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| February 2008 Issue | |||||
 The removal of the spent rods and control rods has been delayed because the water in the cooling pond is contaminated, but otherwise the process appears to be moving forward. [7] The spent fuel is being moved to a temporary storage pond, but the final disposition of the fuel rods is uncertain. Wet storage is not a long-term solution, and long-term dry storage is not practical. Ultimately, the rods will most likely need to be reprocessed, but this will have to be done in another country, which presents a number of technical and political obstacles. Furthermore, Pyongyang has insisted that it will not discuss the disposition of the spent fuel until North Korea has been removed from the U.S. State Department’s list of states that sponsor international terrorism. [8] However, on January 23, the White House announced that there would be no movement toward removing the DPRK from the terrorism list until Pyongyang provides its nuclear declaration. [9] North Korea is estimated to have about 50 kilograms (kg) of weapons-grade plutonium, but Tokyo Shimbun reported on December 27, 2007 that Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan told visiting Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill the DPRK had extracted about 30 kg of plutonium. [10] Some analysts have interpreted this to mean that North Korea has diverted or is hiding about 20 kg, but the 30 kg figure is plausible — depending on how the reactor was operated and the efficiency of the reprocessing campaigns conducted in Yŏngbyŏn. [11] A more accurate assessment of the DPRK plutonium inventory will be possible if Pyongyang provides data on the reactor’s operation and its reprocessing campaigns.  Most of the DPRK’s fresh fuel rods were manufactured for the 50 MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun that was never completed after construction was frozen by the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. North Korea could reconfigure the rods for use in the 5 MW(e) reactor, but this would take time. The ROK has proposed buying the fuel rods and using them in a Canadian-supplied “CANDU” power reactor in the South, but the North has not yet responded to this proposal. The international market value of the fuel rods reportedly is about $15 million. [12] While significant progress has been made in the disablement of North Korea’s plutonium production facilities, they are not being dismantled, which will be an objective in the next phase of Six-Party negotiations. However, sources close to the talks believe there will be no dismantlement without a commitment to provide the DPRK with a light-water nuclear power reactor (LWR). [13] The United States has agreed to discuss the DPRK’s acquisition of an LWR “at an appropriate time.” However, there is little, if any, political will in Washington to supply Pyongyang with an LWR, which could lead to a long stalemate in the Six-Party Talks. Although a strong case can be made for nuclear energy in North Korea, it is difficult to imagine the emergence of an international creditor or multilateral consortium that might be willing to supply the county with LWRs unless there is significant political change in the DPRK. The DPRK’s suspected past activities in support of a uranium enrichment program pose another obstacle to denuclearization. Washington says it is still waiting for the DPRK’s nuclear declaration. However, on January 4, 2008, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement declaring that the DPRK has fulfilled its requirement to submit a declaration and that Pyongyang had granted access to aluminum tubes at a military site. [14] (The United States believed the tubes, exported from Russia in mid-2002, were precisely sized for use in uranium enrichment centrifuges and provided proof that the DPRK was pursuing a uranium program, based on blueprints and models supplied by the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network.) The DPRK statement denied the tubes were procured as part of a uranium enrichment program, but, according to the Washington Post, the tubes had been contaminated with traces of enriched uranium. [15] Another source claimed the level of enrichment had reached 90 percent – the level suited for nuclear weapons. [16] In the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK delegation has not denied the existence of a uranium enrichment program, but instead has said that “relevant agencies in the DPRK do not admit to having procured any materials for a uranium enrichment program.” [17] While recent U.S. intelligence failures regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and elsewhere have led many to question the U.S. allegations concerning the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program, it appears to be the most plausible explanation for Pyongyang’s past procurement activities. [18] According to the Los Angeles Times, a European diplomat asserts there is now a consensus in “western countries” that the site in Syria bombed by the Israeli Air Force in September 2007 was in fact a nuclear facility built with North Korea’s assistance. [19] According to a knowledgeable government official, the Bush Administration claims it has evidence that the site was a nuclear reactor built with North Korean assistance, which could have begun operating around the end of 2008. [20] The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement on January 4, 2008, however, denied that North Korea has provided any nuclear materials or technology to Syria. If the site was a reactor built with North Korean assistance and Pyongyang fails to disclose this fact, the issue could derail the Six-Party process. Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea Policy While Lee Myung-bak is expected to take a harder line than his predecessor against the DPRK, Lee and the Grand National Party (GNP) have an ambitious plan to resuscitate the North Korean economy. The plan strives to achieve “denuclearization, opening, and $3,000 per capita income” for North Korea and includes the following five pillars:
Advocates of the bureaucratic reform argue that it would give Seoul greater leverage over Pyongyang and that it would be easier to coordinate the ROK’s North Korea policy with the international community and other participants in the Six-Party Talks. However, critics argue that it sends the wrong signal to Pyongyang and could be the beginning of a deep freeze in inter-Korean relations that could unravel the Six-Party process. One possible sign of North Korean dissatisfaction with Lee is that Pyongyang suddenly cancelled bilateral talks on inter-Korean railway projects one day before the talks were scheduled to begin on January 22, 2008. [23] The proposal to abolish the Unification Ministry is highly controversial in South Korea, but according to a January 23, 2008, nationwide poll by the Joongang Ilbo, 42.7 percent of respondents agree with the proposal and 36.6 percent are opposed. [24] While the issue is often portrayed as being split along liberal and conservative lines, some conservatives are opposed to the idea; even Lee Myung-bak’s senior policy advisors are not unified on the disposition of the Unification Ministry. [25] The abolition of the ministry is part of a plan to downsize the ROK bureaucracy, but it would require approval by the National Assembly. The GNP only has 128 seats out of 299 in the National Assembly, so party leaders would have to strike a bargain to pass the proposed reforms. Despite passionate opposition in some quarters to the elimination of the Unification Ministry, [26] Lee is expected to get his way on the issue of merging it with the Foreign Ministry. [27] Conclusion The disablement of three key plutonium production facilities in North Korea is nearly complete. However, the DPRK has failed to meet a December 31, 2007, deadline to submit a declaration of its nuclear programs despite the DPRK Foreign Ministry’s claim that the country has met all of its obligations in the Six-Party process, including the provision of the declaration. For the immediate future, North Korea is no longer capable of producing plutonium to increase its nuclear arsenal, but there is still no clear commitment by Pyongyang to give up its existing stocks of the material and any nuclear weapons it may have. Nor has Pyongyang demonstrated its willingness to be forthcoming about its past procurement activities in support of a uranium enrichment program – or its alleged nuclear transfers to Syria. Denuclearization is now slowed, if not stalled, by politics, and the Six-Party process could be facing deadlock or complete collapse.
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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) missed a December 31, 2007, deadline to submit a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs, leading many analysts to fear that the Six-Party process is losing momentum and could be headed for collapse. (The process is an on-going negotiation involving China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States.) The United States has urged the DPRK to submit the declaration by the end of February, [1] but Pyongyang appears to be in no rush as it assesses the intentions of Lee Myung-bak, who will be inaugurated as president of the Republic of Korea on February 25, 2008. Lee has said he will expect greater reciprocity from North Korea, and he has promised to review all of the inter-Korean economic cooperation projects that were proposed during President Roh Moo-hyun’s summit with Kim Jong-il in October 2007. (
SOURCES AND NOTES