In a March 2007 report titled “China’s Navy 2007,” the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence declared that China is building five second-generation (Type 094) JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and that the first of these has already undergone sea trials and is expected to enter into service in 2008. [1] A May 2007 U.S. Department of Defense annual report on the Chinese military also highlighted the country’s submarine program, noting that the JIN-class boat, which will be armed with the 8,000-kilometer-range JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) now under development, will replace China’s one XIA-class (Type 092) SSBN. The Department of Defense report projects initial operational capability (IOC) for the new sub will occur between 2007 and 2010. [2]

The development and launch of the JIN-class SSBN, with its JL-2 SLBMs, would represent an important improvement in China’s nuclear second-strike capability and thus have important implications for the United States and its allies. [3]

Submarine Fleet Expansion
In recent years, China has built up its naval capabilities through the acquisition of Russian destroyers and Russian Kilo-class diesel attack submarines – of which it purchased 12 at a cost of over $1.6 billion – as well as through domestic production of the new SSBN and attack submarines. [4] The latter have included the new nuclear-powered SHANG-class (Type 093) SSN attack submarine and new YUAN-class nuclear-powered (Type 041) and SONG-class diesel-powered (Type 039/039G) attack submarines. According to the Congressional Research Service, between 1995 and the end of 2007, at least 31 of the above five classes
of submarines are expected to have been built or procured and commissioned. [5] These will supplement, rather than replace, China’s aging MING- and ROMEO-class diesel powered attack subs.

Western discussions of the growing People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine fleet generally focus on the new JIN-class SSBN. Western observers note that the PLAN is building a new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island to accommodate the JIN-class SSBNs. [6] A Heritage Foundation report even suggests that a Type 095 SSBN, a larger version of the SHANG/JIN hull, is also under development. [7] What is significant with regard to the JIN SSBN is its complement of 12 8,000-km-range JL-2 SLBMs, which give it a second-strike nuclear retaliatory capability, allowing the PLAN to launch nuclear attacks from a great distance. [8]

Chinese media and commentators reject such characterizations as nothing but Western (in particular U.S.) exaggeration of Chinese military capabilities, intended to stoke fears of a growing Chinese threat. [9] They note that recent reports by the U.S. government, including the intelligence community, deliberately and publicly highlighted China’s alleged ambition to build a blue water navy to operate in the open ocean beyond the Taiwan Strait. They also stress that, contrary to the allegation that China’s growing submarine capability is posing a threat to U.S. maritime interests, it is the United States that is posing a new threat in the region by strengthening its naval presence in the Western Pacific with the recent redeployment of three nuclear-powered Los Angeles-class subs to Guam and the transfer of four Ohio-class SSBNs from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. [10]

SSBN Capabilities
Western NGO analysts also have raised questions about official U.S. technical characterizations of China’s SSBN capabilities. A 2006 Federation of American Scientists (FAS)/Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) report on China’s nuclear modernization pointed out that previous U.S. government assessments of Chinese military capabilities have tended to be inflated projections, if not outright exaggerations. FAS/NRDC noted China’s experience with its one XIA-class SSBN, which has encountered serious technical problems and has never been fully operational. [11] Given this history, the authors questioned whether China, as it seeks to deploy the next generation of strategic subs, will be able to overcome the many technical difficulties that have hampered the XIA. In addition, the report noted that “an operational SSBN force, and certainly one that would patrol America’s West Coast, would require a dramatic change of policy, capabilities, and operation.” [12]

These critics also emphasized that, compared to the U.S. submarine force, which conducts hundreds of patrols each year, the PLAN attack submarine force has had only limited patrols, while the XIA SSBN has never conducted a single deterrent patrol. Indeed, the FAS/NRDC report noted that the total number of Chinese submarine patrols between 1981 and 2006 totaled 49 for that 26-year period. For comparison, the U.S. SSBN force conducted 44 patrols – with almost half undertaken in the Pacific – in 2005 alone. This would suggest that the Chinese submarine force has very little operational experience. The report thus concluded: “Overall, the data suggests thus far that the Chinese submarine force’s mission is not force projection but coastal defense and sea denial near China and Taiwan.” [13]

China’s Maritime Strategy
Nonetheless, some Chinese analysts point out the growing importance of sea and maritime interests in the development of China’s overall military capabilities. They argue that China should transition from its status as a traditional land power to one capable of pursuing and defending its maritime geo-strategic interests. [14] Some Chinese analysts have argued for a blue water navy and power projection capabilities commensurate with China’s growing international role and reflecting the country’s increasing dependence on overseas oil and its need to secure crucial sea lines of communication (SLOCs). [15]

However, most Chinese analysts continue to urge that China’s maritime strategy should remain one of “near sea offense and deep sea defense.” [16] The latter strategy is based on China’s near-term objective of preventing Taiwanese independence and blocking U.S. intervention to support such a development, as well as on recognition of the practical limits of China’s current and projected naval capabilities. Recognizing that China has unresolved territorial disputes with a number of Southeast Asian countries and that the contested areas may contain oil and gas resources, such a strategy would also enable China to defend its sovereignty and maritime economic interests in this arena.

While analysts may be debating these points of strategy, it appears that China’s current naval order of battle will leave the PLAN little choice but to focus on the near sea option, rather than deploy a powerful blue water surface fleet. [17] Chinese naval development priorities have strongly favored submarines over aircraft carriers, given the latter’s high cost and technological complexity, as well as the political issues carriers would raise because of the major threat they would pose to regional states. [18]

However, while the PLAN’s general orientation has remained unchanged, there is growing recognition of the multiple roles that the PLAN’s submarine force must play, and thus China is developing and procuring different types of submarines for maritime blockade, near-sea offensive operations, and survivable nuclear second-strike operations. Indeed, the last mission has received strong support for a number of years, with Admiral Liu Huaqing, former vice chairman of China’s powerful Central Military Commission (1989-1997) and the PLAN Commander (1982-1987), being one of its key proponents. [19] China’s no-first-use policy, which requires that it maintain an ability to survive a nuclear first strike, also elevates the importance of developing a reliable SSBN deterrent force. [20]

Although the United States is obviously unhappy with these growing Chinese capabilities – the attack submarines, for example, could significantly complicate U.S. offensive naval operations in a future Taiwan Strait crisis – the new JIN-class SSBN could have a more positive effect, by potentially increasing bilateral nuclear stability in such a confrontation. Chinese analysts have expressed concern that at present, China’s land-based retaliatory systems may be vulnerable to U.S. preemptive attack with conventional weapons, a situation that could lead China to use these missiles early in a crisis, before they might be lost. [21] A sea-based deterrent would be less vulnerable to preemption and could reinforce China’s no-first-use policy, reducing the risk of sudden escalation to the nuclear level.

Jing-dong Yuan – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies