Since August 2004, Iraq has taken significant steps toward joining the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) through the CWC accession process used by states that did not sign the CWC before its entry into force in April 1997. Despite delays by the Iraqi Council of Representatives in passing the necessary legislation, the Iraqi government has continued to demonstrate its commitment to the Convention’s goals. This process began with a series of statements of intent and has since developed into increasingly specific actions preparing the Iraqi state bureaucracy for the obligations of CWC membership. Although Iraq’s accession to the CWC may present some difficulties for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), it will nevertheless be an important development for Iraq and a welcome step toward the universality of the Convention. It seems unlikely, however, that Iraqi accession will have any significant impact on remaining CWC holdouts in the Middle East region, including Israel, Egypt, and Syria.

Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam Hussein’s government resolutely rejected membership in the CWC. Iraq stood by Egypt in refusing to sign or ratify the Convention until the issue of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons was addressed. Saddam Hussein also avoided signing the CWC as part of his policy to remain deliberately ambiguous about whether Iraq continued to have weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, he tried to sustain the impression that Iraq possessed chemical weapons (CW) even though UN weapons inspectors had located and destroyed the country’s chemical weapons stockpiles by the mid-1990s and U.S. cruise-missile strikes – Operation Desert Fox – in December 1998 had destroyed much of the country’s CW production infrastructure. [1] Ironically, Saddam’s effort to deter his enemies with a non-existent chemical arsenal was a major factor contributing to the overthrow of his regime in 2003 by a U.S.-led coalition and the eventual installation of a new government that was more amenable to active participation in international nonproliferation and disarmament regimes.

Steps Toward Accession
Iraq began the process of acceding to the CWC soon after the United States returned sovereignty to the country on June 28, 2004, and an interim government was established under the leadership of Iyad Allawi. In an August 2004 letter addressed to the Director-General of the OPCW, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, “affirmed Iraq’s commitment to the conventions and treaties on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its intention to accede to the [Chemical Weapons] Convention as soon as an elected Iraqi Government [is] established.” [2] This statement of intent was repeated in Iraq’s initial declaration under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in April 2005. [3]

On April 26, 2005, in response to a request from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Secretariat of the Iraq Council of Ministers authorized the establishment of a multi-agency committee to consider Iraq’s accession to the CWC. [4] After a series of meetings chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the committee reported back to the Secretariat with a recommendation that Iraq’s accession to the CWC be approved. [5] On August 3, 2006, the Council of Ministers formally approved the Foreign Ministry’s recommendation. [6] Following the council’s approval, a bill for CWC ratification was proposed to the Council of Representatives for discussion and adoption. [7]

The Iraqi Council of Representatives recently passed the bill on Iraq’s accession to the CWC, and, on November 22, 2007, the Iraqi Presidential Council endorsed the law. [8] The Council’s decision had been delayed by several factors not related to the legislation itself: the need to consider many other important pieces of legislation; a series of disruptive disputes among different parliamentary factions; difficulties in achieving a quorum; and a running battle over the position of the speaker.

Announcing the decision of the presidential council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson noted that Foreign Minister Zebari would deposit the instruments of accession with the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) in the near future. [9] The CWC will enter into force for Iraq 30 days after the UNSG receives the accession documents opening the possibility that Iraq may become a full CWC member before the end of 2007.

Steps Toward Implementation
Despite its slow progress in acceding to the CWC, Iraq has been active in making preparations for implementing the Convention. This process has entailed three separate but closely related activities: training the personnel who will be responsible for implementation; participating in regional CWC events and OPCW meetings; and preparing an initial CWC declaration and systems for domestic implementation.

Training
The Iraqi government has worked with the OPCW and CWC member states to prepare some of its personnel for their eventual roles in implementing the CWC. In July 2005, the OPCW hosted the first group of nine Iraqi representatives for training at its headquarters at The Hague. The training course provided the Iraqi participants with the expert guidance needed to: prepare initial CWC declarations; establish and efficiently operate a National Authority for domestic implementation and liaison with the OPCW; enact implementing legislation; and put in place the required regulatory measures, including procedures for chemical industry inspections and chemical export controls. [10] The OPCW provided two additional training courses for Iraqi officials in February and December 2006, both held in Amman, Jordan. [11] Additionally, two Iraqi government representatives participated in the “Foundation Course for National Authorities involved in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),” in Swindon, United Kingdom in January 2006. This course was organized by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British Ministry of Defence, and the OPCW to assist government personnel in fulfilling their national obligations under the CWC. Most recently, from October 29-31, 2007, the OPCW held a fourth workshop on the CWC for Iraqi officials in Amman. [12]

Participation in CWC Events
Since 2004, the Iraqi government has participated in a number of OPCW meetings and activities. Beyond demonstrating its commitment to CWC implementation, Iraq derives several advantages from these events, including the familiarization of Iraqi diplomatic personnel with the policies, procedures, and content of day-to-day OPCW operations. As a first step, Iraq has sent delegations as observers to the past four OPCW annual conferences. [13] In addition, Iraq has requested and been granted special permission to attend two sessions of the Executive Council of the OPCW as an observer, despite its not yet being a member of the organization. [14] The Executive Council decided to allow Iraqi attendance as part of the OPCW’s ongoing effort to encourage universal adherence to the Convention in the Middle East and noted the “special circumstances of the requesting State not Party, which has also clearly indicated its intention to join the Convention and is actively working towards that end.” [15] Finally, Iraq has sent representatives to several regional CWC meetings, including the “Second Asian National Authorities Meeting,” in Beijing, China in September 2004, the “Second OPCW Workshop to Promote the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention among States in the Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East, and Neighboring Regions,” in Nicosia, Cyprus in June 2005, and the “Third OPCW Workshop to Promote the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention among States in the Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East, and Neighboring Regions,” held in Rome, Italy, in October 2006. [16]

Preparing for Implementation
In early 2006, Iraq began the process of preparing its initial CWC declaration. New CWC members must submit this declaration within 30 days of the Convention’s entry into force for that country. The requirements are substantial; the new member state must list in detail all of its chemical weapons-related activities since 1946, including the production of agents, the construction or use of facilities for development or production of CW, and transfers of scheduled chemicals and CW production equipment to or from the country. [17]

Iraq’s effort to prepare its initial CWC declaration will be helped immeasurably by the last “full, final, and complete declaration” (FFCD) that the former Iraqi regime prepared for the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in December 2002. This detailed declaration included a full accounting of all CW research, development, production, use, and ultimately destruction by the government of Saddam Hussein. It also listed all transfers of CW precursor chemicals to Iraq by foreign suppliers. [18] The Iraqi government initially approached UNMOVIC in April 2006 to request a copy of the FFCD “relating to chemical weapons that was provided by the National Monitoring Directorate of Iraq to the United Nations Special Commission in 1996.” [19] UNMOVIC complied with this request a month later by providing a copy of the 2002 FFCD. [20] The document made available to Iraq was sanitized by removing all “proliferation-sensitive” data. [21]

In August 2006, Iraq requested that UNMOVIC provide it with copies of “certificates of destruction” of the chemical weapons-related material and equipment that had been destroyed under UN supervision. Iraq also requested a copy of the handover protocol signed in 1994 between Iraq and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM, the predecessor of UNMOVIC) concerning the transfer of the Muthanna chemical warfare agent production site to the custody of Iraq. [22] This document provided a full account of the CW destruction activities conducted at Muthanna between 1992 and 1994 and set out safety and security measures to be applied at the site after the handover. UNMOVIC provided the requested documents in October 2006 after editing them to remove proliferation-sensitive content. [23]

The UNSCOM and UNMOVIC reports and documents will be essential for the preparation of Iraq’s initial declarations, especially with regard to the construction, operation, and subsequent destruction of former CW production facilities (CWPF), of which Iraq possessed several in the 1980s and early 1990s. CWC membership requires Iraq to list these facilities and all associated equipment and then prepare a plan for their destruction or document that such destruction has already occurred. It is very likely that the Iraqi authorities are also making use of the final report of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which added some detail to the UN reports. The ISG concluded that Iraq had not reconstituted its chemical weapons stockpile after the departure of the UNSCOM inspectors in December 1998, although it maintained covert chemical laboratories and the know-how to rebuild a CW program at some point in the future. [24]

Potential Complications
Due to the inspection and dismantlement activities of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, Iraq no longer possesses a chemical weapons stockpile. Nevertheless, Iraq will present at least three potential complications for the OPCW, both in terms of its initial declarations and achieving satisfactory verification of CW destruction.

The first issue arises because, in principle, the OPCW inspectorate must verify all of the details in Iraq’s initial declaration. Given the fact that the Iraqi CW program was large and operated for many years at multiple facilities, the OPCW will need to decide whether to reduce its workload by accepting the results of the UN destruction and verification activities, instead of duplicating these efforts. If the OPCW decides to rely on the earlier UN verification effort, this decision will be unprecedented for the organization but will not violate the Convention. Article IV of the CWC states that “[i]n carrying out verification activities . . . [the OPCW] shall consider measures to avoid the unnecessary duplication of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the verification of chemical weapons destruction between States Parties.” [25] To save the maximum time and effort for the organization and the Iraqi government, the OPCW Executive Council must decide either before or immediately following Iraq’s accession to accept the results of the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC verifications. [26]

The second and potentially more difficult issue arises from the chaotic period immediately following the over-throw of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. A devastating campaign of looting and destruction, some of it highly organized, swept across the country for several weeks before some degree of order could be restored. In addition to destroying the records of many government ministries, the looters also damaged and dismantled former WMD production and storage sites. In August 2004, UNMOVIC noted that significant amounts of Iraqi WMD-related equipment had been exported from Iraq as scrap metal and had shown up in scrap yards in many countries, notably Jordan and the Netherlands. These items included pieces of dual-use chemical production equipment on which UN tags were still attached. UNMOVIC estimated that the export of these items began in June 2003 and continued until June 2004. Through the use of satellite imagery, UNMOVIC determined that several sites that had been monitored by its inspectors before Operation Iraqi Freedom had been looted and razed. With the exception of the items that turned up in scrap yards, UNMOVIC was unaware of what had become of the dual-use equipment and materials contained at these sites. [27] This recent history of unmonitored and undocumented destruction will increase the burden on both the Iraqi government and the OPCW inspectors. Before the OPCW can certify the complete destruction of Iraqi CWPFs, it must account for the destruction of all declared equipment, which may prove impossible.

A third possible complication for the OPCW arises from the legacies of the CW program during the regime of Saddam Hussein. Although Iraq does not currently possess any declarable CW stockpile, the occasional discoveries of chemical munitions left over from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s may present a problem. Since 2003, approximately 500 filled chemical artillery shells have been discovered at a variety of locations in Iraq. [28] In nearly all of these cases, the weapons were in very poor condition and there was no danger that they might be used for military purposes. In a few cases, the agent with which they were filled was still viable, but in most instances the agent had deteriorated over time to the point that its ability to cause harm had been substantially reduced. [29] Nevertheless, Iraq will need to declare any of these items that have not been destroyed by the time the Convention enters into force. Although chemical munitions dating from the Iran-Iraq War are no longer functional weapons or part of an organized stockpile, because they were produced after 1946, they do not fit the Convention’s definition of “Old Chemical Weapons” (OCW). [30] Iraq’s initial declaration may therefore create a requirement for the construction of dedicated CW storage and destruction facilities, as well as detailed plans for the elimination of the declared items within an agreed timeframe. However, given that these weapons turn up unpredictably, Iraq might be required to amend its initial declaration and CW destruction plans on a frequent basis.

Regional Implications of Iraq’s Eventual CWC Membership
It remains to be seen whether Iraqi accession to the CWC will have a significant political impact within the Middle East region. Libya’s accession to the Convention in 2004, which represented a dramatic transformation in its national policy regarding WMD, came as a surprise to the international community and was initially believed to increase the chances of accession by other regional holdouts. In contrast, Iraq’s likely accession is a result of the elimination of Iraq’s WMD programs in the 1990s and the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Because the chemical disarmament of Iraq has been widely accepted for more than four years, it seems unlikely that Iraqi accession to the CWC will have a dramatic impact on the policies of other regional holdouts.

Although the CW programs of both Iraq and Libya have now ended, Israel’s reluctance to ratify the CWC is strongly affected by the existence of CW programs in other neighboring states, most significantly Egypt and Syria. [31] Israel also continues to believe, along with the United States, that Iran has maintained a covert CW program despite its membership in the CWC. [32] Thus, it is extremely unlikely that Iraqi accession will have any impact on Israel’s policy toward the Convention.

Egyptian policy on CWC accession is closely tied to its efforts to pressure Israel to join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Although Egyptian efforts to maintain a united Arab front against CWC accession until Israel joins the NPT have clearly failed, Egyptian policy remains unchanged. Given that Cairo’s refusal to join the CWC is unrelated to Iraq, it is doubtful that Iraqi accession will change Egyptian policy.

Syrian policy is also unlikely to be affected by Iraqi accession to the CWC. Syria is widely seen as relying on its CW capability as a deterrent against Israel’s superior conventional military forces. Iraqi accession does not affect this calculus.

While Iraqi CWC ratification is unlikely to lead to major shifts in Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian views on the treaty, this step, along with parallel actions by Libya and potentially Lebanon, is likely to increase international attention to the status of the remaining regional holdouts and contribute incrementally to the pressures on them to join the Convention

Conclusion
As of late 2007, it is likely that Iraq will complete the process of CWC accession before the end of the year. The delays in achieving that goal had little to do with a lack of interest or willingness. Rather, the delays were a product of the complexity of Iraq’s CW history, the devastation of Iraqi governmental structures in the wake of the 2003 war, and the continuing parliamentary disputes in which CWC accession played a minor role. By taking many of the steps needed to prepare for accession, Baghdad has taken a more responsible approach than those states that ratified the CWC and then delayed implementation of even the most basic treaty obligations. [33] Hopefully, Iraq will continue this responsible and cooperative relationship with the OPCW as a full member of the CWC.

Markus K. Binder – MKB Consulting