LARIJANI’S STRUGGLE WITH AHMADINEJAD: A PRELUDE TO THE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION?
July/Aug 2007 Issue
 

On May 21, 2007, the independent online news service Al Moheet reported that Ali Larijani, Secretary-General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, had tendered his resignation for the fifth time. [1] On the same day, Iraqi Radio Dijla reported that this resignation came as a protest against what Larijani saw as irresponsible declarations and actions by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his collaborators. [2] Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i reportedly rejected Larijani’s resignation, and, on the day it was supposedly tendered, the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) quoted a high official at the SNSC, Abderrida Fadli, as saying, “There is no substance to the reports about Larijani’s resignation.” [3]

Despite the denial, regional commentators took the reports of Larijani’s attempted resignation seriously and offered a number of reasons to account for it. Some of these explanations directly linked the alleged resignation to the politics surrounding Iran’s nuclear program; others pointed to maneuvering among Iran’s conservative political factions to gain influence over a broader range of issues. (
For more on political maneuverings in Iran related to the nuclear program, see “Mussavian’s Arrest: National Security Risk or Domestic Political Ploy?” in the June 2007 issue of WMD Insights.) While the struggle between moderates and conservatives has been a constant element of Iranian political life, the strife within the ruling conservative coalition, to which both Larijani and Ahmadinejad belong, has cast doubt on its ability to maintain unity and sustain Iran’s hard-line nuclear policy. The supposed resignation attempt has also shed light on positioning that may be underway in preparation for the 2009 Iranian presidential elections.

Possible Reasons for Larijani’s Alleged Resignation
Regional observers put forward a number of reasons for Larijani’s apparent resignation. In its May 21 report, Al Moheet cited Larijani’s frustration at President Ahmadinejad’s fiery rhetoric, which had disrupted Larijani’s negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program with European Union officials and diverged from the more cautious position he was seeking to advance in the talks. [4] A week later, Sameh Rashed, a regular columnist for Asharqalawsat, a pan-Arab daily published in London, wrote, “Larijani has declared that Iran is not interested in a nuclear weapon, while Ahmadinejad keeps repeating that enrichment is on-going and will not stop,” which he says creates the impression that the country’s nuclear program has more than the production of energy as its goal and may culminate in a weapons program. [5] Ahmadinejad, he continued, is thus depriving Larajani of any flexibility as a negotiator, particularly because suspending enrichment is a key condition set by the United States for the start of any negotiations with Tehran and one of the Europeans’ most sought-after goals in their ongoing negotiations.

A second likely reason for the alleged resignation is the apparent competition between Larijani and Ahmadinejad in shaping Iranian foreign policy in the region. Larijani has been credited with much of the behind-the-scenes diplomacy that led to the release of the British sailors seized in late March 2007 by the Iranian Navy. [6] He is also believed to have direct access to Iran’s Supreme Leader. In early April, the UAE-based moderate English daily Khaleej Times noted: “While Ahmadinejad nominally is ‘president’ of the Security Council, in reality Larijani receives his orders from supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i whose confidence he is believed to enjoy.” [7] In fact, following Larijani’s successful visit to Saudi Arabia to discuss regional stability with the Saudi leadership in February 2007, the Supreme Leader placed him in charge of handling Iran’s relations with the Gulf States and neighboring countries. However, Ahmadinejad ignored the Supreme Leader’s directive and reportedly did not even consult Larijani prior to his visit to UAE and Oman in mid-May 2007, a slight that may have been the proximate cause of Larijani’s attempted resignation. [8] In addition, the Cairo-based Islamic News Agency, Naba’, reported, “Larijani had planned to meet with representatives of the UAE government later this year away from the limelight to discuss potential solutions to the Iran-UAE conflict over the Greater and Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa islands. However, the visit of President Ahmadinejad to UAE hindered Larijani’s initiative.” [9]

The May 4, 2007, Sharm al-Shaykh conference on Iraq’s future had previously exposed these fissures. In its May 21 analysis, Asharqalawsat wrote that while Larijani was in the process of negotiating the conditions of Iran’s participation in the summit with the Iraqis, the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, announced that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Manushhar Muttaki would represent Iran at the conference, suggesting that Iran’s involvement had been decided in Tehran without Larijani’s participation. [10] The announcement apparently infuriated Larijani, who was said to have been unaware of the decision to place Muttaki in charge. [11] During this conference, it was Muttaki, as head of the Iranian delegation, who met with U.S. Secretary of State Rice.

Larijani’s apparent lack of professional respect for Muttaki also seems to have contributed to the deterioration of relations between Larijani and Ahmadinejad’s faction, which includes the Iranian foreign minister. At the time of Larijani’s resignation, the Islamic News Agency Naba’ wrote, “Larijani believes Muttaki lacks the qualifications for his current position especially during these very sensitive times, requiring a strong and skilled political figure able to face the challenges.” [12]

Differences over the issues to be discussed between the United States and Iran at their May 28 meeting also contributed to the continuing tension between Larijani and Ahmadinejad after the former’s fifth resignation attempt was rejected. [13] Following the May 28 meeting, Nasif Hatti, a contributor to the independent Lebanese daily Almustaqbal wrote:

After Ali Larijani’s announcement that the Iranian Ambassador to the UN will lead the delegation to the Iran-U.S. discussions, President Ahmadinejad canceled Larijani’s decision and named the Iranian ambassador to Baghdad to lead the delegation. Ahmadinejad’s choice reflected the agenda for the U.S.-Iran meeting. The presence of Iran’s Ambassador to the UN might have made the meeting appear to be an opportunity to discuss all issues between Iran and the U.S., including the nuclear stand-off, which is one of Iran’s main issues at the UN. Naming the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad underscored President Ahmadinejad’s intention to send a strong signal that Iraq was the only issue to be discussed between Iran and the U.S. during the May 28 meeting. [14]
The political histories of Larijani and Ahmadinejad may be contributing to the intensity of their competition for influence. While President Ahmadinejad has always been deeply entrenched in the conservative camp, Ali Larijani and his older brother Mohammed Jawad have moved across the Iranian political spectrum. In fact, Ali M. Ansari wrote in his book Iran, Islam and Democracy, The Politics of Managing Change that Jawad Larijani, along with his brother Ali, were considered pillars of the moderate wing in the political spectrum, and the ease with which they changed sides and moved to the conservative bloc was perceived as a case of blatant political opportunism, diminishing Larijani’s stature and credibility with the conservatives. [15]

Conclusion
The competition between Larijani and Ahmadinejad has two dimensions. First, Larijani may be concerned that Ahmadinejad’s actions and declarations with regard to Iran’s nuclear intentions may lead to the suspension of Larijani’s negotiations with the European Union, the United States, and the IAEA. This would not only increase the risk of military action against Iran, but could prevent Larijani from achieving a breakthrough in the negotiations that might enhance his domestic political stature. Success on the international stage would be an invaluable asset for Larijani in the 2009 presidential elections. By repeatedly tendering his resignation, Larijani may be attempting to distance himself from President Ahmadinejad, at a time when many voices within Iran have criticized Ahmadinejad’s lack of vision and diplomacy. The fact that Supreme Leader Khamene’i has repeatedly rejected Larijani’s resignation indicates his confidence in the SNSC Secretary General. This confidence, Larijani’s extensive national security experience, and the frustration of the conservative base with Ahmadinejad’s inability to fulfill his campaign promises for Iranian economic growth are likely to be major assets for Larijani in the coming 2009 presidential elections.

Khalid Hilal – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies






SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “Tehran: Larijani Yuqaddimu Stiqaltahu wa Khamene’i Yarfuduha” [Tehran: Larijani Resigns and Khamene’i Rejects his Resignation], Al Moheet, May 21, 2007. Larijani’s previous four alleged resignation attempts were also rejected by the Supreme Leader; notably the earlier resignations did not receive the close media coverage of the fifth attempt, suggesting it represented a more significant gesture within the politics of the country’s ruling faction.
[2] “Larijani Yattahimu Raiis Irani Bi3aqti al Mufawadat ma3 Ittihad Urooppi” [Larijani Accuses the Iranian President of Undermining the Negotiations with the European Union], Radio Dijla, May 21, 2007.
[3] “Wakeel Ameen Al Majlis Al A3la Lilamn Al qawmi Yanfi Stiqalat Larijani” [The Deputy Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council Denies Larijani’s Resignation], IRNA, May 21, 2007.
[4] “Tehran: Larijani Yuqaddimu Stiqaltahu wa Khamene’i Yarfuduha” [Tehran: Larijani Resigns and Khamene’i Rejects his Resignation], see source in [1].
[5] “Liman Nasghi li Larijani aw Nejad” [Whom Should We Listen to Larijani or Nejad], Asharqalawsat, May 28, 2007.
[6] “Larijani: Iran’s Pragmatic Man for all Crises,” Khaleej Times, April 5, 2007, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/newsmakers/2007/April/newsmakers_April1.xml&
section=newsmakers&col= [View Article]
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ali Nuri Zadeh, “Ali Larijani Yuqaddimu Stiqaltahu Htijajan 3la Nejad wa Muttaki wa Khamene’i Yarfuduha” [Ali Larijani Resigns in Protest Against Nejad and Muttaki and Khamene’i Rejects it], Asharqalawsat, May 21, 2007.
[9] “Sira3 al Manasib wa al Masooliyat Bada fi Tehran” [The Struggle Over Positions and Responsibilities Has Started in Tehran], Naba’ Islamic News Agency, May 21, 2007.
[10] Zadeh, “Ali Larijani Yuqaddimu Stiqaltahu Htijajan 3la Nejad wa Muttaki wa Khamene’i Yarfuduha” [Ali Larijani Resigns in Protest Against Nejad and Muttaki and Khamene’i Rejects it], see source in [8].
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Sira3 al Manasib wa al Masooliyat Bada fi Tehran” [The Struggle Over Positions and Responsibilities Has Started in Tehran], see source in [9].
[13] “Tehran: Larijani Yuqaddimu Stiqaltahu wa Khamene’i Yarfuduha” [Tehran: Larijani Resigns and Khamene’i Rejects his Resignation], see source in [1].
[14] Nasif Hatti, “Hiwar al Quwwa wa Nufood” [The Dialog of Power and Influence], Almustaqbal, May 31, 2007.
[15] Ali M. Ansari, “Iran, Islam and Democracy, The Politics of Managing Change,” London, Chatham House, 2006, p. 90.