 The twelve-day confrontation following Iran’s March 23, 2007, seizure of 15 British sailors momentarily diverted attention from the ongoing negotiations aimed at circumscribing Iran’s nuclear program. In the forefront are actions by the UN Security Council under Resolutions 1737 (adopted December 23, 2006) and 1747 (adopted March 24, 2007), imposing economic sanctions on Iran for its failure to halt sensitive nuclear activities, in particular, pursuit of uranium enrichment that could provide it access to weapons-usable nuclear materials.
EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, met again on April 25, in Turkey, to discuss under what conditions the parties might resume negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. [1] Solana proposed a “double suspension,” whereby Iran would agree to halt its uranium enrichment activities and the EU and the UN would suspend their sanctions, pending achievement of a more enduring settlement. [2] To encourage Iranian moderation, on April 23, the EU foreign ministers imposed additional sanctions against Iran’s political-military leadership, including a more extensive arms embargo and travel ban than provided for in existing UN resolutions. Although both sides spoke positively about the talks, little progress was apparent. [3]
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has indicated that his government will continue its refusal to abandon uranium enrichment. He has also accused the EU of adhering too closely to U.S. preferences: “If the EU is to play a relevant role in international affairs, it should be independent. If the EU wants to interpret U.S. statements to us, we do not need this.” [4] Should Iran nevertheless agree to suspend these activities and begin negotiations on a lasting resolution of the crisis, the three European Union governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the so-called EU-3) are likely to play a leading role.
From October 2003 to late 2005, the three governments had been instrumental in persuading Iran to freeze controversial aspects of its nuclear program as part of a negotiation in which, in return for a permanent termination of these activities, the three offered to assist Iran in developing its civilian nuclear energy programs and to enhance cooperation in confidence-building measures and regional security arrangements, trade and investment, economic and technical issues, and countering terrorism and drug trafficking. [5] Under then newly-elected President Ahmadinejad – who adopted a strongly anti-Western stance on this and other issues – Iran rejected this offer and subsequently took steps to restart its enrichment activities, leading the EU-3 to announce in early January 2006 that their negotiations with Tehran had reached a “dead end.” [6] Iran’s continued refusal to halt its sensitive nuclear activities, which it had hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 18 years in violation of Iran’s obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), led the UN Security Council on July 31, 2006, to adopt Resolution 1696 demanding that Iran cease this work. When Iran refused to comply, the Council adopted the resolutions noted above, imposing sanctions on Tehran with the hope that these penalties would lead it to suspend such activities and negotiate a permanent resolution of the crisis.
Against this backdrop, the parties to possible future negotiations are now reassessing their positions, policies, and negotiating strategies. The following review examines the evolving views of the EU as a whole, as well as those of each of the EU-3 governments. [7]
Recent Developments
On April 9, 2007, Iran celebrated “National Nuclear Day,” the first anniversary of the country’s success in enriching small amounts of uranium at its Natanz enrichment facility. On the occasion, President Ahmadinejad made a televised speech from Natanz in which he said, “I proudly announce that as of today, Iran is among the countries which produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.” [8] Ahmadinejad reiterated that Iran would “resist pressures from the great powers” and would “defend its nuclear rights to the end.” [9]
At the event, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the
head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, told the international media that they should not underestimate Iran’s capabilities or intentions. Aghazadeh claimed Iran had injected uranium hexafluoride gas into some 3,000 gas centrifuges, and that it would soon put some 50,000 centrifuges into operation. [10] This would give it the capacity to manufacture considerable nuclear reactor fuel – or several nuclear bombs – each year. At the same time, Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Iranian National Security Council and Iran’s chief negotiator on nuclear matters, threatened to follow the Iranian parliament’s guidance and withdraw from the NPT if the Security Council continued to pressure Iran about its “peaceful nuclear activities.” [11] The Iranian government has already retracted its pledge to notify the IAEA of any plans to build new reactor facilities.
The significance of the most recent Iranian actions is unclear. International experts doubt that Iran has achieved sufficient progress to manufacture fuel for its nuclear reactor or produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA head Mohammed ElBaradei and the Russian Foreign Ministry, for example, promptly expressed skepticism that Iran had achieved a technological breakthrough in its nuclear research program. [12] Yet, Iran’s declaration – as well as its subsequent announcement that it was seeking tenders to construct two additional nuclear reactors, which would further justify its need for enriched uranium fuel – underscored Tehran’s refusal to heed international demands to curb its nuclear ambitions. [13]
The EU Institutional View
 As soon as the Iranian government released the captured British sailors, EU representatives reaffirmed their desire to resume negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. Solana talked almost an hour with Larijani in the first of several phone calls. They eventually agreed to meet in person and discuss the conditions under which Iran would resume negotiations with the EU-3. [14] Before these discussions proceeded very far, however, the subsequent Iranian statements that the country had expanded its uranium enrichment activities evoked widespread alarm among EU governments.
The German office of the EU presidency issued a formal statement expressing “great concern” about Iranian plans to begin uranium enrichment on an industrial scale because such activity would violate UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, as well as disregard numerous IAEA requests. It added: “The presidency of the European Union once again urges Iran to comply with the demands of the international community and to create the conditions for a return to the negotiating table and for a solution to the conflict surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme.” [15] A statement issued by the European Commission insisted that Iran’s move “does nothing to change our position” that “Iran must cooperate fully” with the IAEA and implement all relevant UN resolutions. [16] EU spokesperson Christiane Hohmann likewise insisted that,“Iran should comply with its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and should
implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions.” [17] Speaking on behalf of the EU, Ambassador Bernhard Brasack, Germany’s representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, told the other delegates that the EU “deplores Iran’s failure to take the steps repeatedly required” by the IAEA. [18] Cristina Gallach, Solana’s spokesperson, said that the EU’s essential response to the Iranian announcement was that we need “more solutions and less centrifuges.” [19]
British Views and Expectations
Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that Iran’s decision to release the British sailors affirmed the value of the “dual-track strategy” his government was pursuing toward Iran – “being open to bilateral dialogue with the Iranian regime but at the same time mobilizing international support and pressure, whether in the United Nations or Europe, the United States of America or our allies out in the region.” Blair added that:
It is correct that over the past couple of weeks there have been new and interesting lines of communication open up with the Iranian regime and it is sensible for us to continue to pursue those. However, the international community has got to remain absolutely steadfast in enforcing its will, whether it is in respect of nuclear weapons or in respect of the support of any part of the Iranian regime for terrorism, particularly when directed against democratic governments.
Blair insisted that “The possibility of a different relationship with the international community is there, but it has to be based on proper support for the law of that community and the choice in the end is one that Iran will have to make.” [20]
In response to a question specifically about Iran’s nuclear program, Blair explained:
In respect of the nuclear ambitions of Iran, if the ambition, as they say it is, is for civil nuclear power and for scientific progress, let me make it clear the international community stands ready to help Iran with that, not merely to allow Iran to develop civil nuclear capability, but to help in the development of that civil nuclear capability. But obviously we have to make sure that the non-proliferation aspects of the international treaties that govern the issue of nuclear weapons are upheld. [21]
Other British officials said that the incident showed the utility of foreign pressure in moderating Tehran’s behavior since Iranian leaders generally desire international legitimacy for their actions. [22]
A British Foreign Office spokesperson characterized Iranian declarations that Tehran would soon begin industrial-scale enrichment as yet another breach of IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions. [23] The Foreign Office also affirmed that, “The international community stands together in ensuring that Iran does not develop the means to acquire nuclear weapons.” [24]
William Hague, Shadow Foreign Secretary of the opposition Conservative Party, argued that “The timing of Iran’s decision to seize our naval personnel is a classic example of its policy of fostering division in the international community, whether in Iraq, Lebanon or elsewhere, in the hope of increasing its leverage and buying time for its efforts to cross the nuclear threshold.” He supported the decision to offer Iran assistance with its civil nuclear power program, as well as improved relations, if it changed its policies. He argued, however, that if Iran does not moderate its position, “Now is the time to intensify the pressure on the Iranian government, with tougher UN sanctions when they are reviewed next month.” He also urged the British government to advocate within the EU, adopting policies similar to those of the United States: “Denying Iranian access to the international banking system, ending European export credits to Iran, and stopping investment in her oil and gas fields.” He concluded that such “intensification of pressure – multilateral, legitimate and peaceful in nature – is both urgent and necessary” to avert Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. [25]
British media commentators have tended to downplay the value of increased pressure in bringing about a change in Iranian policies. Writing in The Guardian, Alex Bigham argued “engagement remains the best option to solve the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme” because the costs of a military confrontation would be excessive and the international community still has time to negotiate a compromise. Bigham conditioned his support, however, on the EU making a greater effort to induce Washington to negotiate directly with Iran. “The Europeans have tried valiantly to negotiate with Iran, but the team simply doesn’t have the muscle necessary to secure a final deal without the involvement of the Americans.” In his assessment, the United States should pursue a “grand bargain,” such as the one Tehran purportedly offered Washington in 2003:
This could have many benefits – empowering moderates in Iran, enhancing prospects for stability in Iraq, improving our global standing as well as containing the spread of nuclear weapons technology. Engaging is also the most likely to work – as every Iranian will tell you. Human rights activists, feminists, reformers and students – many of whom despise the regime, all want the West to talk to Iran, not isolate the country through sanctions or military action. [26]
Another example is an editorial in the traditionally conservative Financial Times. Referring to the negotiations that led to the release of the British sailors, it argued that, “The best lesson to take away from this affair was how rapidly it was resolved once empowered officials on both sides talked directly. The U.S. and its allies should confront Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions the same way. If it does not work, nothing will be lost.” [27] In a comprehensive report, a group of largely British-based multinational organizations argued even more strongly for a negotiated settlement. In their assessment, military action would result in disastrous consequences for Europe and the rest of the international community. For this reason, they urged the United Kingdom and other European governments to try to reduce security tensions between Iran and the West. In particular, the authors maintained that London needs to encourage Washington to moderate its policies toward Iran since, in their opinion, only direct engagement between Iran and Washington can lead to a general resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. [28] The former British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Richard Dalton, also argued that involving the United States in the negotiations is essential for securing enduring progress. [29]
German Debate on Iran Overlaps with Missile Defense Issue
In Germany, the debate over how to respond to the Iranian nuclear program has become intertwined with the issue of whether to support U.S plans to deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Poland, the Czech Republic, and perhaps other parts of Europe. (For additional information on the BMD debate in Europe, see “Special Report: The European Ballistic Missile Defense Dispute” in the April 2007 issue of WMD Insights.) Many members of the main conservative political party in Germany’s governing coalition, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), have cited the Iranian threat to justify their support for the proposed deployments. In contrast, representatives of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the other major member of Germany’s governing coalition, have resisted making this link. [30]
Although a member of the CDU, Chancellor Angela Merkel has sought to focus attention exclusively on the Iranian nuclear program rather than on the divisive BMD issue, which risks splitting her governing coalition as well as inducing conflict between EU governments. On the one hand, she has stated, as on March 25, 2007, that, “If Iran is prepared to return to the fold of the international community we are prepared to make very generous offers to them.” [31] On the other hand, in a speech delivered at Jerusalem’s Hebrew University on April 1, she stressed that, in light of the unanimous decision of the international community, “Iran should be under no illusions: a nuclear-armed Iran is not acceptable.” [32] It is unclear how long Merkel can prevent Germany’s policies towards Iran from again becoming an issue of acute contention between the CDU and SPD. A year ago, CDU leaders were warning against “appeasement” while SPD leaders were complaining about a “militarization of German foreign policy.” [33]
Ruprecht Polenz, CDU Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, mirrored Merkel’s endorsement of the two-track strategy that combines elevated pressure against Iran with offers of economic and technological cooperation in return for a reasonable compromise. [34] Yet, he openly doubted Iranian claims that the nuclear program had peaceful aims: “Tehran would not have to enrich uranium at all at the moment, because it currently does not even have a working nuclear power plant.” In addition, he described Iran’s pursuit of ballistic missiles of increasing range as “a potential threat for Europe.” [35]
Similarly, Andreas Schockenhoff, Deputy Chairman of the Bundestag Group of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), called for renewed negotiations with Iran to place its nuclear program under international supervision. [36] He added, however, that Iran’s decision to proceed with industrial-scale enrichment presented a “new character” of threat that justified
the deployment of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. [37] CDU foreign policy spokesperson Eckart von Klaeden, characterizing Iran as “the biggest danger to world peace at the moment,” likewise said that Germany should support the deployment of the planned U.S. ballistic defense systems in Europe to counter the growing Iranian military threat. [38] He argued the BMD would negate Iran’s ability to use its nuclear and missile programs to pressure Germany. [39] More recently, the CDU-affiliated German Defense Minister, Franz Josef Jung, said that Iran’s nuclear program made it necessary for Europe to develop missile defenses, ideally within a NATO framework and with the involvement of Russia. [40]
In contrast, SPD members tended to underscore the need to pursue a negotiated settlement, while downplaying the need for European missile defenses. For example, Gert Weisskirchen, a SPD foreign policy expert, expressed doubts that Iran would be able to produce long-range nuclear missiles in the foreseeable future. He termed as “absolute rubbish” suggestions by some CDU/CSU members that Germany offer to host American BMD systems. [41] SPD Bundestag Group Deputy Chairman Walter Kolbow also said that, while Iran’s decision was a mistake, “It would be wrong to conclude now that the controversial U.S. missile defense system must be installed.” [42] SPD legislator Uta Zapf warned against a panicky reaction, noting it remained unclear “whether Iran will present a threat in the foreseeable future.” [43]
Instead of developing ballistic missile defenses, SPD leaders called for further negotiations with Iran. SPD Foreign Affairs expert Niels Annen warned against giving up too hastily on the goal of achieving a diplomatic settlement with Iran. [44] In addition, while SPD leaders agreed with their CDU colleagues that Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons, they went further than the CDU in categorically excluding a military solution to the crisis. [45]
An editorial in Die Welt online maintained that Germany’s extensive economic ties with Iran are discouraging German leaders from taking a harder line on the nuclear issue. It claimed that, during his recent visit to Washington, Finance Minister Steinbrück had argued that Berlin found it harder than the United States to apply economic pressure against Tehran, because commercial ties between Germany and Iran were greater. The editorial’s authors consider this position unacceptable given Germany’s current presidency of both the EU and the G8, which they believe require it to defend
the broader interests of the international
community. [46]
French Politicians and Media Remain Uncertain How to Proceed
In an official statement, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy deplored the Iranian announcements regarding the country’s ambitious plans for uranium enrichment as a “bad sign.” He urged Iran to respect UN Security Council resolutions that “demand the suspension of all sensitive nuclear activities” and “seize the opportunity to open a dialogue that was offered to it in the statement from the six ministers [of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany] when they adopted resolution 1747.” [47] Commenting on the subsequent skepticism regarding the number of uranium enrichment centrifuges Iran had actually been able to put into operation, French Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jean-Baptiste Mattei maintained that “Regardless of the technological reality on the Iranian side, these statements are in themselves a bad sign.” Although Mattei reaffirmed the French government’s willingness to help Iran develop its civil nuclear energy program, he insisted that France would not provide such assistance until Iran exercised greater transparency regarding its nuclear program in order to assure the international community that it was “not being diverted for military purposes.” [48]
French President Jacque Chirac did not make any major comments on the subject – perhaps a recognition that he had undermined his own position on this issue when he unguardedly told several journalists in January 2007 that Iran’s acquisition of a few nuclear bombs presented more of a proliferation than a military challenge since the logic of deterrence would prevent Tehran from ever using them. [49]
The leading French presidential candidates, while denouncing Iran’s decision to expand its enrichment capabilities, did not indicate how, if at all, their policies towards Iran would differ from those of the present French government. Segolene Royal, the Socialist Party’s standard-bearer, said that “nuclear proliferation was unacceptable,” especially in the Middle East where it risked destabilizing the region because of the Iranian president’s threatening statements regarding Israel. [50] Yet, she opposed unilateral military actions, calling instead for the “sextet” (again, the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) to induce Iran, through negative sanctions and positive
offers of civil nuclear cooperation, to abandon its plans for uranium enrichment and resume full IAEA inspections. [51]
The leading conservative candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, has long advocated creating an internationally managed repository of uranium fuel to supply to countries, such as Iran, that the international community does not want to possess independent uranium enrichment capabilities. [52] More recently, in an April 17 interview, he argued:
Today, the prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons is unacceptable. It will start an arms race in the region and directly threaten Israel and southeastern Europe. Tehran must choose between cooperation with the international community and increased isolation. For my part, I think we cannot hesitate in reinforcing sanctions for noncompliance as I think they can be effective. This is precisely what the Security Council has started to do. Conversely, though, if Tehran agrees to cooperate, the international community must give full guarantee to Iran that it will live by its agreements, specifically in terms of access to civilian nuclear technology. [53]
French media commentators also avoided advocating a clear and decisive policy line. Writing in Le Figaro, both Pierre Rousselin and Alain Barluet argued that, although the international community had shown remarkable unity in applying sanctions against Iran – despite Tehran’s efforts, such as the seizure of the British sailors, to divide the various countries – the sanctions were unlikely to induce Tehran to modify its behavior. [54] Rousselin was particularly pleased by the extent to which Britain, France, and Germany were able to collaborate effectively on the Iranian issue despite the absence of a new EU constitution: “On this 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome and despite the failure of the Constitution, it is comforting to see that the Europeans have so far managed, together, to deal with one of the most difficult and most vital questions on the international agenda.” [55] After Tehran released the captured British sailors, Rousselin concluded that this result showed that dialogue, “even in Iran,” can resolve even the most challenging confrontations. [56] A few days later, however, he discussed how the Iranian regime had an interest in prolonging the confrontation with the West over its nuclear program in order to rally popular support and obscure the failure of the Islamic Revolution to provide “tangible results” to the Iranian people. [57]
Prospects
In late May 2007, the IAEA Board of Governors will again meet to discuss Iran’s compliance with its NPT commitments and prepare a report on this topic for UN Security Council consideration. IAEA representatives continue to insist they cannot confirm that Iran’s nuclear program has solely peaceful purposes as long as the Iranian government impedes their surveillance efforts. The March 2007 IAEA report, for example, complained that Iranian authorities have impeded round-the-clock monitoring of the Natanz facility by preventing IAEA inspectors from installing cameras to watch the underground centrifuges. [58] In addition, IAEA representatives criticize Iranian obfuscation regarding its past nuclear activities, including Iran’s earlier plutonium experiments and the sources that supplied Iran’s early centrifuges. [59]
For their part, Iranian officials have given no sign that they will heed UN Security Council resolutions instructing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and other suspect nuclear activities. To underscore its commitment to develop an indigenous nuclear fuel manufacturing capacity, the Iranian government is issuing a new currency that provocatively bears a nuclear emblem. [60]
The governments of Britain, France, and Germany, like those of other countries, find themselves in a challenging position regarding Iran’s nuclear programs. Economic sanctions have thus far failed to induce Iranian leaders to renounce their plans to acquire the capacity to enrich large quantities of natural uranium. Yet U.S. officials, arguing that the British hostage incident did not indicate any readiness on the part of Iran to compromise on other matters, such as the nuclear issue, urged Europeans to focus attention on ensuring the effective enforcement of the new UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. [61]
In addition, European officials show little interest in pursuing alternative policy options, such as acquiescing in Iran’s nuclear program or supporting military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. A recent opinion polls show that, while a small majority of the publics in Britain and France would support military action if necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, most people in Germany and other EU member nations would not. [62] Although these nations and their governments hold differing views on how to manage Iran, their desire to uphold European solidarity – which they have largely done since 2003 – on such an important issue tends to draw them towards centrist positions. [63]
In the absence of a superior alternative, the EU is likely to continue its “dual-track” strategy of imposing sanctions while reaffirming its willingness to resume negotiations and offer various incentives if Iran halts its objectionable nuclear activities, particularly uranium enrichment. The strategy satisfies those Europeans who favor applying continuing pressure on Iran in the hope that, at some point, a future Iranian government will yield under pressure and agree to curb its nuclear ambitions in return for an end to international sanctions. The dual-track strategy also appeals to those Europeans seeking a “grand bargain,” such as that recently offered North Korea. In this scenario, Iran would agree to binding limits on its nuclear-related activities in return for economic and security assurances from the EU and other countries – especially the United States, whose active support Europeans see as essential for success.
Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute
|
 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1]“EU to Meet Iran over Nuclear Plans,” Excite.UK, April 23, 2007, [http://news.excite.co.uk/international/Europe
/32686].
[2] Parisa Hafezi and Paul Taylor, “Ahmadinejad Dampens Hopes of EU-Iran Progress,” Reuters, April 23, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL2353678520070423?src=042307_1356_FEATURES_interview.
[View Article]
[3] Rafael Epstein, “EU Agrees to New Sanctions against Iran,” ABC News Online, April 24, 2007, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200704/s1905070.htm; [View Article] Iran nuclear talks moving towards ‘united view’ - Larijani Update,” AFX News, April 26, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2007/04/26/afx3654577.html. [View Article]
[4] “Iran Sees No Obstacle in Restoring Relations with U.S.—President,” RIA Novosti, April 23, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/world/20070423/64181832.html. [View Article]
[5] “Letter from E3 Ministers and EU High Rep. to Dr. Rouhani dated 5 August 2005,” reprinted in International Atomic Energy Agency, Information Circular No. 651, August 8, 2005, http://www.basicint.org/countries/iran/
IranIAEA20050808.pdf. [View Article]
[6] Fiona Symon and Stephen Fidler, “Origins of the Dispute,” The Financial Times, January 22, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f99aba68-874e-11da-8762-0000779e2340,dwp_uuid=be75219e-940a-11da-82ea-0000779e2340.html. [View Article]
[7] For more on the recent strains in Russian-Iranian nuclear relations, see Pabel Podvig, “Behind Russia and Iran’s Nuclear Reactor Dispute,” The Bulletin Online, March 26, 2007, http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/pavel-podvig/20070326.html; [View Article] and Nikolai Sokov, “The Bushehr Payment Dispute: Moscow Signals the Limits of its Support for Iran,” WMD Insights, May 2007, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I15/I15_RU1_BushehrPayment.htm. [View Article]
[8] “Iran Announces ‘Industrial-Level’ Nuclear Work,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 9, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/04/CB8C4194-F512-4DA5-A0C1-8CF186C28DEA.html. [View Article]
[9] “L’Iran passe à l’enrichissement industriel d’uranium” [Iran Achieves the Industrial Enrichment of Uranium], Le Figaro, April 9, 2007 [http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/20070409.WWW000000403_liran_defendra_son_droit_au_nucleaire_jusquau_
bout_.html].
[10] “L’Iran compte installer 50 000 centrifugeuses d’enrichissement d’uranium” [Iran Plans to Install 50,000 Uranium Enrichment Centrifuges], Le Monde, April 9, 2007 [http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3218,36-893732@51-677013,0.html].
[11] “L’Iran passe à l’enrichissement industriel d’uranium” [Iran Achieves the Industrial Enrichment of Uranium], see source in [9].
[12] “U.N. Nuke Chief Discredits Iran’s Nuclear Claims,” USA Today, April 12, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-04-12-iran-nuclear_N.htm; [View Article] and Sam Knight, “Russia Questions Iran’s Grand Nuclear Claims,” Times Online, April 10, 2007,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article1636498.ece. [View Article]
[13] Nazila Fathi, “Iran Says It Wants Bidders for 2 More Nuclear Plants,” New York Times, April 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/world/middleeast/16iran.html?ex=1177300800&en=c32cd51767eac5be&ei=5123
&partner=
BREITBART. [View Article]
[14] Goerge Jahn, “EU, Iran Seek Common Ground on Nukes,” Associated Press, March 26, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6510142,00.html. [View Article]
[15] “EU Voices Concern At Iran’s Nuclear Plans,” DPA, April 10, 2007, http://www.eux.tv/article.aspx?articleId=6181.
[View Article]
[16] Helena Spongenberg, “EU Says Iran Taking a Step in ‘Wrong’ Direction,” EU Observer online, April 10, 2007, [http://euobserver.com/9/23847].
[17] “EU Calls on Iran to Implement UNSC Resolutions,” Islamic Republic News Agency, April 10, 2007, http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-234/0704109095162155.htm. [View Article]
[18] “U.N. Chief Calls Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Setbacks ‘Unacceptable’,” Associated Press, April 9, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/10/news/UN-GEN-UN-Disarmament-Commission.php. [View Article]
[19] “L’Union europeanne condamne l’Iran” [The European Union Condemns Iran], Liberation.fr, April 10, 2007 [http://www.liberation.fr/actualite/monde/246646.fr.php].
[20] “Tony Blair’s Comments on Release by Iran of British Sailors,” lawfuel.com, April 6, 2007, http://lawfuel.com
/show-release.asp?ID=11530. [View Article]
[21] Ibid.
[22] Bronwen Maddox, “International Pressure, Not Bargaining, Won the Day,” The Times Online, April 6, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/bronwen_maddox/article1620665.ece. [View Article]
[23] “EU Warns Tehran over Nuclear Row,” Gulf Daily News, April 11, 2007, http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/Story.asp?Article=178690&Sn=WORL&IssueID=30022. [View Article]
[24] “World Leaders Condemn Iran over Nuclear Expansion,” Deutsche Welle, April 10, 2007, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2437750,00.html. [View Article]
[25] William Hague, “A Damning Failure at a Critical Time,” The Sunday Telegraph, April 15, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/04/15/do1501.xml. [View Article]
[26] Alex Bigham, “It’s Not Too Late to Talk,” The Guardian, February 5, 2007, http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/alex_bigham/2007/02/post_1053.html. [View Article]
[27] “Iran’s Calculated End to Hostage Drama,” Financial Times, April 5, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a4c2ad1e-e311-11db-a1c9-000b5df10621.html. [View Article]
[28] “Time to Talk: The Case for Diplomatic Solutions on Iran,” London, Foreign Policy Centre, February 7, 2007, http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/838.pdf. [View Article]
[29] See, for example, Richard Dalton, “Why Iran Must Make the Next Move,” Daily Telegraph, February 7, 2007, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/february-2007/why-iran-must-make-the-next-move. [View Article]
[30] For a more detailed discussion of the BMD debate in Germany, see “Irans Atomprogramm heizt deutsche Debatte über Raketenschirm an” [Iran’s Nuclear Program Heats Up the Debate over the Missile Shield], Spiegel Online, April 10, 2007 [http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,476473,00.html].
[31] “Neue Sanktionen gegen Iran beschlossen” [New Sanctions Against Iran Adopted], Office of the German Chancellor, March 26, 2007 [http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/nn_4922/Content/DE/Artikel/2007/03/2007-03-26-neue-sanktionen-gegen-iran.html].
[32] “Merkel warnt Iran vor Ausbau” [Merkel Warns Iran Not to Extend Nuclear Program], Online Focus, April 1, 2007 [http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/atomprogramm_aid_52316.html].
[33] E. Koch and J. Meyer, “Kriegs-Streit Spaltet Koalition” [Dispute Splits Coalition], Bild.de Online, February 13, 2006 [http://www.bild.t-online.de/BTO/news/aktuell/2006/02/13/iran-krise/iran-krise.html].
[34] Manfred Rey, “ ‘Massive Exaggeration’—Experts Doubt Iran’s Capability To Enrich Uranium; SPD Calls US Missiles in Germany ‘Absolute Rubbish’,” DDP in German, April 11, 2007, OSC document EUP20070412072001.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] “Unionspolitiker fordern Schutzschild gegen Iran” [Union Politicians Demand a Missile Shield Against Iran], Der Tagesspiegel Online, April 11, 2007 [http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/archiv/11.04.2007/3192540.asp].
[38] Judy Dempsey, “Merkel Aide Seeks Debate on U.S. Antimissile Shield,” International Herald Tribune, April 10, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/10/asia/germany.php. [View Article]
[39] “Unionspolitiker fordern Schutzschild gegen Iran,” [Union Politicians Demand a Missile Shield Against Iran], see source in [37].
[40] “Jung befürwortet US-Raketenabwehr für Europa” [Jung Endorses U.S. Missile Defense for Europe], Spiegel Online, April 12, 2007 [http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,476780,00.html].
[41] Rey, “ ‘Massive Exaggeration’—Experts Doubt Iran’s Capability To Enrich Uranium; SPD Calls US Missiles in Germany ‘Absolute Rubbish’,” see source in [34].
[42] Ibid.
[43] “Unionspolitiker fordern Schutzschild gegen Iran” [Union Politician Demands a Missile Shield Against Iran], see source in [37].
[44] Ibid.
[45] “Beschluss des Parteivorstands der SPD zum Thema: Abrüstung stärken—neue Aufrüstung verhindern” [SPD Party Executive Committee Resolution on the Topic: Strengthening Disarmament and Preventing New Armament“], Official website of the German Social Democratic Party, March 26, 2007 [http://www.spd.de/menu/1709556/].
[46] “Sanktionen? Geschäfte!” [Sanctions? Business!] Welt Online, April 7, 2007 [www.welt.de/welt_print/article798196/Sanktionen_Geschaefte.html].
[47] “Declarations du Porte-Parole,” French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 10, 2007 [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/pointpresse.asp?liste=20070410.html&submit.x=9&submit.y=8&submit=
consulter#
Chapitre1].
[48] Ibid.
[49] Elaine Sciolino, “News Analysis: Chirac Says What Many Have Been Thinking,” International Herald Tribune, February 2, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/02/news/france.php. [View Article] After his remarks became public, Chirac quickly said he had misspoken and his office issued a statement affirming that, “France, along with the international community, cannot accept the prospect of an Iran equipped with a nuclear weapon.” See Angelique Chrisafis, “Nuclear-Armed Iran Would Not Be Very Dangerous, Says Chirac,” Guardian, February 2, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/0,,2004390,00.html. [View Article]
[50] “L’Union europeanne condamne l’Iran” [The Union condemns Iran], Liberation.fr, April 10, 2007 [http://www.liberation.fr/actualite/monde/246646.fr.php].
[51] “Dix enjeux de politique étrangère” [Ten Foreign Policy Issues at Stake], Le Monde, April 16, 2007 [http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_element/0,40-0,50-896642,0.html].
[52] “French-U.S. Relations: Sarkozy Has a Fresh Take,” European Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006, http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2006_fall_winter/2006_fall_winter_15.php4. [View Article]
[53] “Making France a Power for the Future, Part II,” National Interest Online, April 17, 2007, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14046. [View Article]
[54] Alain Barluet, “Iran: U.S. Pressure Starting to Stifle Economy,” Le Figaro, April 4, 2007, http://www.lefigaro.fr/english/20070404.WWW000000332_iran_us_pressure_starting_to_stifle_economy.html;
[View Article] and Pierre Rousselin, “Iran: A Test for Europe,” Le Figaro, March 28, 2007, http://www.lefigaro.fr/english/20070328.WWW000000408_iran_a_test_for_europe.html. [View Article]
[55] Rousselin, “Iran: A Test for Europe,” see source in [54].
[56] Pierre Rousselin, “Iran: la vertu du dialogue” [Iran: The Virtue of Dialogue], Le Figaro, April 5, 2007 [http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/20070405.FIG000000044_iran_la_vertu_du_dialogue.html].
[57] Pierre Rousselin, “Entêtement iranien” [Iranian stubbornness], Le Figaro, April 10, 2007 [http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/20070410.FIG000000018_entetement_iranien.html].
[58] Robert Tait and Julian Borger, “Iran Raises Stakes with Claim of Nuclear Leap,” Guardian, April 10, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,2053452,00.html. [View Article]
[59] Dominic Moran, “Iran’s Big Bluff,” ISN Security Watch, April 13, 2007, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17488. [View Article]
[60] Dairush Mirzai, “‘Nuclear’ Banknotes to Counter Rising Inflation,” AsiaNews, March 5, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=8644&size=A. [View Article]
[61] David E. Sanger, “No Diplomatic Change after Britons’ Release,” New York Times, April 6, 2007, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10D16FC3C5B0C758CDDAD0894DF404482. [View Article]
[62] “European Poll Findings on Globalisation and Foreign Policy: Majority of UK and EU Citizens Would Back Military Action Against Iran,” OpenEurope, April 4, 2007, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/pressrelease.aspx?pressreleaseid=36. [View Article]
[63] Charles A. Kupchan, “On Iran, European Decide to Work in Concert,” European Diplomacy, Fall/Winter 2006, http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2006_fall_winter/2006_fall_winter_11.php4. [View Article]
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