On October 20, 2007, Ali Larijani, Iran’s moderate conservative chief nuclear negotiator, resigned from his post. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accepted the resignation, apparently having received the approval of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, his superior, who has the final say on all Iranian political affairs. [1] On several past occasions, Khamene’i had refused to allow Larijani to step down. Against this backdrop, many media commentators saw the development as yet another step by the ultra-conservative Ahmadinejad to consolidate power at the expense of moderate, traditional conservatives like Larijani. [2] (For additional background, see “Larijani’s Struggle with Ahmadinejad: A Prelude to the 2009 Presidential Election?” in the July/August 2007 issue of WMD Insights.) While this was most likely Ahmadinejad’s goal – he had recently replaced several other governmental ministers with his ideological allies – it remains uncertain whether Larijani’s resignation will ultimately strengthen Ahmadinejad’s political hand. Indeed, by effectively forcing Larijani out, the hard-line president may actually have threatened his own influence, as well as that of his party, by stimulating a growing outcry across the political spectrum. The consequence that may be most perilous for Ahmadinejad’s future, however, is evidence suggesting that he has incurred the displeasure of Supreme Leader Khamene’i, himself.

Ahmadinejad vs. Larijani
Most news agencies commenting on Larijani’s resignation characterized it as the culmination of the persistent conflict between Larijani and Ahmadinejad, in which the Iranian president repeatedly contradicted and overruled the country’s senior nuclear diplomat. Although the specific trigger for Larijani’s action has not been disclosed, one of his relatives stated that Larijani had “strongly objected” to Ahmadinejad’s statements following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s October 16, 2007 visit to Tehran during which Ahmadinejad declared that Putin had not offered proposals intended to resolve the nuclear standoff with the UN Security Council. The declaration was directly at odds with an earlier statement by Larijani, following Putin’s meeting with Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, that the Russian President had, in fact, put such proposals forward. [3]

It has been noted that Larijani and Ahmadinejad have clashed on more than one occasion over how to approach the nuclear talks with the West. [4] The New York Times reported that, during talks with a senior EU delegation, Larijani “[complained] to his European interlocutors that he had no authority to negotiate and [asked] for their patience.” [5] Upon his resignation, several sources quoted prominent conservative and Ahmadinejad supporter Mohammd Reza Bahonar as saying, “Larijani had almost reached a deadlock in working with the president. Both of them had come to the conclusion that they could not work together.” [6] He went on to suggest that Ahmadinejad had pushed Larijani out. Radio Free Europe reported that comments by various politicians in Iran corroborated this point, indicating that Larijani was “essentially forced to resign” as he “could no longer work with” Ahmadinejad. [7] According to pro-government Rajanews.com, “Larijani could not realize Ahmadinejad’s demands in foreign diplomacy. Ahmadinejad has called for a change in foreign policy from passivity to activism.” [8]

Saeed Jalili, the individual whom Ahmadinejad installed as new chief nuclear negotiator, is much closer ideologically to Ahmadinejad than Larijani and shares Ahmadinejad’s thinking on how to incorporate this vision into Iran’s foreign policy. Reflecting these views in a speech entitled “Logical Cohesion in Foreign Policy,” published by conservative news and commentary website Farda News on October 25, Jalili stressed that Iranian foreign policy under previous (more engagement-oriented) governments, led by Presidents Mohammed Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani, had strayed from the principles derived from Islamic Revolutionary teachings and declared that only now, under Ahmadinejad, did Iran’s foreign policy have the true ideological base that these teachings mandate. [9]

In diplomatic style, too, Jalili is very unlike Larijani. While Larijani “pleaded with the Europeans for understanding and room to maneuver,” Jalili is fond of didactics. According to one European official who has dealt with him: “He doesn’t listen or pretend to listen. It’s not a dialogue of the deaf. It’s a monologue of the deaf.” [10] The Iranian reformist daily Etemad offered a similar assessment, stating that because of his rejection of pragmatism in diplomatic dealings, Jalili will be able to avoid a “clash of spirits” with the “aggressive and radical” Ahmadinejad of the kind Larijani suffered. [11]

Negative Intra-Governmental Response
Ahmadinejad’s acceptance of Larijani’s resignation amid reports that the president had forced the nuclear diplomat out, once again brought to the surface Ahmadinejad’s unpopularity in many sectors of the Iranian government. Indeed, some saw the sidelining of Larijani as an attempt by Ahmadinejad to shore up his own standing by displacing a widely respected rival. [12] Ahmad Tavakkoli, a leading moderate conservative, described Larijani as a particularly well-respected figure among “what might be regarded as Iran’s political family of traditional [i.e., moderate] conservatives,” and went on to express concern over Jalili’s fitness for the job, “The political and executive background of Larijani is not comparable with an inexperienced deputy of the foreign ministry [Jalili].” [13]

Significantly, leading members of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) and of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) – both of which are dominated by members of the more moderate conservative camp – praised Larijani’s performance, either implying or openly declaring their regret over his resignation and expressing the opinion that it was a negative development for the country. [14] Ala’eddin Borujerdi, chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Majlis, extolled Larijani as “brilliant and intelligent” and expressed hope that “his success would be continued” by his successor. [15] In contrast, staunchly pro-Ahmadinejad sources, such as RajaNews.com, while praising Larijani for his service, unambiguously criticized him for his inability to “realize Ahmadinejad’s demands in foreign policy.”

Also expressing displeasure with Larijani’s departure, the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee wrote a “letter of complaint” to Ahmadinejad for failing to inform them of the resignation in advance or consult with them on Larijani’s successor, and protesting that Larijani’s departure “put the country in danger.” [16] Additionally, in what has been called the “most notable sign of discord” among Iranian policymakers, 183 out of parliament’s 290 members – most of them moderate conservatives – signed a letter praising Larijani and implicitly criticizing his departure. [17] The disruption caused by the letter apparently led Ahmadinejad to cut short a trip to Armenia; Saudi Arabian and Egyptian news sources stated Ahmadinejad’s reason for returning was to address “surprise domestic issues.” [18]

Ayatollah Khamene’i’s Disapproval?
Ahmadinejad may also have incurred the displeasure of the Supreme Leader, himself, who reportedly refused to accept Larijani’s past attempts to resign his post over differences with Ahmadinejad and is said to have accepted it now only on Larijani’s insistence. [19] Widely thought to be close to the Supreme Leader, Larijani reported directly to Khamene’i in his role as chief nuclear negotiator – a position to which he had been appointed by Khamene’i – and has been an advisor to Khamene’i for over seventeen years. [20] It has been argued that Khamene’i’s previous refusals to allow Larijani’s resignation were an indication of the high esteem to which he held Larijani. Khamene’i’s acceptance of the resignation in October does not suggest that this has changed; rather than simply allowing Larijani to be ejected from the political scene because of conflict with Ahmadinejad, Khamene’i placed him in a special position of power that may insulate him from the president’s political caprices. According to several sources, the Supreme Leader “immediately” responded to Larijani’s resignation by appointing him as his own special representative to the talks on Iran’s nuclear program. [21] It was clarified with equal haste that Larijani would maintain his position and influence within Tehran’s decision-making circles and would retain his post as Khamene’i’s principal advisor. [22]

Indeed, the week following the resignation, Larijani not only attended the nuclear talks between Iran and EU leaders in Rome and Hamburg – according to an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, at the behest of both Ahmadinejad and Khamene’i – but also appeared to be in charge of the Iranian delegation. [23] Tellingly, it was Larijani who spoke to the press at the conclusion of the meetings. [24] Moreover, in a rare instance of unvarnished intra-governmental criticism, Khamene’i’s advisor on international affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, declared at the time: “It would have been better if such a thing [Larijani’s resignation] had not happened. Considering the sensitive and important conditions facing the country’s nuclear case, it would have been better if such important developments did not occur or at least be avoided as much as possible.” [25] The comment has been generally interpreted as directly conveying Khamene’i’s displeasure over the pressures from Ahmadinejad that led to Larijani’s resignation.

The negotiations between Iran and the IAEA that have taken place since Larijani’s resignation exhibit the very pragmatism for which the former chief negotiator was known. On November 16, for example, Iran acceded to IAEA demands for clarification regarding its possession of a document describing how to shape uranium metal into hemispheres – the sole purpose of which is to fabricate components for nuclear weapons. The document, widely believed to have been provided by the nuclear smuggling network headed by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, has been a major factor contributing to international suspicions that Iran’s nuclear program is focused on the development of nuclear weapons, despite Tehran’s denials. As reported by the Los Angeles Times, “IAEA inspectors had discovered the document in 2005. They had been permitted to read it then, but not take it out of the country.” [26] The Iranians were also reportedly forthcoming about the document’s source and the circumstances by which they came to possess it. [27]

The IAEA’s concerns over Iran’s failure to disclose all information regarding its sensitive nuclear activities led to the agency’s referral of the Iran dossier to the UN Security Council in the fall of 2006 and to the Council’s subsequent imposition of economic sanctions against Tehran. Iran’s recent efforts to engage and placate the IAEA seems to demonstrate the continuation of the strategy favored by Larijani and stand in sharp contrast to the fiery rhetoric and diplomatic intransigence practiced by President Ahmadinejad and his fellow hard-liners. As one IAEA official stated, just weeks after Larijani resigned from his position as chief nuclear negotiator, “They have changed gear with us, they are engaging with us.” [28] The Iranian delegation’s pragmatic approach was so marked that IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei expressed the hope of resolving the Agency’s list of unanswered questions about the history and status of the Iranian nuclear program by the end of 2007. [29]

It may be noted, however, that both during Larijani’s tenure as nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad and afterwards, Iran has refused to suspend work on elements of its nuclear program that could eventually allow it to produce material for nuclear weapons, as demanded by the Security Council in Resolutions 1737 and 1747. Therefore, even as it works gradually to satisfy IAEA demands, Iran’s capabilities for developing nuclear weapons are being enhanced. [30]

Recent Developments
It has been speculated that Larijani’s intent in resigning was to force the usually aloof Khamene’i to intervene against Ahmadinejad. [31] In this regard, Khamene’i advisor Velayati’s expression of dismay at Larijani’s ouster, noted earlier, were reinforced by a subsequent show of Khamene’i’s displeasure with the Iranian president. After a recent speech in which Ahmadinejad labeled more moderate government officials opposed to his approach as “traitors” and accused some of spying, on November 21, a hard-line conservative daily that is close to the supreme leader published an unusually harsh attack on Ahmadinejad’s behavior, calling it “immoral.” According to a BBC analysis, such criticism “would be difficult to imagine without at least tacit support from Ayatollah Khamene’i.” [32] The anti-Ahmadinejad article appeared shortly after it was reported that Khamene’i was coming under increasing pressure to rein in the Iranian president over the radical stance he has taken on the country’s nuclear program. [33]

Jalili had his formal debut as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator on December 1, 2007, when he held talks London with Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU, representing represented the P5-plus-Germany. While Jalili claimed the talks were “positive,” press accounts stated that the meeting left Solana “disappointed.” [34] According to officials present, not only was the first hour and a half of the meeting was a “monologue” delivered by Jalili, but the Iranian told Solana he was wrong to assume that there would be continuity with talks held before his Jalili’s appointment: “Everything in the past is past, and with me, you start over. … None of your proposals has any standing.” [35]

The next day, China, said to be the P5+1 member most strongly opposed to punitive measures against Tehran, reacted sharply and for the first time voiced clear support for a new round of UN sanctions that would further squeeze Iran’s banking and business sectors. [36] Considering that Beijing’s recent decision to force Chinese state banks to refuse loans to Iranian businessmen is already hitting Iran hard, it is possible that the additional measures proposed could foment further resentment toward Ahmadinejad, from both popular and governmental quarters. [37] Moreover, as a reformist Iranian politician has noted, “If Ahmadi-Nejad’s chances of winning the [2009 presidential] election decline, the leader [Khamene’i] will not go down with him.” [38]

Conclusion
It is possible that Ahmadinejad’s effective forcing of Larijani’s resignation has, in fact, weakened the Iranian president’s position rather than strengthening it. Ahmadinejad has exposed himself to strong disapproval from more moderate conservatives and exacerbated the division between them and his own ideological camp. Through the comments of intermediaries and through his own actions to sustain Larijani’s influence, moreover, Khamene’i appears to have expressed displeasure at Larijani’s ouster. While the opacity of Iranian politics makes it difficult to predict how this power struggle will be resolved, there is increasing evidence suggesting that winds of change may be in Tehran’s forecast, and they are not likely to blow to Ahmadinejad’s advantage.

Deborah Berman – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
with Khalid Hilal – Independent Consultant