On September 3, 2007, India Today reported that, in June 2008, the Indian Navy would commission an Akula-II class (Project 971) nuclear-powered attack submarine, to be leased from Russia for a period of 10 years. [1] The story is the culmination of comments to the media dating back to 1999 regarding the possible Russian transfer to India of what India Today characterized as “an undersea platform to launch nuclear weapons.” [2] However, both governments have met the most recent reports with either silence or evasive denials, neither confirming any agreement regarding the sub nor commenting on reports of a potential future lease of a second nuclear submarine. [3] No official mention of any deal was made, for example, on the sidelines of October’s Indian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for Military and Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) meeting, during which representatives of both states publicly recommitted to their longstanding defense-industrial partnership. [4]

Background
The lease of the Akula-II class submarine, if true, would follow in the wake of India’s lease of a Charlie-II class (Project 670M) nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) from the Soviet Union during 1988-1991. That boat, dubbed the INS Chakra, reportedly provided not only ample training opportunities for Indian submariners, but it also allowed the Indian Navy to acquire technical expertise for India’s own Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) submarine program, intended to establish the sea-based leg of the Indian nuclear triad. [5] The ATV, a joint project between the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), is in construction at the Mazagon Dockyard in Mumbai. The ATV is 20 years behind its original schedule, and is now set to start sea trials in 2010. [6] The boat’s hull is a copy of the Charlie-II class hull, and DAE has reportedly received Russian assistance with the ATV’s nuclear reactor. [7] While the Soviet Union rejected India’s offer to purchase the INS Chakra upon conclusion of the lease in January of 1991, the Indian Navy retained its interest in Russian nuclear submarine technology and in procuring or leasing a vessel as a follow-on to the INS Chakra lease. [8]

Reports of India’s interest in leasing one or more Akula-II class nuclear subs from Russia first surfaced in Russian and Indian publications in 1999 and 2000. An article in the September-October 1999 issue of Yadernyy Kontrol, journal of the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in Russia, alleged that after having been shown Akula-II SSNs in the summer of 1998, an Indian delegation placed the purchase of these vessels on the agenda of the November 1998 meeting of the IRIGC-MTC. [9] India reportedly pledged to finance completion of two boats, while Russia agreed to provide training for two crews of Indian submariners. [10]

No Fire, but Much Smoke
There has been strong media interest in the possible Russian lease of a nuclear submarine to India since 2002, but no official confirmation of any of the stories to date. [11] Indian and Russian press reports have cited the fact that Russia had completed training of over 300 Indian naval officers at a specially-built international training center in Sosnovy Bor (near St. Petersburg, Russia), begun sometime in 2001, as a confirmation of the conclusion of at least one agreement. [12] Although India had purchased numerous Russian diesel boats, which would also require officer training, the Hindustan Times stressed in 2002 that Indian submariners had reportedly been training on Akula-II class vessels. [13]

In 2002, it appeared that the transfer or lease of one or more SSNs was to be part of a package deal Russia had proposed to India that included the refitting of the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier for the Indian Navy. [14] During a visit to Komsomolsk-on-Amur shipyard, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov spurred press speculation by stating that one of the Akula-II boats, the Nerpa, would soon be sold to India. [15] According to a report in Novyye Izvestiya from January 26, 2002, India promised Russia it would fund completion of two SSNs, which would be subsequently leased for five years. [16] Officials from Russia’s state arms export agency, Rosoboronexport, reportedly divulged on January 28, 2002, that work on the boats would resume once the Indian side paid the first $100 million. [17] On December 2, 2002, the Indian Express cited Russian sources as saying that “the lease has been in the air for awhile,” and asserted that “both sides decided to stay silent” about the negotiations due to “fear of pressure from Western governments.” [18] Apparently, negotiations dragged on into 2003, awaiting financial commitment on the part of the Indian government. [19]

The press then appeared to lose interest in the story, only to revive it in 2004, when Indian papers tied the inking of a submarine lease agreement to the deal to refit the Gorshkov, signed by then-Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov during a visit to Delhi in January of 2004. [20] On October 24, 2004, however, Ivanov denied the existence of a submarine deal, telling the Russian media: “I know this subject very well and can assure you that this information is not truthful…. There was no talk about any kind of submarines and leasing.” [21] A December 1, 2004, article in Jane’s Missiles and Rockets contradicted Ivanov’s statements, however, suggesting Russia had begun work on the boats in October 2004, after India finally paid the first $100 million installment. [22]

In 2005, a pattern emerged in which the lease was denied in the Russian media, while the Indian press and articles by Delhi-based Rahul Bedi of Jane’s continued to report that talks were on. A February 2, 2005 article in the authoritative Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer tried to make sense of press speculations, stating that “up until this time, all of this has remained on the level of discussions and rumors.” [23] However, an October 12, 2005 India Defence Consultants article stated that India was “all set” to receive the submarines, while “official formalities may near completion around 2005-2006.” [24] Adding to the confusion, on November 25, 2005, on the sidelines of an IRIGC-MTC meeting, India’s Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee deflected questions on the matter by saying, “no, this topic was not discussed at the meeting,” instead of simply confirming or denying press allegations outright. [25] On January 9, 2006, the Hindustan reported that India paid $400 million to complete the submarines and that the annual rent for the vessels would be $250 million. [26] In stark contrast to these reports, on July 5, 2006, Deputy Head of Russia’s Federal Service on Military and Technical Cooperation Vladimir Paleshchuk, speaking to an Itar-Tass news agency reporter, denied the existence of a lease to India for a Project 971 submarine, insisting instead that negotiations were ongoing regarding sales of non-nuclear submarines. [27]

It appears possible that, by 2007, no formal agreement had yet been concluded. While a September 3, 2007 India Today article reported that the boat was set to be inducted in 2008, a September 19, 2007 Jane’s Defence Weekly article argued that Moscow was “believed to be reevaluating the price… [of] the highly secretive lease of at least one Akula-class” boat. [28] The Pioneer, an Indian daily, stated on October 16, 2007, that “Russia and India are likely to sign a major defence agreement for leasing” the Akula in November 2007, and the lease would be “for ten years, to be extended by another five years and the submarine is likely to join service by June 2008.” [29] In one of the clearest confirmations of a deal, on December 3, 2007, a Reuters news story quoted India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta as saying there were plans for a nuclear-powered submarine lease agreement with Russia. With regard to the submarine deal, Mehta stated, “We want the Russian nuclear submarine to enable our boys to train on how to operate nuclear reactors and platforms and other systems.” [30]

Potential Candidates for Lease
Fourteen Akula and Akula-II class SSNs were commissioned by the Russian Navy from 1984-2001. [31] Several others were under construction as of mid-2002. [32]

On July 4, 2006, Russian daily Kommersant reported that construction of one of these boats, the Nerpa had been completed by Komsomolsk-on-Amur Shipyard in the Russian Far East. [33] Present at the subsequent celebration was the chief of the shipbuilding department of the Russian Navy, Rear Admiral Anatoliy Shlemov, who was quoted as saying that the SSN would enter service with the Pacific Fleet upon completion of sea trials. [34] However, Kommersant proceeded to speculate that after the defense order was fulfilled, the Nerpa would then be leased to India; according to the paper, officials at Amur declined to comment on the issue, stating that the defense order was a state secret. [35] On September 5, 2007, Aleksandr Markov, a press liaison at Amur, was quoted by Interfax news agency as saying that the Nerpa would enter service with the Pacific Fleet by the end of 2007, depending on results of sea trials of the boat, which had begun June 11, 2007. [36]

Some sources suggest that, while initial Russian-Indian discussions reportedly involved two boats, the Indian government later reduced its request to one vessel. [37] However, a September 2, 2007 report in the Indian Express stated that India has “quietly revived its dialogue” with Russia for a second submarine, potentially to be discussed during a December 2007 bilateral summit. [38]

India’s Plans for the Akula-II SSN
There have been multiple and sometimes divergent reports regarding the potential role of the Akula-II SSN, which is to be dubbed the INS Chakra, like the earlier-leased Charlie-II vessel, if it is ultimately inducted into service with the Indian Navy. A December 20, 2000 story in the Times of India, for example, argued that the lease of the submarine would strengthen Indian naval capabilities in light of China’s advances in nuclear-powered submarine technology, “bridg[ing] the gap till the time” the indigenous Advanced Technology Vessel “fructifies,” and, most importantly, providing Indian officers with “operational experience.” [39] However, other Indian sources have trumpeted the lease of the Akula “as well as its attendant nuclear missiles” as first and foremost an acquisition of a “sea-based nuclear deterrent.” [40] In the final analysis, the lease, if it moves forward, will not endow India with the capability to launch nuclear weapons, at least in the near term, due to the fact that India does not have long-range, nuclear- capable cruise missiles to fit on the boat, while Russia is unlikely to break its commitments under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by transferring such systems to New Delhi.

The Indian Navy has been seeking to establish control over the sea lines of communication in its vast area of operations, which stretches from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal. In 2004, the Indian press was provided excerpts of the Indian Maritime Doctrine, which showed the Navy’s desire to “pursue a more competitive strategy aimed at developing a credible minimum nuclear deterrence, generating a littoral warfare capability and dominating the Indian Ocean Region.” [41] While the Indian Navy reportedly considers the naval forces of its neighbor Pakistan merely an “irritant,” it has been intently watching the development of China’s nuclear-powered submarine program. [42] India’s Sunday Express in a September 2007 story, for example, discussed the concerns of the Indian government “about the shift in focus of China’s military doctrine from land to sea.” [43] Reportedly, in order to counteract emerging Chinese capabilities, the Indian Navy was “interested in having a long-range nuclear platform on the eastern as well as western seaboards.” [44]

Beijing has two nuclear-powered submarine programs currently under development that may potentially worry Delhi – attack submarines of the Shang (Type 093) class and ballistic missile submarines of the Jin (Type 094) class. [45] (See “Do China’s New Submarines Signal a New Strategy?” in WMD Insights, July/August 2007.) Although the exact status of China’s submarine programs is unknown, reports suggest that China has commissioned two Shang-class boats and is conducting sea trials of its first Jin-class sub. In leasing the Akula-II, Delhi would acquire a measure of parity with China in operating a fully functional nuclear-powered attack sub, while its indigenous ATV remains in the dockyard. Moreover, the Russian sub has been reported in the media as quieter than its Chinese counterpart and “a generation ahead of both the ATV and the Shang-class submarines.” [46] The strategic value of the boat was reiterated by Indian Navy Rear Admiral Raja Menon, who stated that “a nuclear submarine is much more than just a submarine with a nuclear reactor. It is the arbiter of power at sea.” [47]

India has struggled to move the sea-based leg of its nuclear triad, the ATV, into the water for over two decades. The Indian Navy is unlikely to give up on the project or trade a domestically built platform for a leased submarine. However, the lease of the Akula-II could indirectly accelerate the ATV program. Rear Admiral Menon stressed this role of the Russian boat, saying “a leased submarine gives you a tremendous head start in training crews. It takes several years to produce a crew of nuclear submarine experts.” [48]

Such possible benefits aside, some Indian sources have rushed to conclude that the transfer would signify acquisition of a sea-based deterrent. For instance, the September 3, 2007 report in India Today stated that “the impending acquisition of the Chakra gives India the long-awaited third leg of the nuclear triad…widely regarded as the most survivable mode of launching nuclear weapons.” [49] The story also quoted Indian analyst Bharat Karnad as saying that the leased sub would be “the most crucial strategic capability…after [India’s] testing [of] nuclear weapons in 1998.” [50] The press has not offered a clear picture, however, as to what nuclear missiles, if any, could potentially be placed on the SSN in order to endow it with nuclear deterrent value.

Challenges in Arming the Akula
According to Jane’s, Akula-II multi-purpose submarines are considered to be the quietest nuclear submarines manufactured by the Russian Federation, and their operational diving depth is 1,476 feet. What makes the boats, presently in service with the Russian Navy, a potent sea-based threat is their SS-N-21 Sampson cruise missiles (submarine-launched version of the Kh-55 Granat/AS-15 Kent), capable of carrying a 200-kiloton Russian-made nuclear warhead to a distance of more than 2500+ km. Moreover, Russia’s Akulas are also armed with SS-N-15 Starfish and SS-N-16 Stallion anti-ship missiles, similarly capable of delivering a 200-kiloton payload, and 533 millimeter (mm) and 650 mm torpedoes. In order to fire these weapons, the Akula-II class boats have eight torpedo tubes (both 533 mm and 650 mm) and an additional six external tubes of 533 mm. [51]

The guidelines of the MTCR, however, restrict Russia from transferring the SS-N-21 Sampson cruise missile, whose capabilities are above the MTCR’s 300-km range restrictions. There appears to have been no discussion between Moscow and New Delhi of transfer of the SS-N-21; reports in both the Indian and Russian press as far back as 2002 have indicated that India has considered arming any leased Akula-II boats with the conventionally armed SS-N-27 Club (Novator Klub) anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) instead. [52] Export of all missiles of the Club family (of which 3M-14E is a land-attack version, and 3M-54E and 3M-54E1 are the anti-ship versions) is compliant with MTCR guidelines, as their range is below 300 km and their payload is below 500 kilograms (kg). [53]

If armed with the short-range Club, the Akula-II attack submarine could potentially fill the Indian Navy’s anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare missions. However, given the multi-purpose nature of the boat, the SSN could, in theory, eventually serve as the third leg of the Indian nuclear triad, provided it were fitted with long-range nuclear-armed land attack cruise missiles. [54] The September 3, 2007, article in India Today asserted that the Chakra would be armed with “indigenously built nuclear-tipped cruise missiles with a range of over 1,000 km.” [55] However, while India is reportedly developing two long-range submarine-launched cruise missiles – the Sagarika and the Nirbhay – these systems are not likely to enter testing until well after the summer of 2008, when the Akula is reportedly scheduled for induction. (For more on India’s missile programs, see “India and Pakistan Missile Race Surges On,” WMD Insights, October 2007.)

A further option that could be under consideration, although it has not been discussed in the press, is modification of the Akula-II to serve as a test-bed for the submarine-launched version of the BrahMos cruise missile, produced by the Russian-Indian BrahMos joint venture. With a range of 280-kilometers, however, it could not serve as a long-range land-attack system in its current configuration. [56] Moreover, deploying the 670-mm diameter BrahMos would require modification of the 533-mm and 650-mm torpedo tubes of the Akula-II SSN, from which cruise missiles are typically launched.

Conclusion
With both Moscow and New Delhi running silent on the status of the possible sub lease or leases and with great uncertainties remaining as to the possible role that the Akula-II might play in the Indian Navy, recent press speculation on the subject raises far more questions than it answers. Among other matters, the potential transfer of naval propulsion reactor technology and highly enriched uranium (HEU) submarine fuel could raise a number of complex proliferation issues, particularly because India possesses nuclear weapons and has never signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

If the boat or boats were provided with the express goal of serving as a nuclear weapon platform, for example, the transfer would represent a major escalation in the proliferation of potent nuclear delivery systems. It is also possible that the deal – under which India would take custody over Russian nuclear materials, even if title remained in Russian hands – would require Russia to invoke a heretofore unused clause in the NPT exempting nuclear transfers for naval propulsion systems from monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such IAEA safeguards normally apply to all nuclear transfers by NPT parties, such as Russia. [57] The exemption creates a loophole under which recipients could, in theory, use transferred nuclear materials – for example, supplies of fresh submarine reactor fuel – for nuclear weapons without detection by international inspectors. The Russian lease could thus set a precedent that India or other states pursuing naval nuclear propulsion systems might exploit in the future.

Continuing the ambiguity on the subject that has reigned for nearly a decade, a September 5, 2007 Interfax story quoted Amur shipyard head Anatoliy Adamenya stating, that the “Amur shipbuilding plant builds submarines not for lease, not for some partners, but in order to fulfill an order in the interests of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.” [58] Such continued opacity suggests that eight years of press speculation are not about to end, and that the truth about the Indian Akula is likely to remained submerged for some time to come.

Anya Loukianova – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies