On June 7, at the G-8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to provide the United States with unprecedented access to real-time data from the Russian-leased Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan. At the Bush-Putin Kennebunkport Summit on July 1-2, 2007, the Russian leader expanded his proposal to include a second early detection system in southern Russia. Part I below discusses the Russian proposal and the U.S. and NATO responses. Part II, “The Gabala Option and Its Eurasian Implications,” examines the facility and country at the center of the proposal, as well as the reactions of interested third-parties in Armenia and Iran.

PART I - PUTIN SHAKES UP EUROPEAN BMD DEBATE

In early June, Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to redefine the debate over the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture in Europe by proposing joint use of the former Soviet radar at Gabala in Azerbaijan with the United States. The proposal was intended to delay or even halt the deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech Republic, which Russia regards as a potential threat to its security. The Bush Administration has welcomed the Russian offer, but has also indicated that its plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe would not change.

It is important to bear in mind that NATO countries are engaged in three separate BMD initiatives. First, NATO decided in March 2005 to develop an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system by 2010. Its purpose is to protect NATO military forces and installations, wherever they operate, from short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. Second, NATO governments are considering a missile defense system to protect the national territories and population centers of NATO’s European members from missile attacks. In May 2006, a feasibility study concluded that the alliance could construct a BMD system capable of defending Europeans against missile threats from Iran, Syria, and North Korea. [1] Third, the United States is pursuing bilateral initiatives with select NATO members – currently only Poland and the Czech Republic – to deploy a small number of U.S. missile defense interceptors, as well as support assets such as radar tracking stations, at locations near the potential source of missile attacks against U.S. territory (e.g., Iran).

The Offer
On June 7, at the G-8 summit, Putin surprised his fellow heads of state by offering to provide the United States with unprecedented access to real-time data from the Russian-leased Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan. Putin described the proposal as an alternative to U.S. plans to deploy missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech Republic. Putin’s suggestion followed months of escalating Russian-American disagreements over these plans.

The Russian proposal consisted of several elements, but its basic assumption is that Iran will not soon have missiles capable of threatening Europe – thus making missile defense in Eastern Europe unnecessary at this time. [2] By using the Gabala complex, the United States would be able to closely monitor missile tests in Iran and would have ample time to deploy BMD against a threat should it ever materialize. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov subsequently explained, “The U.S. is convinced that Iran is a threat; we are ready to prove – using the radar if necessary – that these fears are unwarranted.” [3]

At Heiligendamm, Putin suggested that if Iran ever did acquire the ability to threaten Europe with ballistic missiles, the United States could station the BMD interceptors now intended for Poland in Iraq, Turkey, or on Aegis-equipped warships – or even on floating platforms – in the Caspian Sea. The Russian president also reaffirmed Moscow’s longstanding proposal that Russian, American, and European diplomats and experts conduct a joint assessment of the evolving ballistic missile threat to their countries.

Finally, Russian officials have argued that, since using the Gabala radar would allow the United States to hedge against unexpected advances in Iranian missile technology, Washington should “freeze” its planned deployment of BMD assets in Eastern Europe, at least in Lavrov’s words, “for a period of study and negotiations on the Russian proposal.” [4] In turn, Putin said that Russia “would have no reason to target Poland and the Czech Republic.” [5]

Although members of the Bush Administration indicated that Putin’s proposal showed that the Russian government now agreed with Western assessments that Iran’s ballistic missile programs represented a potential threat to European security, Russian officials later insisted that the offer was premised on the assumption that Iran was not an immediate threat to Europe. Lavrov told reporters a few days after the summit that, “honestly speaking, we were slightly surprised by the assessments in some Western commentaries and from the lips of officials that distort the picture of what actually took place.” The Russian Foreign Minister denied that Putin “acknowledged the existence of a real threat from Iran.” He insisted that Putin had repeated the longstanding Russian view that, “according to our professional estimates, including geography, geometry, ballistics, and so on, Iran has no missiles of the kind that the United States is going to protect itself against by establishing a third [BMD] deployment area in Europe, nor will it have in the next fifteen to twenty years.” [6] (The two existing U.S. BMD deployments are at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.)

The Tactics
The Russian government may have sought to catch the Bush Administration off-guard. General Yuri Baluyevsky, the Chief of the Russian General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, boasted that U.S. officials experienced disabling “awe and shock” when Putin first made his proposal. [7] The general confidently declared that formal U.S.-Russian consultations on possible use of the Gabala radar base in Azerbaijan would begin after Russian President Vladimir Putin completed his visit to the United States in early July. [8]

Despite Baluyevsky’s comments, Putin’s proposal was probably not a complete surprise to the Bush Administration – at least to the officials with full-time responsibility for these issues. In May 2007, the current Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Vasiliy Istratov, told the Russian media that, “The United States has expressed interest several times in obtaining information from various radar stations that Russia possesses,” including the Gabala station. [9]

Although Istratov described the issue in terms of Russia awaiting a specific proposal from the United States for joint use of the radar, Colonel General Viktor Yesin, the former chief of staff of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, said that, “In general, this is not a new question. Russia has long proposed to the Americans joint use of the Gabala radar station to monitor the direction of the Iranian missile threat, which so concerns the Pentagon.” Yesin believed that Washington had not accepted the offer because it would have required abandoning the planned radar for the Czech Republic. [10]

Putin’s unexpected proposal might have been a tactical move intended to throw the United States and its allies off balance after months of confrontational Russian declarations opposing missile defenses in Eastern Europe as presenting a threat to Russia (declarations that included a threat to aim Russian offensive missiles at U.S. BMD sites in Poland and the Czech Republic and to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaties). [11] These aggressive tactics had limited, if any, success. At best, U.S. representatives had offered to take steps to make the operations of the proposed BMD systems in East Central Europe more transparent to Russia. For example, the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Henry Obering, has suggested that, with the consent of the host governments, Russian government representatives might be allowed to visit the BMD sites. [12] This proposal was rejected by Russia as insufficient to address its concerns.

The jury is still out as to whether the proposal reflects a change of tone and Moscow’s decision to try a new approach or is merely the continuation of the same policy in a new form – a move calculated to sow the seeds of dissent within NATO. It is even possible that Moscow, anticipating that the United States would not abandon the missile defense project, simply sought to obtain additional justification for further harsh responses in the future.

Russian Objectives
At best from the Russian perspective, acceptance of Putin’s Gabala offer could have led the United States to abandon its efforts to deploy BMD assets in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia could also hope to participate in Europe’s emerging ballistic missile defense architecture: in October 2006, for example, General Baluyevsky indicated that Russia would only fully support a NATO BMD system that was jointly developed with Moscow. NATO must choose, he argued, “whether the missile defense system in Europe will be developed jointly with Russia, or whether it will be a segment of the U.S. national system without Russia’s participation.” [13] The head of the Russian Air Force, Vladimir Mikhailov, likewise insisted that Russia should be closely involved in establishing any multilateral BMD system, with Moscow enjoying the same status as the United States and its allies. [14]

Perhaps even more important, using the Gabala radar might remove Russian concerns that American intelligence could peek across the border from the proposed Czech station at the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) fields located in central Russia in the Tver, Kaluga, Ivanov and Vladimir regions. [15] Russian analysts say that Gabala’s location and southern orientation make its radar incapable of tracking missile launches from central Russia – unlike the proposed Czech BMD radar deployments. [16]

In making his proposal, Putin said that Russia and the United States would receive “equal access” to the Gabala BMD radar and that its operation should be transparent to all parties. [17] On its face, the location of the radar makes it look more suitable than the Central Europe plan for covering a potential ballistic missile launched from Iran and would appear to resolve the objections of those concerned that a system based in East Central Europe would not cover all European countries from a potential Iranian missile threat (e.g., Turkey, Greece, and the countries in the Caucasus). That concern was voiced by NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and other European leaders, who have insisted that the continent’s BMD architecture must provide protection to all European nations. [18]

Putin’s offer will certainly encourage popular opposition to the U.S. proposals. Although the incumbent coalitions in Poland and the Czech Republic continue to back the proposed deployment of U.S. missile defenses on their territories, public opinion polls show widespread and even growing opposition to the idea in both countries. [19] The citizens of about a dozen Czech villages situated near the proposed BMD radar have voted overwhelmingly against its construction in a nonbinding referendum. [20] Many in Poland, the Czech Republic, and other European countries favor placing the system under NATO rather than U.S. command. Rather than having to argue against the U.S. plan directly, opponents of the deployments can now plausibly cite Gabala as an alternative.

