In mid-October 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Moscow for a two-by-two meeting with their Russian counterparts, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Anatoliy Serduykov. George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin had agreed to the format for regular two-by-two meetings earlier in 2007.

Expectations surrounding the meeting were very low, although in Moscow it was still regarded as an important way to maintain a dialogue and the appearance of a reasonably normal relationship between the two countries. A former high-level official in the Foreign Intelligence Service, Gyennadi Yevstafiev, expressed the view of many observers when he said that a breakthrough was impossible because both the U.S. and Russian administrations were “lame ducks.” According to Yevstafiev, the absence of an outright failure would have been an acceptable outcome. [1]

Contrary to expectations, the meeting resulted in small, but significant progress on three highly contentious issues: U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system in Eastern Europe; replacement of the 1991 START I Treaty, which expires in December 2009; and the fate of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The movement on the missile defense question, which was particularly significant because it came after several years of clashes on the issue, resulted primarily from new American proposals. Moscow initially seemed to reject them, but after a hiatus of several days, the Russian side began to see the proposals in a less negative light. Although the parties did not come close to resolving any of these issues, they did take their first tentative steps toward workable arrangements to address them.

Missile Defense in Eastern Europe
At the beginning of the October visit, the two sides took almost diametrically opposed positions on the subject of U.S. deployment of missile defenses in Eastern Europe. Russia continued to reject American arguments for deploying the system, while the United States refused to heed Russia’s call to cancel the deployment. The Russian military regarded the U.S. justification for the missile defenses as hollow because, in its view, Iran was not close to developing long-range missiles. In summer 2007, Putin proposed to give the United States access to data from Russian radars in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and possibly a new radar under construction near Armavir to monitor the Iranian missile program. According to Putin’s proposal, the U.S. missile defense system would not be deployed unless and until monitoring from the Russian radars revealed that Iran was testing long-range missiles. (For more analyses of this proposal, see “Special Report: Russia’s Azerbaijan Radar Proposal,” WMD Insights, July/August 2007.) The United States expressed interest in using the Russian radars, but refused to compromise on its planned deployment of missile defenses and sought to integrate the radars into its missile shield, rather than accept them as a substitute for it.

Russian experts found the U.S. position logical, even if it was not acceptable to Russia. Former Director of the 4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense Vladimir Dvorkin and former Chief of Staff of Strategic Rocket Forces Viktor Yesin both said in interviews that the Gabala and Armavir radars could benefit the planned U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic by providing advance warning about the launch of Iranian missiles. The U.S. acceptance of Putin’s offer to use these two radars did not constitute progress at the early summer negotiations, however, because the Russian proposal sought to cancel U.S. missile defense plans, not augment them. Because of this impasse, both Dvorkin and Yesin predicted that the Rice-Gates visit to Moscow would bring no breakthroughs. [2]

Aleksandr Konovalov, director of the Institute of Strategic Assessments in Moscow, predicted on the eve of the two-by-two meeting that the United States would want to integrate the Gabala radar into the missile defense system and would reject the Russian proposal to freeze the deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe – perhaps permanently. Konovalov concluded that the only chance for an agreement between the two sides would be if they joined together to try to convince Iran and North Korea to terminate their missile programs. [3] A researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Aleksandr Pikaev, commented that the United States and Russia would be locked into their positions on missile defense until a new administration enters the White House in 2009. [4]

On October 12, however, the United States introduced a new proposal during the two-by-two meeting to more fully involve Russia in the proposed U.S. missile defense system. As described by U.S. sources, the newly proposed system would include, in addition to the originally planned missile interceptor base in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic, the early warning radar at Gabala and perhaps another one at Armavir. This was in line with the predictions of Russian commentators. Not predicted, however, was that under the new U.S. proposal, the facilities would become operational simultaneously, and both the United States and Russia would have liaison officers stationed at all sites to ensure that the system was not used improperly, i.e., trained against Russian missiles. [5] The decision to launch missile interceptors would still be made nationally, however, and thus Moscow would not be able to veto a U.S. launch decision. [6] Russian sources emphasized that the proposal contained enhanced transparency elements, including the sharing of detailed technical data on the systems. [7]

Russian sources paid close attention to a statement reportedly made by Gates during the two-by-two meeting. According to the RIA-Novosti information agency, Gates admitted that while, in the short term, the proposed missile defense system in Eastern Europe would not threaten Russian deterrence capabilities, in the long term it could become such a threat. He reportedly added that the United States was prepared to develop measures, together with the Russian side, to eliminate concerns about this possibility. [8] That statement seemed to address the oft-repeated concern of the Russian military that the missile defense system in Eastern Europe in its currently planned configuration would not be a threat to Russian deterrence, but it could become one if the number of interceptors were increased and modernized to improve their ability to intercept Russian missiles. If the admission by Gates was, in fact, made as quoted by Russian media sources, it could represent an important conceptual development that might help to bridge the gap between the two countries’ positions.

However, in its public pronouncements, at least, the Russian government initially reacted negatively to the proposal. Speaking during the meeting, Lieutenant-General Yevgeni Buzhinski, Head of the International Treaty Department of the Ministry of Defense, declared: “We will not concede anything because our position is crystal clear.” [9] Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explained that Russia saw at least “two serious problems” with the U.S. proposal. The first problem was the difference in the assessment of the threat: Russia had said many times before that it did not see evidence that Iran was working on missiles that could present a threat to Europe, much less to U.S. territory. To clarify these differences, experts would need to establish a common definition of the threat. The second problem was that, under the Russian proposal, work on U.S. missile defenses in Europe would have to be frozen while negotiations continued. [10] During a meeting with Rice and Gates, Putin reiterated that success in negotiations on missile defense issues could only be achieved if the United States “abstained from pressing on with the implementation of earlier agreements with East European countries.” [11]

While Putin initially rejected the U.S. proposal, several days later, in an October 16, 2007, interview with the Iranian media, he noted a “certain transformation” of American views and listed three elements that should be part of the solution.

First, Putin reiterated Russia’s traditional point of view that a missile defense system should not be created until there is evidence that Iran is developing long-range missiles. He added, however, the proviso, first voiced by Lavrov during the meeting with Rice and Gates, that Russia was prepared to consider evidence provided by the United States on this issue. Referring to the Iranian missile program, Putin stated: “There is no data on where such a threat comes from today. At least, we do not have it. If someone has it, the data should be shared.” [12] The modification seems to be insignificant, but nevertheless appears politically important. (Subsequently, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Security and Disarmament Department Anatoli Antonov expanded on this point, saying that the alternative to missile defense was “the analysis of potential missile threats until 2020” and a “regional system of objective monitoring of the evolution of strategic situation.”) [13]

Second, Putin insisted on “democratic access” to the U.S.-proposed missile defense structure, involving several countries, and “a clear understanding of how [member-states] would participate in the [joint] work.” [14] This statement could be interpreted as tentative acceptance of an important element of the American proposal – a missile defense system spread across several countries with representatives from each country at each facility.

Finally, Putin called for the negotiation of procedures to govern a multi-national missile defense system, stating, “It is necessary to agree on the procedures of joint management.” [15] While Putin’s statement can be interpreted as a concession to the United States, it also raises a point of contention. The U.S. proposal assumes decisions would be made nationally and not by consensus, but Russia apparently wants joint management, which presumes consensus on how the system is operated and when it is used.

To be sure, Putin’s remarks did not constitute an acceptance of the American proposals. Rather, he indicated that Moscow was prepared to discuss them and outlined a number of elements of the agenda for further talks. Moreover, the Russian proposal to freeze the construction of the East European radars remained an important potential stumbling block, along with divergences with regard to the operation of the system. Still, this was an important step forward from a clash of views that had seemed intractable.

The day after Putin’s interview in Iran, however, Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluevski declared that he saw “nothing new” in the American proposals. He also said that Gates’s statements were “unofficial” suggestions and that Russia wanted them in writing so they could be studied more carefully. [16] Baluevski indicated that the military regarded the American proposal as an attempt to legalize the missile defense system using transparency and confidence-building measures to avoid binding limits on its capabilities. His comment suggested that Russian officials were still arguing about the best way to proceed after the Moscow two-by-two meeting.

On October 19, Lavrov characterized U.S. proposals as “quite interesting” and referred to the need for further “interagency analysis.” [17] Like Baluevski, he said he was expecting these proposals to be “transmitted officially.” [18] On October 23, an anonymous source in the Ministry of Defense seconded this call, stating that “the Ministry of Defense has not received any formal proposals” on missile defense from the United States. [19] The implication of the Russian request is that Moscow regards an oral proposal as more likely to be withdrawn or reinterpreted than a written one, making it less suitable as the basis for serious negotiations.

Following the meeting in Moscow, U.S. sources made a series of statements that appeared to link the timing of the deployment of missile defenses in Eastern Europe to the evolution of the Iranian nuclear and missile programs – a cautious echo of the Russian view. Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Daniel Fried made this connection on October 17 in Brussels, stating, “If that threat went away, or more realistically, was greatly attenuated, then obviously we would be much freer to make programmatic adjustments” to the planned missile defense program. [20] A Pentagon spokesman, Geoff Morrell, reiterated the point later that day, telling reporters: “It is our intention to proceed with the construction of missile defense in Europe. But the pace at which it becomes operational could be adjusted to meet the threat.” [21]

Later, an anonymous senior U.S. official stated that the United States was prepared to “reconsider the timeline” for construction of a missile defense system, if the Iranian missile program developed more slowly than expected and even to delay making the system operational “until the ICBM threat [from Iran] becomes more concrete.” [22]

Almost simultaneously, President George W. Bush, speaking at the National Defense University on October 23, said that the United States was “inviting Russia to join us in this cooperative effort to defend Russia, Europe and the United States against an emerging threat that affects us all. For his part, President Putin has offered the use of radar facilities in Azerbaijan and southern Russia. We believe that these sites could be included as part of a wider threat monitoring system that could lead to an unprecedented level of strategic cooperation between our two countries.” [23]

As suggested, Russian responses to the recent U.S. proposals on the missile defense system have been rather ambiguous. According to Chairman of the International Relations Committee of the State Duma Konstantin Kosachev, the U.S. initiatives were a step in the right direction, but “the call to Russia for cooperation in that sphere is unclear, unspecific, and difficult to understand.” [24] According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, “Russian observers note that construction of two bases will take several years, and one cannot rule out that Americans might forget about their promises.” [25] An unnamed source in the Kremlin also welcomed American proposals, but said that, “These proposals do not indicate that Washington is prepared to freeze construction of missile defense bases in Eastern Europe for the duration of negotiation, which is what Moscow expects.” [26] Further fueling Russian suspicions about the true motives behind the American plan, Polish Prime Minister Yaroslaw Kaczynski, on October 18, repeated his earlier claims that the missile defense system the United States plans to construct in Eastern Europe would defend Poland from Russia. Kaczynski declared, “We must remember that we are permanently under a threat Russians do not accept the changes that happened since 1989. Apparently, they think we are part of their sphere of influence.” [27] A few days later his government was defeated in a parliamentary election, and many observers in Moscow expected that relations with Poland, including on issues of missile defense, would improve once the country’s new government took office.

For the moment, after an unexpectedly promising round of talks, U.S.-Russian discussion of the missile defense issue appears to be slowing down. This is not surprising: often an innovative proposal is followed by a period of questions, clarifications, and interagency debates. The Moscow meeting has, however, opened the door to possible resolution of a difficult bilateral issue. Whether leaders of the two countries will use the opening to develop a lasting solution to the matter remains to be seen.

START I Replacement
The issue of replacing the 1991 START I treaty, which expires in December 2009, was barely mentioned in the principals’ public comments during or after the Rice-Gates trip to Moscow. As in the case of the U.S. missile shield, both Russia and the United States defined their positions prior to the Moscow negotiations. But in this case, differences between the two sides appeared less intractable, although not insignificant.

Russia is seeking a legally binding “START I Light” treaty, complete with a formalized verification and data exchange system. (See “U.S. and Russia Set to Begin Talks to Replace Start I Treaty,” WMD Insights, September 2007.) The United States had expressed reservations about such an approach, but on October 5, Assistant Secretary Fried suggested that there was a measure of flexibility in the U.S. position. At a press briefing in Brussels, he said that the United States “wants to take the best from START I and create a new regime, so that there will be no break in transparency.” [28] Asked whether the United States had shifted its opposition to a detailed treaty that might necessitate lengthy negotiations, Fried responded,

I wouldn’t say it’s a shift. All this year, all of 2007, we’ve been working with the Russians on a good post-START regime. The form of that regime is something to be discussed. It’s both – there are issues of the form of the regime and then how – the details of what’s covered and how. But we’re working with the Russians and we want to be able to move ahead. [29]