On June 28, 2007, the Russian Navy conducted another test of the new solid-fuel submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Bulava intended for the new Borey-class strategic submarine. [1] Prior to the June test, the Bulava program had suffered from a series of failures: three tests in a row went astray, casting a long shadow over the future of the sea-based leg of the Russian strategic triad. [2] The official representative of the Russian Navy, Captain Igor Dygalo, announced that the new launch, conducted from the Typhoon-class strategic submarine Dmitri Donskoi, was successful. He said that the front section of the missile reached the Kura test range at Kamchatka as planned. Given this success, the Navy will probably embark on an intense testing program to complete the development of the new missile and begin installing the first Bulava SLBMs on the first Borey-class submarine, the Yuri Dolgoruki (launched in April 2007). The Navy currently plans to conduct 12-14 additional tests.

Success of the Test Questioned
Two weeks after the test, however, a news website Grani.Ru, which represents opposition views, published a commentary claiming that the launch was only partially successful. [3] According to Grani.Ru commentator Vladimir Temnyi, a source from the Navy’s Main Staff reported that only two of the three dummy warheads on Bulava reached the impact area on Kamchatka and even those were 30-40 kilometers (km) short of the target; the third warhead fell into the sea. Also, Temnyi stated, the apparent maximum range of Bulava turned out to be 6,000 km instead of 8,000 km as previously reported by the Navy. That information was picked up by Russia’s leading independent military weekly, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, in a story whose authors hypothesized that the shorter range was probably caused by the missile’s fuel burning too fast. [4] They speculated that other possible reasons for the failure were the poor quality of the gyroscopes and the use of the guidance system from a liquid-fuel Sineva missile designed by Makeev Design Bureau in Miass. The Bulava, they noted, was developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and the marriage of two different systems might have resulted in the suboptimal performance.

These reports were independently evaluated by participants in the Russian Submarine Fleet forum, [5] most of whom are naval officers or employees of organizations associated with ship- and missile-building. According to the forum’s participants, the “leak” from the Navy’s Main Staff was probably a well-conceived “practical joke” because of a number of subtle technical mistakes in the Grani.Ru report. One participant pointed out that the missile’s guidance system closely monitors the missile’s trajectory and, in the case of a deviation as large as 30 km, dummy warheads would not separate at all so that the entire front section would fall into the sea as a single unit, “otherwise one could accidentally hit Japan.”

Regardless of the Grani.Ru controversy, it is clear that Bulava’s designers improved the performance of the missile and addressed at least some of its shortcomings, which had previously caused failures at significantly earlier stages of flight. It is also clear that work on the Bulava system will continue, with about a dozen additional test launches planned.

Production Plans for Bulava Detailed
On August 3, Minister of Defense Valeri Serduykov reported to President Vladimir Putin that the test of Bulava was successful. [6] This report closed the debate about the performance of the missile during the test flight, at least at the official level. A few days later, Admiral Vladimir Masorin, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, said he was satisfied with the latest test. He added that two more were planned for 2007 and that in 2008 the Navy planned to test the maximum range of Bulava. He acknowledged that “irregularities” could still happen during future tests but expressed full confidence that the program would be successful. In fact, Masorin announced that the decision to begin serial production of Bulava had been made. [7]

Masorin also revealed that the Yuri Dolgoruki, the first Borey-class SSBN, would be commissioned in time for the final test launches of Bulava. In addition, Typhoon-class Dmitri Donskoi would be further retrofitted to carry Bulava SLBMs. (The Dmitri Donskoi was retrofitted to serve as a testing platform for Bulava; apparently Masorin meant that while to date only a few launch tubes on the sub had been replaced to carry the new missile, in the future all 20 tubes would be replaced.) [8] He said that no other submarines of that class would be retrofitted for the new missile until at least 2015. (Two other Typhoon-class submarines have been taken out of service because the service life of their R-39 missiles has expired). [9]

Sineva Officially Adopted by the Navy
During the same report on August 3, Serduykov also mentioned that the new R-29RGU Sineva SLBM was among the 30 new types of armaments received by the Armed Forces since the beginning of 2007. [10] Sineva is a replacement missile for R-29RM (SS-N-23) intended for Delta IV (Project 667 BDRM) submarines. Deployment of Sineva SLBMs has already begun: three submarines of that class have been overhauled, which includes installation of the new missiles, and two more are now undergoing similar refitting. [11] Serduykov’s report to Putin signifies the official adoption of the new missile for service in the Russian Navy.

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies