traditional Chinese position of opposition to the militarization of outer space.” [32] Downer further complained about the potential economic costs of the test, especially the possible damage to other satellites passing through the debris cloud. [33] Finally, Downer warned that the Chinese test could lead to an arms race in space “where other countries including the U.S., I suppose, would have to start to look for ways of protecting satellites in space.” [34]

Kevin Rudd, the leader of the opposition Australian Labor Party, complained: “Ballistic missile targeting of satellites in space, is in my view inherently destabilising in the strategic order.” He added, however, that the United States was partly responsible for the incident, insisting that, “In the past Labor has warned about the problems which can arise from various proposals concerning new strategic orders arising from ballistic missile defence systems and consequential behaviour by other nuclear weapon states.” [35]

Greg Sheridan, political analyst for The Australian newspaper, also interpreted the Chinese action as aimed at the United States, along with Taiwan: “Most of China's massive military build-up in recent years has had two things in mind—Taiwan and the U.S.” He also saw the test as evidence that China was determined to neutralize U.S. intelligence capabilities in a conflict. [36]

The Chinese test has also placed Australia’s limited space assets at risk. In 1967, Australia became the fourth country to launch a satellite from its own territory, but in the 1970s it abandoned this capacity. It was only in 2002 that another Australian-built satellite, Fedsat, was launched, from Japan. Unlike some 40 other countries, Australia does not have a space agency. It is also not a partner in the International Space Station. [37]

Western Europe: Militarization of Space Feared, Test Seen as Response to U.S. Missile Defense Efforts
The European Union issued a formal statement of concern about the Chinese ASAT test. The statement described the Chinese action as a threat to space security and as contradicting international endeavors to prevent an arms race in space. The declaration affirmed Europe’s support for peaceful exploration and use of outer space, “carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries.” It also called on all countries to adhere to international law and explicitly urged China to adopt the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles. [39]

Upon learning of the test, a British government spokesperson said that, although British officials did not believe the Chinese action had violated international law, the test was nevertheless “inconsistent” with earlier statements China had made against the use of space for military purposes. Speaking on behalf of Tony Blair, the spokesperson also complained about China’s “lack of consultation” regarding the test, as well as the impact of the debris produced by the collision. [40] Representatives of the British peace movement also denounced the test. A member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) said that China’s action had violated the terms of the proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty that the Chinese government had long advocated. CND official Kate Hudson said that the test had underscored the urgency of adopting the PAROS Treaty, despite American opposition. [41]

The French media roundly criticized the ASAT test for placing other sophisticated equipment in space at risk. One commentary belittled Chinese claims that the test did not conflict with Chinese commitment to the peaceful use of outer space. “A country that is able to annihilate a satellite in orbit with a ballistic missile launched from the ground is definitely a threat.” [42] French analysts concluded that Beijing was seeking to exploit a potential American military vulnerability, given the Pentagon’s dependence on satellites for reconnaissance and communication. [43] Some media coverage interpreted the test as an attempt to warn the United States about its pursuit of a space-based antimissile system. [44] Other French observers stated that China’s action underscored the absence of international arms control agreements regarding ASAT activities. [45] The spokesperson for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Baptiste Mattei, reaffirmed France’s opposition to the militarization of space. [46]

Conclusions
While many U.S. friends and allies expressed concerns about the global issue of militarizing space, for most, the greatest anxiety appeared to be focused on whether China’s newly demonstrated ASAT capability would impede the United States in fulfilling its security commitments in time of crisis. It also appears that the test was widely seen as a provocative and unwelcome sign of Beijing’s growing assertiveness, which may set back improving Chinese bilateral relations with a number of states for some time to come.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute

Go to: Part II - Russia Walks a Fine Line in Assessing Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Test

Go to: Part III - India Reacts Cautiously to China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test