The possible deployment of U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic has recently become a top agenda item in European security deliberations. The positions of the various European governments will have a decisive impact on the integration of U.S. bilateral initiatives with NATO’s other BMD programs. The European debate over BMD will also affect how Russia responds if the deployments proceed. In addition, the U.S. government has made clear that it may approach other European countries for assistance as the plans for the missile defense architecture evolve. [1]

Part I of this Special Report focuses on the views of Eastern European nations. Part II focuses on the views of Western European nations (“The View from Western Europe”).

NATO’s BMD Programs
NATO countries are now pursuing three separate, if interlinked, BMD initiatives. [2] First, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest decision making body, decided in March 2005 to construct an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) to defend NATO military forces and installations, wherever they operate, against short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks.

Second, NATO governments are considering how to protect the national territories and civilian populations of European members from missile attacks. Possible defense networks could include national, regional, and NATO-wide BMD systems, which might also include participation by Russia and other non-NATO members. This NATO evaluation entails a technical assessment of which systems might perform best under various scenarios. It also involves a political process to determine whether to undertake such an initiative, which countries might participate, and how it would be funded.

Third, the United States is pursuing bilateral initiatives with two NATO members to deploy a small number of U.S. ground-based midcourse interceptors, as well as their support infrastructure, at forward locations in Europe. In January 2007, U.S. officials formally proposed to the new Czech government the establishment of a BMD radar system, to be operated by American personnel, in the Jince military district southwest of Prague. [3] U.S. officials also announced that the United States and Poland would soon begin formal discussions about the possible deployment of U.S. BMD interceptor missiles at former airbases located near the Baltic towns of Czluchow, Koszalin, and Slupsk. [4] These systems would seek to defend the United States and Europe against long-range ballistic missile threats that could emerge in the Middle East, especially from Iran.

These negotiations involve legal and financial issues, as well as political-military questions. Topics include how much influence the host governments would have on missile interceptor launch decisions, the appropriate legal status of U.S. personnel working at the bases, and monetary and other compensation to the host nation. The American government would like the systems to become operational by 2012, the earliest date U.S. analysts believe Iran could develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. [5]

Moscow’s Reaction
Senior Russian government officials, military officers, and policy analysts have presented an escalating range of complaints regarding the planned deployment of U.S. missile defenses in former Soviet bloc states. First, they insist that the true objective of the deployments along Russia’s periphery is to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Second, they claim that the United States could deploy additional BMD systems besides the small number of interceptors currently under discussion. Third, they assert that the United States will use the pretext of defending the BMD assets to deploy additional military infrastructure close to Russia. Fourth, they fear that the United States could rapidly replace the defensive interceptors with offensive ballistic missiles that could attack targets in Russia. [6]

On March 21, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov concisely summarized Russian concerns: “Deploying the missile shield to cover the Caucasus, Ukraine and other countries bordering on Russia contradicts Russia’s approach to security.” [7]

Russian representatives have indicated they will take measures to avert or counter the deployments. On March 13, 2007, the commander of the Russian Air Force, Vladimir Mikhailov, stated in a meeting with foreign Air Force attaches that “everyone understands that they should not do it.” [8] Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, the commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, observed that, “I think mutual consultations that have been held and will be held will allow avoiding this.” [9]

Russian officials have complained that the briefings by U.S. officials have been insufficiently comprehensive or detailed. On March 6, Lavrov asserted, “Although meetings and briefings are being held on the issue, most of our questions have not received any clear answers.” [10] He subsequently characterized U.S. actions as reflecting “an old approach when our American colleagues decided something and then implemented their decisions proceeding from the assumption that others will have to accept something that has already happened.” [11] RIA Novosti political commentator Vladimir Simonov accused the Bush Administration of making a feigned effort at consultation with Moscow to appease worried Europeans. [12] The Russian envoy to NATO, General Konstantin Totsky, complained that rather than simply offering a briefing of what Washington plans to do, the United States and Russia need to hold discussions at the expert level to exchange opinions and take into account each other’s concerns. [13] Russian and American experts plan to engage in further discussions on the BMD issue at the NATO-Russia Council meeting in April. [14]

In addition, possibly to encourage a reversal of the planned deployments or to reassure anxious Russians’ about their security, some military officers have publicized Russia’s ability to attack any U.S. BMD site near Russia with ballistic missiles or warplanes. [15] Furthermore, Russian leaders have threatened to withdraw from certain arms control treaties, most notably the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, if the deployments ensue. [16] Such intermediate–range missiles, armed with conventional warheads, could prove useful in attacks against U.S. BMD assets in countries bordering Russia, as well as for other purposes. [17]

With such threats, Russian leaders might hope to intimidate possible host countries from accepting the proffered U.S. deployments. In addition, by indicating that U.S. BMD policies are threatening a major East-West crisis, Russian critics might hope to induce other NATO governments to pressure the United States and potential host governments to take steps–such as limiting the size of the deployments or granting Russian monitors extensive rights to inspect the launch sites–to assuage Russian concerns. Some people within Russia might also be seeking to use the BMD issue as a pretext to eliminate certain arms control agreements Moscow no longer supports or to justify additional defense spending. Finally, the negative response of many Czechs and Poles to Russian complaints about their hosting U.S. BMD assets has clearly distressed many Russians and deepened their suspicions about the purposes of the deployments.

Potential Host Governments Face Multiple Challenges

Governments Favorably Disposed Toward Deployment
The current center-right governments in Poland and the Czech Republic seem inclined to accept the U.S. proposal. On February 20, 2007, the Polish and Czech prime ministers, Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Miroslav Topolanek, expressed their joint support for the deployment at a meeting in Warsaw. Since “[i]t is in our joint interest to negotiate this initiative and to build the missile defense,” Topolanek argued, we “will probably give a positive response to the U.S. request.” [18] On March 28, the Czech Republic formally approved holding negotiations with the United States on the proposed radar base to be located on Czech territory, and U.S. Lt. Gen. Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, and other U.S. experts will visit the country in April to discuss the proposal. [19]

Overcoming Russian Concerns
Czech and Polish leaders have dismissed Russian claims that the envisaged U.S. BMD facilities could threaten Russia’s sizeable strategic arsenal. Kaczynski argued, “Any statement suggesting that the missile defense would change the alignment of forces in Europe is a misunderstanding.” [20] He added that the two governments “will attempt to persuade the Russians that which is obvious and which they of course realize–that this is in no way an installation directed at them.” [21] When he visited Washington in March 2007, Czech President Vaclav Klaus underscored to the press that senior U.S. officials had pledged to negotiate with Russia about the proposed deployments. [22]

Responding to Russian Threats
The extent to which Russian warnings of strained bilateral relations and hints that U.S. BMD facilities could become legitimate military targets will affect the planned deployments remains unclear. After General Solovtsov threatened to target any U.S. BMD systems stationed near Russia, Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg told the media that experience had taught the Czechs the need to “make clear to them [the Russians] you won’t succumb to blackmail.” [23] When Putin launched his February 10 tirade against NATO and the United States at the Munich Security Conference, Schwarzenberg complained, “Some people have not noticed that the Soviet Union no longer exists.” [24]

Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski characterized Russian threats as an attempt to establish that Poland still falls within Moscow’s area of special interest when international security issues arise: “We are talking about the status of Poland and Russia’s hopes that Poland will once again come under its sphere of influence.” [25] Kaczynski argued that, “following the deployment of a missile defense base here, the chances of such undue influence arising will be greatly reduced for at least several decades.” [26] Poland’s relations with Russia are especially strained at the moment, with acute differences over trade, energy, and other issues. [27]

Highlighting the Pan-European Dimension
Like their American counterparts, Polish and Czech leaders have stressed that the planned BMD systems would help defend other NATO countries besides their own. For example, in a joint article in the Polish daily Rzeczpospolita, Kaczynski and Topolanek insisted: “Joining the missile defense system will serve as passive protection from attacks ... for all members of the transatlantic community.” [28] Although Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg acknowledged that Iran did not present an immediate missile threat to Europe, he argued that the Iranians were making sufficient progress in mastering the relevant technologies to pose a threat in the near future. [29] The Polish military attaché in Moscow stated that Iran could have a ballistic missile with a range of over 6,000 kilometers by 2010. [30]

Lack of Public Support
Public opinion polls, however, show that the electorate in both Poland and the Czech Republic might reject the proffered U.S. BMD systems in a referendum. According to a survey conducted in Poland in early February, 55 percent of the Polish people oppose the deployment while only 28 percent support it. [31] A subsequent poll by the CBOS agency, a leading Polish public opinion research organization, confirmed this opposition, with 56 percent responding negatively to a question on their views regarding hosting U.S. BMD interceptors. [32] The most recent poll, published on March 19, 2007, found that 51 percent of the respondents definitely oppose the base and 28 percent would prefer not to host it. Only 30 percent support the proposed deployment of the BMD interceptors, with a mere 8 percent “definitely” backing it. [33]

The former Polish president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, told Polish TV that the U.S. proposal “is some kind of game which we should not participate in.” At a minimum, he argued, the Polish government should insist that the United States discuss the deployment issue thoroughly with the governments of Russia and the EU countries. [34] Other Poles complain about the costs Poland has paid for supporting past U.S. security initiatives, especially the war in Iraq, and the refusal of the U.S. government to relax visa regulations for Poles seeking to visit the United States. Even those Poles backing the deployment insist that the United States needs to compensate Poland by, for example, strengthening its national air defenses. [35]

In the Czech Republic, concern about the possibility of losing a referendum on the U.S. radar base led the government parties in mid-March to vote in the Czech legislature against holding a ballot on the BMD issue. [36] An early March poll by the Center for Public Opinion Research (CVVM) found that 61 percent of the respondents opposed the proposed U.S. BMD radar base and 73 percent wanted the government to hold a referendum on the issue. [37] Another early March survey conducted by the STEM agency, a second respected Czech polling firm, found that 70 percent of Czech respondents objected to the radar. [38]

The proposed U.S. radar station has sharply divided the leading Czech political parties. The main governing party, the Civic Democrats, support the proposal as a bilateral initiative. The main opposition party, the Social Democrats, condition their endorsement on achieving a NATO agreement on the project. The Christian Democrats and the Greens, who serve as junior members in the ruling coalition, want the radar issue discussed within both NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, they voted with the government in the legislature to defeat the proposed popular referendum on the issue. Finally, the opposition Communists strongly object to stationing U.S. BMD radar on Czech territory. [39]

Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg believes that the Czechs would view the proposed deployments more favorably if the U.S. Congress agreed to include their country in the Visa Waiver Program. [40] Nevertheless, an early February poll by RCA Research, a Prague-based market research firm, found that most respondents would still reject the U.S. BMD radar station, even if the U.S. government allowed Czechs to visit the United States without a visa. [41]

The U.S. proposal to exempt American service personnel based in host countries from local laws may be contributing to popular concerns about the proposed facilities. East Europeans had very unpleasant experiences with Soviet military bases on their territories during the Cold War. In addition, since the proposal is a bilateral rather than a NATO-wide initiative, some pro-European or anti-American groups might oppose it.

To circumvent the latter problem, some Czech political leaders have called for the facilities to come under NATO rather than exclusively U.S. command. [42] A recent public opinion poll shows popular support for such a NATO-led command arrangement. [43] Schwarzenberg countered that, while other European countries ideally would help fund the BMD systems, EU parliaments would likely take an unacceptably long time before making the decision to make “significant” financial contributions. [44]

Strengthening Security Ties with Washington
Although many Czechs and Poles want to avoid further worsening their relations with Moscow, they also want to strengthen their ties with the United States against potential military threats from Russia and other sources. The Czech and Polish defense communities appear to value the prospective American bases primarily because they would supplement their NATO security guarantees. The presence of U.S. troops might help deter Russian military threats by acting as an escalatory “trip-wire.” If a hypothetical Russian attack resulted in American casualties, the response in Washington almost certainly would become more vigorous. In addition, Czech Deputy Defense Minister Karel Bartak maintains that constructing a U.S.-operated BMD radar on Czech territory would help ensure that American missile defense systems would protect the Czech Republic and its neighbors from potential missile attacks. [45]

Reacting to West European Criticism
Although complaints have been raised in some West European countries about the envisaged deployments, these criticisms could easily prove counterproductive by provoking a nationalist reaction. During an early March visit to NATO headquarters, Topolanek complained, “As for the 18 EU member states who host U.S. military bases, it is not up to them to comment on the existence of such a presence in the Czech Republic.” [46]

Diverging Opinions of Other Former Soviet Bloc States
Other former Soviet bloc politicians have expressed diverging opinions of the Polish and Czech decisions to consider hosting U.S. BMD systems. Lithuania’s Deputy Foreign Minister said: “What’s good for Polish security is good for Lithuania’s.” [47] Jan Carnogursky, a former prime minister of Slovakia, however, noted that the U.S. BMD deployments would disrupt the balance of power and “could lead to a new ‘cold war’.” [48]

The governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have denied reports in the Russian media that the United States has proposed deploying a BMD radar on their territories. [49] Although representatives of the Russian government and military have warned that the deployment of U.S. BMD systems in the Caucasus would deepen Russian concerns about the threatening nature of the U.S. BMD program in Europe, members of the Georgian government and legislature have readily volunteered that they might favorably consider such a request since it would strengthen their security ties with the United States. [50]

Ukrainian officials appear split on the proposed U.S. BMD deployments, as they do on other U.S.-Russian security disputes. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko told the Polish media that, while Ukraine would seek to learn more of the American plans through consultations with the United States, Poland had the right to decide for itself whether it wanted to deploy U.S. BMD facilities on its territory. [51] He also expressed general support for BMD systems: “If every territory, every state has defense systems, I underline—defense, then interests of peace will benefit.” [52]

Ukraine’s Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovich, has argued the United States should have engaged in more extensive consultations with Ukraine and Russia before deciding on the deployments. [53] He indicated, however, that Ukraine deserved to participate in any debate over European BMD architecture “because it has facilities on its territory, which could perform relevant functions.” [54]

Lieutenant General Henry Obering, director of the Missile Defense Agency, visited Ukraine on March 14, 2007, to discuss the planned BMD deployments. At a news conference, he denied that the United States had sought to deploy BMD assets in Ukraine. [55] On March 22, the Ukrainian parliament issued a statement expressing concerns over the possible U.S. BMD deployments in Europe. The declaration, instigated by the Communist Party, stated, “The implementation of these plans threatens Ukraine’s national security.” [56]

Conclusion
The bilateral negotiations between the United States and Poland and the Czech Republic, the two countries most likely to host U.S. BMD deployments, will involve complex legal, financial, and political-military issues. The two Eastern European governments have expressed support in principle for the U.S. initiative, but they face serious obstacles in two crucial areas: first, Russian officials adamantly oppose the proposed deployments and second, popular opinion in both countries remains unsupportive.

At present, it is unclear whether the Polish and Czech governments can overcome this resistance, especially since several other NATO countries appear lukewarm regarding the envisaged BMD deployments. (See “Special Report Part II: The View From Western Europe” in this issue of WMD Insights.)

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute