While Russia’s big-ticket nuclear weapons modernization programs have attracted considerable attention, the Russian military is currently pursuing a range of other programs that may be no less important to Russia’s strategic profile. In particular, it is completing a network of global positioning satellites that will significantly enhance Russian precision strike capabilities, and it is closing gaps in it space- and ground-based early warning systems.

New GLONASS Satellites
Russia has started to rebuild its global positioning and navigation system, a move that could eventually lead Moscow to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine by enhancing the accuracy of conventional missiles. In recent years, Russia has begun deployment of a long-range conventional air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), the Kh-555 and is developing a new, supersonic conventional ALCM, the Kh-101/102. (See “Russian Strategic Forces Meet Success, Setbacks at Year’s End,” WMD Insights, February 2007). Russia has also developed a new tactical missile system, known as Iskander, which comprises both ballistic and cruise missiles, and a mobile launcher able to fire both. [1] This array of weaponry, which is entering or nearing deployment, requires modern targeting capabilities that GLONASS, a global positioning and navigation system similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), should provide.

GLONASS was started in the Soviet era, but it was put on hold during Russia’s severe economic downturn in the mid-1990s. Moscow has since restarted the GLONASS project and has given it high priority among federally funded projects. At the end of October 2007, Russia launched three new GLONASS satellites, a move that brought the total GLONASS constellation to 19 satellites in orbit. Russia plans to launch two more satellites in 2007 and six annually beginning in 2008; it hopes to complete the orbital component of the GLONASS system by the end of 2009, providing reliable coverage of Russia’s own territory and adjacent areas, as well as a degree of global coverage. [2]

According to Colonel-General Vladimir Popovkin, the chief of Russia’s Space Forces, for the immediate future, the GLONASS constellation will be considerably smaller than the U.S. GPS system because it will only fully cover Russia and its nearby areas. Popovkin said that, unlike the United States, Russia does not intend to wage wars far from its own territory, and consequently, it will not need as many communications, targeting, and surveillance satellites. Popovkin estimated that the total number of satellites used by the Russian military will be approximately 60 versus approximately 100 military satellites deployed by the U.S. [3]

According to Russian media sources, Russia needs a minimum of 20 GLONASS satellites for the continuous coverage of Russian territory and surrounding countries. [4] Data on the official GLONASS website indicates that, after the recent launch, Russia has 19 satellites in orbit, only 10 of which are currently operational. Thus the system functions far below optimal capacity. One of the three satellites that have just been launched has not yet come on line; four satellites have been temporarily switched off for regular remote servicing; and four more have outlived their service lives and will soon fall from their orbits. [5]

The main problem the Russian military faces with deployment of GLONASS and other categories of satellites is their short service lives: the existing Soviet era GLONASS satellites last only five to six years. The improved GLONASS-M satellites launched in October are designed to last only a bit longer – up to seven years. In addition, these satellites have to be taken out of service periodically for maintenance. [6]

The constellation of 24 satellites, which is scheduled to be in place by the end of 2009, will provide a measure of global coverage, according to the official GLONASS website, but will have to be replenished at a rate of close to six satellites per year in order to sustain the number of operational satellites at a constant level. To help meet these requirements, Russia has contracted with India for the launch of two GLONASS satellites. Notably, the goal of 24 satellites is greatly scaled down from the Space Forces’ original plan; in January 2007, Popovkin talked about 48 satellites as needed for reliable global coverage. [7]

Russia’s satellite coverage situation might improve after the next generation GLONASS-K satellites with service lives of 10-12 years come on line; testing of these satellites is set to begin in two years. [8] Popovkin, in his October 2007 interview, indicated that the military regarded GLONASS-K as the mainstay of the future satellite array. [9]

New Early Warning Satellite
Almost simultaneously with the GLONASS launch, Russia’s Space Forces launched an early warning satellite for the “Oko” [Eye] system; this is the second operational early warning satellite of this type currently in high-elliptical orbit (two others ended service in late 2006-early 2007). In addition, one “Prognoz” early warning satellite is in geosynchronous orbit. According to Russian missile expert Pavel Podvig, the orbital early warning system cannot provide constant monitoring of ballistic missile launches from U.S. territory. The new satellite, however, will be able to detect launches from the northern Atlantic. [10] In an October 2007 interview, Popovkin stated that full-scale work on the upgrading of the space-based early warning system will not begin until 2009. [11]

New Early Warning Radars
The Russian military is progressing more rapidly to upgrade another component of its early warning system: building replacements for the Soviet-era early warning radars located on the territory of non-Russian former Soviet republics. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has had to lease these external radars or make other arrangements to obtain data from them. The warning and tracking data provided by these systems is essential to Russia’s ability to respond promptly to foreign missile attacks and to track foreign missile tests. [12]

Moscow has sought to end this dependency on foreign states by building new early warning radars on Russian territory. Central to these efforts is the Voronezh-M type radar, the first of which became operational in December 2006, at Lekhtusi, near St. Petersburg. In May 2007, the military completed construction of a second Voronezh-M radar at Armavir in south-west Russia. Voronezh-M is advertised as a “modular station,” whose components are fully assembled at the factory and then can be installed at a desired site in a matter of months. According to Popovkin, construction of the Lekhtusi radar began in May 2005, and in December 2006 it became operational; construction of the Armavir radar began in May 2006, and in December of the same year it “produced the first signal.” (In Russian military jargon this means that all equipment was installed and the testing and fine-tuning had begun.) For comparison, earlier generations of radars took at least 10 years to construct. [13]

In addition to being faster to build, Voronezh-M radars are also reported to be considerably cheaper than earlier types: the Lekhtusi radar cost about $2 billion rubles (approximately $80 million) and subsequent radars of the same type will cost only $1.5 billion rubles (approximately $60 million). For comparison, the Daryal-type radar at Gabala in Azerbaijan cost $1 billion. [14] Voronezh-M radars also consume much less energy: Voronezh-M type radars require only 0.7 megawatt (MWT) to operate, compared to the 2 MWT required by the Dnieper-type radars and 50 MWT for Daryal-type. [15] Voronezh-M radars can detect missile launches at approximately the same distance as Dnieper radars (4,200 and 4,000 kilometers (km) respectively), although the Daryal radars have considerably greater range (6,000 km). The Voronezh-type radars can be upgraded and their detection distance extended to 6,000 km, however. [16]

Lekhtusi Radar
In August 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Lekhtusi radar and observed the simulated detection of three missile launches against three different Russian cities. He was also shown the station operating in combat mode, but details about that part of the exercise were not publicly disclosed. [17] Putin announced that the Lekhtusi radar represented the beginning of the large-scale program that will last until 2015. [18] According to Popovkin, that program envisions construction of six radars along the western, south-western, and southern periphery of Russia to replace Soviet radars that remained outside Russia, as well as modernization of Soviet radars that are located on Russian territory. [19] In 2006, federal funding for construction of new radars and upgrading the existing ones was increased 52 percent. [20]

The Lekhtusi radar covers a significant gap left in the northwest of Russia after Latvia dismantled the Dniester-M radar, at Skrunda, in 1999. According to open sources, the coverage of the new radar extends in an arc running from Spiezbergen to Greenland to Morocco. [21]

The radar at Lekhtusi also renders the Soviet-era Volga-type radar at Baranovichi in Belarus superfluous, since it covers the same area. There are no indications as yet, however, as to whether Russia intends to eliminate its use of that radar. [22]

Armavir Radar
Once the Armavir radar comes on-line, Russia will be able to end reliance on two Soviet-era radars located at Mukachevo and Sevastopol in Ukraine. According to Popovkin, these radars reached the end of their service lives in 2005. [23] The Russian military does not wish to spend considerable funds to extend the radars’ service lives because they belong to Ukraine and are operated by Ukrainian personnel; Russia only has access to the feed from the units. Furthermore, in 2005 and 2006, Ukraine indicated that it wanted Russia to increase its payment for that feed because the payment originally negotiated in 1997 ($1.3 million per year) did not cover all expenses, while Ukraine itself had no need for the radars or their data. (See “Russian-Ukraine Gas Crisis May Impact Russian Strategic Capabilities,” WMD Insights, February 2006). In his October 2007 interview, Popovkin gave another reason for Russia to end its reliance on the Ukrainian radars. He noted that radars in Ukraine, especially the one at Sevastopol, produce many false alarms. Unlicensed and uncertified electronic devices used in the vicinity of the Sevastopol radar produce signals that can be easily mistaken for signatures of incoming warheads. [24]

The Russian government decided to withdraw from the Russian-Ukrainian treaty on these radars in July 2007, but no action has been taken to implement this decision. [25] The withdrawal will probably occur some time in 2008 when the Armavir radar will shift to “test-combat duty,” the same mode under which the Lekhtusi radar has operated since December 2006. At the beginning of 2007, Russia planned to shift to a new mode by December 2007, but it appears that delays in the testing and fine-tuning of equipment have occurred. [26]

The Armavir radar, with its southward focus, figured prominently in the recent Russian proposals to the United States on missile defense. Along with the Soviet-era radar in Gabala, Azerbaijan, it is intended to track missile tests in Iran. (For more information on the Gabala radar, see “Special Report: Russia’s Azerbaijan Radar Proposal,” WMD Insights, July/August 2007.)

The radar at Armavir can also largely duplicate the coverage of the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan, which Russia will lease until 2012. Russian experts doubt that Azerbaijan will extend the lease beyond that date. Thus, Armavir and perhaps a future radar in the south of Russia can cover the gap, if necessary. [27] It should be noted, however, that radar(s) in Russian territory cannot completely compensate for the loss of Gabala; the Daryal-type radar at that site can provide coverage for longer distances and is located farther south than any radar Russia could deploy in its territory. The coverage from Russian territory will also likely be impeded by the Caucasus Mountains. The Russian military indicated, in the discussion of Putin’s proposal on missile defense cooperation with the United States, that Russia could modernize the Gabala radar if necessary (the radar was commissioned in 1985), but the decision to spend funds for this purpose will probably depend on whether there is any prospect of using it beyond 2012.

Despite the potential advantages of continuing to utilize a number of the non-Russian radars, in August 2007, Popovkin stated that Russia ultimately intends to completely eliminate its dependence on such systems. This included not only the Mukachevo and Savastopol radars, in Ukraine, but also Gabala (a strong indication that Russian Space Forces do not plan to use that radar beyond 2012) and even the radars at Balkhash, Kazakhstan (two Dniester-M and Dnieper-type radars, all commissioned in the 1970s). [28]

Conclusion
With the modernizations discussed above and parallel advances in its strategic forces and conventional military systems, Moscow is on the road to reestablishing its reputation as a major military power after the setbacks of the 1990s. The restoration of key satellite capabilities and deployment of advanced early warning radars are reminders of the breadth of Russian technological competence in the military realm and a reflection of Moscow’s readiness, now that Russia’s economy has rebounded, to fund ambitious military projects. From the U.S. perspective, the improvement in Moscow’s early warning capabilities will reduce the risk of false alarms that Russia is under nuclear attack. This is a development that Washington and the West should greatly welcome.

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies