On July 26, 2007, the international press reported that, during a state visit to Tripoli, French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed a protocol with Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi to build a nuclear reactor in Libya for water desalination. [1] Commenting on the nuclear protocol, the French President declared, “Nuclear energy is the energy of the future… if we do not provide the countries south of the Mediterranean Sea with the energy of the future, how would they progress? … And if they do not progress how can we fight terrorism and extremism?” [2] In 2003, Libya agreed to eliminate all its weapon of mass destruction (WMD) programs under international oversight, a step that paved the way for the restoration of diplomatic ties with the United States and other Western governments and ended a formal embargo on nuclear trade with Tripoli.

Notwithstanding Libya’s renunciation of WMD, the nuclear protocol triggered sharp criticism within France and Germany for offering Libya technology that could potentially contribute to proliferation. The announcement of the deal, moreover, came just two days after Libya, in exchange for $400 million, released six foreign medical workers sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly infecting Libyan children with HIV. France played a major role in these negotiations. Some detractors charged that the timing of the nuclear deal suggested that it and a conventional arms sale contract Sarkozy also signed with Libya during his visit were part of a quid pro quo to secure the release of the foreign medics. These detractors complained that the French leader paid too high a price to assure the success of that effort. [3]

Opposition at Home and Abroad
In France, the nuclear protocol was received with skepticism, if not outright condemnation. The opposition Socialist Party declared in a July 26 statement that, “Civilian nuclear [technology] can be used sooner or later to develop military applications,” and asked, “Is it not a bit soon to be throwing ourselves into Qaddafi’s arms and giving him our international endorsement?” [4] Two days later, on July 28, Yann Wehrling, spokesperson for France’s Green Party, deplored the fact that “Those who want to sell French nuclear [technology] anywhere in the world, to any regime and at any price have acted with boundless cynicism…. Libya still remains a non-democratic regime.” [5]

In contrast to the uranium enrichment capability being developed by Iran, the Franco-Libyan deal involves a nuclear power facility, which cannot provide direct access to material usable for nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, Bruno Gulnich, from the far right National Front, linked the two nuclear programs, stating in a July 30 interview, that he “cannot understand the double standards in the way Sarkozy deals with Libya and Iran.” [6]

In Germany, Ruprecht Polenz (CDU/CSU), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag (the lower chamber of the German parliament), made a similar connection, declaring on July 28, “It is naïve to give Qaddafi such a head-start in nuclear technology compared to Tehran.” [7] By encouraging Libya to expand its nuclear capacity, Polenz continued, France is undermining European Union efforts to persuade Iran to freeze its nuclear program. [8] Germany, France, and Great Britain, known as the EU-3, have played a major role in these efforts. Polenz added that, to guarantee that nuclear fuel received from France will not be used for military purposes, Libya must return all of it to France after use. [9] The same day the German government expressed its hesitation regarding the protocol; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gernot Erler, termed the deal, “politically problematic.” [10]

Adding to Berlin’s discomfort is the fact that the German industrial giant Siemens owns 34 percent of the company that would likely build the Libyan reactor, Areva NP; the firm is also partially owned by the French government. On July 30, 2007, Margareta Wolf, the foreign affairs spokesperson for the German Greens’ parliamentary group, warned that “Siemens would be wise in terms of its image and its responsibilities not to play with fire with this.” [11] Henning Rikah, a Berlin-based political analyst summarized German views in a comment to the Qatar-based news channel Al-Jazeera: “Germans are not happy about the exportation of nuclear energy.” [12]

Less Concern in Other Quarters
The U.S. government has not expressed disquiet over France’s plan to supply Libya with a nuclear desalination plant. State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, declared, “I expect ... that the French government would pay full attention to making sure that any safeguard will be implemented in any sort of deal.” [13]

Nonetheless, the Bush Administration has proceeded cautiously in its own nuclear dealings with Tripoli, limiting cooperation in the nuclear field to the uses of nuclear materials for medical purposes. [See text below.]

A number of nonproliferation experts also rejected the idea that the Franco-Libyan protocol would assist Libya in developing nuclear weapons. On July 26, Agence France Presse quoted former U.S. official Mark Fitzpatrick, now a non-proliferation expert at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as saying, “I don’t think there is any proliferation risk, given the fact that Libya is still cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” [14] Referring to Libya’s elimination of its WMD programs, he added, “Libya’s cooperation with the IAEA and the British and American governments has been exemplary.” [15] Similarly, Khaled Charkawe, a Moroccan professor of African studies, pointed to the technical limitations that would prevent Libya from converting a civilian nuclear program into a military one. He told Al-Jazeera on July 27:

The transfer of civilian technology does not pose any threat at the level of military technology. This is because the uranium to be used at this nuclear plant will never become a tool for military use….Libya will not be able, with its technical and technological capabilities, to develop military capabilities . . . . [16]

While the Franco-Libyan nuclear protocol was not extensively covered by the Arab media, an editorial in the United Arab Emirates-based daily Gulf News commended the French President’s posture of trusting Arab states with nuclear energy. The editorial suggested that Sarkozy had complex motivations for taking this stance, including both the desire to differentiate France from other Western powers and the desire to reap profits from France’s nuclear expertise. The paper wrote:

On March 12, the Libyan news agency, Akhbar Libya, reported in a story entitled, “U.S. To Assist Libya in Building a Civilian Nuclear Station,” that the General People’s Committee [the Office of the Prime Minister] had given the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs the green light to “sign the nuclear agreement that the U.S. had offered to Libya.” [1] In addition to cooperation on nuclear energy, the news agency added that the objectives of the agreement were increasing water desalination, improving radiochemistry performance at energy research centers, creating joint projects using nuclear technology in the fields of agriculture, industry, environment and medicine, and allowing Libyan citizens to study nuclear sciences in American academic institutions. [2] The U.S. State Department quickly sought to quash the expansive Libyan interpretation of plans for bilateral nuclear cooperation. On March 13, a U.S. official anonymously told the daily Almanara that, after Libya had renounced its WMD programs in 2003, the United States stated that it would be open to discuss cooperation in some aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. [3] He added that bilateral discussions had been held only with respect to a medical center and pointed out that even these discussions are still on-going. [4] On the same day, Tom Casey, a State Department spokesperson, underscored these points: “We are in discussions with the Libyans regarding a project to help them develop a nuclear medicine center, and that is the only thing you could use the word ‘nuclear’ in relation to past agreements.” [5]     Sources and Notes [1] “Amirica Tusa3idu Libya Libina’ Mahatta Nawawiyya Madaniyya” [U.S. Will Assist Libya in Building a Civilian Nuclear Station], Akhbar Libya, March 12, 2007. [2] “Libya Satuwaqi3u Ma3a America Itifiqiyya Liincha’a Mahatta Nawawiya Madaniya” [Libya and the U.S. Will Sign an Agreement To Build A Civilian Power Plant], Asharqalawsat, March 13, 2007. [3] “Masool Amiriki Taqrir Alwikala Allibiyya 3an Tifaqiyyata3awoonbayna Al Baladaynmobalagh Feeh” [U.S. Official: The Report of the Libyan Agency about Cooperation between the Two Countries Is Exaggerated], Almanara, March 13, 2007. [4] Ibid. [5] “U.S. Says No Nuclear Power Cooperation in the Cards with Libya,” DefenceTalk.com, March 14, 2007, http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/wmd/US_says_no_nuclear_power_cooperation_ on_the_cards_with_Libya170010935.php. [View Article]

Since Napoleonic times, France has seen itself as a champion of the Arab cause and has often sided with the views of Middle East leaders against those of Western nations. It is not just a hankering for the old colonial days, but of preferring to take a considered and different stand from that of European, or more frequently, American, positions. Therefore, it is not surprising for Sarkozy to say the West should learn to trust Arab nations which pursue their own domestic nuclear energy requirements. [17]

The paper, however, also pointed out that the Libyan deal was likely to pave the way for French economic gains in other quarters of the Arab world:

It is more than likely that Sarkozy is very aware that the GCC countries are investigating the feasibility of creating their own nuclear reactors to assist in the enormous demands for electricity and potable water. Undoubtedly, the French would be more than delighted to assist any or all of the GCC nations in their inquiries, with the ultimate aim of obtaining the lucrative contracts. [18]