On August 11, 2005, Pakistan announced that it had successfully tested a 500 kilometer-range land-attack cruise missile (LACM)—dubbed the Babur or Hatf-VII—capable of delivering, with pinpoint accuracy, either nuclear or conventional warheads. While providing little detail on the Babur’s guidance or propulsion system, Pakistan Army spokesman, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan, noted that the missile is designed to avoid hostile radar detection by flying very low. [1] Pakistan’s president, Pervez Musharraf, greeted the successful test by declaring, “The biggest value of this system is [that] it is not detectable. It cannot be intercepted.” [2]

The new missile would thus address growing fears in Islamabad that India may seek to neutralize Pakistan’s existing ballistic missile-based nuclear deterrent by deploying ballistic missile defenses in the future. Politically, the conservative Islamic daily newspaper, Nawa-e Waqt, which is harshly critical of the United States and India, interpreted the announcement of Pakistan’s first LACM as not only a national achievement but also as a “message of courage and valor for the Muslim world.” [3]

Indian military analysts immediately responded to Pakistan’s LACM test with disbelief about Babur’s origin. Rather than accepting Islamabad’s claim that the missile was entirely of indigenous origin, K. Santhanam, former chief technology advisor of India’s Defense Research and Development Organization, argued that the Pakistani missile was of Chinese origin, adding wryly that Pakistan simply made a “label change.” [4] Santhanam added that China has strong reasons to keep its role secret, as the transfer violates the Missile Technology Control Regime’s restraints against selling missiles capable of delivering 500-kilogram payloads to ranges of 300 kilometers or more. Another Indian analyst, Prasun K. Sengupta, wrote a seemingly authoritative assessment of the Babur’s capabilities and origin, in which he stated that Pakistan’s August 11 LACM test culminated a year-long Chinese-Pakistani contract to transfer the Babur’s licensed-assembly technology to Pakistan. He indicated that Pakistan’s current plans were to outfit the Babur with a conventional warhead alone, and that the missile’s true range was 300 rather than 500 kilometers. A regiment of 18 road-mobile launchers, each carrying four LACM canisters, was slated to be inducted into the Pakistani Army by 2008 and a naval ship-launched variant would be provided by 2008. Although Sengupta specified the names of Chinese and Pakistani entities involved in the covert transfer, it is important to note that his assessment was entirely without attribution. [5] That said, because Pakistan’s ballistic missile development program has relied heavily on Chinese support, it would not be surprising to find a similar level of Chinese support for Pakistan’s cruise missile programs.

Another Indian analyst, Pravin Sawhney, views Pakistan’s new LACM as portending a disadvantageous and destabilizing future for the Indian-Pakistan military balance, unless India adjusts its current policy attitudes towards cruise missiles. [6] Sawhney urges a two-pronged program of investment in hypersonic and subsonic technology, the former for shorter-range cruise missiles and the latter for long-range LACMs. Recognizing the difficulty of defending against low-flying or extremely fast LACMs, Sawhney also calls for major investment in cruise missile defenses.

At present, India is engaged with Russia in co-developing the PJ-10 BrahMos cruise missile, a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) derived from Russia’s Yakhont ASCM, a product of the NPO Mashinostroyenia design bureau. Capable of speeds up to mach 2.8 and propelled by a two-stage (solid booster and liquid ram jet) propulsion system, the BrahMos can reach ranges of just under 300 kilometers. India announced in December 2005 that it intended to induct the BrahMos into its Navy, while plans existed to integrate another variant with their Sukhoi Su-30 aircraft for the Indian Air Force. [7] Although the BrahMos’ current radar seeker, aided by global positioning system updates, has some limited capability against land targets, Jane’s Intelligence Review reports that NPO Mashinostroyenia is working on a terminal guidance multi-spectral seeker for the Russian Yakhont, which, if incorporated into the BrahMos, would greatly improve its land-attack utility. [8]

Although Pakistan’s test launch of the Babur LACM came as a surprise, it would not be surprising to see growing interest in cruise missile technology in South Asia and other regions. The supporting technology is increasingly available, and in comparative terms is more affordable than that for ballistic missiles. Moreover, the poor performance of U.S. Patriot missiles in Operation Iraqi Freedom against low flying cruise missiles and slow flying aircraft could encourage regional militaries to pursue cruise missile options as a way to avoid, evade, or defeat existing ballistic missile defense systems.[9]

SOURCES:
[1] “News Alert” Interview on Dubayy Geo TV in Urdu, August 11, 2005, FBIS document SAP20050811000083.
[2] Islamabad PTV World in English, August 11, 2005, FBIS document SAP20050811000083.
[3] Rawalpindi Nawa-e Waqt in Urdu, August 12, 2005, p. 10, FBIS document SAP20050812000039.
[4] Rajat Pandit, “Pak Missile is Made in China,” Mumbai Times of India (Internet Version) in English, August 12, 2005.
[5] Prasun K. Sengupta, “Babur’s Flight,” New Delhi Force (Internet Version) in English, September 9, 2005.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Chennai The Hindu (Internet Version) in English, December 16, 2005.
[8] Robert Hewson, “Cruise Missile Technology Proliferation Takes Off,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
October 1, 2005.
[9] Dennis M. Gormley, “Missile Defence Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War,” Survival, vol. 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003-04).