On January 12, 2008, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party won a landslide victory in Taiwan’s parliamentary elections, gaining 81 of the 113 seats in the Legislation Yuan. [1] President Chen Shui-bian’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took only 27 seats, while five other seats went to pro-opposition parties. [2] Most Taiwan media and observers blamed the DPP’s loss on Chen’s role in the campaign and his confrontational stance toward China; indeed, some suggested that the legislative vote, “was more of a ‘public vote of no-confidence’ for President Chen than an approval of the KMT.” [3] Chen resigned as DPP chairman after the election. The KMT’s victory could foreshadow a defeat for the DPP’s candidate, Frank Hsieh, in the upcoming March 22 presidential elections.

Relations between China and Taiwan, the economy, and corruption charges against members of Chen’s family all played a role in the DPP’s defeat and voters’ repudiation of Chen. However, another factor that may have influenced the election was the allegation by a respected Taiwanese legislator that Chen planned to revive Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program. Taiwan has a history of covert nuclear weapon development activities and, although those activities are believed to have ended in 1988, there have been recurring allegations over the years of renewed Taiwanese efforts to pursue nuclear arms. In this case, the allegations may have served to heighten fears about Chen’s confrontational stance toward China, as well as to remind the international community of Taiwan’s latent ability – if not intent – to produce nuclear weapons.

Allegations that Chen Planned Nuclear Weapon Activities
On October 19, 2007, during a question and answer session of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, KMT Legislator Su Chi accused President Chen of restarting Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program. Su made three specific accusations: that Chen had ordered the Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology, a subordinate unit of the Ministry of National Defense Armament Bureau, to begin developing nuclear weapons; that Taiwan’s National Security Council (NSC) had secretly invited an unnamed former defense secretary and several nuclear weapons experts from a state with nuclear weapons to discuss this issue; and that President Chen planned to use the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missile as a means of delivering future nuclear warheads. [4] He further stated that by March 2008 at least 12-14 Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles might be outfitted with nuclear warheads. [5]

Su claimed he had overheard a high-ranking DPP legislator with close ties to the president telling two other prominent DPP legislators of President Chen’s recent orders. He also stated that an official from the NSC inadvertently “blurted out” the information about the “secret” meeting with nuclear experts. [6] Lending a modicum of credibility to Su’s comments, on November 9, 2007, the Taiwan News, a Hong Kong-based newspaper, revealed that former Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes visited Taiwan in April 2007 and met with members of the NSC. India is an acknowledged possessor of nuclear weapons. [7] The Taiwan News article further revealed that former NSC officials Parris Chang and Antonio Chiang, as well as former Vice Defense Minister Lin Chong-pin, had secretly visited India numerous times at Fernandes’s invitation while he was defense minister (presumably in 2000-2001, the years when Fernandes’s tenure overlapped with that of Chen’s presidency). [8]

President Chen denied Su’s accusations, but at the same time declared that “Taiwan … must step up our self-defense capabilities.” [9] Su’s accusations allowed Chen to highlight Taiwan’s need for military protection against a strengthening China. However, Su probably made the charges to draw attention to Chen’s desperate moves in recent months to deflect corruption charges and improve the hand of his like-minded pro-independence supporters. Su’s accusations also positioned the KMT as the peaceful party, advocating more cordial relations with China, just in time for the January 2008 legislative and March 2008 presidential elections.

Taiwan’s History of Nuclear-Weapons-Related Activities and Accusations
In the past, Taiwan was involved in two well-known episodes oriented toward the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials that triggered alarms in Washington. During the mid- to late-1970s, under President Chiang Ching-kuo, Taiwan began operating a Canadian-supplied heavy-water reactor at the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER) that was well suited for the production of plutonium. Additionally, Taiwanese scientists undertook research at the center to master plutonium extraction technology, and Taiwan entered into negotiations to purchase a plutonium extraction (“reprocessing”) facility with Germany, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. These developments led the United States to demand that Taipei cease all activities relevant to the production of fissile materials and reorient its nuclear research program towards exclusively peaceful purposes.[10] Under U.S. pressure, Taiwan accepted a number of restrictions on its nuclear activities and agreed to comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring of its nuclear program. [11] Among other measures, Taiwan agreed to transfer plutonium-containing spent fuel from the INER reactor to the United States, a program that began in 1985.

The second episode of activities that the United States believed were connected to a possible nuclear weapon program occurred during the late 1980s. In 1987, soon after Chiang’s death, the INER began building a facility with multiple radiologically shielded “hot cells” suitable for the small-scale extraction of plutonium. The United States learned about this facility from Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, then INER’s deputy director. In 1987 Chang provided the United States with secret documents detailing Taiwan’s plans to produce a nuclear bomb. [12] In 1988, confronted by the United States with evidence of Taiwan’s nuclear weapons effort, President Lee Teng-hui provided written guarantees to Washington that Taiwan would cease all weapons-related activities and agreed to shut down the INER reactor. [13]

Su Chi’s Motives for Nuclear Accusations
The KMT is positioning itself as the party that, in contrast to the DPP, seeks to improve relations with China, although according to KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou, this will fall short of unification with the mainland. [14] The KMT strategy is to portray the DPP as unstable – a tactic that seemed to work in the January parliamentary elections and may work as well, in the March presidential elections.

Su Chi is a respected politician and an outspoken critic of President Chen. Su is a graduate of Taiwan’s Chengchi University and holds a masters degree from John Hopkins University, as well as a doctorate from Columbia University. In the late 1990s under the previous KMT administration, he served on the Strait Exchange Foundation Board of Directors as a policy advisor to the president and as minister of the Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council. Su is currently a member of the Legislative Yuan Defense Committee, and also holds other highly visible posts. [15]

Su has been a vocal political opponent of President Chen and a member of KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential campaign committee. Given this background, Su’s accusations that Chen had revitalized Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program were likely intended, at least in part, to weaken support for DPP candidates in the recent parliamentary and pending presidential votes by raising fears that the DPP was taking steps that could dangerously provoke China.

Su and Chen have previously clashed on numerous issues, particularly with respect to the country’s defense budget. For two years, the KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan blocked Chen’s proposed military budget, and it was not until in December 2007, that the KMT majority finally approved funding to purchase the U.S. Patriot III anti-missile system and to procure eight submarines. [16] Su Chi spearheaded the successful effort to cut the Chen administration’s budget for the Hsiung Feng IIE missile system by a third. [17] In his comments in response to the budget cut, Chen said that Su seemed as if “he were not a citizen of [Taiwan], but someone eager to yield the island to China.” [18]

Su’s recent comments also appear to have been aimed at highlighting a number of controversies plaguing President Chen. Su Chi claimed that Chen’s motive for seeking nuclear weapons was to divert attention from himself and his family members, who are facing corruption charges. On November 9, 2006, President Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-chen, and three other officials were charged with embezzling NT $14.8 million ($448,000) in special state affairs funds. [19] As president, Chen has immunity from prosecution for any such acts, but will most likely face prosecution after his term in office ends in March 2008. According to Su Chi, in order to escape prosecution, President Chen may ultimately seek political asylum in the United States. [20]

Su also accused Chen of trying to provoke a military confrontation with China that could create an excuse for the president to impose martial law and suspend the upcoming presidential election. [21] Although Chen has never taken steps towards declaring martial law, on November 26, 2007, he declared that he had the option of doing so, and of postponing legislative elections, proclaiming them null and void, or changing local election commission chairmen. Chen later rescinded his threats, but many saw this as a desperate effort by the president to protect himself and the Taiwan independence movement. [22]

Response to Su’s Statement
Su Chi’s accusations set off a round of political debate. President Chen responded by vehemently denying the charges that he had launched a nuclear weapons program, although he appeared to leave open the possibility of doing so with the ambiguous response that, “Taiwan is not engaging in an arms race with the Chinese communists, but we must step up our self-defense capabilities.” [23]

Premier Chang Chun-hsiung was more categorical in his denial, declaring that Taiwan would not “develop, produce, or acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.” [24] Defense Minister Lee Tien-yu similarly told the Legislative Yuan that Taiwan had no plans to develop nuclear weapons. [25]

A Taiwanese military official further noted that the current rumor about Taiwan’s nuclear weapons development effort might be the result of confusion about ongoing research on non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons at the INER. [26] Additionally, Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) President Gong Chia-cheng challenged Su’s claims about the activity of the institute, declaring that it was involved only in research on civil nuclear applications, not weapons. [27]

Su’s own party appeared to distance itself from his remarks. The KMT’s presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, told Bloomberg News Agency that although Taiwan is capable of developing nuclear weapons, Taipei has already committed to giving up this option. [28] He further explained that the cross-Strait issue could only be resolved through political negotiation, rather than by nuclear weapons. [29]

While Chinese officials did not offer any direct response to Su Chi’s accusations, the spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, Yang Yi, said the mainland was firmly against any attempt by Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons or acquire nuclear weapons-related capabilities. [30] Despite the low-key official response, government-backed media outlets were wary about the substance of Su’s allegations. A pro-Beijing paper in Hong Kong cautioned that the public should not “make light of Chen’s intentions to develop weapons of mass destruction.” [31] In an interview with China’s CCTV-4, Taiwanese Professor Wang Kao-cheng said that while the Hsiung Feng IIE missile was unlikely to be outfitted with nuclear warheads, in light of Chen’s political personality, the president might be willing to take risks and launch a nuclear weapons program. [32]

Conclusion
While experts agree that Taiwan possesses the underlying technological capability and expertise to produce nuclear weapons, they also acknowledge that the country would face major obstacles before becoming a proliferator. Taiwan would still need to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium, which would entail constructing a uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing plant. Furthermore, Taiwan would also need a nuclear weapon delivery system, and it is not clear that the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missile can meet this requirement. Under the watchful eyes of the United States, China, and the IAEA, Taiwan would have great difficulty hiding such a program, and most analysts believe that no Taiwanese government, of either party, would be prepared to risk the consequences of exposure.

With these obstacles in mind, Su Chi’s accusations are more likely a tactical maneuver to gain advantage in Taiwan’s domestic political arena than the first piece of evidence whose trail will ultimately reveal a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Indeed, Su Chi’s are not the first such still to be substantiated accusations against Chen. Similar charges were leveled in 2004 by Nelson Ku, another KMT parliamentarian, but have yet to be proven. [33] Whatever their validity, however, Su Chi’s claims serve as a reminder that Taiwan’s precarious security situation and latent capabilities make nuclear weapons a subject of inevitable interest, even if the country has, for the present, continued to resist their allure.

Mimi Dougherty – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies