On March 5, 2007, the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) concluded their 102nd session in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. During the meeting, the participating governments discussed the status of the GCC nuclear initiative launched the previous December, which was to study the feasibility of employing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. At the end of the summit, they issued a joint communiqué that addressed a number of WMD-related issues. First, the declaration reaffirmed their governments’ desire to maintain a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. Second, they simultaneously called for a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue while urging Iran to continue its dialogue on the topic. Third, the statement demanded that Israel join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and open its nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection. Finally, the foreign ministers declared that the GCC would continue to pursue a research and development program aimed at applying nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as discussed in December 2006. [1]

Background
At the December summit in Riyadh, the GCC Supreme Council — consisting of the heads of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman — instructed the GCC secretariat to study the feasibility of employing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in accord with international regulations and standards. The GCC declaration followed statements by Egyptian officials in September 2006 that their country planned to restart its civilian nuclear power program, largely dormant since the mid-1980s. [2] In a January 19, 2007, interview with the Israeli daily newspaper Ha’aretz, King Abdullah II of Jordan indicated that the Jordanian government also intended to start a peaceful nuclear energy program. [3]

Until their December 2006 meeting, the six GCC governments had shown only limited interest in developing nuclear technologies, despite longstanding concerns about a probable Israeli nuclear weapons program. Analysts have generally seen the recent Egyptian, Jordanian, and GCC initiatives, however, as at least partly responding to Iran’s progress in developing a nuclear program with military overtones. Saudi commentator Salih Bin-Sab’an wrote that, whatever Iran’s rights and intentions, the Arab reaction to its nuclear program shows that the program “casts a long shadow over the region’s security and stability.” [4] Mustafa Alani, director of national security at the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center, complained, “The Iranians have left us no option, so this is our answer to them.” He added: “Arabs have no choice but to start a program under a civilian banner. You need to build the know-how, and know-how always starts with a civilian program.” [5]

Statements by certain Arab leaders after the GCC announcement have confirmed these suspicions about the recent interest Arab governments have shown in pursuing nuclear technologies. In early January 2007, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak maintained, “We don’t want nuclear arms in the area but we are obligated to defend ourselves. We will have to have the appropriate weapons. It is irrational that we sit and watch from the sidelines when we might be attacked at any moment.” [6] Two weeks later, King Abdullah observed, “The rules have changed on the nuclear subject throughout the whole region. Where I think Jordan was saying ‘we’d like to have a nuclear-free zone in the area’, after this summer, everybody’s going for nuclear programs.” [7]

Although Iranian officials describe their activities as directed at developing civilian nuclear power, many security experts in the region suspect Tehran also seeks to establish the basis for rapidly developing nuclear weapons if the government decides to do so. [8] On the closing day of the March 2007 GCC summit, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal criticized Iran’s nuclear policies for placing “an additional burden” on the Gulf states, though he reaffirmed the need to avert a military confrontation between Iran and the United States over the issue. [9] Al-Faisal suggested that the GCC hoped its transparent and peaceful nuclear initiative would encourage other countries to pursue nuclear technology in a similarly open and peaceful manner. [10]

GCC Nuclear Plans and Progress
At present, the GCC has not established a firm timeline for its nuclear energy program. [11] In early February, Abderrahman Al-Attiyya, the GCC Secretary General who serves concurrently as Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy and Industry, told Gulf News that the GCC hopes to begin construction of a nuclear power plant by 2009. In the same interview, he indicated the GCC would hire an international consulting firm and within two years, would start its nuclear energy program if the GCC governments approve the use of this energy source. [12]

This schedule may be overly ambitious. Countries without an existing nuclear power program typically need as long as a decade to start producing nuclear power. [13] Although the decision to undertake a collective program will allow GCC members to pool people, technology, and finances, the experience in Europe and other regions shows that major multinational enterprises often suffer from delays while seeking the consent of all the participants. Furthermore, the GCC has had difficulties in achieving progress on other joint projects (e.g., adopting common customs procedures or a common currency).

GCC members insist that their program would pursue only the peaceful application of nuclear power and would avoid what Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal called Israel’s “original sin” of constructing a nuclear reactor solely to produce nuclear bombs. [14] Al-Attiyya declared that the GCC countries planned to use nuclear power only for legal purposes, such as meeting their growing demands for electricity production, assisting with water desalination, and promoting agriculture. [15]

GCC Seeks IAEA Involvement to Underscore Initiative’s Peaceful Purposes
In February 2007, Al-Attiyya affirmed the GCC countries’ intention to develop their nuclear program within the NPT and according to the safeguard regime supervised by the IAEA. He insisted, “Our nuclear programme will be in accordance with international criteria and full transparency. That’s why we went to the IAEA.” [16] Al-Attiyya has said that the GCC desired to engage the IAEA in its program from the beginning since its involvement would make clear the GCC’s commitment to pursuing “a transparent process, within international standards.” [17]

The IAEA normally assists national governments seeking to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes as long as they adhere to the NPT and other nuclear nonproliferation norms and agreements. The GCC countries have worked with the IAEA for years on the national level in such areas as medicine and basic scientific research, but the December 2006 collective initiative has expanded contact between the agency and the GCC Secretariat, which is coordinating the initiative.

On February 22, Al-Attiyya briefed the IAEA director, Dr. Mohammad ElBaradei, and the agency’s technical staff on the proposed GCC nuclear energy program. He also requested IAEA assistance with developing the preliminary study, determining the required infrastructure, and assuring the appropriate training of GCC nuclear personnel. [18] In March, Al-Attiyya told reporters that the IAEA had agreed that its nuclear experts would meet with those of the GCC countries to “discuss the framework, terms of reference, and all the points that might be required for the feasibility study.” [19]

External Reaction to the Initiative Mixes Formal Support with Concerned Comments
Iran’s defiant pursuit of its nuclear program in the face of international threats and sanctions has made it harder for foreign governments to criticize the more limited nuclear activities of its Arab rivals. [20] U.S. officials have indicated that they will assist the GCC to develop civilian nuclear power. On January 23, 2007, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns told an audience at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai that the United States favored international nuclear energy cooperation since it helped counter global warming and concerns about the supply of energy. [21] American policymakers deny that the United States is employing double standards in its approach towards nuclear energy programs in the Middle East. They justify their opposition to Iran’s activities on the grounds that Tehran has been violating the NPT. U.S. officials maintain that, in contrast, Egypt, Jordan, and the GCC have affirmed their intent to adhere to nonproliferation rules and norms.

The Russian government, perhaps seeing a useful commercial opportunity to assist its plans to revitalize the country’s nuclear energy program, has expressed strong support for the nuclear energy aspirations of Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and the GCC states. When he visited Saudi Arabia in February, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered Russian assistance for the Gulf nuclear programs. [22] During a trip to the United Arab Emirates that same month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov affirmed Russia’s support for the GCC nuclear energy programs since the GCC members planned to proceed in accord with their NPT requirements and under IAEA supervision. [23] Putin and other Russian officials have previously proposed creating multinational enrichment centers, including in Russia, which would provide uranium fuel to NPT members who cooperate with the IAEA. [24]

Representatives of the civilian nuclear power industry have also seen commercial opportunities in the GCC declaration. The Chairman of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, Lady Barbara Thomas Judge, stated that a GCC nuclear program would contribute to the worldwide renaissance of nuclear power because of the Gulf countries’ oil wealth and the limited opportunities available in GCC states for the expression of public opposition to nuclear power programs. [25]

Some observers interpret the GCC initiative as an attempt to generate alarm among non-regional governments (including Russia, Western Europe, and the United States) and international security institutions (the IAEA and other UN bodies) about nuclear proliferation trends in the Gulf region and thereby cause them to redouble their efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. [26] In an unguarded comment to major Western newspapers that he later sought to retract, French President Jacques Chirac expressed his fear that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, while perhaps not a direct threat, could prove extremely destabilizing by provoking a cascading nuclear arms race in the Middle East: “Why wouldn’t Saudi Arabia do it? Why wouldn’t it help Egypt to do so as well? That is the real danger.” [27]

Although the GCC members have repeatedly — including at the March summit — called on Israel to renounce nuclear weapons and place its own nuclear energy program under IAEA supervision, certain Israelis have viewed the GCC announcement (if not the development of GCC nuclear energy) positively because they also believe it is primarily directed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program. [28]

Conclusion
Most of the international community has publicly supported the GCC nuclear initiative. The envisaged program does not represent an immediate proliferation threat because the six member countries have only begun to examine how they might use nuclear technologies. They have yet to address such questions as which members would finance projects, where they might be located, and whether joint facilities would be administered collectively. In addition, GCC officials have not expressed intent to pursue the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. Furthermore, the progress Iran has achieved in advancing its own nuclear program has both galvanized its neighbors into taking similar actions and made it easier for them to justify doing so. Finally, the GCC states have pledged to eschew a nuclear weapons program and adhere to international nonproliferation rules and norms embodied in the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. In recent years, the leaders of the governments and civilian nuclear power producers of Europe, Russia, and the United States have generally supported programs aimed at promoting civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Nevertheless, the perceived link between the Iranian nuclear program and the GCC initiative has reinforced alarm about an incipient nuclear arms race in the Middle East between a radical Shiite Iranian regime and a generally pro-Western, Sunni Arab bloc. [29] Even if intended primarily to pressure the international community to restrain Iran’s nuclear program, the GCC initiative, like the parallel Egyptian and Jordanian moves, might aim to position these states to hedge against a breakdown of the nuclear nonproliferation regime by narrowing the technological gap between their nuclear expertise and that of Iran. The GCC initiative could also provide its members with technical capabilities useful for breaking out of the NPT should their future governments decide to do so. Perhaps most worrisome, some GCC countries suffer from terrorism, sectarian strife, and other sources of internal conflict, raising the issue of the safety and security of any new nuclear materials and technologies.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute