CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CELEBRATES 10TH ANNIVERSARY
June 2007 Issue
 

On April 29, 2007, the state parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) celebrated the treaty’s tenth anniversary. On the occasion, a number of commentaries by foreign governments and media outlets provided insights into attitudes towards the treaty around the globe. Their statements mixed praise for the CWC’s many achievements with exhortations to overcome the continuing challenges facing the accord. These assessments shed new light on the issues that will shape the chemical arms control agenda as the date for the Second CWC Review Conference approaches in April 2008.

  • During its first decade, the CWC has achieved considerable progress in prohibiting the development, production, and use of chemical weapons. According to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the institution charged with overseeing the treaty’s implementation: [1] Almost 90%, or 58, of the 65 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPF) declared to the OPCW by 12 state parties have been certified as either destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes; 100% of them have been inactivated and are currently subject to OPCW verification.

  • The declared global stockpile of chemical warfare munitions, containing approximately 71,000 metric tons of CWC “Schedule 1” agents, has been secured and inventoried to ensure that monitors will detect any diversion prior to the weapons’ destruction. (Schedule 1 agents are those that have no major commercial use and are of a type that has previously been employed in chemical warfare. For more information, see the inset text, CWC Schedules and Categories of Chemical Agents.)

  • Over 30% of the 8.6 million declared chemical munitions and containers have been verifiably destroyed according to the CWC’s provisions.

  • More than one quarter of the declared CW agents has been verifiably destroyed.

  • OPCW inspectors have conducted a total of almost 2,900 inspections since April 1997.

Despite these achievements, governments and CW experts have identified a number of challenges relating to the CWC, making them possible, if not likely, topics at next year’s review conference. The state parties have already established a preparatory Working Group – chaired by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the OPCW, His Excellency Mr. Lyn Parker, with the collaboration of vice-chairs representing the other regional groups – to solicit input from non-governmental organizations, chemical industry representatives, and academic and other independent experts. [2]

Russia and the United States Confront Timetable Challenges
One of the most serious problems with the CWC is that its architects drastically underestimated the time required to eliminate national CW arsenals, especially in the case of Russia and the United States, which had the largest stockpiles. The original deadline required all state parties to destroy their Schedule 1 chemical weapons by April 29, 2007, one decade after the CWC entered into force. In December 2006, the Conference of State Parties granted Russia and the United States five-year extensions to complete the elimination of their CW stocks in return for both countries agreeing to accept at least one visit by representatives of the OPCW Executive Council to their CW dismantlement sites. [3]


Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Schedules and Categories of Chemical Agents
 

The CWC contains an “Annex on Chemicals” that categorizes chemicals according to three “schedules.” [i] This classification system groups toxic chemicals and their precursors (key ingredients) according to their past and current uses for military as well as civilian purposes. The chemical agents in Schedule 1 pose a “high risk” since they have no major commercial use and have already been employed as chemical weapons in past conflicts (e.g., mustard gas, sarin, and VX). Schedule 2 includes “significant risk” items that have some legitimate commercial purposes (e.g., as inks or insecticides) but also have served in the past as precursors to Schedule 1 CW agents. Schedule 3 items have mainly commercial applications but have served as CW agents in earlier wars (e.g., phosgene, hydrogen cyanide) or as precursors to Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 chemicals. Schedule 2 and 3 chemical agents are also referred to as “dual-use” items. Since they have legitimate commercial purposes but can also be used as chemical weapons, their manufacture presents particular challenges for the CWC, which only regulates rather than prohibits their production.

For purposes of destruction and verification, the CWC groups chemical weapons into three “categories.” [ii] Category 1 covers munitions filled with Schedule 1 chemical agents, as well as Schedule 1 items themselves. Category 2 encompasses munitions filled with other toxic chemicals and weaponized chemical agents not included in Schedule 1. The third category covers unfilled munitions and devices and all other equipment designed to deploy CW. The CWC establishes destruction deadlines for all three CW categories. The CWC state parties had to destroy – through chemical neutralization, incineration, or other techniques – all Category 2 and Category 3 CW by April 2002. The original deadline for eliminating Category 1 chemical weapons as extended was April 29, 2007, one decade after the CWC entered into force.

In addition to classifying chemical agents and munitions, the CWC also addresses facilities used to produce, store, or destroy chemical weapons. CWC state parties are required to declare all these sites and destroy the CW production facilities (CWPFs). They must also declare chemical industry plants that annually produce, process, or consume “scheduled” chemicals in quantities above certain CWC-specified amounts.

SOURCES AND NOTES
[i] Chemical Weapons Convention, “Annex on Chemicals,” pp. 49-54, http://www.opcw.org/docs/cwc_eng.pdf.
[View Article]
[ii] Chemical Weapons Convention, “Annex on Implementation and Verification (‘Verification Annex’),” pp. 87-88, http://www.opcw.org/docs/cwc_eng.pdf. [View Article]
 
 


In their 10th anniversary messages, the governments of both Russia and the United States restated their intent to eliminate their CW stockpiles. Neither, however, explicitly committed to destroy them by the new April 29, 2012 deadline. In the assessment of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov:

At this stage, the most important objective of the CWC continues to be the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. This task is becoming even more urgent because of the real danger that weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, might fall into the hands of international terrorists. Freeing the world from chemical warfare agents is the best safeguard against their use for hostile purposes. The progress made by the possessor states in this area is obvious. It is, however, of paramount importance that all the possessor states comply with the deadlines established by the CWC for the destruction of chemical weapons.

Russia is committed to this goal and, technical, financial and economic difficulties notwithstanding, is doing its utmost to achieve it in a timely manner. The most vivid example of this is the destruction of 20% of Russia’s CW stockpiles within the established deadline. This important achievement, which coincides with the tenth anniversary of the CWC, has been possible thanks to both Russia’s own concentrated efforts and to the international assistance which Russia has been receiving. [4]
The United States and a number of other Western nations have committed roughly $1.5 billion to the Russian CW elimination effort, and the Russian government has committed more than $2 billion to it. [5] (For more information on Russia’s CW dismantlement challenges, see “Russian Chemical Weapons Dismantlement: Progress With Problems,” in this issue of WMD Insights.)

In her message, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote, “The United States is committed to fulfilling its obligation to destroy all of its chemical weapons and will do so as rapidly as possible, while at the same time ensuring the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.” [6] The opacity of both governments regarding future timetables is understandable given that most observers do not believe that Russia and the United States will prove able to meet even their extended deadlines given the complex technical, financial, and environmental challenges they have encountered. For example, some U.S. government officials involved in domestic CW dismantlement do not expect the United States to eliminate its entire CW stockpile until around 2023, a project estimated to cost $32 billion. [7]

North Korea and Middle Eastern Non-Signatories Create Concerns
Even after the CWC signatories eliminate their residual CW stockpiles, the difficulty of dealing with non-members will remain. Although the CWC has acquired more members more rapidly than any other previous WMD treaty, Rogelio Pfirter, the OPCW Director-General, observed that “the convention is only as strong as its weakest link.” [8] Analysts fear that several non-signatories maintain covert offensive CW programs, presenting a serious threat to the CWC’s core norm of non-use of CW. [9] North Korea, for example is thought to possess between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, reportedly including all of the major classes, such as phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister) and sarin (nerve agent). [10]

In the case of North Korea, Pyongyang seems even less interested in entering the CWC than it does in rejoining the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). According to Pfirter, North Korea has ignored OPCW communications urging it to join the CWC. [11] With the international community focused on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the prospects of the current regime in Pyongyang adhering to the CWC and granting OPCW inspectors widespread access to its chemical facilities seem remote.

In the Middle East, the governments of Egypt and Syria have long adhered to a formal “linkage policy” of refusing to adopt the CWC until Israel commits to joining the NPT, nominally creating a WMD-free zone in the region. For various military, political, and economic reasons, the Israeli government has declined to take such a step or ratify the CWC unilaterally. [12] Despite OPCW lobbying and outreach efforts, the Egyptian government reaffirmed this linkage policy at the time of the CWC’s 10th anniversary. [13] Pfirter and others closely involved in the CWC do not expect this stalemate to end until Arab-Israeli relations improve significantly. [14]

Europeans Pledge Continued Efforts to Support the CWC
The European Union (EU) and its member governments used the occasion of the CWC’s 10th anniversary to reaffirm their commitment to a CW-free world and pledge additional technical and financial support to countries seeking to fulfill their CWC-related obligations. European governments also expressed alarm at the newly perceived dangers of chemical terrorism.

The threat of chemical terrorism was not fully appreciated at the time of the CWC’s establishment. It was not until March 1995, three years after the CWC became open for signature, that the Aum Shinrikyo cult conducted its sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system. Although the incident killed 12 people and led 5,500 individuals to seek medical care, many more people might have died had the gas been employed more effectively. More recently in early 2007, insurgents in Iraq have begun using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices that combine conventional explosives with chlorine gas. They also have shown interest in using other toxic chemicals in terrorist attacks, leading foreign governments to fear similar attacks in other countries. [15]

Although the CWC does not define the OPCW as an anti-terrorism institution, since September 2001, the state parties have encouraged it to support national and international efforts to deny terrorist access to WMD. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2006, describes the OPCW and the CWC as helping to prevent chemical terrorism. [16] Pfirter, other OPCW staff, and CW experts argue that the best way to counter CW terrorism is through universal application of the CWC and effective operation of the OPCW. [17]

European Union
In its declaration, the EU called for “universal adherence to all international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, agreements, and instruments.” [18] The EU presidency statement also advocated measures to strengthen the CWC verification regime, including those affecting the private chemical industry, as well as bolstering defenses against chemical attacks. In addition, the EU adopted a new Joint Action, making its third consecutive voluntary financial contribution to the OPCW. It provided 1.7 million euros to support projects that promote univeral adherence to the CWC, effective national implementation of CWC provisions, and peaceful international cooperation in the science of chemistry. [19]

Great Britain
In March 2007, the United Kingdom completed destruction of its World War II-era chemical weapons. [20] The Foreign and Commonwealth Office convened a seminar, attended by Pfirter, to mark the 10th anniversary of the CWC and assess future challenges to the regime. [21] In the view of the British government, a major concern at present is to prevent terrorists from using chemical weapons. Kim Howells, an official at the Foreign Office, explained that, “Back in 1992, the impetus was to destroy the stockpiles built up during the Cold War. This remains of great importance, but in 2007 our biggest threat comes from terrorism.” [22]

France
France ratified the CWC in March 1995, thus becoming the first permanent member of the UN Security Council to do so. The French government issued a statement on the CWC’s 10th anniversary that, in addition to praising the convention, stressed the importance of adapting WMD arms control to deal with the emergence of new threats, such as terrorists seeking to use illicit proliferation networks to gain access to WMD. [23] French officials also argued that the optimal response to WMD threats was through multinational cooperation rather than unilateral action. [24] They indicated they would seek to strengthen CWC verification procedures at next year’s review conference, especially in the industrial field. [25]

Germany
With a large civilian chemical industry, as well as historically sobering experiences involving the use of toxic chemicals during World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany has strongly supported CW arms control. [26] From April 25-27, 2007, the German Foreign Office and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs co-hosted a conference in Berlin on “Freeing the World of Chemical Weapons – The Chemical Weapons Convention Ten Years after its Entry Into Force.” Representatives from 41 countries, along with Pfirter, attended the gathering, which marked the CWC’s 10th anniversary. [27]

At the session, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier lauded the CWC as “a model for the EU’s approach to disarmament and non-proliferation as a whole.” Although acknowledging the contribution of the Proliferation Security Initiative and other informal mechanisms to counter the spread of WMD, Steinmeier said that formal international treaties with binding provisions, such as the arms control treaties that ended the Cold War, proved more effective. He underscored the importance of the United States’ and Russia’s eliminating their remaining CW stockpiles by 2012. “To put it simply, countries capable of putting people into space and onto the moon should also be able to destroy their chemical weapons within a given time-limit.” [28] Finally, Steinmeier emphasized the importance of making use of the CWC “challenge inspections” option so that they can become a routine verification tool, “not unlike an audit in a company or authority.”

Japan and China Struggle with World War II Legacy

Japan
The Japanese government has long been a vocal proponent of the CWC and other forms of arms control. [29] Even before ratifying the CWC in September 1995, the Japanese government enacted the “Act on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Control, etc., of Specific Chemicals (Chemical Weapons Prohibition Act),” which brought Japanese domestic legislation and regulations into compliance with the CWC. [30] Although Japan did not have any CW to destroy, it hosts many OPCW inspections due to Japan’s large domestic chemical industry, which includes about 500 declared commercial chemical plants, potentially relevant to the production of CW agents. [31]

The 2006 Diplomatic Bluebook issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry characterized the CWC as “a groundbreaking treaty on disarmament of WMD.” Yet, the text also expressed concerns about the failure of the CWC to achieve universality, the problems some governments had experienced in implementing its provisions, and the ability of the CWC to prevent terrorists from using chemical weapons. The Japanese government has hosted seminars to help other governments, primarily from Asia, implement their CWC Article VII obligations. [32]. Also, it has encouraged the OPCW to promote cooperation in countering chemical terrorism. [33]

China
The government of China has remained preoccupied with the destruction of the hundreds of thousands of chemical weapons Japanese troops abandoned in northeast China when they withdrew to Japan in 1945. So far, only about 38,000 of them have been unearthed and recovered, from 30 locations in 13 provinces, along with two hundred metric tons of CW pollutants. [34] Only a small proportion of these have been collected, and none has been destroyed, as Japan is still building CW destruction facilities in China, including possible mobile destruction units. In 1999, Japan and China signed a bilateral agreement whose terms required Japan to provide all necessary funds, equipment, and personnel to secure the removal and destruction of the abandoned CW in China by April 2007. The OPCW subsequently extended this deadline to 2012. [35] Chinese government representatives have underscored the necessity of foreign governments meeting their CWC deadlines. In December 2006, Xue Hanqin, China’s permanent representative to the OPCW, declared that her government “believes that the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles in line with the timetable is a matter that has some bearing on the authority and credibility of the CWC.” [36]

Ambassador Hanqin also called for greater international cooperation with regard to promoting legal commerce in chemical products. [37] In a May 2007 article in the OPCW journal, moreover, she wrote that it would prove helpful to conduct a comprehensive review of past verification experiences in order to determine how to modernize the regime to address the latest scientific and technological developments in the chemical field. [38]

On the 10th anniversary of the CWC, Zhang Guobao, Vice Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, highlighted China’s support for OPCW inspection missions in China and affirmed the country’s “resolute” opposition to WMD proliferation. He also stated that, “In recent years China has continuously strengthened its anti-proliferation capacity and strictly censored its chemical imports and exports according to the law.” [39] Similarly, “China’s National Defense in 2006” white paper affirmed China’s own commitment to the CWC and underscored its strict compliance with the convention’s obligations. [40]

Nevertheless, U.S. government representatives have in the past expressed concern that China might have a covert chemical and biological weapons program. They also have criticized the Chinese government for allowing Chinese companies to engage in the proliferation of technology and equipment that might be used to develop chemical weapons. The Chinese government dismissed these allegations as “baseless” and “irresponsible.” [41]

Iran Denounces Double Standards
The government of Iran, whose soldiers suffered from chemical weapons attacks during the 1980-88 war with Iraq, ratified the CWC in November 1997. At an event marking the 10-year anniversary of the CWC’s entry into force, the deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli, lamented that many Iranians still had yet to recover fully from Saddam Hussein’s CW attacks, which he observed failed to provoke much international opposition at the time. [42] Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki urged the OPCW and state parties to “take specific measures to provide assistance and care for the survivors of the use of chemical weapons in Iran and Iraq by the former Iraqi regime.” [43]

In an implicit criticism of the perceived discriminatory nature of the NPT, Iranian officials have also lauded the principle of equal treatment underlying the CWC. [44] The CWC is seen as “non-discriminatory” in that it formally treats all parties equally. Although the NPT establishes the goal of universal nuclear abolition, it allows certain states (those that tested a nuclear weapon before January 1, 1967) to retain their nuclear arsenals for an indefinite period while denying other countries the legal right to develop comparable weapons. Critics complain that the NPT therefore inappropriately legitimizes the unfair privileges enjoyed by the established nuclear powers. In contrast, the CWC requires all states to renounce CW, regardless of whether they possessed them at the time the convention entered into force.

On the other hand, Iranian officials and commentators have criticized Israel for refusing to ratify the CWC and accused “the illegal Jewish state” of “using phosphorous bombs which are barred under the Chemical Weapons Convention, during the Lebanon war last summer.” [45] They also attacked the United States for failing to eliminate its CW arsenal within the original 10-year deadline, “despite having the means to fulfill its CWC commitments.” [46] Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi warned that the application of double standards when assessing countries’ compliance with their CWC obligations represented the most serious threat to the convention’s effectiveness. [47]

Interestingly, an Iranian commentary in Tehran Times, in addition to complaining about the lack of prosecution of the many companies, governments, media outlets, and individuals in Western countries that he claimed had facilitated Saddam Hussein’s CW program, also wrote that “It is disturbing to see that non-state actors have been using chemical weapons in terrorist attacks in Iraq since January 2007.” [48]

Challenge Inspections Remain Untested
The CWC relies on national reporting requirements, periodic pre-scheduled “routine” on-site inspections of declared sites, and potential short-notice “challenge” inspections to verify compliance. In practice, the CWC members have employed primarily bilateral diplomacy and Executive Council interventions to clarify compliance issues. [49] Although suspicions persist about the CW-related activities of some countries, thus far no government has called for a challenge inspection, which must be supported by evidence of an “unresolved concern.” [50] Under the provisions of CWC Article IX, the OPCW Executive Council may deny requests for challenge inspections if a three-fourths majority of the Council deems the inspection “frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of the Convention.” The OPCW is also authorized to conduct investigations of alleged use of CW to confirm the accusation and assess the extent to which a victimized state may require assistance.

CW experts also question the effectiveness of the procedures for conducting challenge inspections. Various state parties have organized “mock” challenge inspections to confirm their own preparedness to receive a challenge inspection. [51] Yet, the OPCW has yet to conduct an actual challenge inspection because no CWC member has requested one. Possible reasons for parties’ reluctance to request challenge inspections include concerns about revealing their own intelligence sources and methods, fears of retaliation, doubts that any inspection would irrefutably confirm or deny accusations of cheating given the complex issues involved, and concerns that states might thwart inspections by invoking a “national security” exemption to investigations of specific locations. Whatever the reason, experts fear that, if governments come to believe that challenge inspections will never occur, the deterrent value of the OPCW inspection regime will decline.

To counter this problem, some observers have called for establishing an additional OPCW verification procedure, less politically divisive than challenge inspections, or at least adopting a looser interpretation of when and how to apply challenge inspections. [52] Pfirter has stressed that, “Challenge inspections are not a punishment mechanism. It is entirely a mechanism for reassurance, and we need to un-demonize it.” [53] He announced that the OPCW intended to organize its own mock inspection exercise later in 2007 in The Hague to allow national representatives to the OPCW to understand better the procedure and its potential contributions to the maintenance of the convention. [54]

In addition, the challenge inspections might serve a supplementary purpose as counterterrorist tools. In this application, they would function as a cooperative mechanism to help member governments counter illegal and unwanted terrorist activities on their soil as opposed to their traditional application as a means of detecting non-compliance by CWC signatories. The CWC presumes that enforcing compliance is a collective responsibility of the OPCW, the state parties, and the private chemical industry, so expecting parties to develop innovative means to cooperate against potential terrorist threats is not unreasonable.

Conclusion: Towards the April 2008 CWC Review Conference
Governments and CW experts used the occasion of the CWC’s 10th anniversary to praise the treaty and the OPCW for their evident accomplishments. These include the CWC’s rapid growth in membership, the absence of CW use in recent interstate wars, and progress in eliminating global CW stockpiles. Yet, they also cited certain problem areas – most notably the lack of universal membership, the failure to use the challenge inspection mechanism, and the delays Russia and the United States are encountering in eliminating their stockpiles. These latter issues will likely occupy a prominent place on the agenda of the preparations for next year’s Second CWC Review Conference.


Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute



SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “The Chemical Weapons Ban: Facts and Figures,” May 2, 2007, http://www.opcw.org/factsandfigures/index.html#HelpingEachOther. [View Article]
[2] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “The Chemical Weapons Convention’s Second Review Conference,” Press Release 87, November 22, 2006, http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2006/PR87_2006.html.
[View Article]
[3] “11th Session of the Conference of the State Parties,” Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, March 2007, p. 4, http://www.opcw.org/docs/publications/cdq_mar2007.pdf. [View Article]
[4] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Congratulates the OPCW on its Tenth Anniversary,” Press Release 47, May 11, 2007, http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR47_2007.html. [View Article]
[5] See Government Accountability Office, “Cooperative Threat Reduction DOD Needs More Reliable Data to Better Estimate the Cost and Schedule of the Shchuch’ye Facility,” GAO-06-692, May 2006, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06692.pdf. [View Article]
[6] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “U.S. Secretary of State Congratulates the OPCW on its Tenth Anniversary,” Press Release 42, May 10, 2007, http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR42_2007.html.
[View Article]
[7] Peter Eisler, “Chemical Weapons’ Disposal Delayed,” USA Today, November 20, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-11-20-chemical-weapons_x.htm; [View Article] U.S. Department of State, “United States Seeks Extension for Chemical Weapons Destruction,” April 20, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m= April&x=20060420183936
sjhtrop0.9848596. [View Article]
[8] Oliver Meier, “The Chemical Weapons Convention at 10: An Interview with OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter,” Arms Control Today, April 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Pfirter.asp. [View Article]
[9] Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present,” citing multiple sources, http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm#68.
[View Article]
[10] “North Korea Profile, Chemical Overview,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, [http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index_1549.htm].
[11] “Chemical Weapons Watchdog Says Iran Complying with CWC,” IRNA, May 16, 2007, http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-239/0705164594140044.htm. [View Article]
[12] Israel’s position is evaluated in Eltan Barak, “Israel, the CWC, and the Universality Objective: The View from Jerusalem,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 68, June 2005, pp. 1-6, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/CBWCB68-Barak.pdf. [View Article]
[13] “ECFA Backs Egypt Linking Anti-chemical Deal to Israel Signing NPT,” MENA, April 20, 2007, OSC document GMP20070420950007.
[14] See, for example, Michael Nguyen, “OPCW Director Seeks Middle East Inroads,” Arms Control Today, November 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Pfirter.asp; [View Article] and “Russia: Lavrov Says Israel Should Sign Nonproliferation Treaty,” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, March 2, 2007, OSC document CEP20070302950206.
[15] Richard Weitz, Ibrahim Al-Marashi, and Khalid Hilal, “Chlorine as a Terrorist Weapon in Iraq,” WMD Insights, May 2007, http://www.wmdinsights.org/I15/I15_ME1_Chlorine.htm. [View Article]
[16] “The United Nations Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Role of the OPCW Recognized,” Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, September 2006, p. 9, http://www.opcw.org/docs/publications/cdq_sep2006.pdf.
[View Article]
[17] Pfirter has repeatedly condemned the chlorine attacks in Iraq; see, for instance, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Press Statement: Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, OPCW Director-General, Condemns the Chlorine Attacks in Iraq,” Press Release 9, February 23, 2007, http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR09_2007.html. [View Article]
[18] “Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the EU on the 10th Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” European Union website, April 27, 2007, http://eu2007.de/en/News/CFSP_Statements/April/0427CWU.html. [View Article]
[19] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “European Union Supports OPCW; Third Joint Action Adopted: EUR 1.7 mln Granted to OPCW,” Press Release 27, April 18, 2007, http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR27_2007.html. [View Article]
[20] British Ministry of Defence, “Britain Completes Destruction of Old Chemical Weapon Holdings,” March 27, 2007, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/BritainCompletesDestructionOfOld
ChemicalWeaponHoldings.htm. [View Article]
[21] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “OPCW Director-General Visits the United Kingdom; Meets Minister of State, Dr Howells,” Press Release 19, March 27, 2007, http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR19_2007.html. [View Article]
[22] Kim Howells, “10th Anniversary Seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Speech, March 26, 2007, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid =100702939
1647& a=KArticle&aid=1176969027845. [View Article]
[23] French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “10ème anniversaire de l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention pour l’Interdiction des Armes Chimiques” [10th Anniversary of the Entry into Force of the Chemical Weapons Convention], French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, April 29, 2007 [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/desarmement-maitrise-armements-controle-exportations_4852/mise-oeuvre-engagements-desarmement_4873/france-desarmement-chimique_4875/10eme-anniversaire-entree-vigueur-convention-pour-interdiction-armes-chimiques-29.04.07_48985.html].
[24] French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “La France et la Convention pour l’Interdiction des Armes Chimiques” [France and the Chemical Weapons Convention], French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_8 30/desarmement-maitrise-armements-controle-exportations_
4852/mise- oeuvre-engagements-desarmement_4873/france-desarmement-chimique_4875/france-convention-pour-interdiction-armes-chimiques_48984.html].
[25] Ibid.
[26] Alexander Kelle, “Preventing Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention: A German Perspective” Bonn, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2000, http://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00714008.htm. [View Article]
[27] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “OPCW Director-General Visits Germany; Meets German Foreign Minister,” Press Release 34, April 26, 2007, http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR34_2007.html.
[View Article]
[28] The Federal German Government, “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, zur Eröffnung der Konferenz zum zehnjährigen Bestehen des Chemiewaffen-Übereinkommens (CWÜ) am 25. April 2007 in Berlin” [Speech Given by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Marking the 10-Year Anniversary of the CWC], German Government website, April 25, 2007 [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Rede/2007/070425-BM-CWUE.html].
[29] Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and its Search for an Arms Control Strategy,” Arms Control Today, vol. 30, no. 6, July/August 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_07-08/japanjulaug.asp. [View Article]
[30] “Japan’s Perspective on the Chemical Weapons Convention’s Tenth Anniversary,” Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, May 2007, p. 36, http://www.opcw.org/docs/publications/cdq10AMay2007.pdf. [View Article]
[31] Ibid.
[32] Article VII of the CWC specifies seven national implementation requirements for treaty parties. Each adherent to the treaty must create a “National Authority” which provides declarations, facilitates inspections, promotes peaceful chemical use, assists member states threatened or attacked by chemical weapons, and serves as the country’s general point of contact with the OPCW and other CWC parties. The parties must also enact legislation to incorporate the CWC provisions into domestic law (including national penal law), establish export controls for CWC-specified chemicals and technologies in accordance with the convention’s chemical transfer guidelines, and take other compliance measures to align their national policies and regulations with their CWC requirements.
[33] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s Foreign Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields,” Diplomatic Bluebook 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2006/10.pdf. [View Article]
[34] “Mobile Disposal Facility Planned to Deactivate Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 9, 2007, http://www.cwwg.org/tas04.09.07.html. [View Article]
[35] “8 Japanese Wartime Bombs Found Buried in China Home,” Xinhua, April 18, 2007 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-04/18/content_853776.htm].
[36] “Chinese Urges Greater Effort in Destroying Chemical Weapons,” Xinhua, December 12, 2006 [http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t282675.htm].
[37] “PRC Envoy to OPCW Urges Countries to Destroy Chemical Weapons Stockpiles by 2012,” Xinhua, December 6, 2006, OSC document CPP20061206968030.
[38] Xue Hanqin, “Towards a World Free of the Threat of Chemical Weapons; A Chinese Perspective of the Chemical Weapons Convention in its First Decade,” Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, May 2007, p. 20, http://www.opcw.org/docs/publications/cdq10AMay2007.pdf. [View Article]
[39] “Official Says China Strictly Implements Chemical Weapons Convention,” Industry Watch website, April 29, 2007, [http://www.industrywatch.com/pages/iw2/Story.nsp?story_id=105762761&ID=iw&scategory=Chemicals&P=
&F=&R=&VNC=hnall].
[40] Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” December 29, 2006, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html. [View Article]
[41] See, for example, Caroline Daniel, Mure Dickie, and Guy Dinmore, “China Says US Charges ‘Baseless’,” Financial Times, September 16, 2006, http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=China+%2B+baseless&aje=true&id=060916001275; [View Article] and “China Profile: Chemical Overview,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, January 2006, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Chemical/index.html. [View Article]
[42] “Double Standards Weaken Chemical Weapons Convention: Deputy FM,” Tehran Times, May 9, 2007 [http://www.tehrantimes.com/Description.asp?Da=5/10/2007&Cat=2&Num=008].
[43] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Iranian Foreign Minister Congratulates the OPCW on its Tenth Anniversary,” Press Release 49, May 11, 2007, http://www.opcw.org/pressreleases/2007/PR49_2007.html.
[View Article]
[44] See, for example, the statements of Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki in “Dismantling Chemical Weapons Will Boost Security in Mideast,” IRNA, December 6, 2006 [http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/757652/dismantling_chemical_weapons_will_boost_security_in_mideast_
iranian_president/index.html#].
[45] “World Celebrating 10th Anniversary of Chemical Arms Ban as Real Threats Still Exist by Saeid Najar Nobari,” IRNA, April 24, 2007, OSC document IAP20070424950022.
[46] “Double Standards Weaken Chemical Weapons Convention: Deputy FM,” see source in [42].
[47] Ibid.
[48] Hamid Golpira, “Ghosts of the Chemical Wars Return,” Tehran Times, May 13, 2007, http://www.mehrnews.ir/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=485076. [View Article]
[49] Tehal Chandan and Ramesh Thakur, “The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges, and Opportunities,” United Nations University Policy Brief, no. 8, 2006, p. 6 [http://www.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2006/PB8-06.pdf].
[50] Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present,” see source in [9].
[51] See, for example, “Germany Host OPCW Challenge Inspection Exercise,” Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, June 2006, p. 18, http://www.opcw.org/docs/publications/cdq_jun2006.pdf. [View Article]
[52] Chandan and Thakur, “The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges, and Opportunities,” see source in [49].
[53] Meier, “The Chemical Weapons Convention at 10: An Interview with OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter,” see source in [8]; see also Chandan and Thakur, “The Chemical Weapons Convention : Implementation, Challenges, and Opportunities,” see source in [49].
[54] Meier, “The Chemical Weapons Convention at 10: An Interview with OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter,” see source in [8].