Russian officials depict the Gabala proposal as an alternative to any U.S. BMD systems in East Central Europe. Putin said that U.S. acceptance of the Gabala option would mean that, “There will be no need for our partners to place offensive weapons in outer space – which in itself is a real threat to international security – or build a new radar in the Czech Republic, or deploy missiles in Poland.” [21] Lavrov likewise asserted that, “Joint use of information collected by this station would allow the U.S. to give up plans of deploying elements of its missile shield in Europe, as well as plans of deploying some components in space.” [22] In return, Putin stated that acceptance of his proposal would mean that, “There would be no necessity of pointing our missiles at any sites in Europe or in the United States.” [23]

Even if the Gabala gambit fails to disrupt U.S. plans to deploy BMD assets in East Central Europe, the Russian government might have hoped to use the proposal to improve Putin’s sagging image in Europe. Ivanov cited the offer as proof that Russians are “taking into account the security interests of our partners, our interests, and everybody else’s interests.” [24] Similarly, Putin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov asserted that, “This offer shows once again that President Putin is ready to find consensus and he’s ready to find solutions, not by confronting, not by threatening anyone well, he’s never done that, actually – but by working together.” [25]

The U.S. Reaction
U.S. officials termed Putin’s proposal“interesting” and worthy of study. The Bush Administration agreed to conduct what the President called an intense “strategic dialogue” on the proposal and other BMD-related issues. [26] White House spokesperson Tony Snow told the media that the deployment was “not going to take place for a while” and the Administration wanted to avoid prematurely closing any options. [27] Nevertheless, the President reaffirmed interest in pursuing the Czech-Polish option when he visited Poland after the G-8 summit.

One reason for the Bush Administration’s hesitation in embracing the Russian offer is that the two countries have had a very bad experience attempting to launch a comparable joint BMD early warning facility in Moscow. In the late 1990s, the two countries agreed to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) to enable Russian and U.S. operators, located in the same facility, to receive data from both countries’ early-warning systems about missile and rocket launches worldwide, including possible accidental launches by Russia and the United States. The JDEC’s advocates argued that exchanging such real-time data would improve the quality of both countries’ missile detection networks by allowing for mutual confirmation of potential threats. They also expected it would stimulate cooperative BMD and missile control initiatives by both governments. [28]

The Bush and Putin Administrations have continued to support this proposal. The May 2002 Russian-American Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship called for bilateral measures
to promote confidence, transparency, and cooperation regarding BMD, including implementation of the June 2000 bilateral memorandum of understanding creating the JDEC. [29] Nevertheless, protracted disagreements over taxes, legal liability, and other issues have continued to block the JDEC’s start. [30] Russian officials recently indicated they might scuttle the whole project, if the United States went ahead with its plans to deploy BMD systems in East Central Europe. [31]

The Gabala facility would have to operate in even less favorable circumstances than the JDEC. The Gabala radar, unlike the bilateral JDEC, would be located in a third country whose host government would rightly insist on some say in its management. Trilateral decision-making could give either Russia or Azerbaijan the authority to block measures the United States might wish to take, such as tracking, or more importantly intercepting, a suspicious Iranian missile launch. [32] Given the compressed time for making an intercept decision, even a few minutes delay in transmitting information would prevent a timely launch. In contrast, the current plan is for the Czech facility to be largely an American-run enterprise, which should facilitate the rapid transfer of data to the U.S. BMD command.

In addition, Russian-American political and military relations have deteriorated considerably since the late 1990s. In this regard, the past history of intermittent Russian-Iranian security cooperation could lead U.S. officials to fear that the Russians at the complex would limit U.S. access to information generated by the radar or seek to use its joint management to acquire sensitive data regarding the capabilities and operation of the U.S./NATO BMD architecture. At worst, such intelligence might find its way to Tehran, Pyongyang, or other states of proliferation concern, where it would facilitate the development of countermeasures.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who expressed mild annoyance at what apparently was a new idea to her, commented upon learning of the proposal: “One does not choose sites for missile defense out of the blue. It’s geometry and geography as to how you intercept a missile.” [33] She later observed that it was unclear “whether Azerbaijan makes any sense in the context of missile defense.” [34]

U.S. Missile Defense Agency spokesperson Rick Lehner later elaborated on Secretary Rice’s concerns. He explained that, “I do not know whether any research or calculation was carried out for such a location as Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, it was precisely after researching the territory of all of Europe that we considered it necessary to deploy the radar and the missile interceptors precisely in Poland and the Czech Republic,” which lie along the path that Iranian missiles would fly toward North America. [35]

Operational Complexities
In this regard, the Gabala radar’s closer proximity to Iran could provide earlier warning of any missiles launched from that country than would a radar complex based in the Czech Republic. On the other hand, what the U.S. military is seeking from the planned X-band radar in the Czech Republic is a system capable of tracking and guiding interceptor missiles toward Iranian offensive ballistic missiles. Even if the Gabala launch-detection radar were reconstructed into a battle-management radar, its proximity to Iran could make the radar less useful for guiding the envisaged mid-course interceptor missiles toward the targeted offensive missile, which could quickly overfly any radar deployed in Azerbaijan. The site might prove more useful for intercepting Iranian missiles immediately after launch in their boost phase, but the United States has yet to master the more challenging technology required for such an interception. [36]

Similarly, the interceptor missiles should ideally be placed at some distance from the launch site of the targeted ICBM to allow time to track the missile and calculate how to intercept it. The Americans have been using precisely this argument with the Russians in their efforts to explain why any missile interceptor based in Poland would be unable to intercept an ICBM launched from nearby Russian missile fields, which would fly over the North Pole rather than Europe if aimed at the United States. [37] In early March, Lieutenant General Obering argued against a British proposal to place missile interceptors in the United Kingdom on the grounds that their location would present a greater threat to Russian ICBMs in flight than those planned for Poland because “we probably could catch them from a UK launch site.” He argued that a British-based system would provide the defenders more time to track and target Russian strategic missiles heading toward the United States. [38]

From a technical point of view, the Gabala system therefore would work best as a complement rather than a substitute for the radar planned for the Czech Republic. For this reason, on March 1, 2007, in Brussels, Lieutenant General Obering indicated that having access to data from an early-warning radar in the Caucasus could be helpful, though he did not relate any concrete American intentions in that regard. [39] All three of the South Caucasus countries also quickly denied the existence of any such plans, though Georgian leaders, realizing the potential value of hosting a U.S. military facility to their ambitions of joining NATO and deterring Russian military coercion, soon began endorsing the idea. [40]

Alliance Reaction
At the June 14-15 NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told his Russian counterpart, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, that the Bush Administration was prepared to consider the Gabala option as, at best, a supplementary capacity. He told reporters that: “I was very explicit in the [NATO] meeting that we saw the Azeri radar [at the Gabala station] as an additional capability, that we intended to proceed with the X-Band radar in the Czech Republic.” [41] Serdyukov did not engage in a direct debate at the meeting, nor raise it at the bilateral meeting with Gates. But the following day, he characterized the American decision as an “unfriendly step,” explaining that, “We see such a decision as a move aimed at destroying the existing security system and creating new dividing lines on the European continent.” [42]

At the NATO meeting, the Bush Administration secured the general endorsement of the other allied governments, which had expressed varying reservations in the past, to proceed with the planned Czech-Polish deployments. NATO spokesperson James Appathurai said that none of the 26 member countries had raised questions about the desirability or feasibility of the proposed U.S. BMD deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. [43]

The NATO Defense Ministers also launched a comprehensive study designed to assess the political and military implications for the alliance of the possible U.S. BMD deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. As part of this study, scheduled for completion by the time of the February 2008 Defense Ministers meeting, NATO military experts would develop options for a possible additional short-range missile defense system to protect members located in southeastern Europe. [44] (NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer referred to this as a possible “bolt-on” to “the U.S. third site.”) [45] The proximity of these countries – including Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey – to Iran would make it difficult for long-range BMD interceptors based in Poland to protect them from a potential Iranian missile strike. [46] When President Bush visited Bulgaria on June 11, Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov said his government would support any BMD architecture for Europe that would guarantee “the indivisibility of the Euro-Atlantic space.” [47] NATO sources said that the short-range BMD “bolt-on” could achieve initial operational capacity in 2010 and full capacity by 2015. [48]

Appathurai indicated that the NATO military assessment would also consider a possible role for the Gabala radar. He stressed, however, that the purpose of this NATO study, like other alliance BMD activities, was not to endorse or oppose bilateral U.S. BMD initiatives but solely to consider how American plans might affect NATO’s own separate multilateral BMD initiatives. [49] The NATO governments might then determine at their scheduled April 2008 summit in Bucharest how to achieve their preferred European BMD architecture.

The final communiqué of the Defense Ministers meeting also endorsed continuing discussions between NATO and Russia on BMD issues, as well as their joint efforts to deepen interoperability between NATO and Russian theater BMD systems. [50] Anatoly Serdyukov, attending his first NATO meeting in Brussels as Russia’s new defense minister, agreed that Russia and NATO should continue exploring joint initiatives to protect their troops on deployment in foreign missions from short-range missile attacks. [51]

The Future
If the United States accepts Putin’s offer, whether as a substitute or (contrary to Russia’s desires) as a complement to a Czech-based radar, the American, Russian, Azerbaijani, and perhaps NATO governments would need to decide how any multilaterally-managed BMD radar in Azerbaijan would integrate into the evolving European missile defense architecture. At present, this architecture includes a Russian national system, an air defense structure for the Moscow-led Commonwealth of Independent States, forward-based elements of the American national missile defense system, and at least two potential NATO systems (one for defending allied military forces deployed in theaters of conflict; the other, under development, for protecting the populations of NATO’s European members).

A major difference has already arisen between Russia and the United States over whether Washington must halt its efforts to deploy missile defenses in East Central Europe pending resolution of the discussions regarding the Azerbaijani option. After the G-8 summit, President Bush traveled to Poland, where he discussed the proposed deployment of BMD interceptors in that country. U.S. National Security Council Adviser Stephen Hadley has labeled the Azerbaijan radar as “a contribution” (rather than a substitute) to a more comprehensive European missile defense architecture. [52] In contrast, Lavrov complained that the United States must at a minimum halt its deployment of missile defense elements in Europe while it evaluates the Russian proposal. [53]

Another difference has emerged over how inclusive the negotiations must be. Putin said the dialogue should be “multifaceted and involve all European countries.” [54] Many American, Russian, and European commentators also call for “Europeanizing” the BMD issue by involving NATO more in the negotiations and even operation of the U.S. BMD systems planned for deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic. NATO governments, however, have formally treated the planned U.S. deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic as bilateral initiatives. They have turned to Washington to negotiate directly with Moscow and Baku about the Gabala option.

Finally, members of the Bush Administration profess to see the recent Putin initiative as evidence that the diverging threat assessments between Russia and Western governments regarding Iran are narrowing. In particular, they cite the proposal as confirmation that their Russian counterparts now recognize that Iran’s nuclear and missile programs represent a major problem for Russian security – if not as a direct threat, then as a driver of NATO’s BMD efforts. Putin may have given this impression when he observed in a joint press conference with Bush at the G-8 summit that, “We have a mutual understanding of common threats, but we also have differences over how we can counter and prevent these threats.” [55] As noted earlier, after the summit, however, Russian officials emphatically denied that they shared the Bush Administration’s threat perception regarding Iran.

As noted, Presidents Bush and Putin discussed these matters on July 1-2 at the Bush family summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine, but no agreements were reached.

Part II of this Special Report focuses on The Gabala Option and Its Eurasian Implications.


Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute