In the first months of 2007, U.S. plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic triggered an intense debate in Ukraine. The debate was interrupted, however, in early April 2007 by a major constitutional crisis, when the Supreme Rada (the Ukrainian parliament), led by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, refused to comply with a decree issued by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko disbanding the body and calling for new elections. With the Ukrainian elite having failed to reach a consensus on the missile defense issue by the time the crisis erupted, the debate – which pitted the country’s major political parties against one another – could well reignite as the country readies for both parliamentary and presidential elections, to be held later this year at a still unspecified date.
Other European countries have experienced debates, often along domestic political cleavages, over the proposed missile defense deployments. In Ukraine, however, where the debate reflects the split between Yushchenko and Yanukovich, politics have almost completely overshadowed substance. [1] While President Yushchenko has traditionally positioned himself as an advocate for the accelerated integration of Ukraine into the West, including membership in NATO and the European Union, Prime Minister Yanukovich has, since the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, been seen as a proponent of a “pro-Russian” orientation. As Ukrainian political scientist Viktor Nebozhko described the situation, “The movement of U.S. missile defense systems toward Russia will require Ukraine to define its place in the European security landscape; Washington and Moscow will compete over [that choice].” [2] Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that Yanukovich’s position, at least on this issue, though at odds with Yushchenko, is far from being “pro-Russian,” suggesting that observers may need to revise somewhat their customary image of the Ukrainian prime minister.
As the debate unfolded, only one specific, technical concern was voiced in Ukraine, when Minister of Defense Anatoli Gritsenko noted that the destruction of an incoming missile by an interceptor launched from Poland could, under certain circumstances, take place over Ukrainian territory. In this case, he stressed, the debris from such missiles, with their possible nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads, and from the interceptors would fall on his country. [3] His concern was not developed further, however, and did not figure in the subsequent public sparring over the issue.
Predictably, Viktor Yushchenko supported the U.S. position that deployment of the missile defense system concerned only the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic. [4] He also argued that defensive weapons, by their very nature, can only enhance security, in contrast to strategic offensive
weapons, which can undermine it. [5] Minister of Defense Gritsenko (widely regarded as a Yushchenko supporter) stressed that he
had been convinced, after consultations with the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Henry Obering, that the planned system was a defensive rather than an offensive asset and could become “an important element of a pan-European missile defense system.” [6] Gritsenko also said that the American proposal to invite Ukrainian and Russian officers to the missile defense sites should “remove the reasons” for Russian concerns. [7]
While Prime Minister Yanukovich might have been expected to support Russia in the controversy and take a position opposite that of his arch-rival Yushchenko, in practice, he pursued a different tack. Yanukovich opted to keep his distance from the growing U.S.-Russian dispute and protect Ukraine from becoming embroiled in the controversy. In contrast to Moscow’s outright rejection of American plans, Yanukovich has promoted caution and encouraged prudent discourse, while expressing particular dismay that Poland and the Czech Republic, with whom Ukraine has maintained close ties, did not discuss their plans with Kyiv.
Yanukovich explained: “These kinds of decisions may be made only after broad European discussion and dialogue.” [8] Reflecting this view, the Supreme Rada, where Yanukovich’s faction holds the majority, adopted a statement expressing concern over the lack of adequate consultations with Ukraine regarding missile defense plans. [9]
Andrei Mishin, Director of the Kyiv-based Institute of Strategic Policy, wrote that Yanukovich and his supporters strongly favored a multilateral, Europe-wide approach to missile defense because the Ukrainian missile industry hoped to win contracts from such a multilateral effort. These groups in the Ukrainian economic elite are primarily associated with the Party of Regions, which Yanukovich leads. [10]
Ironically, emphasis on broad consultations has placed Yanukovich and his supporters closer to the position of Germany and France, than to that of Russia, and has cast the debate in Ukraine in somewhat unexpected terms. Whereas President Yushchenko and his supporters clearly associated themselves with the position of the United States and the former Eastern Bloc states of the “new Europe,” his rival, Prime Minister Yanukovich, appeared to share the attitudes of “old Europe” and seemed bent on distancing Ukraine from the political conflict between the United States and Russia over the missile defense question. Thus, regardless of which side prevails in the Ukrainian debate, it appears unlikely that Russia will find political support in Kyiv on the BMD issue as the controversy continues to unfold.
Nikolai Sokov and Jacob Quamme – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] Richard Weitz, “The European Ballistic Missile Defense Dispute,” WMD Insights, April 2007, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I14/I14_EU1_SRI_EasternEurope.htm. [View Article]
[2] Irina Kozhukhar, “NATO Idet na Ukrainu” [NATO Comes to Ukraine], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 31, 2007.
[3] “Gritsenko: Kuda Upadut Oblomki Iranskikh Raket, Sbitykh nad Ukrainoi?” [Gritsenko: Where Would Debris of Missiles Intercepted Over Ukraine Fall?], UNIAN, February 23, 2007; Irina Kozukhar, “Na Ukraine Mogut Posupatsya Bomby” [Bombs Might Fall on Ukraine], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 1, 2007.
[4] “Yushchenko pro Amerikanski Rakety ta Energetiku” [Yushchenko on American Missiles and Energy], UNIAN, March 5, 2007.
[5] “Yushchenko: Ukraina Privetstvuet Nachalo Konsultatsii po Voprosu Razmeshcheniya v Evrope Amerikanskoi Sistemy PRO” [Yushchenko: Ukraine Welcomes Consultations on Deployment of U.S. BMD System in Europe], Censor.Net., March 7, 2007.
[6] Irina Kozukhar, “PRO i Kontra” [ABM and Opposition], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 20, 2007.
[7] “Gritsenko: Yaksho Tem Bude Sidity Rossiiskii Ofitser, to Nikhto ne Bude Ikh Atakyvaty…” [Gritsenko: If a Russian Officer Will Sit There, No One Will Attack Them], Obozrevatel, March 16, 2007.
[8] “Yanukovich Porazil Evropu Svoimi Vyskazyvaniyami o PRO” [Yanukovich Surprised Europe With His Thoughts on BMD], Korrespondent.Net, March 28, 2007.
[9] Svetlana Stepanenko, “Rada Osudila PRO” [Rada Criticized BMD], Vremya Novostei, March 23, 2007.
[10] Andrei Mishin, “Nad PPOpastiyu” [Over the BMD Abyss], Grani-Plus (Kyiv), March 6, 2007.
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