Following Iran’s early January 2006 decision to resume activities at its uranium enrichment facilities,
Russia has embarked on a last-minute effort to prevent the referral of the Iranian case to the UN
Security Council and the possible imposition of sanctions. Sanctions would not only doom plans for
cooperation with Iran in civil nuclear energy and for the recent, record-setting arms transfer deal with
that country, but would also be a painful blow to Russia’s reputation.

Over the years, Russia has tried to balance two major interests in its policy toward Iran. On the one
hand, it has sought to preserve the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and is wary of the prospect of having
a nuclear Iran at its doorstep. On the other hand, it has sought to continue and expand cooperation
with Iran in nuclear energy beyond the existing Bushehr project and build economic ties in other
areas, such as arms sales. Consequently, Moscow is perhaps more interested than any other outside
actor in finding a compromise solution to the ongoing crisis over the suspected Iranian military
nuclear program.

Uranium Enrichment Proposal
The so-called “Russian proposal” to Iran, which has moved to the center stage of the negotiations on
the Iranian nuclear program, is designed to satisfy both of these competing demands. According to that
plan, production of uranium fuel for Iranian nuclear power plants would be organized through a Russian-
Iranian joint venture. Iran would produce uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) – an intermediate product in the
enrichment process – which would then be sent to Russia, where it would be converted into uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) – the product that undergoes enrichment. This would then be enriched in Russia
to produce low-enriched uranium, a product that is suitable for nuclear power plant fuel, but unusable
for nuclear weapons. The low-enriched uranium would then be fabricated into fuel in Russia and
sent back to Iran for insertion in nuclear power reactors. Spent fuel would be returned to Russia,
as now required in the Russian-Iranian agreement for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Under this approach, Iran would have no reason to pursue its domestic uranium enrichment programand would forgo further development of this technology, which can be used to produce nuclear weapons-usable highly enriched uranium, as well as low-enriched uranium. The United States, among others, believes that Iran is seeking to develop a uranium enrichment capability to produce highly enriched uranium as a step towards building a nuclear arsenal.

In November 2004, after the international outcry that followed exposure of Iran’s secret pursuit of a uranium enrichment program or nearly two decades, Iran agreed to halt further work in this area, under a deal brokered by France, Germany, and the U.K., known as the “EU-3.” In the first days of 2006, however, Iran announced it would restart research work at its Natanz uranium enrichment complex and at other installations, and it removed seals that had been placed on these facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify they were closed down. [1] As of late January 2006, Iran had not apparently recommenced the actual enrichment of uranium at Natanz.

The key stumbling block to the Russian proposal has been Iran’s insistence that uranium enrichment be conducted on its territory, in addition to any enrichment conducted in Russia. Ironically, Russia has reinforced this position by accepting and reiterating the view that Iran has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under Article IV of the NPT. (Article IV provides that all states have the “inalienable right” to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, consistent with the overall purposes of the NPT.)
Iran’s rights under the NPT have been an important argument for Russia vis-à-vis the United States. For example, during a surprise October 2005 visit of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov strongly and publicly defended the right of Iran to pursue uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes and objected to the American proposal—reportedly promoted by Secretary Rice—to refer the case of Iran to the UN Security Council. [2]

Sympathy for Iran, Competition with U.S.
The Russian policy on Iran displays a number of idiosyncrasies characteristic of recent Russian foreign policy. Iran is viewed sympathetically in Russia because it is perceived as a force opposing U.S. predominance in world affairs and, in a more general sense, simply because Iran has been the target of U.S. pressure. This orientation makes the Russian government and the country’s political elite reluctant to fully support the United States on the Iran nuclear issue. As one well-connected Russian observer explained, “Iran is not an enemy to us. The ‘Iranian problem’ is first and foremost the problem of the United States and Israel. Moscow has got its own problems and should not try to solve someone else’s. … Iran has consistently pursued a surprisingly balanced position on the issue of Chechnya [where it has not supported the cause of anti-Russian rebels].” In a more general sense, the commentator continued, Shiite Muslims (the dominant sect in Iran) have been largely positive toward Russia, unlike Sunnis. Although Russia would not break with the West for the sake of Iran, he said, it would not refuse promising opportunities with Iran (such as the recent arms deal), especially since the United States limits itself to straightforward opposition to such transactions, instead of trying to offer Russia equally profitable alternatives. [3]

Other Russian observers have expressed similar views in even stronger terms. The president of a “Neocon” consulting company, Mikhail Khazin, for example, has stated that the ability to deter the United States was an essential condition of the emergence of a “greater Iran” (including Western Afghanistan and Shiite-dominated parts of Pakistan and Iraq). Similarly, the director of the Center of Defense Forecasting of the Institute of Political and Defense Analysis, Anatoly Tsyganok, has declared that Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons capability is part of its effort to undermine the unipolar structure of the world, implying that breaking the current U.S. hegemony might be a positive development from the standpoint of Russia’s interests. [4]

The majority of the Russian elite backs Moscow’s determination to chart a course on the Iranian issue different from that of the United States. Commentaries about the October 2005 Rice-Lavrov meeting concentrated on the Kremlin’s ability to disregard U.S. pressure to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. One report almost jubilantly stated, “Condoleezza Rice Turned Around Her Plane In Vain.” [5]

In recent months, a well-connected Russian nongovernmental organization, the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center), has stated several times that authoritative Russian sources were certain that Iran had not yet made a decision to proceed with a military nuclear program. [6] This assessment is in direct—and perhaps intentional —contradiction of American assessments of Iranian policy. PIR Center Director Vladimir Orlov said that Moscow did not regard evidence of Iran’s intentions that it received from the United States and others to be convincing and trusted only the findings of the IAEA; to date, the agency has declared that it has no conclusive evidence that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. It is also significant that the most recent of these statements by the PIR Center was made in late December 2005, indicating that official Russian views of Iran’s intentions remained agnostic, even after Iran had seemingly decided to reject the Russian deal by insisting that enrichment in Russia would complement, but not replace, Iran’s planned domestic enrichment program.

In line with this assessment is the widespread view in Russia that the U.S. attitude toward Iran is excessively tough and complicates the search for a compromise. According to Russian observers, the Kremlin believes that convincing Iran to abandon plans for uranium enrichment requires that Washington promise roughly the same benefits it has offered to North Korea in exchange for that country’s agreement to abandon its nuclear weapons program. These benefits have included, for example, U.S. security assurances, normalization of relations, and removal of trade restrictions. The reluctance of the United States to provide such inducements to Tehran is considered to be evidence that Washington is not genuinely interested in a peaceful solution to the current impasse and that it has supported the Russian enrichment proposal only because it was expected to fail and that, thereafter, Moscow would be more amenable to the referral of the Iranian file to the UN Security Council. [7]

Russia’s underlying sympathies toward Iran and Moscow’s apparent long-range plan for closer relations with that country were also displayed in the $1 billion arms sales contract that the Russian Ministry of Defense concluded with Tehran in late November 2005. Among other elements, this contract included the sale of 30 “Thor-M1” air defense missile systems and modernization of old Soviet aircraft (35 MIG-29s and 24 Su-2s), as well as the sale of 30 Mi-8 helicopters and a number of naval vessels. [8] Reportedly, Iran also wanted to purchase S-300 tactical missile defense systems, but the Russian defense industry was unable to satisfy this request. [9]

The announcement of the deal was made by the Ministry of Defense in tones that suggested that Moscow was on the side of Tehran. Specifically, Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluevski noted that whereas Washington accuses Iran and North Korea of not fully disclosing their nuclear programs, it has closed its eyes to Israel’s nuclear capability. The Russian media, similarly, saw the arms deal as a means of opposing Washington’s policy of “double standards.” [10] The deal is all the more noteworthy since, by the admission of an unnamed high-level representative of the Ministry of Defense, the systems purchased by Iran are intended first and foremost to defend the nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Bushehr, Tehran, and the eastern part of the country. Deliveries were scheduled to begin in January 2006. [11]

Global Role for Moscow
Russia’s negotiations with Iran are also seen as evidence of Russia’s indispensable role in world affairs – as the “last hope” of the international community. The endorsement of the Russian proposal by U.S. President George W. Bush during a meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin, at Pusan, South Korea, in November 2005 was regarded as recognition of Russia’s central role. [12] Although Moscow officially supported efforts of the EU-3 to negotiate a compromise deal with Iran, the lack of progress in these negotiations was noted with some smugness by many Russian commentators, since Moscow, despite its important stakes in the matter, had been excluded from the negotiations. Moreover, the apparent collapse of the EU-3 effort promoted Russia to the leading role on a highly important international issue. Indeed, a meeting between Iranian and EU-3 representatives, which took place in Vienna in late December 2005 in an attempt to resuscitate the EU-3 deal, was viewed with considerable irritation in Moscow as a potential threat to Russia’s newly enhanced role. [13]

Seen through the eyes of Russian news sources, Moscow’s nuclear negotiations with Tehran have been a string of successes. Although Iran agreed only to shift a portion of its enrichment activities to Russia, Russian newspapers and electronic media claimed this was significant progress, because it went well beyond what the EU-3 had been able to accomplish. [14] This view was consistent with the statements of the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Igor Ivanov, following his mid-November 2005 visit to Tehran. Despite Iran’s rejection of the key element of the Russian proposal (namely, that enrichment be conducted exclusively outside Iran), Ivanov insisted that negotiations were constructive and should be continued in the same format. [15] In addition, the fact that the subsequent November 2005 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors did not refer the Iranian matter to the UN Security Council and that Iran at that meeting expressed readiness to “seriously consider” the Russian proposal were viewed as successes of Russian diplomacy, both because they appeared to validate Russia’s negotiating strategy and because they thwarted U.S. efforts to advance its more aggressive position. [16]

Growing Russian Irritation
In recent weeks, however, Moscow’s irritation with Iran has been growing. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran, in June 2005, and his highly inflammatory statements against the United States and Israel have complicated Russia’s task. When, at the height of negotiations in December 2005, for example, Ahmadinejad called the Holocaust “a myth,” Russia felt obliged to join the rest of the international community in condemning the statement. [17] This official condemnation was echoed by moderate members of the Russian foreign policy establishment, such as the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Sergey Karaganov, and the chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, Konstantin Kosachev, who called the statements by the Iranian leadership “unwise” and “counterproductive.”

A series of negative and, initially, rather derogatory comments by Iranian officials about the Russian proposals in late December 2005 also caused irritation in Moscow. Russian observers were particularly displeased by Iranian claims that the proposal tabled by the Russian Foreign Ministry was too imprecise and not sufficiently detailed. Still, the Russian media tried to convince itself that this was not Iran’s last word. [18] And, indeed, on December 28 Deputy Chief of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Javad Vaidi, announced that Tehran would study the Russian proposal about a joint venture “seriously and with enthusiasm,” again reviving optimism in Moscow. [19]

Iran’s January 3, 2006, announcement that it would resume research work on uranium enrichment dashed Russian hopes of a breakthrough. Both official and unofficial Russian reaction was one of dismay and “deep disappointment,” words carefully chosen to match the overall reaction of the United States and other Western countries, but slightly softer. [20] Nevertheless, the sting was apparently very painful: one of the strongest proponents of expanded cooperation with Iran, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, characterized the Iranian decision as a “personal disappointment.” [21]

A Russian delegation, headed by Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Valentin Sobolev and which included Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak and representatives of the Russian Federal Nuclear Agency (Rosatom), visited Tehran on January 7-8, 2006, to discuss the Russian nuclear fuel proposal. It now faced the more difficult task of convincing Iran to reverse its newly announced plans to end its moratorium on sensitive nuclear activities. The talks apparently failed: a representative of the delegation only said that “negotiations were detailed, open, and professional,” which is usual parlance for a less than fruitful meeting. The only somewhat positive outcome was Iran’s agreement to resume these consultations in mid-February 2006. [22]

Iran, for its part, seemed satisfied with these talks, emphasizing in particular that the delegation brought proposals for expanded cooperation in the nuclear sphere. [23] It is likely that the Russian position for that meeting had been approved prior to the latest round of bad news, when there was a greater likelihood of an agreement being reached that might have opened the door for new projects desired by Rosatom. Ironically, the last-minute efforts to save the deal were yet again regarded in Russian media as evidence of Moscow’s indispensable role in the international effort to limit Iran’s nuclear-weapon ambitions. The tone of comments suggests that Russia firmly intended to save Iran, as long as Iran would allow it.

During the following week, Russian rhetoric on Iran underwent significant changes. At first, the tone of Russian statements and unofficial comments was very close to that of the EU-3 and the United States. Headlines announced: “Russia Will Leave Iran Face-to-Face with the UN,” “Iran Has Lost Its Next to Last Ally,” “Moscow Has Abandoned Tehran,” and “Russia is Tired of Defending the Iranian President Akhmadinejad.” Both Foreign Minister Lavrov and Minister of Defense Ivanov refused to rule out possible Russian support for referring the Iranian issue to the UN Security Council if Tehran did not reinstate the EU-3 moratorium. [24] A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry called for a restoration of the freeze and an official Foreign Ministry statement noted, with apparent frustration, that “Iran had undertaken that step [of removing IAEA seals] after the January 7-8 Russian-Iranian consultations in Tehran,” amounting to a flat rejection of Russia’s advice. [25] [26] Director of the Moscow-based Center for the Study of Contemporary Iran, Rajab Safarov, said Russia might reverse its earlier position and was likely to join its Western colleagues. [27] Chairman of the State Duma’s International Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev announced that “Russia’s position on this issue will not be different from that of other members of the Security Council.” [28]

Moscow Softens its Stance
In a few days, the tone of comments changed, however. Russian officials began to stress that diplomatic possibilities were not yet exhausted and that premature pressure on Iran, such as the referral of the issue to the UN Security Council or imposition of sanctions, could be counterproductive. Speaking on January 16, President Putin emphasized that it was necessary to “work with Iran very delicately” and that not a single “hasty” statement would be allowed. [29] The following day, Foreign Minister Lavrov declared that sanctions were “not the best and far from the only method of solving international problems.” [30] The Russian government had clearly decided to prevent its Western colleagues from raising the issue of Iran at the UN Security Council and to prevent the introduction of sanctions. Secretary of the Security Council Igor Ivanov announced that Russia was committed to a diplomatic solution of the problem, was reiterating its earlier proposal about production of fuel in its territory, and continued to advocate “a moratorium on all activities related to enrichment by Iran in order to ensure effective cooperation with the IAEA.” [31]

The director of the Moscow-based PIR Center, Vladimir Orlov, having criticized Iran for an unconstructive policy, declared that, nonetheless, “there are no serious reasons, from the point of view of Russia’s interests, to begin wrapping up cooperation with Iran.” [32] He also repeated the traditional argument about Iran’s right under the NPT to conduct uranium enrichment and particularly emphasized that Iran was only restarting research in that area, rather than recommencing enrichment itself.

The reasons for the sudden change in attitude remain unclear, but the media has broadly hinted that Moscow’s decision was made after consultations with China. Supposedly, on January 15 or 16, 2006, contacts between unnamed Russian and Chinese diplomats resulted in a decision to continue negotiations with Iran, although both countries also agreed that Iran should again halt the implementation of its enrichment program. Media sources reported, “Russia and China took a short time-out until early February to give Iran one more opportunity to continue dialogue.” [33]

Foreign Minister Lavrov announced on January 19 that Russia would make its decision on forwarding the Iran matter to the UN Security Council based on the assessments of the IAEA, rather than on assessments of individual countries, in a clear reference to U.S. suspicions about Iran’s secret military nuclear program. [34] Although official statements seemed to presume that the decision would be made before or during the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on February 2, 2006, Sergey Lavrov also mentioned the scheduled Russian-Iranian consultations on February 15-16, making it clear that Russia (and presumably China) would resist attempts to refer Iran to the Security Council until at least that date. [35]

Simultaneously, Russian officials once again began to sound optimistic about the chances that their proposal might be accepted by Tehran. During a meeting with President Putin, Rosatom chief Sergey Kiriyenko declared that contacts with Iran never stopped and that Russia was awaiting the visit of an Iranian delegation to Moscow. He also said that the Iranians seemed highly interested in the Russian proposal and were prepared for a detailed discussion. [36] He also reported that the plants that would produce nuclear fuel for Iran were standing ready to begin the implementation of the proposal. [37]

In addition to criticizing Iran, Russian newspapers and news services again began to challenge Western governments for their unwillingness to compromise and their militant stance. Even reasonably liberal or centrist newspapers began to feature headlines like, “The United States and Europe Are Against Negotiations with Iran” or “Tehran is Painted into a Corner.” [38] In effect, after several days of sharply anti-Iranian rhetoric and assessments of the situation, Russian officials and the Russian media returned to its familiar refrain: Iran is wrong, but not totally wrong; the United States is hegemonistic, militaristic, and generally unfriendly toward Russia; and Russia is the last hope of the world and will save the day, if given a chance.

While angered by Iran’s actions, it appeared that Russian officials did not want to miss an opportunity to play the role of “savior” of the nuclear nonproliferation regime; moreover, if their plan succeeds, they might even be able to claim that they had averted a new military confrontation in the Middle East. Indeed, this “psychological” rationale may be as important an influence on Moscow as China’s insistence on negotiations, rather than confrontation, in managing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The Kremlin soon learned that charting an independent course regarding Iran’s nuclear future might be more difficult than it had imagined. During a January 25 visit to Moscow, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, reportedly broached the possibility of involving China as an additional partner in the proposed joint uranium enrichment venture, a step that would greatly dilute Russia’s role. [39] Indeed, one authoritative Moscow-based analyst, Dmitri Trenin, observed that in pushing for an “independent course” in international affairs, Russia risked becoming a “junior partner” of China, which was even less desirable that being a “junior partner” of the United States. [40]

Publicly, however, the Iranian representative endorsed the Russian uranium enrichment proposal (without mentioning possible Chinese involvement), causing considerable euphoria among Russian observers. [41] It only became clear a few days later that Russia had had to agree to a new concession as the price of this achievement: whereas the original Russian proposal foresaw that enrichment activities in Iran would be limited to producing uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), the new tentative deal allowed Iran to take the next step in the enrichment process, converting the uranium tetrafluoride to uranium hexafluoride (UF6).

Even that concession seemed insufficient, however, when Larijani, upon his return to Teheran, declared that the Russian proposal, although positive, still did not satisfy Iran. This led Vyacheslav Nikonov, an analyst close to the Kremlin, to complain, “It is normal to be scheming in international negotiations, but Iran is too scheming.” Moderate commentator Sergey Karaganov sounded even more exasperated: “Iran is now playing not even a double game, but a triple or even quadruple game, and it is not clear how long this can be managed.” [42]

As the Iranian nuclear crisis continues, U.S. policymakers need to acknowledge that Russia’s motivations are not congruent with those of the United States. While Russia shares the goals of sustaining the nuclear nonproliferation regime and preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, Russia tends to be “softer” on Tehran. Russia places greater emphasis on Iran’s legal rights under the Nonproliferation Treaty, is less committed to the view that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, wants to enlarge economic and political ties with that country, and views Iran’s opposition to U.S. global dominance in a rather positive light.
Thus, as it has shown, Russia is not a submissive ally, but rather a diplomatic partner with distinct interests to pursue and leverage to exploit. In the end, the Kremlin may well go along with the United States and accept tough measures against Tehran – but not until Russia has fully exhausted other options to drive a bargain more to its liking.

SOURCES:
[1]  "Iran to Resume Nuclear Research," Associated Press, January 3, 2006. [View Article]
[2] Yadernyi Kontrol, Information, October 15, 2005
[3] Maksim Yusin, “Kak Budem Delit Iran?” [How We Will Divide Iran?], Izvestiya, December 7, 2005.
[4] Luybov Borshchevvskaya, “SShA Nachali Voinu s Iranom” [The United States Has Begun a War with Iran], RBC-Daily: Politics, November 21, 2005.
[5] Viktor Sumskoi, “Kondoliza Rais Zrya Razvernula Samolet” [Condoleezza Rice Turned Around Her Plane In Vain], Gazeta.Ru, October 15, 2005.
[6] PIR Center Hot News, November 16, 2005; PIR Center Hot News, December 20, 2005.
[7] Artur Blinov, “Iranskaya Dilemma Moskvy I Vashingtona” [Moscow’s and Washington’s Iranian Dilemma], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 28, 2005.
[8] “Rossiya Vooruzhit Iran na $1 Milliard” [Russia Will Arm Iran $1 Million Worth], Strana.Ru, December 12, 2005.
[9] Aleksanrd Babakin and Vladimir Ivanov, “Bomba Dlya Blizhnego Vostoka” [A Bomb For the Middle East], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 5, 2005.
[10] “Moskva Vozobnovlyaet Voennye Postavki Tegeranu” [Moscow Resumes Military Transfers to Teheran], Strana.Ru, December 2, 2005.
[11] “Minoborony: Postavka Iranu ZRK Budet Krupneishei Sdelkoi” [The Ministry of Defense: The Transfers to Iran Will Be The Biggest Deal Ever], Strana.Ru, December 23, 2005.
[12] David Sanger and William Broad, “Bush and Putin Want Iran to Treaty Uranium in Russia,” New York Times, November 19, 2005.
[13] Vasilii Sergeev, “Uran-patriotism” [Uranian Patriotism], Gazeta.Ru, December 26, 2005.
[14] “Iran Vydvigaet Rossii Usloviya po Obogashcheniyu Urana” [Iran Gives Russia Conditions On The Enrichment Of Uranium], Strana.Ru, November 25, 2005.
[15] Aleksei Bausin, “Irantsy Otkazalis Obogashchat Svoi Uran v Rossii” [Iran Refused to Enrich Uranium in Russia], Izvestiya, November 14, 2005.
[16] Vladimir Benazarov, “Tehran Ready to Reply to Russia,” RIA-Novosti, November 28, 2005; Mikhail Pervushin, “Admadinezhad Nazval Kholokost ‘Mifom’” [Admadinejad Called Holocaust a ‘Myth’], Strana.Ru, December 14, 2005.
[17] Mikhail Pervushin, “Admadinezhad Nazval Kholokost ‘Mifom’” [Admadinejad Called Holocaust a ‘Myth’], Strana.Ru, December 14, 2005.
[18] Vasilii Sergeev, “Iranu Ne Khvatilo Bukv” [Not Enough Letters for Iran], Gazeta.Ru, December 27, 2005
[19] “Iran Mozhet Soglasitsya na Obogashchenie Urana v Rossii” [Iran Could Agree to Enrich Uranium in Russia], Strana.Ru, December 28, 2005; “Iran Obogatitsya v Rossii,” Gazeta.Ru, Dedember 29, 2005.
[20] “RF Prizyvaet Iran Vosstanovit Moratorii na Obogashchenie Urana” [Russia Calls Iran to Restore the Moratorium on Uranium Enrichment], Strana.Ru, January 10, 2006.
[21] “Sergeya Ivanova Trevozhit Obogashchenie Urana v Irane” [Sergey Ivanov is Worried by Uranium Enrichment in Iran], Strana.Ru, January 11, 2006.
[22] “Rossiya Provela s Iranom ‘Otkrovennye’ Peregovory” [Russia Has Conducted ‘Open’ Talks with Iran], Strana.Ru, January 9, 2006.
[23] “MID Irana Odobryaet Khod Peregovorov s Rossiiskoi Delegatsiei” [Iranian Foreign Ministry Endorses Talks with the Russian Delegation], Strana.Ru, January 8, 2006.
[24] Elena Suponina, Petr Iskenderov, “Dogovorilsya” [He Talked Too Much], Vermya Novostei, January 13, 2006; “Ivanov: Rossiya Prodast Iranu Kompleksy Tor-M1” [Ivanov: Russia Will Sell Thor-M1 Systems to Iran], Strana.Ru, January 13, 2006’ “Sergey Ivanov Ne Iskluychaet Vozmozhnosti Peredachi Yadernogo Dosie Irana v Sovet Bezopasnosti” [Sergey Ivanov Does Not Rule Out the Transfer of the Iranian File to the Security Council], Prime-TASS, January 13, 2006.
[25] “Rossiya Prizyvaet Iran Vernutsya k Sostoyaniuy Moraniriya” [Russia Asks Iran to Return to the State of Moratorium], Strana.Ru, January 13, 2006.
[26] Ivan Gorshkov, “Evropa Grozit Prekratit Dialog s Tegeranom” [Europe Threatens to Terminate Dialogue with Iran], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 12, 2006.
[27] Elena Suponina, Petr Iskenderov, “Dogovorilsya” [He Talked Too Much], Vermya Novostei, January 13, 2006.
[28] Igor Romanov, “Iran Reshil Proverit OON na Prochnost” [Iran Decided to Test the Strength of the UN], SMI.Ru, January 13, 2006.
[29] “Putin: V Voprose s Iranom Ne Dolzhno Byt Oshibochnykh Shagov” [Putin: There Should Be No Mistakes with the Iranian Issue], Strana.Ru, January 16, 2006.
[30] Ivan Preobrazhenskii, “Bombit Nelzya” [To Bomb or Not to Bomb], Strana.Ru,January 17, 2006.
[31] “Rossiya Nastaivaet na Diplomaticheskom Reshenii problemy Irana” [Russia Insists on a Diplomatic Solution to the Iranian Issue], Strana.Ru, January 18, 2006.
[32] PIR Center Hot News: Orlov on Iran, Russia, January 19, 2006.
[33] Vasilii Sergeev, “Rossiya I Kitai Tyanut s Iranom” [Russia and China Drag on the Situation with Iran], Gazeta.Ru, January 17, 2006; see also Ivan Preobrazhenskii, “Bombit Nelzya” [To Bomb or Not To Bomb]. Strana.Ru,January 17, 2006.
[34] “Lavrov: RF v Otnoshenii Irana Budet Orientirovatsya Na MAGATE” [With Regard to Iran, Russia Will Follow the IAEA], Strana.Ru, January 19, 2006.
[35] Dmitri Vinogradov, “Iranu Dali Mesyats” [Iran has Been Given a Moth], Gazeta.Ru, January 17, 2006.
[36] “Yadernaya Problema Irana Reshaetsya v Rossii” [The Nuclear Problem of Iran is Being Solved in Moscow], Mayak radio station, January 20, 2006.
[37] “Rosatom Podgotovil Tsekha Dlya Obogashcheniya Iranskogo Urana” [Rosatom Has Facilities Ready to Enrich Uranium for Iran], Lenta.Ru, January 20, 2006; “V Moskve Zhdut Iranskikh Peregovorshchikov” [Moscow Awaits Iranian Negotiators], Strana.Ru, January 20, 2006.
[38] Yevgeni Bai, “SShA i Evropa Protiv Peregovorov s Iranom” [The United States and Europe Are Against Negotiations with Iran], Izvestiya, January 20, 2006; Vladislav Vorob’ov, “Tegeran Zagonyauyt v Ugol” [Tehran is Painted into a Corner], Rossiiskaya Gazeta, January 20, 2006.
[39] Ivan Groshkov, Yevgeni Grigoriev, Gabriel Volfson, “Iranskaya Diplomatiya Pytaetsya Izbrezhat Sanktsii” [Iranian Diplomacy Tries to Avoid Sanctions], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 23, 2006; Nadir Habibi, “Delo – Za Pekinom” [The Nexty Word Belongs to Beijing], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 24, 2006; IvanGroshkov, ‘Tegeran Oglyadyvaetsya na Pekin” [Teheran Looks at Beijing], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 25, 2006.
[40] “Dmitri Trenin: ‘Rossiya Perekhodit v Kontrnastuplenie” [Russia in a Counteroffensive],
Strana.Ru, January 26, 2006.
[41] Katerina Labetskaya, “Iranskii Razgovor pro Uran” [Iranian Talk About Uranium], Vremya Novostei, January 24, 2006; Anatoli Goldovski, “Izotopy, Obogashchaites” [Isotopes, Enrich Yourself], Gazeta.Ru, Januaary 26, 2006.
[42] Boris Yunanov, “Iranski Maraphon” [The Iranian Marathon], Moskovskie Novosti, January 27, 2006.