From August 20-24, 2007, representatives from the member states of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) met in Geneva, Switzerland, to discuss ways to improve the implementation of the treaty. [1] This expert-level meeting, chaired by Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, was the first element of a four-year intersessional work program adopted in December 2006 at the Sixth BWC Review Conference to strengthen the treaty and its implementation. Ninety states parties participated in the Geneva meeting, as well as representatives from five countries that have signed but not ratified the BWC.

The “Meeting of Experts” addressed two topics: strengthening countries’ national implementation of the BWC and enhancing regional cooperation among states parties. Unlike other arms control agreements, such as the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or the Chemical Weapons Convention, the BWC lacks an on-site inspection regime or other formal verification measures. The experts were tasked to think creatively about how to overcome this gap and to recommend other measures to implement the pact with a focus on intra-regional initiatives. [2]

On August 24, the participants adopted a final report by consensus. The document consists of a procedural section and two annexes, including 23 pages of suggestions for strengthening the BWC. [3] This list, along with the other reports and materials generated by the meeting, will be considered at a follow-on Meeting of States Parties, to be held in Geneva from December 10-14, 2007.

New Political Dynamics
At past BWC meetings, negotiations have often deadlocked as a result of irreconcilable conflicts among the states parties. Until recently, the two most active blocs were the Western Group, consisting of the EU countries, Canada, and the United States; and the group of 115 developing countries affiliated with the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). [4] At the Meeting of Experts, however, these tensions were muted, for a number of reasons. First, the fact that Chairman Khan is from Pakistan, a member of the NAM, may have encouraged other NAM members to minimize disruptive disputes. Second, a number of moderate Latin American countries that are members of the NAM broke off from the bloc at the August 2007 meeting and sought to offer policy recommendations more acceptable to Western governments than those offered by the NAM as a group. These states moved away from traditional NAM positions on a number of issues, such as stressing the importance of negotiating a BWC compliance protocol and the need to abolish export control regimes, in particular the Australia Group. [5] Finally, a new faction has emerged within the Western Group. Known as the JACKSNNZ (pronounced “Jacksons”), it includes seven countries that are neither EU members nor possessors of nuclear weapons: Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea, Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand. Like the Latin American group, the members of the JACKSNNZ prepare independent proposals and joint statements whose recommendations sometimes differ from those of the Western Group or the NAM. [6]

Another recurring conflict at past BWC meetings has been between Iran and the United States. Washington has repeatedly accused Tehran of pursuing a covert offensive bio-weapons (BW) program. [7] Iranian representatives, for their part, have criticized Washington for failing to uphold Article X of the BWC, which calls on states parties to assist one another in the peaceful uses of biology. U.S. policymakers have sought instead to limit technology transfers that might contribute to the proliferation of offensive BW capabilities. Nevertheless, these differences remained largely unstated at the August meeting. Several factors may explain this relative harmony. First, the Iranian government is seeking the chairmanship of the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), scheduled for April 2008, and may be on its best behavior. [8] Second, it is likely that the United States and Iran did not want to further strain a relationship already burdened by serious disagreements over Iraq, Afghanistan, international terrorism, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

National Proposals
A number of countries whose views on BWC issues are generally considered the most salient took the floor during the Meeting of Experts. Their interventions are summarized briefly below.

China: Supported Full Implementation of BWC and Touted Accomplishments
The Chinese delegation contributed frequently to the discussions, making proposals on every topic under consideration. The number and breadth of these interventions was seen as an attempt by China to exert diplomatic leadership in this area. The Chinese experts also affirmed: “China has all along supported the principles and objectives of the Biological Weapons Convention...and fulfilled its obligations in a comprehensive and earnest manner.” [9] With respect to BWC implementation, the Chinese delegation suggested that each country create a national legal framework and implementation mechanism, with a clear division of responsibility, effective coordination, strict enforcement of relevant laws and regulations, and punishment of violations. On international cooperation, the Chinese experts stressed the need for regional workshops, financial assistance to less-developed countries, and the sharing of experience and technology. In the area of export controls, China stressed the importance of clear and detailed classifications for pathogens of BW concern. The Chinese experts repeatedly stressed the principle of “equality and mutual respect,” perhaps referring to a perceived U.S. double standard on nonproliferation issues which favors its friends and allies. [10]

Germany: Supported Basic Common Principles, Extraterritorial Enforcement
The German experts set forth several “basic common principles” on national implementation of the BWC, including: the need to adopt licensing requirements for dangerous biological materials; to base export licenses and pathogen classifications on assessments of risk; and to grant only federal bio-safety agencies the authority to authorize the transport of dangerous biological materials. They also argued that BWC implementation measures must include penalties for violations. Contrary to German policy in other areas, the German implementing legislation for the BWC allows the application of German penal provisions outside of German territory, as long as the offense was committed by a German citizen or bears a substantial relationship to Germany. Moreover, Germany defines any use of biological weapons as a war crime that is subject to German law, even when such use is not directly linked to Germany. [11] The German experts stressed that these provisions are necessary “at least as long as the prohibitions related to biological weapons are not yet implemented on a global scale in an equally restrictive manner.” [12]

Japan: Stressed Networks, Overseas Implementation of National BW Laws
The Japanese experts stressed the need for a multisectoral approach to enforcement of national BWC legislation that includes strong networks among national institutions, coordination with regional and international institutions, and improved counterterrorism capabilities. When discussing international and regional cooperation, the Japanese delegation advocated informal cross-border networks among experts. They also stressed the need to ensure participation by all relevant countries and to take into account regional characteristics to ensure effective BWC implementation. Although the Japanese experts did not use the term “extraterritorial,” they did advocate the overseas application of national BWC laws. In particular, Japan’s presentation stressed that the country’s BWC Implementation Law “contains an article on the punishment of crimes committed outside Japan related to the use and discharge of biological or toxin weapons (Article XI).” [13] The Japanese experts also mentioned that a revision of the BWC Implementation Law is under consideration in Parliament. This revision would allow the punishment of BW-related crimes committed overseas, such as the production, retention, transfer, and acquisition of biological weapons. [14]

India: Offered Low-Key Support, Pressed for Technology Sharing
Most of India’s proposals focused on promoting greater international collaboration in biotechnology, including the conduct of joint research and development projects, exchanges of scientists, increased use of electronic information networks, and the establishment of facilities for sharing expertise between developed and developing nations. [15] India would benefit directly from expanded commerce in biotechnology because it is poised to become a major global player in this sector. Revenue from the Indian biotech industry was US$2 billion in 2006-07, and is expected to reach $5 billion by 2010-2011. [16] Nevertheless, the BWC has somewhat conflicting provisions on technology transfer: Article III obligates states parties not to assist BW proliferation, while Article X obligates them to promote the exchange of biotechnology for peaceful purposes. [17] India’s stance could therefore raise tensions with Western countries, for whom preventing BW proliferation takes priority over expanding trade in biotechnology.

Iran: Called for Updating of National Laws, Use of Confidence-Building Measures
The Iranian delegation did not explicitly advocate full implementation of the BWC but called instead for the periodic updating of national laws and regulations in response to “the progressive nature of the developments in the field of science and technology and according to the country’s needs.” [18] With respect to the scope of national implementation measures, the Iranian delegation endorsed the use of training courses for scientists and experts on scientific and ethical issues, and active participation in BWC confidence-building measures (CBMs). The Iranian delegation also supported the World Health Organization guidelines for laboratory bio-safety and bio-security.

United Kingdom: Stressed Criminal Penalties, Close Monitoring of Exports
The British experts proposed that all states parties should assess the adequacy and effectiveness of their existing BWC implementing legislation, including criminal penalties for violations, and enhance them as necessary. They also called for keeping export control legislation up to date and ensuring that it provides clear guidance, especially with respect to exports of intangible technologies. Although the British experts underscored the value of national and regional cooperation, their joint proposal with the Netherlands affirmed that cooperation should occur “among States that share language, legal and cultural traditions, have similar biotechnology industries, and have a history of cooperation.” [19] This paper did not address the fact that, frequently, countries requiring assistance do not share characteristics with those states in a position to provide it.

United States: Focused on Bio-Terror Threat Assessments, International Cooperation
The U.S. delegation offered the most detailed proposals in the area of biological terrorism. Although many states parties discussed the need to establish appropriate enforcement measures for the BWC, the U.S. experts focused primarily on threat assessment. They outlined possible BW incident scenarios and highlighted the differences between plans to respond to an “overt” release of biological agent and plans to respond to one that is “covert”. U.S. experts also highlighted basic strategies for conducting national investigations. The U.S. experts also stressed the concepts of prevention and deterrence, as well as the value of effective legal and investigative measures for catching would-be bioterrorists before an incident occurs. Finally, the U.S. delegation also called for greater cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in order to strengthen national enforcement measures.

Russia: Emphasized Strengthened Export Controls
Russian experts stressed the importance of strengthened export controls, citing the need to hold regular briefings and consultations with exporters to raise awareness and create an atmosphere of cooperation. This focus on export controls reflects some recent Russian policy innovations. On May 30, 2007, the administration of President Vladimir Putin announced it was banning the export of human biological specimens to prevent the use of these materials in biological weapons. Since Russia sends hundreds of clinical samples to foreign diagnostic laboratories every day, the export ban will adversely affect the country’s doctors and patients, as well as the Russian pharmaceutical industry, which earns an estimated $100-150 million annually from the conduct of clinical trials. [20] In August 2007, Putin announced that the Russian government would increase the number of biological pathogens and technologies on its export-control lists to help Russia comply with the BWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which urges countries to strengthen their WMD nonproliferation measures vis-à-vis non-state actors. [21]

The BWC Implementation Support Unit; New States Parties
To help states parties implement the BWC more effectively, participants at the Sixth BWC Review Conference in December 2006 established a new Implementation Support Unit (ISU). (For other developments at the Sixth Review Conference, see Peter Crail, “BWC Review Conference Outcome Received Qualified Praise,” WMD Insights, February 2007.) The ISU officially began operation on August 2, 2007. [22] Based at the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the ISU is responsible for providing administrative support, including acting as a focal point for states parties to submit information. The ISU is also tasked with increasing support for the prohibition of biological weapons, promoting compliance with voluntary CBM declarations, and persuading hold-out states to join the BWC.

The ISU is not a policymaking or regulatory agency and has no mandate to carry out investigations, enforce compliance, or conduct training. Instead, it facilitates interactions among BWC states parties, receives and distributes information on annual CBM declarations, and promotes participation in BWC-related projects. According to Richard Lennane, the Head of the ISU, the unit’s main job is “helping States Parties to help themselves.” [23] Because the ISU works for and is funded by BWC states parties, it will not participate in UN activities that fall outside the BWC, such as those relating to the revision of the Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigating the alleged use of biological weapons. Those activities will continue to be led by UNODA’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch.

The ISU’s formal administrative and CBM-related functions include:

Administrative support:
• Providing administrative support to and preparing documentation for meetings agreed to by the Review Conference;
• Facilitating communication among States Parties and, upon request, with international organizations;
• Facilitating, upon request, States Parties’ contacts with scientific and academic institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations;
• Serving as a focal point for submission of information by and to States Parties related to the convention;
• Supporting, as appropriate, the implementation by States Parties of the decisions and recommendations of the Sixth Review Conference.
  
  Confidence-building measures:
• Receiving and distributing confidence-building measures (CBMs) to/from States Parties;
• Sending information notices to States Parties regarding their annual submissions;
• Compiling and distributing data on CBMs and informing on participation at each Meeting of States Parties;
• Developing and maintaining a secure website on CBMs to be accessible only to States Parties;
• Serving as an information exchange point for assistance related to preparation of CBMs;
• Facilitating activities to promote participation in the CBM process, as agreed by the States Parties

The ISU also intends to encourage more hold-out states to join the BWC. Since the Sixth Review Conference in late 2006, four additional countries have become parties. Kazakhstan acceded on June 28, 2007, and Trinidad and Tobago, on July 19, 2007. Montenegro also announced that its accession to the BWC took place on June 3, 2006, the date of its independence. [24] Most recently, on August 21, Gabon became the 159th country to join the BWC. [25] In a recent interview, Lennane expressed the belief that the membership could reach 185 countries before the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. [26] He observed that increasing the number of states parties is chiefly a matter of “overcoming bureaucratic and legislative inertia, and encouraging governments to make joining the BWC more of a priority.” [27]

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute