Did China’s Autocracy Exploit India’s Democracy to Stall the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal?
November 2007 Issue
 

A number of Indian analysts are questioning whether China exploited its links to the Communist Party of India (Marxist) – CPI (M) – to stymie the pending U.S.-India nuclear deal. [1] The deal, based on a joint statement signed by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush in July 2005, would end a decades-long embargo on U.S. nuclear trade with India. Its underlying purpose, however, is to serve as the cornerstone of a strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi intended, in part to, counter China’s growing power in Asia. [2]

The CPI (M) has long-standing ideological ties with the Communist Party of China (CPC), in effect the Chinese government, which has expressed reservations about the nuclear accord. [3] The CPI (M) and other smaller parties in the “Left Bloc” have argued that the deal improperly limits India’s nuclear independence and ties India too closely to the United States. In September and October 2007, the CPI (M) and other Left Bloc parties threatened to withdraw from Singh’s governing parliamentary coalition, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), if Singh took further steps to bring the India-U.S. nuclear agreement to fruition. [4] Their withdrawal (or even the withdrawal of the CPI (M) alone) would bring down the Singh government and trigger elections more than a year before their planned date in early 2009. [5]

Rather than cede power and face the uncertainties of early elections, on October 15, 2007, Singh agreed not to proceed with the deal for the time being. He also agreed to enter into further negotiations on the matter with the Left Bloc, who have demanded an unambiguous statement that the deal has been cancelled. Stating that “certain difficulties have arisen with respect to the operationalization of the India-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement,” Singh informed President Bush that it might not be possible until after Indian elections in 2009 for India to take further steps to implement the deal. [6] Still required to bring the deal to fruition are an agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the monitoring of India’s civilian nuclear activities, a consensus decision at the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to lift the group’s embargo on nuclear trade with India, and final approval by the U.S. Congress of a formal nuclear trade agreement with India. [7] Singh has halted talks with the IAEA pending further discussions with the Left Bloc.

In short, a deal that would have cemented a U.S.-India partnership largely aimed at constraining China appears to have been at least temporarily derailed by an Indian political party with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party.

Left Bloc’s Power Magnified after 2004 Parliamentary Elections
The Left Bloc reached its present powerful position in Indian politics after the 2004 elections for the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian parliament). The center-right government at the time, headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was defeated by a center-left coalition, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), supported from the outside by the Left Bloc. The Communist parties increased their power significantly after strong election results in the West Bengal and Kerala states, winning approximately 11 percent of the parliamentary seats. [8] Together the UPA and the Communist parties hold a narrow parliamentary majority (about 53 percent of the seats), but without the support of the Left, the UPA only holds about 42 percent of the parliamentary seats. As noted, the CPI (M) alone holds enough seats in the Lok Sabha to single-handedly bring down the current coalition.

CPI (M) Stance
The CPI (M) argues that the deal limits India’s nuclear independence and threatens to impair its sovereignty. In an open letter to India’s parliament on September 8, 2007, the CPI (M) Central Committee protests that the terms of nuclear trade under the deal, as set out in a now-pending bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, would deny India access to certain types of civilian nuclear technology related to the enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium (technologies that can be used to produce nuclear weapons material). CPI (M) further asserts that the agreement will leave India vulnerable to a cut off of reactor fuel, and requires it to accept IAEA inspections on U.S.-supplied nuclear equipment and material in perpetuity, even if fuel supplies are terminated. [9]

The letter expresses great concern that “[The U.S.-India deal] is part of [an] American design to try in India a wide ranging strategic alliance which will adversely affect the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and our strategic autonomy.” [10] In particular, the letter argues that the deal must be seen in conjunction with the June 2005 10-year U.S.-India Defense Framework Agreement, which the Bush Administration sees as a commitment from India “to cooperate with the United States in furthering its strategic interests in Asia.” [11] It also highlights that, in response to U.S. pressure, New Delhi voted twice against Iran at the IAEA, in September 2005, and February 2006, “contrary to its stance earlier that Iran, as a NPT signatory, has every right to develop its nuclear technology for civilian purposes.” [12]

Before concluding with the demand that the Singh government not “rush through the next steps” to bring the deal to fruition, the letter asks the rhetorical question, “Is the nuclear cooperation agreement going to bind India with the United States in a relationship which goes contrary to our cherished goals of national sovereignty and independent foreign policy and an economic development based on the priorities of our people?” [13]

Commenting in early October 2007, CPI (M) General Secretary Prakash Karat put the matter more succinctly: “We don’t want to be another Japan. It’s not in our interest.” [14]

CPI (M)’s Allegiance Questioned
Links between CPI (M) and China date to 1964 when the Communist Party of India (CPI) split into two factions, the CPI (M), supported by Beijing, and CPI, backed by Moscow. [15] Although the CPI (M)’s arguments against the deal have focused on India’s interests, its ties to China have led several Indian commentators to accuse the CPI (M) of disrupting the U.S.-India nuclear entente on instructions from Beijing. Referring to the CPI (M)’s general secretary, one Indian analyst complained that “Karat derailed one of the boldest foreign policy initiatives in recent times and won a famous victory for China.” [16] Another Indian columnist declared that the CPI (M) “has always been pro-China. It keeps Chinese interest in mind…. When this party was born…this was the raison d’etre.” [17] A former senior Indian intelligence official went further to say that the CPI (M) believes that “‘China’s interest is our interest.’” [18] An opinion piece in the prominent Calcutta-based Telegraph similarly argued:

The way Mr. Karat has railed against the media for dubbing his party “pro-China” suggests that he has been stung by the criticism. His is the kind of discomfort one has in facing unpleasant truths. Yet, while defending his party against the charge of being pro-Chinese, [Karat] argued that the U.S. wanted New Delhi to act as a counterweight against Beijing. Only two days earlier, the People’s Daily, the organ of the Chinese communist party, had exactly the same thing to say about the Indo-US deal…The Chinese party thus confirms what Mr. Karat denies – the fact that he is really China’s voice. [19]
Critics of the CPI (M) have linked their arguments to decades-old accusations that India’s Communist parties had sided with and taken guidance from foreign powers (namely the Soviet Union and China) against nationalist movements in India, both during the freedom struggle and after independence, especially during the 1962 war with China. [20] These accusations and circumstantial evidence notwithstanding, there is no conclusive proof that the CPI (M) acted at China’s behest in stalling the nuclear deal.

CPI (M) and Beijing: Friendly Relations, But Not Always in Step
The CPI (M) and Beijing have a strong record of friendly and accommodating relations, and the CPI (M) has intervened on numerous occasions to advance Chinese interests in India. [21] In 2006, for example, the Indian National Security Council Secretariat of the Prime Minister’s Office urged that foreign investments in sensitive sectors of India’s economy – flowing from China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh – should be subject to special security vetting. In response, allegedly at the request of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, Sitaram Yechury, a member of the CPI (M) Politburo, “literally forced the Indian government” to drop the proposal. [22] The same year, a Chinese company won a contract to build a gas pipeline in India and wanted to bring 1,000 of its own engineers to India to complete the construction. Due to the high unemployment rate among Indian engineers, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs and the Intelligence Bureau did not clear visas for the Chinese technical workers, questioning the necessity of having foreign workers complete the job. After Yechury issued a strong protest, the UPA government changed course and issued the visas. [23]

Most recently CPI (M) took a stand against the Indian government and aligned itself with China over two security-related issues, the August 2007 “quadrilateral initiative” discussions – the first inter-governmental meeting on security issues between India, Japan, Australia, and the United States – and the September 2007 joint naval exercise carried out by the United States, Australia, India, Japan, and Singapore. [24] The Chinese government issued demarches in June seeking to know the objective of the “quadrilateral initiative” and also raised concerns over the war games. [25] In August, the Indian Communist parties organized two marches to protest India’s increased naval cooperation with the United States; these protests were termed by one Indian newspaper as finding a “friendly echo in Beijing.” [26]

Despite this convergence of objectives between the CPI (M) and China, their views appear to differ on at least two issues. The CPI (M), for example, is said to be sympathetic to Maoist insurgencies in the Indian state of Assam and in Nepal. [27] In late 2005, however, China reportedly offered the Indian government assistance in suppressing its Maoist insurgency and also offered arms to the government of Nepal to help quell Maoist rebels there. [28] Similarly, the CPI (M) has not spoken out against or sought to slow the development of India’s Agni-III long-range, nuclear-capable ballistic missile, even though the system’s core mission is to reinforce India’s deterrent vis-à-vis China by placing cities in eastern China at risk of nuclear attack. [29]

The CPI (M) leadership has sought to counter the impression that Chinese interests played a role in the party’s opposition to the nuclear deal. In late September 2007, for example, Karat rejected the charge that his party was subject to Chinese influence, stating that, “People say we are against the deal to help China. I want to ask how? China wanted India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but we never said that the country should do so.” [30] In October 2007, after the nuclear agreement was frozen, Karat stated that even if China supported India’s position at the NSG, his party would still oppose the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. [31]

For its part, China has stated it has not sought to influence Indian policies through the Indian political process. In a statement on September 30, 2007, Ai Ping, Director-General of the International Department of the CPC’s Central Committee, declared: “The Indo-US civilian nuclear deal is an internal affair of India and we will not use our party-to-party relations with the CPI or the CPM to oppose that.” [32]

Conclusions
The CPI (M)’s intervention with the Singh government to thwart the U.S.-India nuclear deal greatly benefits Beijing. If the deal had continued to move forward, China would have confronted a difficult choice when the issue of opening nuclear trade with India came before the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Since the group operates by consensus, China, in effect, would have had the opportunity to veto the deal by voting against lifting the group’s 15-year embargo on nuclear trade with New Delhi. That step, however, would have forced Beijing to directly and openly oppose the United States. At least for the moment, the CPI (M)’s ostensibly independent initiative freezing the deal achieves the same result, without the potential risks for Beijing of a stark confrontation with Washington.

Nonetheless, how closely the CPI (M) may have coordinated with Beijing in developing its course of action remains a difficult question. The party has unquestionably strong links to China and certainly would have recognized that the U.S.-India deal was not to Beijing’s advantage.

At the same time, however, the party’s position could have been decided without direct encouragement from Beijing or to any other foreign state. Indeed, the CPI (M)’s stand against the loss of Indian autonomy under the deal has much in common with the thinking of the Hindu-nationalist BJP Party and other opponents of the arrangement in India who have no political ties to China. Karat and other CPI (M) leaders may have recognized that they could be true to these principles and advance China’s cause at the same time.

On the other hand, the CPI (M) also had much at risk in threatening to bring down Singh’s coalition, since the party could not be assured that new elections would return it to a position of importance in a future government. New elections, had they been called, might have also jeopardized a key goal of the left parties, keeping the Hindu-nationalist BJP out of power. Would the CPI (M), have, in effect, risked all without strong outside encouragement? That is a question that may never be unambiguously resolved.

Leonard S. Spector and Johan Bergenas – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies





 

SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] See, for example, Swapan Dasgupta, “Incredible India Wanes,” The Telegraph, October 19, 2007, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1071019/asp/opinion/story_8452034.asp; [View Article] T. R. Jawahar, “Red Spells Danger,” News Today, August 25, 2007, http://www.newstodaynet.com/2007pb/250807.htm; [View Article] Dina Nath Mishra, “CPM’s Ideology Affects National Interest,” Pioneer, http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnist1.asp?main_variable=Columnist&file_name=MISHRA191.txt&writer=MISHR
A&validit=yes; [View Article] B. Raman, “‘China’s Interest is Our Interest,’” Rediff India Abroad, August 19, 2007, http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/aug/19raman.htm. [View Article]
[2] See, for example, Paul Richter, “In Deal With India, Bush Has Eye on China,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2006, http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/challenges/competitors/2006/0304eyeonchina.htm. [View Article] During the debate in the U.S. House of Representatives on legislation to establish the legal basis for the deal to go forward, Congressman Henry Hyde, the principal sponsor of the legislation also stressed this aspect of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. After noting some of the potential drawbacks of the deal, he stated, “A major argument in favor, however, is that a closer relationship with India is needed to offset the rising power of China. There is much to this view, and it is clear that the U.S. will need to draw upon new resources to handle the challenges of this new century.” Statement of House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry H. Hyde, Congressional Record, July 26, 2006, p. H5903.
[3] Mohan Malik, “China Responds to the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” The Jamestown Foundation, March 29, 2006, http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3670&article_id=2370926. [View Article] China has also, it appears, sought to use the potential change in nuclear trade rules to improve ties with New Delhi, even opening the door to sharing civilian nuclear technology. See Jehangir S. Pocha, “China and India on Verge of Nuclear Deal; Would Enable Buying, Exchange of Technology,” Asia Times Readers Forum, http://forum.atimes.com/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=9334. [View Article]
[4] The Left Bloc consists of the CPI (M), the Moscow-oriented Communist Party of India (CPI), the All India Forward Bloc, and the Revolutionary Socialist Party. For the Bloc’s position on the U.S.-India deal, see “No to Nuclear Deal,” CPI (M) website, http://www.cpim.org/. [View Article] The withdrawal threat was made repeatedly prior to the freeze of the agreement, see “‘Left Would Withdraw Support If Govt Operationalises N-Deal’,” MSN India News, October 5, 2007, http://content.msn.co.in/News/National/NationalPTI_051007_1602.htm. [View Article]
[5] Details concerning the pivotal position of the CPI (M) within the Indian parliament are discussed below.
[6] Brajesh Upadhyay, “Is India-U.S. Nuclear Accord Dead?” BBC News, October 16, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7047662.stm; [View Article] Siddharth Srivastava, “India’s Congress Party Backs off Nuclear Pact,” Asia Times Online, October 16, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ16Df02.html.
[View Article]
[7] Regarding the steps needed to implement the deal, see, “Commercial Motivations Add Impetus to Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement,” WMD Insights, May 2007, http://wmdinsights.org/I15/I15_SA1_CommercialMotivations.htm. [View Article]
[8] K. Alan Kronstadt, India’s 2004 National Elections, CRS Report for Congress, July 12, 2004.
[9] CPI (M) Open Letter to the Members of Parliament, September 8, 2007, http://www.cpim.org/. [View Article]
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Somini Sengupta, “In India’s Coalition Math, Marxists’ Power Is Magnified,” The New York Times, October 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/world/asia/09india.html. [View Article]
[15] Rahul Bedi, “Communists Steering India like Back-seat Drivers,” Irish Times, August 23, 2007.
[16] Dasgupta, “Incredible India Wanes,” see source in [1].
[17] Mishra, “CPM’s Ideology Affects National Interest,” see source in [1].
[18] Raman, “’China’s Interest is Our Interest,’” see source in [1].
[19] “China Checkers,” The Telegraph, September 2, 2007, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070902/asp/opinion/story_8263502.asp. [View Article]
[20] Rudrangshu Mukherjee, “The Red Blunders,” The Telegraph, August 21, 2007, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070821/asp/opinion/story_8214848.asp; [View Article] Amulya Ganguli, “Left on the Wrong Side,” The Tribune, September 8, 2007, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070908/edit.htm#4. [View Article]
[21] See, for example, “Senior CPC Official Meets Indian Communist Party Delegation,” People’s Daily Online, April 24, 2003, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200304/24/eng20030424_115733.shtml; [View Article] “CPC to Continue Cooperation with Communist Party of India (M),” People’s Daily Online, March 20, 2002, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200203/20/eng20020320_92438.shtml. [View Article]
[22] Raman, “’China’s Interest is Our Interest,’” see source in [1]; Ananda Majumdar, “It’s All About Business But Comrades Will Take Up China’s Problems With PM,” The Indian Express, September 29, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/13632.html. [View Article]
[23] Majumdar, “It’s All About Business But Comrades Will Take Up China’s Problems with PM,” see source
in [22].
[24] Pranab Dhal Samanta, “Not Just Karat & Co, Comrades in China, Too, Aren’t Happy with India’s ‘3 New Friends,’” The Indian Express, August 9, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/209434.html; [View Article] “Yin and Yang,” The Indian Express, August 10, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/209516.html. [View Article]
[25] Siddharth Varadarajan, “Four-Power Meeting Drew Chinese Demarche,” June 14, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/14/stories/2007061410501500.htm. [View Article]
[26] Sandeep Dikshit, “Biggest Joint Naval Exercise in Bay of Bengal in September,” The Hindu, July 13, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/07/13/stories/2007071354331500.htm; [View Article] Rajat Pandit, “Left to Protest Against War Games,” Times of India, August 23, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2315256.cms;
[View Article] Samanta, “Not Just Karat & Co, Comrades in China, Too, Aren’t Happy With India’s ‘3 New Friends,’” see source in [24].
[27] Balbir K. Punj, “Chinese Capitalism Vs. Maoism,” Pioneer, November 4, 2005, http://www.indiafirstfoundation.org/ARCHIVES/articles/arc_bkp/2005/november0405.htm; [View Article] “India Approved Chinese Arms Sales to Nepal,” China Confidential, June 13, 2006, http://chinaconfidential.blogspot.com/2006/06/india-approved-chinese-arms-sales-to_13.html; [View Article] See, for example, “Nepal Maoists Toe Yechuri Line,” The Financial Express, July 6, 2006, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/story/169976/. [View Article]
[28] See sources in [27].
[29] Extensive on-line research did not find commentary by the CPI (M) or its leaders on the Agni III.
[30] “CPI (M) For Nuclear Power But Not for Deal with U.S., Says Karat,” The Hindu, September 23, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/23/stories/2007092360240800.htm; [View Article] “CPM Tries to Delink N-Deal Stand From China,” The Indian Express, September 7, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/214958.html. [View Article]
[31] “Karat Warns: Even China Support at NSG Won’t Change Our Position, Stick to CMP,” The Indian Express, October 19, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/230080.html. [View Article]
[32] “Nothing to Do with Left’s Stand on N-Deal: China,” The Tribune, September 30, 2007, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20071001/world.htm#.7. [View Article]