Since North Korea’s test of a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile overflew Japan in August 1998, Japan has cooperated with the United States on the research, development, and initial deployment of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. The Japanese Cabinet officially endorsed the decision to develop missile defense systems in December 2003, and in 2006, Japan expedited its BMD efforts in response to North Korea’s July 2006 missile tests and October 2006 nuclear test. (For more on the history of Japan-U.S. BMD collaboration see, “Japan Takes Steps to Integrate with U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” WMD Insights, July/August 2007.)

In December 2007, U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation reached a new milestone when the Japanese Maritime Self- Defense Force (MSDF) successfully conducted its first missile intercept test. The test also indicated that Japan’s new Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda may be as strong a supporter of BMD as his predecessor, Shinzo Abe, who resigned in September 2007. Abe had been vigorously advocating the revision or reinterpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution in order to allow Japan to deploy a more extensive BMD system and to cooperate more fully in collective self-defense with the United States. Fukuda, while not as vocal on these issues, has continued to accelerate the deployment of BMD systems and push for closer security cooperation with Washington. (Most recently, he promoted the Diet’s January 11 passage of a bill to extend the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to allow the Japanese MSDF to continue its refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, as part of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.) [1] While Fukuda is continuing Japan’s push toward a more robust BMD system, BMD faces on-going opposition in Japan, based both on its costs and its potential to roil relations with China.

Transition from Abe to Fukuda
Prime Minister Fukuda is generally perceived as more moderate than Abe, who was famous for his conservative nationalism and outspoken support of BMD. In his October 2007 policy statement to the 168th session of the Diet, for example, Fukuda did not directly mention missile defense or collective self-defense with the United States; in contrast, Abe continually highlighted these issues, particularly his desire to amend Article 9, which currently bars collective self-defense. [2] (Fukuda’s silence on missile defense issues in his statement derived, in part, from the need to stress more urgent agenda items facing his cabinet, particularly the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.)

As part of his efforts to foster closer cooperation with the United States, in April 2007, Abe formed a
13-member “Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security” to make recommendations to the Cabinet by September 2007 on issues related to whether Japan should revise its interpretation of the constitution to allow collective self-defense. Such a change would be needed to permit Japan to participate in a joint missile defense system with the United States that was intended to protect the latter, as well as Japan. [3] However, after the devastating defeat of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Upper House Election in July 2007 and Abe’s sudden resignation in September, the Council’s members reportedly decided to delay making their recommendations. In early January Japanese media outlets reported that the Council planned to submit its recom-mendation by mid-January; however, as of January 24, a search of Japanese media failed to reveal whether the recommendations had been submitted to Prime Minister Fukuda. The Council had been expected to recommend that Japan interpret its constitution to allow collective self-defense, as Abe advocated. However, Fukuda’s policy is unlikely to reflect these recommendations, as he is reluctant to revise the interpretation of Article 9. Thus, in effect, the submission of a report will be largely ceremonial, formally completing the work of the Council. [4] Media sources have suggested that, given Fukuda’s cautious attitude toward the collective self-defense debate, he might seal any recommendations offered by the Council. [5]

However, Fukuda may not be able to avoid more active engagement on the collective self-defense issue for long. Currently, the Japanese and U.S. governments are jointly developing an advanced version of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block II A missile to improve its defensive capabilities against longer-range missiles, such as the Taepodong. [6] The new SM-3 is scheduled to be available by 2014. If Japan decides to deploy the advanced version of the SM-3, in addition to the current version, theoretically, Japan would also have the capability to intercept a missile heading for the United States. Thus, the decision to deploy the advanced SM-3 version would rekindle the debate over Article 9. [7]

Opposition to BMD in Japan remains significant, based primarily on the considerable cost of the system. [8] According to the Ministry of Defense, the missile defense program is estimated to cost between 800 billion yen ($7.4 billion) and one trillion yen ($8.9 billion) through 2012. However, since Japan plans to continue to pursue still more advanced technologies, costs are likely to increase well beyond this amount. [9] According to the Ministry of Defense, fiscal year 2007, because it was the first year of actual deployment, is expected to mark the greatest annual expenditure for missile defense to date – 186.3 billion yen ($1.7 billion). [10] The total budget allocated for missile defense for fiscal year 2008 is 171.4 billion yen ($1.6 billion), only slightly lower than 2007. [11] Some Japanese defense industry officials assert that the domestic defense industry does not benefit from the government’s spending on BMD, because U.S.-developed and built SM-3s are used for flight tests. [12] In response to such criticism, Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba has insisted, “We can’t talk about how much money should be spent when human lives are at stake.” [13]

Successful SM-3 Test
While Fukuda has been quieter than his predecessor about constitutional reform, he continues to promote accelerating the deployment of missile defense systems. On December 18, 2007, the Japanese MSDF, as noted, succeeded in shooting down a mock missile resembling North Korea’s No-dong during the first such intercept flight test conducted in cooperation with the United States. The destroyer Kongo, equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, launched an SM-3 interceptor missile from the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands on Kauai Island, Hawaii. The SM-3 Block IA missile successfully detected, tracked, and destroyed the target outside the atmosphere at an altitude of approximately 161 km (100 miles). [14] The USS Lake Erie, an Aegis BMD-equipped cruiser based in Pearl Harbor, and the ground-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense test unit on Kauai also participated in this test. The USS Lake Erie tracked the missile target and provided information on the target to a command center. [15] This test, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 1 (JFTM-1), made Japan the first country other than the United States to have successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target using a sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by the Aegis BMD system. [16] Both U.S. and Japanese officials commented that the successful test was a significant step forward for the countries’ cooperation on ballistic missile defenses. Lt. General Henry Obering III, Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, emphasized that the test helped confirm strong U.S.-Japan defense cooperation and highlighted the important role of Japan in taking the lead to promote missile defense systems among U.S. allies. [17]

Senior Vice-Defense Minister Akinori Eto, who was present at the test, emphasized that the success of this experiment is symbolic of the close security relationship between Japan and the United States. He also stated that strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance is essential to maintain peace and security in East Asia, given the increasing ballistic missile threat in the region. [18] Defense Minister Ishiba told reporters that Japan will continue to strive to increase the system’s credibility, since the missile defense system is worth its high cost if it can protect the Japanese people. He also pointed out that missile defense alone would not be sufficient to create deterrence. Therefore, a credible nuclear umbrella, i.e., U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, is necessary to enhance deterrence along with missile defense. [19] Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Nobutaka Machimura, also hailed the successful test as an important step, commenting that the Japanese government would continue to install the necessary equipment and conduct exercises. [20] Encouraged by this successful test, Kongo was deployed at the MSDF’s Sasebo base in Nagasaki Prefecture on January 4, as planned. [21] The Ministry of Defense plans to deploy four Aegis equipped destroyers armed with SM-3s by March 2011. [22]

Following the SM-3 test, Prime Minister Fukuda again indicated his strong belief in the importance of BMD systems. On December 24, Fukuda’s Cabinet decided to revise Japan’s emergency missile defense guidelines to allow Japan to use the sea-based SM-3 to intercept a foreign missile. [23] Before the revision, the guidelines had recognized only the ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles as available to intercept incoming missiles. Now, the Japanese Self-Defense Force has the legal authorization, as well as the technical capability, to intercept incoming foreign missiles with its two-layer missile shield. In addition, the revision authorizes the Defense Minister to command the Self-Defense Forces to launch interceptors against incoming missiles in case of emergency without the Prime Minister’s approval. [24]

PAC-3 Upgrades
In addition to testing its sea-based SM-3, Japan has also been upgrading its ground-based PAC-3 ballistic missile defense system. The United States deployed a ground-based PAC-3 unit at Kadena Air base in Okinawa in October 2006, and Japan deployed its first PAC-3 at Iruma Air Base in Saitama prefecture in March 2007. Japan’s second PAC-3 interceptor system was deployed in November 2007 at the Air Self-Defense Force Narashino base in Chiba Prefecture, near Tokyo. [25] By March 2011, PAC-3 missiles will be deployed at 16 fire-units around major cities. [26]

As part of recent efforts to accelerate deployment of the missile defense system, the Ministry of Defense was planning to conduct drills with the mobile PAC-3 at 10 locations in Tokyo during 2007. The high-profile drills, originally scheduled for September 2007, were postponed until January 2008, for fear of stirring public opposition to the growing role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces at a time when Fukuda was trying to gain approval in the Diet for the then-stalled extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. [27]

China’s Response
Japan’s relations with China, which had deteriorated during the tenure of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), were improved during Abe’s administration. [28]

Nevertheless, China has been wary of the U.S.-Japan joint development of a BMD system in the region, fearing that it might erode China’s limited nuclear deterrent. China’s main concern is that the U.S.-Japan system might be used to protect Taiwan in case of a conflict between Beijing and Taipei – in part by protecting the United States against a possible Chinese nuclear attack should the conflict escalate. However, China’s response to the December 2007 missile defense test was relatively mild. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang told reporters that China hopes that the actions of Japan are beneficial to the peace and stability of the region and conducive to mutual trust between countries in the region. [29] The test was conducted immediately before Prime Minister Fukuda’s first visit to Beijing, which took place from December 28 to December 31, 2007, at a time when both Japan and China are trying to improve relations.

Problems at the Defense Ministry
The successful December 2007 SM-3 test provided some encouragement to the Japanese Ministry of Defense at a time when it is suffering from major bribery scandals involving defense contractors and from the leak of classified data related to the BMD system. On November 28, former Administrative Vice Defense Minister Takamasa Moriya, the most influential figure in the Defense Ministry’s procurement branch, was arrested on suspicion of taking bribes from defense contractor, Yamada Corporation. This incident exposed the lack of transparency in the equipment-procurement process at the Ministry of Defense. [30] In a more damaging development for BMD cooperation, on December 28, MSDF Lieutenant Commander Sumitaka Matsuuchi was indicted for distributing classified information on the Aegis system. Matsuuchi allegedly received a CD containing confidential Aegis data from his superior; he allegedly sent the information to the First Service School in Etajima, Hiroshima Prefecture, where it was circulated to various MSDF members. [31] The leakage of Aegis system data came to light when police investigators found a hard disk containing the confidential data at the home of an MSDF member during a January 2007 search in connection with his Chinese wife, who was alleged to have overstayed her visa.

The highly classified information related to the Aegis system could directly affect the U.S.-Japan joint development of missile defense systems. Based on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed in 1954, Japan’s Secret Protection Law prohibits release of such sensitive information. The arrested MSDF lieutenant commander was alleged to have violated this stricture. This is the first time the law has been invoked since its adoption in 1954. [32]

Due to the potentially serious damage caused by this leak, the United States has conditioned further BMD cooperation on the Japanese Ministry of Defense establishing a more effective system to protect highly sensitive information. Japan has procured much of its BMD equipment from the United States, including the Aegis and PAC-3 systems, and is dependent on U.S. early warning satellites to obtain vital information on when and where a ballistic missile is launched. [33] This makes it essential for the Japanese government to retain Washington’s trust.

Future Prospects
While some obstacles, from domestic opposition to missteps at the Ministry of Defense, continue to harry U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation, Fukuda has maintained the steady advance toward the goal of his predecessors to build a powerful joint missile defense system with Washington, even as he makes efforts to improve relations with China. Although some analysts have pointed out that Fukuda was not treated as warmly as his two predecessors during his visit to the United States in November 2007, his later success in gaining the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and in expanding missile defense cooperation indicates he is ready to continue support of key Bush Administration security goals. For the moment, however, Fukuda has shown reluctance to press for the reinterpretation of Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defense under the current constitution. Instead, Fukuda seems to have opted for solidifying Japan’s technological capabilities to intercept longer range ballistic missiles before tackling this more difficult and politically charged issue.

Masako Toki – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies