On November 19, 2007, the United States and Russia announced that they had overcome longstanding differences on how to dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian surplus nuclear-weapons-usable plutonium. Three weeks earlier, Washington and Moscow declared that they had completed security upgrades at some of Russia’s most sensitive nuclear facilities – 25 nuclear warhead sites at 11 inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) bases. [1]

The two achievements underscore a major paradox in Russia-U.S. relations. Despite major differences between the two countries over a number of U.S. foreign policy and defense initiatives and over Russian human rights and energy policies, in the area of nuclear cooperative threat reduction (CTR), both governments continue to make substantial progress through joint bilateral and multilateral collaborations. During her October 2007 visit to Moscow, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told ABC News that, although Russia and the United States have their “differences” and “disappointments,” the two countries nevertheless “have some areas in which I think our cooperation has never been better. I would cite in that way counterterrorism cooperation, cooperation on global nuclear proliferation.” [2] The CTR process between Russia and the United States, commonly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program after its two original U.S. Senate sponsors, continues to represent one of the most successful examples of peacetime security collaboration between major military powers.

Joint CTR Objectives
The U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, and State each run separate, but closely coordinated, threat reduction programs in Russia and the other former Soviet republics. The “Cooperative Threat Reduction Program” technically refers to only the Department of Defense (DOD) effort, which recently celebrated its 15th anniversary. In practice, “CTR” is a widely used shorthand designation to refer to all U.S.-government WMD threat-reduction projects in the former USSR, whether managed by the DOD Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) or another arm of the U.S. government. CTR will be used in this more general sense in the discussion below. [3] Hundreds of private businesses, universities, think tanks, and other non-governmental organizations also participate in CTR and related activities. [4] These entities have made prominent contributions to CTR by implementing projects, suggesting innovative approaches to reducing threats, and helping to establish informal issue networks that transcend bureaucratic organizations and national governments.

Although the flexible nature of the CTR process has given rise to numerous CTR projects, almost all CTR programs address at least one of three broad U.S.-Russian security issues. First, several U.S.-funded programs support the elimination of former Soviet strategic weapons systems, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems, as mandated by various international or bilateral treaties. A second group of programs seeks to improve the security of Russia’s residual WMD materials against theft or diversion and to discourage former Soviet WMD experts from offering their services to terrorists or states of proliferation concern. The third, and most recent, objective of CTR programs is joint U.S.-Russian cooperation to reduce proliferation risks in third countries.

Elimination of Former Soviet Strategic Weapon Systems and Other WMD
The original Nunn-Lugar initiative (the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991) was developed to assist the newly independent former republics of the recently disbanded Soviet Union in fulfilling the preexisting Soviet-American START I treaty. U.S. executive and legislative branch officials saw clear benefits in eliminating weapons systems designed especially to attack the United States, while Russian policy makers were open in principle to receiving external assistance to destroy these systems and meet their treaty obligations during Russia’s difficult transition to a market economy. U.S. and Russian policy makers also wanted to eliminate or transfer to Russia the nuclear-weapon holdings of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, where substantial numbers of strategic missiles with nuclear warheads were based at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Since the enactment of the original November 1991 legislation, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia, the CTR program has helped deactivate 7,191 strategic nuclear warheads and destroyed 653 ICBMs, 485 ICBM silos, 110 ICBM mobile launchers, 615 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 456 SLBM launchers, 30 ballistic-missile launching nuclear submarines, 155 strategic bombers, 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles, and 194 nuclear test tunnels. [5] (With the help of funding from the United States and other countries, Moscow has also made important progress in eliminating its chemical weapons arsenal as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention.) [6]

Countering Diversion of Russian WMD and Expertise
Since the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, U.S. government agencies have also devoted special attention to enhancing the security of Russia’s nuclear weapons storage sites and to helping the Russian government consolidate, secure, and account for its nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium). In addition, important programs have been pursued to engage former Soviet WMD scientists in non-militarily oriented projects in order reduce the danger that the scientists might sell their expertise to states or non-state actors of proliferation concern.

Nuclear Weapons
In October 2006, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced that it had completed upgrading the security of all nuclear warheads and materials under the control of the Russian Navy. This work was complemented by the October 2007 announcement noted earlier that both governments had completed their ambitious commitments to secure nuclear warheads at 25 nuclear missile sites under the control of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin established this goal in their Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation, signed at the February 2005 Bratislava summit. [7] The October 2007 announcement noted that this work had been completed two years ahead of schedule. [8]

WMD Materials
An increasing priority for the United States is cooperation with Russia and other countries to establish multiple layers of defense against the theft or diversion of WMD materials in transit, as well as at facilities where they are held. [9] To this end, the U.S. and Russia now cooperate on programs to secure sites with weapons-grade nuclear materials, consolidate holdings of such materials in fewer locations, and render excess quantities of such materials unfit for use in nuclear arms. The program is conceptualized as creating multiple lines of defense against the theft or diversion of these materials.

The “first line of defense” is to deny unauthorized access to the approximately 125 research, storage, and manufacturing facilities located in the Russian Federation that contain weapons-usable nuclear materials. Under its Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program, by the end of May 2007, the NNSA had completed security upgrades at approximately three-fourths of these sites. [10] The NNSA estimates that it will complete upgrading all Russian nuclear warhead, material, and missile storage sites of security concern by the end of 2008. [11]

The MPC&A also supports the conversion of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) into low-enriched uranium (LEU) and helps consolidate Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear material into a smaller number of specially secured locations. By the end of FY 2008, the NNSA MPC&A program will have eliminated a total of 10.7 metric tons of HEU, enough for use in nearly 500 nuclear weapons. [12] On the 15th anniversary of these programs, Russian officials showcased security upgrades at their nuclear research center at Podolsk, where a highly publicized instance of the attempted sale of stolen nuclear material occurred in 1992. A senior plant official insisted that, thanks to the security upgrades, such a theft was now “physically impossible.” [13]

Russia and the United States have also made progress on two additional programs designed to eliminate excess Russian nuclear weapon materials. First, the two countries continue to implement the 1993 “Megatons-to-Megawatts” agreement. This 20-year, multibillion dollar deal involves the continuing purchase by the United States of what will amount to 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads. The HEU will be converted into non-weapons-usable LEU fuel for use in U.S. commercial reactors. [14] These purchases currently supply fuel for approximately half of the commercial nuclear reactors in the United States and have resulted in the elimination of weapons-grade uranium sufficient for the manufacture of more than 10,000 nuclear weapons, above and beyond the eliminations achieved through the separate MPC&A program noted above. [15]

The third U.S.-Russian program for the elimination of excess weapons-grade material focuses on surplus plutonium in both countries. On November 19, 2007, U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) Director Sergey Kiriyenko signed a statement describing a plan to dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian surplus plutonium in a manner that will make it extremely difficult to use for nuclear weapons. [16] According to its terms, the Russian government, with $400 million in U.S. financial assistance, will modify two fast-neutron (“breeder”) reactors in a manner that will enable them to burn plutonium; normally breeder reactors are configured to maximize the production of new plutonium from uranium fuel and targets. The agreement should allow both sides to implement the long-delayed Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement of 2000, which commits the United States and Russia to each dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. On the U.S. side, the Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a program to burn excess U.S. plutonium in conventional nuclear power reactors. Construction of a key facility for the fabrication of this fuel is beginning in South Carolina and prototype plutonium-containing fuel rods have been undergoing testing in a nuclear power reactor in the same state. [17]

As part of the U.S. “Second Line of Defense (SLD)” program, at the end of May 2007, the Russian and American governments agreed to accelerate the installation of radiation monitors at all 350 international border crossings of the Russian Federation so that this task can be completed by 2011, rather than 2017 as originally planned. The two countries will equally share the $280 million cost of installing the monitors and training their operators. At the announcement, NNSA Deputy Administrator Will Tobey underscored that Moscow and Washington had achieved progress despite their current rocky political relationship, noting: “This cooperation is one of the real bright spots of our relationship with Russia.” He estimated that approximately 200 radiation monitors would be operational by the end of 2007. [18]

WMD Expertise
To address the danger of Soviet WMD expertise leaking to state or non-state actors of proliferation concern, a variety of U.S. government programs have underwritten non-WMD related research projects that have engaged thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists in order to provide the scientists with job alternatives and to avoid the sale of their skills to foreign buyers. The most important efforts are centered on the U.S. State Department-sponsored “Science Centers” program, which helped to establish the International Science and Technology Center, in Moscow, and the Science and Technology Center (Ukraine), in Kiev, to coordinate peaceful science collaborations with former Soviet weapons scientists. [19] The United States and many other states contribute to the science centers by underwriting specific projects.

As of the end of 2006, the Moscow-based center had funded roughly 2,500 proposals totaling $744 million and had supported 67,684 participants from 922 institutes in Russia and other NIS states. [20] Since 1993, the center in Kiev has worked with private companies and government agencies from the European Union, United States, and Canada to manage over 1,100 research and development projects worth over $166 million. [21]

Reducing Proliferation Threats in Other States
Russia and the United States also work through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to identify, secure, and dispose of stockpiles of vulnerable civilian nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment throughout the world. The initiative is implemented in the United States by DOE. The first element of GTRI is the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, which funds efforts to convert the cores of targeted civilian research reactors worldwide, many of which are Soviet-built, to use LEU rather than HEU fuel. [22] A second element, the International Radiological Threat Reduction program, involves identifying and securing radiological materials, potentially usable for radiological dispersion devices, or “dirty bombs.” Under GTRI, Russia and the United States have collaborated to secure a quantity of radiological material from sites in the Russian Federation, including the volatile Chechnya region, which could have been used to manufacture over 200 such devices. [23] Policy makers and analysts sometimes refer to the other two GTRI elements as the “global cleanout” programs. Funded by DOE, they encompass efforts to repatriate Soviet/Russian- and U.S.-origin HEU from vulnerable locations in foreign countries. [24]

At their February 2005 Bratislava summit, the United States and Russia agreed to accelerate their joint cooperation efforts and complete repatriation of all Soviet/Russian-origin HEU fresh and spent (used) fuel from other countries by the end of 2006 and 2010, respectively. [25] In December 2006, Russia airlifted 268 kilograms of HEU from the Rossendorf nuclear research facility in the former East German city of Dresden. [26] The following September, Russia and the United States again collaborated to remove HEU from Vietnam. [27] Although the 2006 Bratislava Summit deadline has not been achieved, in total, the NNSA has worked with Russian partners to remove Russian-origin fuel from nine countries – in 13 shipments of fresh fuel and four shipments of spent fuel and cooperation continues on additional projects. [28]

Continued Challenges
The current situation – progress on CTR despite problems regarding other dimensions of the U.S.-Russian relationship – is actually less of an anomaly than it might first appear. CTR cooperation continued, for example, during the late 1990s, when Russian-American relations deteriorated sharply over NATO’s decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo despite Moscow’s opposition and the alliance’s failure to secure UN Security Council authorization to use force. Indeed, in June 1999, even as U.S. warplanes were bombing Serbia, Russia’s main ally in southeastern Europe, the Russian government agreed to extend the original 1992 CTR agreement and declined to interrupt any existing CTR programs. Disagreements over the 2001 U.S. decision to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and NATO’s continuing expansion have also not appreciably disrupted cooperation on CTR.

Nevertheless, while some of the problems that plagued the CTR program in the 1990s – including corruption, miscommunication, and poor accounting – have now been largely overcome, two major impediments to deeper cooperation persist: (1) restrictions on the access of American officials to U.S.-funded projects in Russia; and (2) persistent doubts that Russian partners to the various CTR efforts will assume full responsibility for funding and managing CTR programs after official U.S. support ends.

Access
The October 2007 announcement of the completion of important security upgrades at Russian nuclear missile facilities indicates that the February 2005 summit between Bush and Putin at Bratislava resolved some difficulties, accelerating the pace of security and accounting upgrades at many Russian buildings containing nuclear material. [29] In June 2006, moreover, Russian and American negotiators finally resolved their longstanding differences over liability issues that had prevented renewal of the U.S.-Russian CTR umbrella agreement. [30]

Yet, a February 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report warned of continuing restrictions on U.S. access to other facilities that store, manufacture, or dismantle Russian nuclear weapons. [31] Such limitations could impede compliance with U.S. laws requiring verification of the proper use of American funds. The government-to-government CTR umbrella agreement, as well as the program-specific implementation agreements, grants Washington the right to examine the use of any material or service supplied by the American government as part of the CTR process. [32]

For example, for years Russian and American negotiators have failed to establish procedures whereby U.S. representatives can inspect whether Russia is using the Fissile Missile Storage Facility at Mayak for its intended purpose of storing plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads. [33] The Mayak facility represents one of the most expensive CTR projects, costing the U.S. DOD more than $300 million to build before the site was transferred to Russia in December 2003. [34] At that time, the plan was for the facility to store 25,000 canisters holding up to 100 tons of plutonium or up to 400 tons of HEU. Thus far, however, Russian officials have filled only one-sixth of the facility and have said they will likely fill only one-fourth of it. [35] Until the two governments finish negotiating a Transparency Protocol for the site, which would allow the DOD to monitor the nuclear emissions of the stored fissile material, U.S. representatives cannot be sure that Russia is actually keeping the required fissile materials at Mayak rather than reusing them in new weapons. [36]

Impediments to American access to certain Russian WMD sites remain a contentious feature of the CTR process. Representatives of the Russian government and the Russian national security community still complain that, in the process of helping to store, move, and dismantle their excess WMD stockpiles, Americans demand insights into Russian military practices that are unreciprocated. [37] Some Russians also worry about safeguarding Russia’s commercially relevant WMD technologies from foreign economic espionage. [38] American-funded CTR programs use U.S. contractors whenever possible, which encourages these espionage concerns and generates Russian complaints that only a small percentage of U.S. funding actually reaches Russia. Although good ties at the ground level between American and Russian personnel can often overcome these problems in the case of specific threat reduction programs, an element of strategic distrust has permeated Russia-U.S. security engagement on CTR since its inception.

In a sense, access problems are an inherent feature of the CTR process. The Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological infrastructures tightly integrated civilian and military functions, which the post-Soviet Russian government has only partly separated. In addition, the CTR model diverges sharply in this area from traditional arms control arrangements. The formal Soviet-American strategic arms control agreements of the Cold War typically include mutual verification measures, as well as mutual privileges and obligations, which guarantee parties roughly equivalent access for inspection and monitoring. The current bilateral threat reduction framework does not give Russian personnel the same level of access to American weapons elimination programs and facilities because the Russian government does not pay for these activities in the United States. These asymmetries have led Russian officials to impose considerable limitations on U.S. access to certain Russian WMD sites. [39]

Sustainability
At present, a major concern of U.S. officials is the transition of the CTR programs in Russia to eventual Russian control. In a step in this direction, the Bush Administration’s budget submission for FY 2008 reduced funding for bilateral CTR programs involving Russia, while increasing resources allocated to WMD-related threat reduction efforts in other countries. [40] The Congress has already instructed DOE to transition the nuclear security systems in that country to Russian funding and control. [41]

U.S. program managers have sought to promote sustainability by enhancing the capacity of their Russian partners. For example, they are training Russians involved in implementing CTR projects, supporting the use of Russian-made technologies, and encouraging Russians to reinforce their nuclear security culture. Despite these efforts, it remains unclear whether the Russian government will prove willing and able to maintain security upgrades at Russian WMD sites that previously were sustained by U.S. and other foreign financing.

Some evidence suggests, however, that Russia and the United States have been making progress in preparing for the transition in certain areas. In April 2007, the NNSA announced that it had reached an agreement with Rosatom, which is responsible for all aspects of Russia’s nuclear affairs, that defines the procedure by which Russian authorities would assume responsibility for maintaining U.S.-installed security controls at Russian sites containing sensitive nuclear material. The agreed joint sustainability plan establishes specific regulatory, maintenance, and other requirements Rosatom will need to meet to ensure the long-term viability of U.S.-funded security upgrades. [42] In May 2007, for example, the Russian government agreed to assume sole responsibility by 2013 for maintaining the 176 radiation monitors that U.S. and Russian technicians have installed near Russia’s major nuclear facilities, seaports, airports, and land and rail crossings between 1998 and 2006. [43] However, evidence indicates that the Russian federal government has not yet provided many Russian nuclear facilities with the financial support required to maintain U.S.-funded security improvements at these locations when American financing ends. [44] The February 2007 GAO report, moreover, cautioned that many U.S.-funded security improvements have sometimes provided only limited enhancements and that the Russian government has encountered difficulty in maintaining even these modest upgrades at certain nuclear sites. [45]

Although Russian political leaders express genuine concern about the threat of nuclear terrorism, the sentiments voiced by senior members of Russia’s nuclear establishment are less consistent. While making pro forma statements warning of this threat, they also regularly assert that Russia’s nuclear facilities are well-secured against such dangers. The Russian government also pursues policies that would seem to indicate only limited concern about the risks of nuclear terrorism or illicit diversion of sensitive materials. For example, Russian security managers still use low-paid workers and conscripts to guard facilities containing weapons-usable nuclear material. [46] (Well-trained professional troops guard the sites where the nuclear weapons are stored, however.)

Other longstanding problems have disrupted progress with international efforts to engage former Russian unconventional weapons scientists into non-military employment. U.S.-funded grants have managed to engage these experts to work on short-term civilian projects, typically in collaboration with American or other Western researchers. These programs generally have not, however, secured long-term employment for the Russian workers outside the network of former Soviet defense research institutes. In addition, while U.S. programs have helped dismantle some of the elements of the former Soviet WMD complex, they have not generally succeeded in establishing commercially viable non-defense enterprises to replace them. As a result, when the U.S. and other foreign grants end, many of these former Soviet defense workers will probably seek jobs working for the Russian military complex or, more worrisome, could seek out foreign employers interested in exploiting their WMD-related expertise. [47]

All these factors leave uncertain whether the Russian government, which under current international market conditions could afford to fund all CTR programs, will choose to do so. Such uncertainties may also erode Russia’s WMD “security culture” (the commitment of the individuals responsible for protecting the country’s WMD facilities). Russian and foreign programs have sought to increase workers’ motivation and ensure adherence to burdensome, but essential, security procedures. [48]

Conclusions
Despite the recent deterioration in overall bilateral relations and certain persistent problems specific to cooperative threat reduction activities, surprising progress continues in many U.S.-Russian bilateral and multilateral threat reduction programs. Both Russian and U.S. officials support in principle continuing and perhaps expanding CTR cooperation, particularly now that Moscow’s budgetary circumstances have improved and it is taking added responsibility for various programs. As Bush and Putin recognized at their Bratislava summit, the United States and Russia remain the most important countries supporting nuclear nonproliferation projects of this kind and, given that they possess more nuclear material and expertise than any other states, “bear a special responsibility for the security of nuclear weapons and fissile material.” [49]

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute