On February 15, 2007, Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluevski declared that Russia was considering whether to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. [1] The INF Treaty, which was signed in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, provided for the elimination of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers and banned development, testing, production, and deployment of land-based missiles within that range. Elimination of weapons mandated by the treaty was completed in 1991, and while the inspection regime ended in 2001, the agreement is of unlimited duration.

As reasons for withdrawal from the INF Treaty, Baluevski cited development of intermediate-range missiles by countries other than the United States and Russia – Iran, Israel, and North Korea are known to possess such systems – and the deployment of U.S. missile defense systems in Europe. “What [the U.S. is] doing,” he said, “by creating the third missile defense deployment area in Europe, cannot be explained.” (The two other deployment areas are in Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.) Although the INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, Baluevski noted, each party can withdraw from it if that party provides a convincing explanation that it is doing so because, in the words of Article XV of the treaty, “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.” The final decision on whether Russia would exercise this right, the Chief of the General Staff continued, is contingent upon U.S. actions with regard to deployment of a missile defense system in proximity to Russia. [2]

This is not the first time the Russian Ministry of Defense has raised the possibility of unilateral withdrawal from the INF Treaty. During a meeting with then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Alaska in August 2006, the then-Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov raised this issue and gave the same justifications – development of intermediate-range missiles by countries that were not parties to the INF Treaty and the deployment of U.S. missile defense near Russia. (See “Russia Miilitary Debates Withdrawal form the INF Treaty” in the October 2006 issue of WMD Insights.)

Baluevski’s statement was made at a moment of transition: the same day, President Vladimir Putin transferred Sergey Ivanov to the position of First Vice-Premier and appointed Anatoliy Serduykov, the former head of the Federal Tax Service, as Russia’s new minister of defense. In this context, it is possible that the Chief of the General Staff’s declaration about the INF Treaty also represented an effort to promote a greater policymaking role for Russia’s uniformed services before Serduykov was fully in command of his new responsibilities.

An unnamed source in the Ministry of Defense said that Russia could pursue two options if it decided to abrogate the INF Treaty. One option would be to resume the production of SS-20 (“Pioneer”) missiles, which were banned in 1987 and subsequently eliminated. Technically, this would not be difficult because the SS-20 is very similar to the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which is currently produced at Russia’s Votkinsk plant, the facility that formerly produced the SS-20. If this option were chosen, the SS-20 could be slightly modified to incorporate recent technological innovations. Another option would be to increase the range of the new Iskander-E tactical missile, whose current range is 280 kilometers. Production of the Iskander-E began only a few years ago. [3]

Although there is little doubt that both of these options are technologically feasible, it appears unlikely that the Russian government would be prepared to commit the necessary funds to support renewed production of intermediate-range systems. Even production of existing strategic weapons, which is considered a high priority, suffers from limited funding: for example, only seven Topol-M ICBMs will be purchased in 2007, and only 69 Topol-Ms are to be purchased by 2015. [4]

Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who signed the INF Treaty, strongly objected to the proposal to abrogate it. He recalled that the main reason for concluding the treaty was the need to remove U.S. intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe, whose flight time to Russia was measured in minutes. Abrogation of the INF Treaty could lead to the return of this threat. [5] Aleksandr Pikaev, a researcher from the Moscow-based Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), shared Gorbachev’s view, noting that if U.S. intermediate-range missiles were again deployed in Europe, the risk of a surprise strike against Russia could significantly increase. [6]

Former Chief of Staff of Strategic Rocket Forces Col.-Gen. Viktor Yesin went even further and suggested that in response to deployment of intermediate-range missiles by Russia, the United States might deploy missiles in the Baltic states. He noted that the flight-time of these missiles would be considerably shorter than that of American missiles deployed in Germany in the 1980s, which were regarded then as a major threat. [7]

It is also possible that Baluevski’s February 15 statement, like previous Russian comments regarding INF withdrawal, was predominantly intended to convey a political message, rather than to signal that Russia is on the verge of pulling out of the pact. The intended message could be to warn countries where elements of a U.S. missile defense system might be deployed, including the Czech Republic and Poland, that their security is more likely to be diminished rather than enhanced if they agree to such deployment.

Baluevski may also have sought to send a message to U.S. decision-makers that the justification Washington has offered for deploying missile defenses in Eastern Europe, namely that the systems are directed toward Iran, is not being accepted in Moscow. It remains to be seen whether renewed U.S. efforts in late February 2007 to change Russian attitudes on the subject will succeed. [8]

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies