On January 19, 2007, King Abdullah II of Jordan announced in an interview with the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz that his country would pursue a peaceful civilian nuclear program for energy production. [1] The announcement received widespread attention at home and abroad, including an offer from Pakistan to assist Jordan in the construction of a nuclear power plant.

Announcement Echoes Those of Other Arab States
The Jordanian monarch’s announcement came amid similar declarations by a growing number of other Arab Middle East countries over the past year, all seemingly intended, at least in part, as a response to Iran’s nuclear program and that country’s resistance to UN demands that it halt its uranium enrichment activities. (See related stories in past issues of WMD Insights. [2]) Uranium enrichment is potentially capable of providing Iran with material for nuclear weapons. In his interview with Ha’aretz, King Abdullah declared that “the rules have changed on the nuclear subject throughout the whole region.” [3] He continued that, “while Jordan was saying, ‘We would like to have a nuclear-free zone in the area,’ after this summer, everybody's going for nuclear programs.” [4] Abdullah underscored the need for transparency as these programs progressed, stating that “nuclear power in the Middle East, including Israel, must be developed under effective international control.” [5]

As if to confirm Abdullah’s remarks about growing interest in nuclear energy throughout the region, on January 28, 2007, Abderrahman Al-Attiyya, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), noted that a feasibility study commissioned upon the announcement of a joint GCC nuclear program in 2006 would be presented to the next GCC summit scheduled for late 2007. [6] In early February, the Emir of Kuwait, Sabah Ahmed Al-Sabah, further elaborated that the GCC countries are planning to build a nuclear reactor that will serve the entire region. [7]

Additional Details Emerge
Three days after King Abdullah’s interview, Mahmoud Aleiss, the Jordanian Ministry of Energy spokesperson, announced the formation of a commission to study the technical needs for nuclear electricity production and the construction of a 600 megawatt reactor. [8] This project aims to meet rising electricity demand in Jordan, which is expected to grow by 4.8 percent annually, until the year 2020. In furtherance of its nuclear plans, the government issued a law regulating nuclear energy and its use in the industrial, agricultural, and medical fields, as well as in water desalinization. [9] Jordan is also planning to exploit its uranium deposits to provide the raw material for nuclear reactor fuel and has already requested bids from international companies to explore the uranium resources available in its phosphate deposits. [10]

In this regard, in early February, Maaroof Al Bakheet, the Jordanian prime minister, reported that a Kazakh delegation had recently completed a survey of Jordanian uranium deposits, and a Canadian and a South African company were reported to have entered a joint bid to prospect for and extract uranium. [11] However, while foreign companies have helped evaluate the deposits, it is likely that a Jordanian state-owned company will have exclusive rights to mine and process the material. [12]

One former advisor to the monarchy, Adnan Oudeh, added that Jordan required nuclear power to “build a competitive economy.” He emphasized that “Jordan has the human resources for this, we have the scientists, but we are in need [of nuclear power] more than the other Arab countries because we are a country without a power supply.” [13]

Domestic Political Reactions
A wide range of political forces in Jordan expressed their support for the nuclear project. The Arabic online news service, al-Moheet, reported, for example, that a Jordanian Communist Party official expressed the support of his party for the nuclear program. [14] Similarly, Raheel Al-Gharayba, the spokesperson of the Islamic Action Party, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood political arm and the main opposition party, said, “We appreciate the call of King Abdullah to develop a nuclear program.” He added that “This issue is a matter of national unanimity and … is the answer for energy-starved Jordan.” [15] Apparently referring to Israel, Al-Gharayba continued that his party encouraged all Arab countries, individually or as a group, to acquire nuclear technology, “because the enemy number one of the Arab and Islamic world already owns this technology, including its military branch, which it uses to threaten our security and stability.” [16] One retired Jordanian major-general, Mohammed Shiyyab, who now directs the Amman-based Cooperative Monitoring Center, also alluded to the potential strategic dimensions of a nuclear energy program, which can provide the technological basis for a subsequent nuclear weapons program. He stated that the reasoning behind the recent Jordanian announcement was obvious: “Of course these announcements by Arab leaders are connected to the Iranian nuclear program.… When Israel and Iran have nuclear weapons, then it is only logical that Arab countries would collaborate to develop their own nuclear capabilities.” [17]

Whether the general public in Jordan will be as enthusiastic is less certain. According to a December 2005 survey conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 18 nations around the world, “Support for nuclear power is highest in South Korea, the United States, and India, where clear pluralities support the building of new nuclear plants. In Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Cameroon, pluralities prefer that all existing plants be shut down.” The report continued that, “in Jordan…as many as 41 percent …believe that nuclear power is dangerous.” [18] Public support for a Jordanian nuclear program may have increased since the study was conducted, however, given nuclear developments in Iran and other Arab states during the interim.

Reactions Abroad
Washington seems to have accepted Jordan’s announcement of its nuclear development plans without protest. Following King Abdullah’s January 19 interview, Deputy State Department spokesman Tom Casey stated that any country loyal to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) “has the right to develop civilian nuclear power for the benefit of [its] people.” [19] Jordan has been a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty since 1970.

In a development that may not be as well received in Washington, however, the Jordanian News Agency Amoon reported that a visit by Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf to Jordan in late January 2007 led to a “Pakistani promise for technical assistance in the construction of a peaceful nuclear reactor.” [20] The United States has opposed ending a decades-long nuclear embargo on Pakistan because of concerns that the nuclear smuggling network led by Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan has not been fully uprooted. [21] As a result, Washington is unlikely to welcome nuclear cooperation agreements between Pakistan and other states that appear to endorse Pakistan as a worthy nuclear trading partner. One Saudi Arabian newspaper, however, suggested that the United States was prepared to encourage the Jordan-Pakistan nuclear connection. The paper reported that “a source at the Jordanian Royal Court has confirmed…a promise by Pakistan to help Jordan build a nuclear reactor for civilian purposes…. The Jordanian official request to Pakistan came following U.S. approval…[of] Jordan’s interest in acquiring civilian nuclear technology. The source pointed out that talks were previously held between the three sides in this regard.” [22]

In Iran, analysts focused on the contrast between Washington’s support for the nuclear plans of the GCC, Egypt, Morocco, and now Jordan, and U.S. opposition to Iran’s nuclear development. One Iranian analyst warned that Washington and Europe were supporting Arab states’ quest for nuclear technology to advance Western interests. He argued that Western countries to date have “failed to arrange a front in the region against Iran’s nuclear activities; thus, they are trying to express their support for Arab countries’ nuclear activities so that they can make the Arabs feel the need for nuclear technology…. They want to show that the Arabs have been caught in the nuclear competition that Iran has created, not that they are interested in modern science…. The West has expressed its support for the Arab countries so that it can not only gain privileges, but also prevent them from having relations with other powers.” [23] The last comment was apparently a reference to a reported December 2006 offer by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to share Iranian peaceful nuclear technology with Arab states. [24] To date, no Arab state, other than Algeria, has indicated interest in such an Iranian offer.

Finally, at least one analyst, in Israel, doubted the seriousness of the Jordanian announcement. Gerald Steinberg, a professor of political science at Bar Ilan University, said that the Jordanian nuclear program “makes no sense...They don’t have those kind of energy requirements and won’t for generations to come.” Instead, he viewed the announcement as another layer of “pressure on the international community to take the Iranian threat seriously.” [25]

Jordanian Analyst Points to Risks and Benefits of the Program
Batir Mohammed Ali Wardam, a journalist, writing in the pro-government Amman-based daily Addustour, focused on the practical aspects of Jordan’s launching a nuclear energy program. He stated that the challenge facing Jordan “consists in raising its own funds for such a program… especially when the country suffers from a significant budget deficit.” [26] Wardam added that by embarking on such a program, the Jordanian government owed it to the population to develop and enforce stringent security measures. He questioned the ability of the government to meet these requirements because of favoritism. He also expressed the concern that favoritism would allow less qualified individuals to be in charge of very sensitive tasks, thereby exposing the nation to high risks. [27] In addition, he stated, the region of Sawaqa, the potential future site of the nuclear power plant, lacks the appropriate infrastructure to protect the environment from nuclear waste.

He pointed out, however, that such a program can also offer lucrative business opportunities. For example, if Saudi Arabia financed the project and Jordan provided a site, uranium from phosphate deposits, and the necessary technical know-how, Amman could profit by selling nuclear-generated electricity to neighboring countries. [28] Wardam added that Jordan could also benefit from the U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership program, under which countries with advanced nuclear capabilities provide fresh nuclear reactor fuel and recovery of spent fuel to nations that agree to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. While this partnership does not allow developing countries to enrich their own uranium, it offers a viable and economical alternative. Joining the partnership would give Jordan better access to international financing for its nuclear program. [29]

Conclusion
The announcement of the Jordanian nuclear program appears to be further confirmation of a “domino effect” in the region, as one Arab state after another seeks to develop technological capabilities that could eventually be used to counter those of Iran, should that nation proceed to develop nuclear weapons. Today, Jordan and other Arab countries can argue convincingly that their pursuit of nuclear energy is solely for non-military purposes. However, the announcement of so many new programs could also portend a new era of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East in the decades ahead.


Khalid Hilal and Leah Kuchinsky - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies