In early October 2007, two important steps were taken toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and achieving permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. The first was the joint statement presented at the close of the current round of the Six-Party Talks, which ended on October 3, 2007, in which China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States confirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to disabling its existing nuclear facilities in exchange for diplomatic, energy, economic, and humanitarian benefits. [1]

The next day, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il signed the “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” under which the two countries pledged to expand and promote inter-Korean economic cooperation, hold frequent meetings between “their highest authorities,” enhance military confidence-building, and promote reconciliation by facilitating the “reunion of separated family members and their relatives.” Kim and Roh also reaffirmed their commitment – albeit only in a passing reference – to the denuclearization process and declared that “the South and the North have agreed not to antagonize each other, to reduce military tensions, and to resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiation.” [2]

While the South-North Summit – only the second in more than 50 years since the Korean War of 1950-53 – signals a measure of progress toward inter-Korean reconciliation, its overall impact on denuclearization, peace, and regional security will only become clear as Seoul and Pyongyang move to implement the ambitious and vaguely defined objectives stipulated in the October 2007 Joint Declaration. The two countries have a history of entering into, but never honoring or fully implementing, such agreements. The 1991 “North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange,” the 1992 “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and the 2000 “North-South Joint Declaration” have all suffered this fate.

Moreover, the inter-Korean summit raises a number of serious questions for the United States and China regarding the interplay between the October 2007 Joint Declaration and the Six-Party Talks. Both the United States and China have stated that they will not sign a peace treaty ending the Korean War until North Korea has fulfilled its commitment to abandon its nuclear arms. [3] However, Seoul’s position is that the process of establishing a permanent peace regime and the efforts toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are complementary and that the two issues are inextricably linked, a formula implying that the resolution of the nuclear issue and conclusion of a peace treaty should proceed in parallel.

Six-Party Talks Progress
On February 13, 2007, the participants in the Six-Party Talks adopted an “action plan” for the implementation of the September 19, 2005 “Joint Statement” pursuant to which North Korea agreed to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, return to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and implement International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. (For the recent history of the Six-Party Talks, see “Six-Parties Adopt Steps for North Korean Denuclearization but Uranium Enrichment Controversy Looms as Major Obstacle,” WMD Insights, April 2007.) In July 2007, North Korea began shutting down and sealing five of its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon under IAEA supervision. [4] The October 3, 2007 Six-Party Joint Statement calls for the permanent disablement of these facilities by December 31, 2007. The facilities include the site’s five-megawatt reactor, reprocessing (plutonium separation) plant, and the nuclear fuel rod fabrication plant. A U.S.-led team of experts visited Yongbyon in September to devise specific measures for disabling the structures and to make recommendations to the heads of the delegations. [5]

Pyongyang also agreed to provide a complete declaration of its entire nuclear program by the end of 2007, while Washington pledged to begin the process of removing North Korea (DPRK) from the U.S. government’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and to move forward “the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.” [6] Although no timeline was specified, the agreement states that the United States will fulfill its commitment “in parallel” with North Korea’s actions. In accordance with the February 13, 2007 agreement, the parties also reaffirmed their commitment to deliver economic, energy and humanitarian assistance, including one million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to the DPRK, and to hold a Six-Party ministerial meeting “at an appropriate time.” [7]

Despite the relatively positive climate evident in the most recent sessions of the Six-Party Talks, questions remain as to whether the completion of the declaration and of the disablement process will proceed smoothly. Chun Yung-woo, South Korea’s chief envoy to the Six-Party Talks, predicted they would and that the negotiations on the next and final stage of the dismantlement process were likely to commence in early in 2008. [8] Christopher Hill, head of the U.S. delegation, also indicated that the nuclear talks would move into their final phase in 2008, and added that implementing this phase of dismantlement would require North Korea’s “abandonment” of its fissile material, which it would presumably transfer to the United States or another participant in the Six-Party process. [9]

However, a number of ambiguous areas must be clarified before the current phase of activities can be completed, including the precise definition of “disablement” and the proper mechanism for verifying North Korea’s declarations. [10] Another complicating factor may be recent reports suggesting that North Korea transferred nuclear technology to Syria; the possible transfer came to light after an Israeli air strike on an alleged Syrian nuclear site. [11]

Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to Japan J. Thomas Schieffer warned President Bush that the Six-Party deal, particularly Washington’s pledge to consider removing Pyongyang from the State Department’s list of countries sponsoring terrorist activities, could harm relations with Japan. Tokyo is reluctant to recognize North Korea’s improved behavior before the issue of the DPRK’s past abductions of Japanese citizens is resolved. [12] An even more challenging obstacle for the denuclearization process, however, could be the U.S. reaction to the efforts by North and South Korea to integrate this process with their discussions on establishing a permanent peace regime on the peninsula, centered on a peace treaty to replace the July 1953 Armistice Agreement ending the Korean War.

The Roh-Kim Summit
The inter-Korean summit was held in Pyongyang from October 2-4, 2007. Despite a strong emphasis on the ceremonial during Roh’s trip northward, which began with his historic walk across the Demilitarized Zone between the two countries, the Washington Post observed that a “surprising amount of specific and encouraging substance came out of this Korean summit.” [13]

The two leaders held what were termed “in-depth discussions on measures to promote peace on the Korean peninsula and cross-border economic cooperation.” [14] The summit consisted of “candid talks” in which both leaders “explicitly reaffirmed [their] firm commitment to peace” and discussions on realistic issues involving economic exchanges,” according to Roh. [15] The two sides also held working-group meetings to explore ways of strengthening bilateral cooperation in seven areas, including economy, culture, religion and politics. [16] Although Kim’s reluctance on the subject of economic reform and market opening was evident, the discussions were apparently fruitful; in addition to their “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” and their nod to the nuclear issue, according to news reports, the leaders agreed to facilitate North-South family reunions; to open roads and a rail line; to establish air links to tourist destinations; to build a joint shipbuilding industry; to intensify investment in free trade zones in the North; and to set up a “peace zone” in the form of a joint fishing area around a disputed border in the Yellow Sea.

Although Roh was unable to extract from Kim a promise to come to Seoul for another summit, the South Korean President expressed his satisfaction with the summit’s outcome. [17]

Possible Conflicts Among South Korea, China, and the United States on Peace Treaty Process
After the Inter-Korean summit, the Roh Administration appeared eager to push forward with multi-party talks focused on the peace regime. Critics have accused President Roh of using this peace deal as a means to a positive legacy for his tenure now that he has only four months left in his presidency. Since the Pyongyang summit, South Korea’s media has been reporting a number of mixed messages emanating from within the Roh government, suggesting a lack of consensus with regard to the feasibility and timing of such a multilateral conference. [18]

According to press reports, President Roh has strongly expressed his desire to attain a declaration formally ending the Korean War before his term expires in February 2008, a step which he sees as paving the way for the negotiation of a permanent peace treaty. [19] However, Roh’s proposal for multilateral peace talks and his summit agreement with Kim Jong-il raise basic questions, such as which countries would be involved in the peace negotiation and how these negotiations would affect the on-going Six-Party Talks.

A somewhat puzzling reference in the South- North Joint Declaration calls for having the “leaders of the three to four parties directly concerned” negotiate an end to the current armistice and build a permanent peace regime on the peninsula. In the event of the suggested three-party arrangement, it is not clear who would be invited to the negotiating table and who would be excluded.

In 1953, the armistice that brought the Korean War to a halt was signed by the U.S.-led United Nations Force, China, and North Korea. Although South Korea was not a party to the armistice, the summit statement assumes that South Korea will be included as a separate participant in further talks with North Korea on the peace settlement. According to Roh’s spokesman Cheon Ho-seon, “President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il clarified their willingness to play a leading role in declaring the end of the war….” [20] When talking to reporters, Roh stated that he did not pay attention to the party issue when signing the summit agreement and does not distinguish between the three-party and four-party options. [21] Despite Roh’s indecision, South Korean officials maintain that South Korea wants a four-party summit; North Korea would prefer three-party talks, but in this case the debarred party would be China. [22]

Beijing has responded to speculation that China may be the party to be excluded by asserting that, as a signatory state to the 1953 Armistice Agreement and an important and influential country in Northeast Asia, China expects to be involved in any negotiation leading to a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. [23] Not surprisingly, Chinese analysts have protested that China made great sacrifices during the Korean War and should not be kept out of any negotiation leading to a final settlement of that conflict, since the outcome of any negotiations will have direct bearing on China’s security interests. [24] As this issue has surfaced, the Roh administration has guaranteed that Seoul will take China’s view into full consideration, claiming that “the inter-Korean Joint Declaration leaves fully open the possibility of China’s participation in the peace talks.” [25] However, despite rumblings that China may be the party not invited to the negotiating table, the fact that Beijing was a party to the 1953 ceasefire treaty while South Korea was not renders it possible, although unlikely, that Kim Jong-il believes South Korea would be the country excluded from any three-party talks. [26]

When such a summit might be held is as controversial an issue as who might attend. While at the outset, President Roh expressed his desire to convene the multi-party talks as soon as possible – ideally before the end of his term – subsequent statements issued by various South Korean government officials hedged on the anticipated timing of the commencement of the multi-party talks. Chun Yung-woo, the chief South Korean negotiator at the Six-Party Talks, has been quoted as saying that it would be unrealistic to try to hold a multi-party summit before the end of 2007 for this reason. [27] Chun elaborated that a more feasible and desirable plan would be for the foreign ministers of the four countries to announce the launch of negotiations for a Korean Peninsula peace agreement on the sidelines of a denuclearization meeting among foreign ministers of the Six-Party Talks participant countries. This four-way ministerial meeting would be possible by year’s end. [28] South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon, meanwhile, stressed that while it is too early to discuss a declaration to end the Korean War, it would be possible to “start negotiations to cooperate in building a peace regime on the Peninsula.” [29] He added, “I’m not sure whether we can define the start of the negotiations on the peace regime as any kind of declaration. But the declaration itself would come at the very end of the negotiations.” [30]

Despite this lack of consistency, most South Korean government officials have stressed that it is too soon to decide on the specifics of timing and modalities because any such peace process will be contingent on the progress made in the Six-Party Talks. President Roh has emphasized that the six-party process and the negotiations on a permanent peace regime should be mutually reinforcing. Progress in North Korea’s “disablement” process, he believes, can be a good impetus for the three or four states negotiating the peace regime to declare the formal end of the Korean War, a step that can, in turn, serve as a further incentive for North Korea to faithfully carry out the next phase of dismantlement, expediting the denuclearization process. [31]

However, the Joint Declaration signed by Roh and Kim at the end of the Pyongyang summit barely addresses the nuclear issue. Instead, the Joint Declaration places economic cooperation as the top priority. Indeed, the summit’s most noticeable achievement lies in the area of economic interactions, including commitments for the completion of the first-phase construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex; the opening of rail service between the two Koreas, cooperation in ship building; a new industrial complex; and a joint fishing zone. [32] Seoul has offered economic aid and development packages that reportedly total as much as $11 billion, without requiring that Pyongyang make any progress toward denuclearization in return. Roh emphatically made the point that he would not seek to link economic aid to political issues such as human rights or the issue of the past abduction of South Korean citizens. [33] Roh’s reluctance to link aid to denuclearization was puzzling, as the Six-Party Talks in Beijing had just inked a joint statement the day before the summit pledging aid to North Korea if – and only if – it followed through on its dismantlement promises.

An inter-Korean peace regime without prior resolution of the nuclear issue would not be acceptable to Washington. [34] Indeed, in contrast to the South Korean government, U.S. officials have consistently maintained the position that any discussion on establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula could only take place after the complete and verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. [35] President Bush stressed this point during talks with Roh prior to the North-South summit at the 15th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum held in Sydney on September 8-9, 2007. [36] When pressed by President Roh to clarify the U.S. position on the issue, President Bush said that while he was willing to formally end the Korean War, North Korea’s complete nuclear disarmament would have to come first. [37] State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey also emphasized that the bottom line would be: “With denuclearization, all things are possible, and North Korea can achieve a very different relationship with the United States as well as with the rest of the world.” [38]

China also has also made very clear where it stands on the issue. Ning Fukui, China’s ambassador to South Korea, stated that a formal inter-Korean peace treaty could not be signed as long as North Korea has nuclear weapons. [39] Beijing’s quick reaction to the summit declaration reflects its keen interest in balancing multiple policy objectives. It appears to be giving first priority to obtaining a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, possibly fearing that if Pyongyang retains its nuclear arms, the development could trigger a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia, potentially involving Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan. But as China pursues this goal, it is also seeking a stable relationship with the DPRK, less driven by ideological affinities and more solidly based on securing a strategic buffer. At the same time, Beijing hopes to enhance ties with Seoul, in part to help address the potential security impacts of a future unified Korea, and to manage its relations with the United States regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, as well as all other peninsular developments. [40]

Conclusion
The inter-Korean summit declaration and the agreement adopted by the Six-Party Talks have created a rare window of opportunity for real progress to be achieved on the Korean Peninsula. While Seoul is intent on seizing the momentum created by the two agreements to simultaneously strengthen inter-Korean ties and promote the denuclearization process, the United States may be wary of any measures that it views as a distraction from achieving what it considers to be the most important goal of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. At the same time, the significant economic aid promised by South Korea that is not dependent on its northern neighbor’s progress with nuclear dismantlement could potentially undermine the goals of the Six-Party Talks.

China, on the other hand, views the outcomes of both the latest round of the Six-Party Talks and the inter-Korea summit with guarded optimism. The recent progress at the Six-Party Talks reinforces Beijing’s persistent emphasis that patience, sincerity, and pragmatism are keys to moving the negotiation process forward. The summit’s pledges of greater economic interactions between the North and South are compatible with Beijing’s peninsular interests, as a less fragile and isolationist North Korea lifts some burden from China and also ensures an atmosphere conducive to bilateral and multilateral discussions on the North Korean nuclear issue and the future of peninsular peace and stability. As the debate over the possible integration of peace regime negotiations into the Six-Party Talks underscores, significant challenges lie ahead to satisfy the sometimes divergent interests of the states involved.

Insook Kim and Jing-dong Yuan – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation