WMD Insights

BRAZIL EMBRACES NUCLEAR ENERGY WITH DECISIONS TO COMPLETE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, EXPAND URANIUM ENRICHMENT, FUND NAVY NUCLEAR R&D ACTIVITIES

September 2007 Issue

On June 25, 2007, Brazil’s National Council on Energy Policy (Conselho Nacional de Politica Energetica – CNPE) voted to complete the Angra 3 nuclear power plant by 2013 and consider constructing four additional nuclear plants by 2030 as part of Brazil’s National Energy Plan. [1] The country’s President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (commonly referred to by the nickname “Lula”) announced his strong support for the project during a July 10 visit to the Brazilian Navy’s Aramar Experimental Center. [2] The decision became official on August 7, but an environmental license must be approved before work on Angra 3 can be resumed. [3]

Brazil currently operates two nuclear power plants: Angra 1 (657 megawatts of electrical output [MWe]) and Angra 2 (1350 MWe), which provide approximately 3 percent of the country’s electricity. [4] Brazil stopped work in the late 1980s on Angra 3, which like Angra 2, is a 1350 MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR) acquired from Kraftwerk Union A.G. (KWU), a subsidiary of Siemens. According to Eletronuclear, the operator of Brazil’s nuclear power plants, most of the design work for Angra 3 has been completed and most of the equipment has been purchased, but only 30 percent of the overall project has been built. [5] Analysts project that Angra 3 will not begin commercial operation until approximately 2014. [6]

The approval of Angra 3 gives new impetus to Brazil’s quest to produce all of the country’s nuclear fuel domestically. [7] With large uranium reserves and a desire to maintain a steady nuclear fuel supply and demonstrate Brazil’s technical know-how, the Brazilian government has sought to develop commercial-scale uranium-enrichment facilities that would make it self-sufficient in the production of nuclear power reactor fuel and might event-ually allow it to export fuel to nuclear power programs elsewhere. [8] In 2000, the state-owned Industrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB – Nuclear Industries of Brazil) contracted with the Brazilian Navy to construct the country’s first industrial-scale uranium-enrichment facility using Navy-designed centrifuges at Resende (about 100 kilometers from Rio de Janeiro) for a reported $130 million. [9] In May 2006, after contentious negotiations led to an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the extent of the agency’s inspections at Resende, Brazil announced the start-up of the first of four modules, containing four cascades of centrifuges, at the Resende site. [10] The Navy developed the final design of the Resende enrichment centrifuges at its Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó, near the city of Sao Paulo, where the Navy is also pursuing several programs related to nuclear energy generation, fuel cycle technologies, and nuclear submarine propulsion systems. [11]

According to Brazilian Science and Technology Minster Sergio Rezende, the Resende enrichment plant, together with a companion uranium conversion facility to produce the uranium hexafluoride gas used in the enrichment process, will provide about 60 percent of the fuel for Angra 1 and Angra 2 by 2010. [12] Currently, Brazil sends its uranium to Canada and the United Kingdom for conversion into uranium hexafluoride and enrichment before it is returned to Brazil for fabrication into fuel elements. [13]

During his July 10, 2007, visit to the Aramar Experimental Center, in addition to confirming that Brazil will complete Angra 3, President Lula da Silva announced that the government would provide one billion reais (approximately $534 million) over eight years for the Navy to complete its nuclear program. With 130 million reais per year, the Navy will be able to enlarge a smaller uranium conversion facility at Iperó to produce uranium hexafluoride gas and complete a small prototype reactor suitable for submarine propulsion – capabilities that may eventually enable Brazil to construct an indigenously fueled nuclear-powered submarine. [14] President Lula da Silva’s pledge gave a boost to the Navy’s nuclear program, which has been languishing for lack of funds, and demonstrated the country’s resurgence of interest in nuclear power. [15] (According to an article in the daily O Globo, for several years, the Navy had been barely able to maintain its equipment for its nuclear program on the allotted $40 million reais per year that it received.) [16]

The President’s announcement also appeared to signal that he is no longer concerned that Brazil’s pursuit of the complete nuclear fuel cycle and industrial-scale enrichment facilities might be censured by the international community. In early 2006, the president had postponed the official start of the Resende enrichment facility to concentrate on building more hydroelectric plants and to avoid comparisons with Iran’s enrichment program, which has drawn IAEA scrutiny and UN Security Council sanctions. (For additional detail, see “Brazilian Nuclear Debate Highlights Parallels and Contrasts with Iran,” in the July/August 2006 issue of WMD Insights.) Lula’s statements at Aramar also underscored the key role that the Navy has played in the country’s nuclear program and the importance of advances in the nuclear sector to enhancing Brazil’s international prestige.

Domestic Debate on Nuclear Energy
Lula’s administration has been debating whether to revive the country’s nuclear energy program since he took office in 2003, but the president did not push the issue because of strong opposition from Dilma Rousseff, then Minister of Mines and Energy (now Minister of the Civil Household of the Presidency), and because of concerns that championing this potentially controversial effort might injure his prospects for re-election in 2006. [17] Apprehensions over the risks of a major nuclear accident, like those at Three Mile Island in the United States, and Chernobyl in Ukraine, were also said to have contributed to the president’s hesitancy in backing nuclear power during his first term. [18]

After his re-election in 2006, however, as Brazil’s economy grew stronger, Lula reportedly realized that to provide more jobs and maintain a five percent growth rate, he would have to ensure a plentiful supply of energy to attract new investment. [19] The President’s move to resume work on Angra 3 was also spurred by his frustration at the slow progress of the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and National Renewable Resources (IBAMA) in reviewing the environmental licenses for two hydroelectric plants to be built along Rio Madeira. The plants would add 6,450 MW to the country’s energy grid. In April 2007, Lula was informed that IBAMA would not issue the preliminary licenses for the two hydroelectric plants; thereafter, he decided to schedule a meeting of the CNPE on June 25 and add Angra 3 to the agenda. [20] At that time, Lula criticized environmentalists saying: “Either we build the hydroelectric plants overcoming all obstacles, or we are going to enter the nuclear age.” [21]

For the most part, current and former government officials, academics, and the media have spoken in favor of the decision to revive Brazil’s nuclear energy program, citing its potential contribution in meeting domestic energy needs, reducing dependence on foreign energy sources, providing clean energy, and allowing Brazil to take advantage of its uranium resources and enrichment know-how. [22] A notable exception has been Environment Minister Marina Silva who dissented from the CNPE vote on completing Angra 3 because of concerns about the disposal of radioactive waste (spent nuclear fuel) from the power plant and from any additional such plants that might be built. [23]

Following the vote, Silva reminded reporters that Angra 3’s completion was not yet assured, as the project still required IBAMA’s approval. [24] One day after the vote, IBAMA informed the press that there was no set date for when it might issue the environmental license for Angra 3. [25] On July 9, 2007, IBAMA finally approved the two hydroelectric projects despite Silva’s objections. [26] President Lula thus won the victories he sought on both the hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, and, as noted in his July speech at Aramar, he announced that Brazil would fund further nuclear endeavors.

Prestige from Complete Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Submarine
As media reports from around the world emphasized, President Lula de Silva’s July 2007 announcement was as much about Brazil’s bid for international prestige through its nuclear achievements as about addressing his country’s need for clean and plentiful energy. [27] In a July 10 interview with DefesaNet following the Aramar announcement, the President, while acknowledging that Brazil’s nuclear energy program had been behind schedule, emphasized the tangible and intangible benefits that could be expected from Brazil’s increased funding for the nuclear projects. Referring to the Navy’s uranium enrichment-related programs at Aramar, he stated:

I think that we now have the conditions for completing this project, and Brazil can afford itself the luxury of being one of the few countries in the world to command the technology for enriching uranium and, on the basis of that, I believe that we will be given much more respect as a nation, as the power that we wish to be. [28]

He went on to note that one signal to the world of Brazil’s technological attainments would be development of a nuclear submarine: “Why not dream big and say that we want to reach the point where a nuclear submarine is a possibility?” When pressed by the reporter as to whether Brazil was seeking a new rapprochement with the United States through its energy policy and strategic military policy (including a nuclear submarine), Lula reiterated Brazil’s growing strength and ambitions:

[President] Bush is drawing closer to Latin America because it is a mistake for anyone not to draw closer to Latin America. Our determination is Brazilian, with the determination of the Brazilian State, of the Brazilian Navy, with Brazil in mind. … So I believe that Brazil has everything it needs definitively to become a sovereign State, be it by the required overhaul of our Armed Forces, by reequipping them, [and] preparing Brazil for mastering the entire uranium cycle …. [29]

Asked if his recent media comments, apparently on the new nuclear policy, were aimed at anyone in particular and/or specifically at Venezuela’s President Chávez, the president responded, “Nobody is going to keep Brazil from fulfilling the historic role it is meant to fulfill. … We have the conditions for becoming a huge energy power, and we will not back down on this.” [30] (In a June 2007 interview with BBC’s TV Hard Talk, President Lula had said that he does not believe Chávez represents a threat to Latin America.) [31]

Jose Goldemberg, a regular international commentator on nuclear issues, was one of the few voices following Lula’s July announcement to express caution regarding Brazil’s reliance on nuclear energy. Goldemberg, who formerly served as national science and technology minister and as the environmental secretary of Sao Paulo state, criticized the nuclear expansion as not economically justified given Brazil’s huge hydroelectric and biofuel energy resources. [32]

Nonetheless, Goldemberg wrote a July 16, 2007, opinion piece stating that countries such as Brazil with large uranium reserves and enrichment know-how are planning to make money from a growing nuclear energy market in the coming decades, and they are developing enrichment capabilities as a “safety net” against politically-motivated threats of nuclear fuel interruption. He went on to state that while establishment of a proposed IAEA fuel bank, which would provide fuel in the event of a supply interruption, might lead Brazil to limit the size of its enrichment facilities, it would not lead the country to abandon their development. He also noted that, although uranium enrichment can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons, the Brazilian program would not be a proliferation risk because it is under IAEA safeguards, as well as under the inspection system of the Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC). He concluded: “This is a ‘dual approach’ to enrichment, which satisfies national pride and offers a supply guarantee at small expense, while commercial imports of nuclear fuel go on. From this perspective, Brazil is not setting a bad example by enriching uranium.” [33]

Notably, despite the small scale of Brazil’s enrichment capabilities at the time, in 2004 the United States decided to include Brazil on the list of states with “full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants,” rather than on the list of states that had not reached this advanced stage of development and that Washington seeks to discourage from developing a complete nuclear fuel cycle. [34] The U.S. decision to endorse Brazil’s pursuit of uranium enrichment thus demonstrated Washington’s confidence in Brazil’s nonproliferation credentials, as well as in its technical capabilities. [35]

The Navy’s Activities at Aramar Research Center
While President Lula was reluctant to pursue nuclear energy when he first took office, he has always supported the Navy’s nuclear program, despite its troublesome history, and had promised to fund it at higher levels once Brazil’s economy improved. [36] Until President Lula’s announcement of new funds for the Aramar Center, the Navy’s activities had been in decline. Indeed, in February 1996, the Navy suspended its plans to build a nuclear submarine after 17 years of work. At that time, about half of the 2,000 employees at Aramar were discharged. [37] The Navy then focused on enrichment technology for civilian nuclear energy, although it tried unsuccessfully to restore its nuclear submarine program in 2000. Thereafter, according to a July 10, 2007, Agencia Estado article, the situation continued to decline:

The CEA [Aramar Center] was on the verge of being deactivated five years ago [in 2002] due to a lack of funds. Money became scarcer during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration. The group of physicists and engineers constituting the “brain” of the unit was disbanded. The number of employees, recently as high as 800, dropped by half…. Construction projects came to a halt – some in [sic] the foundations were protected by plastic sheets and covered with earth. [38]

The article continued to report on comments by Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto, the head of the Brazilian Navy, who hosted Lula during the president’s July 10 visit to Aramar. In comments to the press at that time, the Admiral claimed that the Navy’s submarine program was 10 years behind schedule and, highlighting the significance of the new funding announced by President Lula, he noted that it amounts “to half of all that has been spent since the start of the program in 1979 (2.1 billion reais according to the Navy).” [39]

The nuclear infrastructure at the Aramar Center includes the Isotopic Enrichment Laboratory, housing a pilot-scale plant that uses the centrifuge method; a centrifuge manufacturing plant; a uranium purification facility; an experimental pressurized-water reactor; and a partially constructed uranium conversion plant, which will produce uranium hexafluoride to use in the enrichment process at the site. [40] Press reports suggest that the 1 billion reais promised by President Lula will be used primarily to complete the Electronuclear Generation Laboratory (Labgene), the facility to house the prototype PWR, and the uranium conversion plant. The main components for the prototype PWR are complete. At an August 2005 conference, the head of the Nuclear Propulsion Program, Captain Leonam Guimaraes said that “an indigenously developed 50 MW reactor has been assembled and is awaiting installation in a land-based prototype nuclear submarine at the Aramar Experimental Center….” [41] However, because of inadequate funding, only the foundations for Labgene have been built and the reactor equipment has been maintained in storage. The prototype PWR will be used primarily for submarine propulsion but also as a step in developing a small- or medium-sized power plant for electricity. [42] Some media reports suggest that the Navy’s PWR could also be used to train the technicians for the newly funded Angra 3 power reactor. [43] To produce fuel for a nuclear submarine, the Navy will need to enrich uranium to 18-19 percent, more than the five-percent enrichment level used for nuclear power reactor fuel, but still below the level needed for nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, as Brazil takes steps to raise the level of enrichment, it could
raise proliferation concerns for the IAEA and ABACC. [44]

Quest for a Nuclear Submarine
While President Lula da Silva expressed the hope during his July visit to Aramar that Brazil would one day have a nuclear submarine, the country is still far from that goal even with the new funds Lula promised. Indeed, the Navy’s official position, as reported in the press in December 2006, has been that while the Navy is interested in a nuclear submarine, it currently does not have a program to develop one. [45] The Navy operates a fleet of four Tupi-class (modified German Type 209) diesel-electric submarines built between 1985-1996 and one improved Tupi-class diesel-electric Tikuna. The first Tupi-class submarine was built at Germany’s Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, while the other three and the Tikuna were built at Arsenal de Marinha do Rio de Janeiro (AMRJ). [46] According to Jane’s Navy International, the AMRJ “struggled to complete the improved Tupi-class boat, Tikuna, which was originally planned as an eight-boat intermediate step between the Tupi class and a nuclear-attack boat (SSN) under SNUC [the Brazilian Nuclear Submarine program].” [47] In 2004, the Navy announced plans to upgrade the four Tupi-class submarines and to embark on a program to build a new class of five submarines (S-MB-10). [48] The Navy reportedly has selected Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft’s model IKL 214-HDW because its current submarines have similar equipment. [49] The submarine will be built by AMRJ. [50]

While the Navy has made the submarine fleet its priority, there are conflicting views within the Navy on whether the country should develop conventional submarines or pursue a nuclear submarine. This long-running debate involves issues of prestige and self-sufficiency, as well as concerns about the best way to win funds for the Navy’s nuclear activities. For example, in a December 2006 interview, the former creator and coordinator of the Naval Nuclear Program between 1979 and 2004, Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, criticized conventional submarines, which he called “alligators.” He claimed that nuclear submarines are critical if Brazil is to be considered a major power:

France no longer has a conventional submarine, nor do [sic] the United States, Russia, or England either. Only those unable to obtain the nuclear type have conventional submarines. In a country like ours, with continental dimensions, not understanding that is ignorance. Those Navy officials who don’t prioritize nuclear propulsion are officials who want the Navy to remain as a deluxe coast guard: in other words, to have an eternally subservient country. The nuclear-propelled submarine is a gesture of independence, not an affront to anyone. It is a gesture of independence and self-respect. [51]

In response, Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho, the head of the Navy in 2006, defended the plan to purchase conventional submarines because of the difficulty in obtaining funds for the Navy’s nuclear program. In an interview with the weekly Hora do Povo, Admiral Carvalho stated that building a conventional submarine is not going backwards: “Quite the opposite, it will allow us to maintain the technological know-how of our engineers and technicians that was so hard to obtain and we cannot afford to lose it.” [52]

Notably, in 2007, at the beginning of his second term, President Lula picked a new Navy Commander, Admiral Soares de Moura Neto, who favors the nuclear submarine option instead of a close contender for the position, Admiral Euclides Duncan Janot de Matos, the main supporter of the Navy’s retooling program based on conventional submarines. [53] In his inaugural speech, Admiral Moura Neto said that everything would be done to obtain all necessary resources to finish the nuclear submarine program in the shortest possible time. [54] However, when President Lula announced the new funding for the Navy, Admiral Moura Neto emphasized that the priority now is to produce energy, specifically, to work on technology related to the resumption of the Angra 3 project. According to one press report, the admiral stated, “The submarine is a next step, but as yet there is no government decision that we are going to build it.” [55] His focus on the Navy’s role in nuclear energy rather than in building a nuclear submarine may be part of a plan to gain popular support for funding the Navy’s nuclear activities as part of the country’s National Energy Plan. [56] Press reports state that to actually build a nuclear submarine, the Navy will need an additional investment of 3 billion reais. [57]

Conclusion
President Lula’s July 10 visit to Aramar confirmed that the Navy will remain crucial to Brazil’s nuclear energy program, and that Brazil still perceives mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and an indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine as hallmarks of a great world power. For their part, Navy officials now appear to see the benefit of portraying their nuclear activities as key to the success of the strategic National Energy Plan; this formula might finally guarantee continuous funding for a program that will lead eventually to the much coveted nuclear submarine. While the Navy’s involvement may continue to blur the line between the “peaceful” use of nuclear energy and its use for certain non-nuclear-weapon related military purposes, there appears as yet to be no external opposition on proliferation grounds to Brazil’s plans. [58].

Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “OSC Report: Momentum Surges in Favor of Nuclear Program,” July 18, 2007, OSC document FEA20070719236626; Ministry of Mines and Energy, “NOTA À IMPRENSA – 14ª Reunião do CNPE” [Press Release – CNPE 14th Meeting], [www.mme.gov.br/site/news/detail.do?newsId=13069]. See also Clarice Spitz, “Plano Nacional de Energia prevê mais quatro usinas nucleares até 2030” [National Energy Plan Calls for Four Additional Nuclear Reactors Until 2030], Folha Online, June 26, 2007 [www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u307394.shtml].
[2] “Brazil to Build Third N-Plant,” Presna Latina, July 12, 2007, http://www.plenglish.com/article.asp?ID=%7BABF4B054-025A-46FA-A111-4D793CBC0AFC%7D)&language=EN;
[View Article] Ricardo Galhardo, “Lula Releases 1 Billion Reais for Nuclear Program,” O Globo, July 11, 2007, OSC document FEA20070712227587.
[3] Lorenna Rodriguez, “Ministério publica decisão iniciar construção de Angra 3 neste ano” [Ministry Announces Decision to Start Construction Of Angra 3], Folha Online, August 7, 2007 [www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u318290.shtml].
[4] “Energy of Eletronuclear,” Electronuclear website, www.eletronuclear.gov.br/ingles/inicio/index.php.
[View Article] See also “Country Profile: Brazil,” IAEA website, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofiles/Brazil/Brazil2003.htm.
[View Article]
[5] “Angra 3: Empreendimento” [Angra 3: The Project], Eletronuclear website [http://www.eletronuclear.gov.br/hotsites/angra3/empreendimento/index.php]. Eletronuclear estimates that Angra 3 will take five and a half years to complete and will require R$7 billion (approximately $3.7 billion) from domestic funding and the rest to be obtained from foreign sources. See also Judith Perera, “Power Market Developments; Resende Developments,” Nuclear Engineering International, June 14, 2007, in Lexis-Nexis; and Lorenna Rodrigues, “CNPE aprova usina nuclear de Angra 3; Meio Ambiente vota contra” [CNPE Approves Angra 3; Ministry of Environment Votes Against It], Folha de S. Paulo, July 9, 2007 [www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u307130.shtml].
[6] “Eletronuclear Readies Restart of Angra-3 After 21-Year Interruption,” Nucleonics Week, Volume 48, Number 31, August 2, 2007; Ramona Ordoñez , “Entrada em operação de Angra 3 é adiada por dois anos” [Angra 3 Operation Delayed for Two Years], O Globo, July 3, 2007 [oglobo.globo.com/economia/mat/2007/07/03/296617871.asp].
[7] “Angra 3: Perguntas e Respostas” [Angra 3: Questions and Answers], Eletronuclear website [www.eletronuclear.gov.br/perguntas_respostas/perguntas_respostas.php?id_categoria=3&id_subcategoria=6]. Eletronuclear, on its Q&A web page, claims that one benefit of Angra 3 to the Brazilian energy sector will be its contribution to the economy of scale of state-owned Industrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB), which oversees uranium mining and enrichment activities.
[8] Brazil’s uranium reserves are said to be sufficient to meet the country’s needs for 500 years. See “Work to Resume on Brazil Reactor,” BBC News, June 26, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6240268.stm.
[View Article]
[9] Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” Arms Control Today, October 2005 [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/Oct-Brazil]; Perera, “Power Market Developments; Resende Developments,” see source in [5].
[10] Brazil sought to avoid direct inspection of the centrifuges, themselves, on the ground that this would divulge proprietary information, but some observers have suggested Brazil’s true objective was to mask the fact that the Aramar centrifuges were based on a design developed by URENCO, the British-Dutch-German enrichment consortium, that Brazil is alleged to have obtained clandestinely with the help of several German scientists. See Jack Boureston, “Brazilian Nuclear Debate Highlights Parallels and Contrasts with Iran,” WMD Insights, July/August 2006, http://www.wmdinsights.org/I7/I7_LA1_BraziliznNuclear.htm. [View Article]
[11] Ibid.; Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” see source in [9].
[12] Boureston, “Brazilian Nuclear Debate Highlights Parallels and Contrasts with Iran,” see source in [10].
[13] Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” see source in [9]; “Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory (FCN)”, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/brazil/resende.htm. [View Article]
[14] Jose Maria Tomazela, “Government to Grant 1 Billion Reais to Nuclear Program,” Sao Paulo Agencia Estado (in Portuguese), July 10, 2007, OSC document LAP20070710060001; Galhardo, “Lula Releases 1 Billion Reais for Nuclear Program,” see source in [2]; “OSC Report: Momentum Surges in Favor of Nuclear Program,” July 18, 2007, OSC document FEA20070719236626.
[15] For a history of Brazil’s nuclear program, including the Navy’s involvement, see Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, August 1997 [http://iis.db.stanford.edu/pubs/10340/barletta.pdf]; Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” see source in [9].
[16] Galhardo, “Lula Releases 1 Billion Reais for Nuclear Program,” see source in [2].
[17] A July 2007 poll indicates that President Lula de Silva, first elected in October 2002, is popular with the electorate; 50 percent of respondents thought he was doing a good or very good job with another 33 percent ranking him as “fair.” “Lula Keeps Stable Rating in Brazil,” Angus Reid Global Monitor, July 10, 2007, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/16445. [View Article]
[18] Raymundo Costa and Cristiano Romero, “Lula já aprovou construção de Angra 3” [Lula Has Already Approved Construction of Angra 3], May, 25, 2007, Valor Online [http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2007/05/21/295834578.asp].
[19] “Investidor vê risco de apagão de 32% em 2011” [Investor Sees 32% Risk of Blackout In 2011], Agencia Estado, July 18, 2007 [http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/economia/2007/07/18/investidor_v234_risco_de_apag227o_de_32_em_2011_
928176.html].
[20] “Marina nao foi a reunião que aprovou retomada de Angra 3” [Marina Did Not Attend the Meeting Where Angra 3 Was Approved], O Estado, June 25, 2007.
[21] Paulo Peixoto, “Lula critica ambientalistas ao defender construção de usinas hidrelétricas” [Lula Criticizes Environmentalists While Defending Building Hydroelectric Power Plants], Agencia Folha, May 4, 2007 [www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u91881.shtml].
[22] “OSC Report: Momentum Surges in Favor of Nuclear Program,” see source in [14]. For example, Acting Minister of Mines and Energy Nelson Hubner claimed that Angra 3 will lead to an increase in the production and export of uranium. Nielmar de Oliveira, “Construção de Angra 3 levará a maior produção e exportação de uranio, diz ministro interino” [Construction of Angra 3 Will Lead To An Increase In Production and Export of Uranium, Says Acting Minister], Agencia Brasil, July 6, 2007 [www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2007/07/06/materia.2007-07-06.8279638619/view].
[23] Silva, a former environmental activist, has been the most consistent critic of building Angra 3 and has opposed Brazil’s pursuing a nuclear energy program of any type. In various media interviews, she has maintained her opposition to the project, believing that there are better alternatives that are safer and less costly, such as wind, biomass, small hydropower plants, and biofuels. See “OSC Report: Momentum Surges in Favor of Nuclear Program,” in source [14]. She had successfully stopped the push for nuclear energy before the Angra 3 decision, but during the previous year lost a number of important allies on the issue. Minister for the Civil Household Rousseff, for example, previously resisted nuclear energy because of its high cost, but changed her mind after recognizing the need to diversify Brazil’s energy sources and the comparative advantages of nuclear power over other options under government consideration. For more on Silva and the CNPE vote, see Alana Gandra, “Ministério do Meio Ambiente defenderá posição contrária a usinas nucleares” [Ministry for the Environment Will Argue Against Nuclear Reactors], Agência Brasil, June 25, 2007 [http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2007/06/25/materia.2007-06-25.7178422146/view]; Wellton Máximo, “Ministra do Meio Ambiente critica retomada das obras da usina nuclear de Angra 3” [Minister for the Environment Criticizes Building Angra 3], Agência Brasil, July 4, 2007 [http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2007/07/04/materia.2007-07-04.0653256532/view]; Leonardo Goy, “Governo aprova construcao de Angra 3” [Government Approves Construction of Angra 3], O Estado, June 25, 2007.
[24] Chick de Gois, “Marina Silva demonstra contrariedade com aprovação de Angra 3” [Marina Silva Annoyed With Approval of Angra 3], O Globo, June 26, 2007 [oglobo.globo.com/economia/mat/2007/06/26/296512642.asp]; Pedro Dias Leite, “Marina quer isencao no licenciamento para Angra 3” [Marina Wants Unbiased Approach For Angra 3’s Licensing], Folha Online, June 6, 2007 [www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u307560.shtml]; “Exigência para Angra 3 será mesma que Madeira, diz Marina [Requirements For Angra 3 Will Be the Same As For Madeira],” Agencia Estado, June 26, 2007 [http://render.estadao.com.br/economia/not_eco13993,0.htm].
[25] “Ibama nao tem prazo para concluir avaliação de Angra 3” [IBAMA Has Not Set Date For Evaluation of Angra 3], Agencia Estado, June 26, 2007 [http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/economia/2007/06/26/ibama_n227o_tem_prazo_para_concluiravalia231227o_de_
angra_3_842523.html].
[26] Lorenna Rodriguez, “Ibama concede licença para usinas do Madeira; 1º edital sai em agosto,” [IBAMA Issues License For Madeira Plants; Official Notice in August], Folha de S. Paulo, July 9, 2007 [http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u310596.shtml]; “Entenda a polêmica em torno das hidrelétricas no rio Madeira,” [Understanding the Debate About Rio Madeira’s Hydroelectric Plants], BBC Brazil, July 10, 2007 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2007/07/070710_madeiraqandadb.shtml].
[27] For examples of press coverage that note the prestige issue, see “Lula Resumes Nuclear Program to Make Brazil ‘World Power’,” Times of India, July 11, 2007 [http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-2193094,prtpage-1.cms]; “Brazil to Spend US$540 Million on Nuclear Program,” International Herald Tribune, July 10, 2007, http://iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6605268; [View Article] and Reuters, “Brazil to Invest $500 mln in Nuclear-Powered Sub,” AlertNet website, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N03232022.htm. [View Article]
[28] “Brazil’s Lula Discusses Hopes for Nuclear Program Following Visit to Aramar,” DefesaNet (Text in Portuguese), July 10, 2007, OSC document LAP20070712357001.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Rogério Simões , “Chávez é parceiro, não um perigo, diz Lula à BBC” [Chavez Is a Partner, Not A Threat, Says Lula], BBC Brazil, June 4, 2007 [www.defesanet.com.br/zz/al_ven_br.htm]; for the audio interview (President answers in Portuguese), see “President Lula”, BBC News, June 4, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/6718447.stm. [View Article]
[32] “OSC Report: Momentum Surges in Favor of Nuclear Program”; “Angra 3 não deve ser investimento prioritário em energia, avalia Goldemberg” [Angra 3 Should Not Be the Highest Priority Investment in Energy – Analyses Goldemberg], AMCHAM Brasil, July 24, 2007 [www.amcham.com.br/update/2007/update2007-07-24a_html].
[33] Jose Goldemberg, “Is Brazil Setting a Bad Example in Enriching Uranium?” Proliferation Analysis, July 16, 2007, Carnegie Endowment website, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19437.
[View Article]
[34] Boureston, “Brazilian Nuclear Debate Highlights Parallels and Contrasts with Iran,” see source in [10].
[35] In 1991, Brazil and Argentina signed the Bilateral Agreement for Exclusively Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. In March 1994, the Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and the IAEA became effective; it governs inspections and verifications of nuclear facilities in the region. Brazil is also a member of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes a Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone. Brazil ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1998, but it has refused to sign an Additional Protocol to its Safeguard Agreement. Brazil is also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. (See Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” in source [9]; Jose Goldemberg, “Looking Back: Lessons from the Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina,” Arms Control Today, April 2006 [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_04/lookingback.])
[36] “Presidente Lula garante prioridade ao programa nuclear da Marinha,” [President Lula Guarantees High Priority for the Navy Nuclear Program], Defesa Net, July 10, 2007 [http://www.defesanet.com.br/zz/mb_sub_nuc_4.htm].
[37] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (2nd ed), Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005,
p. 398.
[38] Tomazela, “Government to Grant 1 Billion Reais to Nuclear Program,” see source in [14].
[39] Ibid.
[40] Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (2nd ed), pp. 403-404, see source in [37].
[41] Pedro Paulo Rezende, “Brazil Pre-Selects for new Submarine Competition,” Jane’s Navy International, March 1, 2006.
[42] Perera, “Power Market Developments; Resende Developments,” see source in [5].
[43] Tomazela, “Government to Grant 1 Billion Reais to Nuclear Program,” see source in [14].
[44] Miles A. Pomper and William Huntington, “Coming to Terms with Brazil’s Nuclear Past: An Interview with Odair Goncalves, President of Brazil’s Nuclear Energy Commission,” Arms Control Today, September 2005. The IAEA and ABACC currently inspect the Aramar facilities; Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (2nd ed), pp. 403-404, see source in [37].
[45] “Marinha garante que ‘nunca houve projeto’ de Submarino Nuclear” [There Has Never Been a Nuclear Submarine Program, Assures Navy], Defesa Net, December 5, 2006 [http://www.defesanet.com.br/zz/mb_sub_nxc_1.htm].
[46] “Submarine Proliferation Database: Brazil Current Capabilities,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, http://nti.org/db/submarines/brazil/index.html; [View Article] “The Brazilian Navy – A Naval Force in Evolution,” Military Technology, Vol. 29, No. 4, April 2005, pp. 75-77.
[47] Rezende, “Brazil Pre-Selects for New Submarine Competition,” see source in [41].
[48] “Submarine Proliferation Database: Brazil Current Capabilities,” see source in [46].
[49] “Marinha garante que “nunca houve projeto” de Submarino Nuclear” [There Has Never Been A Nuclear Submarine Program, Assures Navy], see source in [45].
[50] Rezende, “Brazil Pre-Selects for new Submarine Competition,” see source in [41].
[51] “Nuclear Submarine is Gesture of Independence, Says Admiral,” Brasilia InfoRel, December 5, 2006, OSC document LAP20061206357001. For the original interview text in Portuguese, see “Almirante Othon: ‘concluir o submarino nuclear é um gesto de independência’,” Hora do Povo, November 22, 2006 [www.defesanet.com.br/zz/mb_sub_nxc_3.htm].
[52] “Almirante Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho, Comandante da Marinha: A Marinha do Brasil e a questão dos submarinos” [Navy Commandant Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho: The Brazilian Navy and the Submarines Issue], Hora do Povo, December 12, 2006 [www.defesanet.com.br/zz/mb_sub_nxc_2.htm].
[53] “Escolha de Lula vai definir modelo de reaparelhamento” [Lula’s Choice Defines Retooling Model], Defesa@Net, December, 5, 2006 [www.defesanet.com.br/zz/mb_sub_nxc.htm].
[54] Yara Aquino, “Reaparelhamento da Marinha e programa nuclear são desafios, diz novo comandante” [Retooling of the Navy and Nuclear Program Are Challenging, Says New Commander], March 1, 2007, Agencia Brasil [www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2007/03/01/materia.2007-03-01.1283744981/view].
[55] Tomazela, “Government to Grant 1 Billion Reais to Nuclear Program,” see source in [14].
[56] “Marinha garante que nunca houve projeto de Submarino Nuclear” [There Has Never Been A Nuclear Submarine Program, Assures Navy], see source in [45].
[57] Galhardo, “Lula Releases 1 Billion Reais for Nuclear Program,” see source in [2].
[58] The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Brazil is a party, does not prohibit parties from using nuclear energy for non-explosive military purposes, such as submarine propulsion. On issues related to the proliferation of nuclear submarines, see, James Clay Moltz, “Closing the NPT Loophole on Exports of Naval Propulsion Reactors,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/61/cmoltz61.pdf; [View Article] James Clay Moltz, “Global Submarine Proliferation: Emerging Trends and Problems” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, March 2006, [http://www.nti.org/e-research/e3_74.html].