 States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC or BTWC) met in Geneva from December 10-14, 2007. The meeting was noteworthy for three reasons. First, the session was the first such gathering after the relatively successful Sixth BWC Review Conference in December 2006. (For a review of the 2006 conference, see “BWC Conference Outcome Received Qualified Praise,” WMD Insights, February 2007.) The December 2007 session was similarly harmonious, at least in its absence of sharp disputes or denunciations by the participating states parties.
Second, the meeting was the first to benefit from the dedicated assistance of the new Implementation Support Unit (ISU) established at the Sixth Review Conference. The attendees praised the ISU for its vigorous efforts to promote such core BWC goals as universal adherence, broader national implementation of BWC obligations, and greater participation in the Convention’s system of confidence-building measures.
Finally, the December 2007 meeting included an unusually large number of states parties as well as representatives from international nonproliferation organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private biotechnology industry. Such broad participation is a testimony to the organizers’ efforts to promote synergy among stakeholders concerned about biological weapons (BW) proliferation.
Background
The BWC was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. Article I (the “general purpose criterion”) does not ban biological agents or toxins directly but requires that they be used only for prophylactic, defensive, and other peaceful purposes. The BWC does explicitly prohibit “weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” [1] The 1925 Geneva Protocol, a precursor of the BWC, prohibits the actual use of biological agents in combat.
Ninety-five of the 159 BWC states parties participated in the December 2007 meeting. The session also included non-voting representatives from six countries whose governments have signed but not ratified the BWC. Angola and Israel, which have neither signed nor ratified it, sent observers. The United Nations, the European Commission, the League of Arab States, and other international organizations also sent delegates to the meeting. [2]
The December 2007 meeting addressed two BWC-related topics: (1) strengthening countries’ national implementation of the Convention and (2) enhancing regional cooperation among the states parties. In their deliberations, the attendees drew on the recommendations of the August 20-24, 2007, Meeting of Experts. [3] (For more on the August meeting, see “Experts Offer Extraterritorial Enforcement of Domestic Laws, Tighter Export Controls, Regional Cooperation to Improve Implementation of Biological Weapons Convention,” WMD Insights, October 2007.) This expert session was the first major element of the four-year program adopted at the Sixth BWC Review Conference to strengthen the Convention and its implementation. [4]
BWC Implementation Support
An explicit purpose of the December 2007 meeting of the states parties was to assess the performance of the new ISU, which was created to provide dedicated administrative support for BWC-related activities. [5] Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the BWC lacks a supporting institution to monitor and enforce compliance with its provisions. The three-person ISU, headed by Richard Lennane, started work in April 2007 and became fully operational in August 2007. The Unit is funded by BWC states parties and based in the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). [6]
The ISU’s specific administrative responsibilities include: managing the logistics for meetings (which normally take place at the Palais des Nations, in Geneva), conducting research on BWC issues, writing speeches and communication for the BWC chairman (a rotating position), serving as a clearinghouse for requests for assistance from member states, and maintaining a comprehensive website of all BWC-related activities [at www.unog.ch/bwc]. The website includes a restricted area accessible only to official representatives of the states parties. [7] The Unit’s staff also interacts with other international organizations, scientific and academic institutions, NGOs, and countries that have not yet acceded to the Convention. [8]
The ISU is primarily an international support center rather than a policy-making or regulatory agency. Unlike the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the ISU’s mandate does not include monitoring compliance or even ensuring the veracity of the states parties’ submissions to the BWC. The issue of whether, and by how much, to expand the ISU’s support role remains under debate.
At the December 2007 meeting, several national governments proposed enhancing the role of the ISU. For example, the submission from Brazil, on behalf of the Latin American states, encouraged the ISU to work with regional organizations and groups of interested countries “to organize activities which will enable us to identify good practices for the application of the Convention.” By tailoring assistance to each region, the Latin American countries believe the ISU “will encourage faster, deeper understanding of the benefits and challenges raised by the applications of the Convention.” [9]
In addition, the Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union (EU), submitted a working paper stating that the EU “stands ready to provide additional financial assistance to support specific activities and projects of the ISU.” [10] The text listed a range of “possible activities of the ISU that states parties could support,” including: increasing its implementation, cooperation, and assistance activities; improving participation in confidence-building measures (CBMs); expanding the number of BWC members; conducting additional outreach activities with NGOs and academic institutions; and promoting international awareness of the BWC. [11]
The U.S. delegation, however, cautioned against transforming the ISU’s role in the process of endowing it with additional resources: “While we wholeheartedly encourage voluntary contributions for the ISU to carry out its assigned tasks, such funding must not in any way undermine the strict delineation of ISU operations that was the basis for the compromise text of the mandate. If regional groups or states parties wish to provide additional funding, that funding should be used to help the three-person ISU to fulfill the tasks assigned and not seek to expand that mandate into new, unauthorized areas.” [12] The Bush administration has long resisted attempts to endow the BWC with an institution like the OPCW, which has a large Technical Secretariat that conducts extensive on-site inspections of past or potential chemical weapons facilities, including those owned by private companies. The administration has been concerned that, even with an inspection component, the dual-use nature of biological technology would make it difficult to confirm that a diversion to weapons use has occurred. In addition, U.S. officials share the concerns of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry that a detailed verification regime could prove very expensive and could both disrupt important civilian research in this area and expose valuable U.S. trade secrets.
The representative from Pakistan noted, however, that the differences between the BWC and the CWC would prevent the ISU from performing the same roles as the OPCW Technical Secretariat: “The CWC has an elaborate verification mechanism that allowed the OPCW to develop detailed reporting formats. BTWC still awaits agreement in this area. The ISU cannot be expected to undertake reporting tasks similar to the OPCW.” [13]
Progress Toward Universality
The BWC was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons. It currently has 159 states parties and hence lags behind the NPT (with 188 parties) and the CWC (with 183 parties). Whereas only a few states remain outside the latter two accords, 36 states have yet to ratify the BWC (although 15 of them have signed the Convention). [14] At the December 2007 states parties meeting, the head of the Ukrainian delegation underscored the security problem in having so many holdouts: “Universality is not simply an aspiration, or a goal to be achieved for its own sake. We strongly believe that in order to create the atmosphere of international trust, transparency and mutual responsibility, and with the aim to give a further credibility to the BTWC, we need a higher degree of participation in the Convention.” [15]
The Sixth Review Conference in 2006 adopted a comprehensive strategy to expand membership in the BWC. States parties committed to work with non-member governments bilaterally, regionally, at multilateral meetings, and through other mechanisms to induce them to join. [16] At
the December 2007 states parties meeting, Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, who chaired the meeting, detailed the extensive activities he and the ISU had made to meet this mandate. [17] Four additional countries (Gabon, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, and Trinidad and Tobago) ratified the BWC during the year following the 2006 Review Conference, but such strategically significant states as Egypt, Israel, and Syria have declined to join. [18]
Since its establishment, the ISU has engaged frequently with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to learn how that organization has increased the number of states parties to the CWC. For example, in November 2007, ISU members participated in the CWC National Authorities meeting in The Hague. At that session, they met with some of the 26 CWC states parties that had not yet ratified the BWC to promote their accession to the Convention. [19] ISU chair Lennane has opined that expanding the membership is primarily a matter of “overcoming bureaucratic and legislative inertia, and
encouraging governments to make joining the BTWC more of a priority.” [20]
In his presentation to the December 2007 BWC states parties meeting, Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the OPCW, underscored the value of collaboration between the two institutions: “Both in their origin as well as objectives, the BWC and the CWC have mutually reinforcing complementarities.” [21] Pfirter noted that the CW community closely followed BW developments “in light of the increasing overlap between the chemical and biological sciences, the integration of chemical engineering into the life sciences, and the impact of micro-reactors and of emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology.” [22] By all indications, the BW and CW arms control communities will continue to deepen their collaboration in coming years.
Strengthening National Implementation
As noted, unlike the CWC or the NPT, the BWC lacks an on-site inspection regime or other formal international verification procedures. BWC Article VI merely notes that states parties can appeal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in cases of suspected noncompliance. Efforts to adopt formal compliance measures by way of a legally binding protocol — a subject of negotiations between 1994 and 2001 that ultimately failed to bear fruit — or by other means have not been successful. [23] As a result, the states parties have focused on national-level enforcement efforts to improve BWC implementation.
BWC Article IV requires that each states party take measures to implement the provisions of the Convention domestically. In addition, on April 28, 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1540 to supplement the BWC and other nonproliferation treaties. It mandates that all UN member states enact domestic measures to prevent individuals from possessing or trading in biological weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. [24]
To meet these commitments, BWC members have sought to address three major interrelated requirements for effective national implementation: adopting suitable legislation and regulations, monitoring their application, and enforcing compliance.
The Sixth Review Conference committed states parties to provide information on:
- National measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in the Convention;
- National biosafety and biosecurity measures;
- Diversion and destruction activities, including safety and security precautions undertaken;
- National implementation of the Article X obligation to support other states’ peaceful biological research; and
- Activities related to universalizing the Convention.
Several national delegations in attendance at the December 2007 meeting submitted detailed reviews of the actions they had taken to strengthen national implementation of the Convention in recent years. [25]
The ISU maintains an extensive National Implementation Database (NID) of measures relevant to BWC implementation. Drawing on a variety of sources, the NID attempts to catalog relevant legislation and other instruments adopted by any state, regardless of whether its government has signed or ratified the BWC. Whenever possible, the NID provides a summary of the measure and a hyperlink to the full text. The database currently contains over two thousand separate items. [26]
Nevertheless, many countries that have ratified the BWC appear to have made only limited progress in meeting their Article IV obligations, though assessing progress is difficult because some
national measures are not publicized for security reasons. [27] In addition, the states parties stress
that, since they all have different national circumstances and legal systems, each government will have a different approach to domestic implementation of the Convention’s provisions. [28]
Despite these caveats, the available evidence suggests that the national implementation of the BWC still lags behind that of the CWC and the NPT. For example, although the Sixth Review Conference urged all states parties to designate a national point of contact for the BWC, only 52 members had done so as of December 2007. [29] The ISU, which maintains the list in a restricted area of the website, has been striving to increase that number.
On February 27, 2006, the Council of the European Union adopted a Joint Action (2006/184/CFSP) to increase the number of BWC members
and help existing states parties to incorporate their BWC obligations into their national laws and regulations. [30] The Joint Action funded 18 months of activities that included convening several regional seminars (in Kenya, Thailand, Costa Rica, and Senegal) and undertaking bilateral technical assistance programs involving both on-site visits and Internet-based support tools. EU representatives helped other states parties to draft appropriate penal provisions and administrative measures required for full BWC implementation. [31]
Confidence-Building Measures
The BWC Review Conferences in 1986 and 1991 established a series of politically binding Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) related to state party compliance with the Convention. The CBMs currently include seven measures:
- CBM A, Part 1: Exchange of data on research centers and laboratories;
- CBM A, Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defense research and development programs;
- CBM B: Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins;
- CBM C: Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge;
- CBM D: Active promotion of contacts;
- CBM E: Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures;
- CBM F: Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programs; and
- CBM G: Declaration of vaccine production facilities.
At the Sixth Review Conference, the states parties did not change the topics covered by the CBMs. [32] Instead, the attendees sought to increase the number of states parties that provide CBM declarations by improving the mechanisms for their submission and distribution. In particular, they authorized national governments to submit the forms to the ISU via email. They also transferred responsibility for processing CBM declarations from the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in New York to the ISU. [33] The Unit now posts submitted CBM declarations on its website, most often in the restricted area, as well as summaries of their results. [34]
In 2007, 61 national governments (38 percent of the BWC states parties) submitted information regarding at least one CBM. This figure is the highest annual total since the BWC began soliciting CBM declarations in 1987. [35] When one considers that the absolute number of states parties has increased over time, however, the total is less impressive. In 1991, for example, almost half the states parties (49.6 percent) participated in the CBMs. [36] Although the Western Group States now regularly submit CBM declarations (partly due to the success of an EU Action Plan adopted in 2006), [37] the Eastern Group States only do so irregularly, while those affiliating with the Group of Non-Aligned Movement and Other States (NAM) rarely do so.
To improve matters, the BWC depositories (Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom) issued a joint statement on October 15, 2007, affirming their readiness to share expertise with states parties having difficulties preparing CBM declarations. [38] In addition, the EU and a number of countries possessing relatively advanced capabilities in biotechnology reaffirmed their willingness to help states parties participate in the CBMs. For example, the JACKSNNZ Group — Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand — observed, “We have made standing offers to assist countries when it comes to ratification procedures and in the preparation of national Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).” [39]
Promoting Regional and Global
Cooperation
At the December 2007 meeting, the states parties generally supported regional cooperation as a useful supplement to national and global efforts. For example, they noted that the shared languages and legal traditions in certain regions could allow for common approaches to achieving BWC-related objectives. Depending on their focus, regional meetings and activities could profitably include BWC issues on their agenda. The states parties also pointed out that certain regional resources (e.g., those for law enforcement, customs, and public health) might assist with BWC implementation. [40]
As in the past, several representatives of developing countries at the December 2007 meeting expressed concern that BWC states parties with more advanced biological technologies were failing to fulfill their Article X obligation to support other states’ peaceful biological activities. A common complaint was that fears of proliferating offensive BW should not unduly constrain the sharing of biotechnologies that could contribute to the public health and economic progress of less developed countries. [41]
The developing countries also stressed their need for additional financial and other assistance so they can fulfill their BWC commitments. For instance, the Cuban government submitted a statement on behalf of the NAM that affirmed, “The implementation of the Convention at the national level is not only limited to enacting and enhancing relevant national legislations, but it also has to do with other actions which require human and financial resources, not always readily available to developing countries.” [42]
The statement of the Indian government went further in asserting that, “Unfortunately, a majority of states parties lack resources for enhancing national implementation and forging greater regional cooperation. The development of national, regional and international capabilities for surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases will require a substantial investment, as also a much greater level of commitment to increased international assistance and cooperation as provided for in Article X of the Convention.” [43]
The Portuguese working paper indicated that the EU plans to launch a new Joint Action this year which would support World Health Organization (WHO) activities aimed at enhancing the public health capabilities of BWC states parties. The new Joint Action’s priorities will be enhancing the safety and security of biological laboratories through awareness raising, training, and network activities, and strengthening the performance of national laboratories by connecting them through regional and international networks. [44]
The Georgian delegation explicitly thanked the U.S. government, especially the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the Department of Defense, for helping Tbilisi to increase its national biological research and disease surveillance capabilities, as well as eliminate Soviet-era BW facilities and related infrastructure on their territory. [45]
Engaging International Organizations, Civil Society, and Industry
In opening the December 2007 meeting, Ambassador Khan identified three “critical areas for collective efforts — synergy, inclusiveness, and transparency.” [46] The meeting was noteworthy in the extent to which it sought to engage outside stakeholders during the public sessions.
Ambassador Khan and other attendees stressed that successful BWC implementation requires incorporating the insights and capabilities of a number of actors from different sectors, including security, agriculture, public health, and law enforcement.
To promote synergy with multinational organizations engaged in activities that affect the BWC, the states parties invited presentations by senior representatives from the OPCW, the WHO, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). [47] The attendees also organized a special dialogue session with representatives of civil society. Although NGOs are entitled to attend public sessions during BWC meetings, they may not participate in other sessions unless official state delegations decide otherwise. In practice, however, NGOs are usually given an opportunity to make short presentations during BWC meetings and to hold informal lunch-time seminars. [48] Twenty research institutes and other NGOs attended the December 2007 states parties meeting. [49] Either through written submissions or in person, including in a novel roundtable format, they offered their perspectives on how to strengthen the BWC and, more generally, improve the international community’s ability to avert and respond to biological threats. [50]
Some states parties also described how they sought to increase the transparency of the private biotechnology sector so that the BWC can keep pace with the rapid pace of scientific and technological developments. [51] Brazil submitted a detailed working paper on how its federal government works with the Brazilian private sector to improve controls on dangerous biological pathogens and toxins. To this end, Brazilian government representatives seek to promote understanding among industry leaders of their obligations under the BWC. [52]
Future Activities
In 2008, Ambassador Georgi Avramchev from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will chair the Meeting of Experts on August 18-22 and the Meeting of States Parties on December 1-5. Both meetings are scheduled to address two main issues: (1) improving biosafety and biosecurity; and (2) preventing the misuse of advances in bioscience and biotechnology through oversight, education, awareness-raising, incident response, and codes of conduct. [53]
The 2009 meetings will consider how to: (1) augment international cooperation, assistance, and exchange in bioscience and biotechnology for peaceful purposes; and (2) enhance the surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases. The 2010 meetings will discuss how: (1) BWC members will respond to a request from a states party to investigate the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons; and (2) how to improve national disease surveillance, detection, and diagnostic capabilities, as well as other public health systems.
Overall Assessment
Despite tensions arising from the demands of developing countries for greater sharing of biotechnology, the December 2007 states parties meeting was more cordial than some past sessions, when the parties frequently deadlocked and denounced one another. [54] The most critical comment came from the Iranian representative, who accused “the Zionist regime” of “posing a serious threat to the international and regional peace and security” by failing to heed the call of the BWC states parties to accede to the Convention. [55]
The states parties also decided not to stress their longstanding differences over whether or not to develop legally binding compliance measures for the BWC. Since 2001, the U.S. government has blocked efforts to negotiate a verification protocol on the grounds that any system of on-site inspections that could gain widespread support would probably be ineffective, provide loopholes for BW aspirants, and expose sensitive commercial proprietary information. [56]
At the December 2007 meeting, the Cuban government submitted a statement on behalf of the NAM stating that it “strongly believes that the only sustainable method of strengthening the Convention is through multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, including on verification, dealing with all the Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner.” [57] Similarly, the Russian delegation affirmed that “We still look forward to an early resumption of multilateral negotiations to develop a legally binding instrument to verify compliance with the Convention that will be the best way of strengthening its regime.” [58] The Ukrainian statement termed the lack of a BWC verification regime “a serious obstacle for its full observance.” [59]
Proponents of a legally binding protocol may be awaiting a new U.S. administration in January 2009 before resuming their efforts in earnest.
Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute
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 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] The text of the BWC is available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/keytext/npttext.htm. [View Article] Additional information on the BWC is available at: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Negotiating Inspection and Enforcement Provisions,” February 2006, http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f2m.html. [View Article]
[2] United Nations Office at Geneva, “List of Participants,” BWC/MSP/2007/INF.1, December 14, 2007, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/647/07/PDF/G0764707.pdf?OpenElement].
[3] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Meeting of Experts (20-24 August 2007),” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F1CD974A1FDE4794C125731A0037D96D?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[4] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Biological Weapons Convention Experts to Meet in Geneva from 20 to 24 August,” http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/C10EA6ED871A2DD2C12573390052FAAB
?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,” Final Document, Geneva, 2006, pp. 19-20, BWC/CONF.VI/6, http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=BWC/CONF.VI/6&Lang=E. [View Article]
[6] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Staff of the Implementation Support Unit,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/360CC676E10CE1B0C12572DB004A3647?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[7] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Role of the Implementation Support Unit,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F8521A510F455706C12573A6003F49F2?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[8] For a complete description of the ISU’s activities in 2007, see United Nations Office at Geneva, “Report of the Implementation Support Unit,” BWC/MSP/2007/3, December 4, 2007, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/54/PDF/G0764654.pdf?OpenElement].
[9] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Transcript of the Statement by Brazil (for Latin American States),” p. 2, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/AD86E337A283B203C12573AF00419548/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Latin_American-071210PM.pdf. [View Article]
[10] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Supporting the BTWC Implementation Support Unit,” BWC/MSP/2007/WP.3, December 7, 2007, p. 1, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/78/PDF/G0764678.pdf?OpenElement].
[11] Ibid. p. 2-3.
[12] “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Christina Rocca, U.S. Representative to the Biological Weapons Convention,” December 10, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/41156CE1F83CD978C12573AF0040BB9E/$file/BWC
_MSP_2007
_Statement-USA-071210AM.pdf. [View Article]
[13] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by Tehmina Janjjua,” December 11, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/50A48E3DE2DB95DAC12573AF004F183A/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Pakistan-071211AM.pdf. [View Article]
[14] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Report of the Chairman on Universalization Activities,” December 11, 2007, BWC/MSP/2007/4, p. 1, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/92/PDF/G0764692.pdf?OpenElement].
[15] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Volodymyr E. Bielashov,” December 12, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/BC6B66162785277FC12573AF005ED703/$file/BWC_MSP
_2007_Statement-Ukraine-071212AM.pdf. [View Article]
[16] “Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties,” p. 23, see source in [5].
[17] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Obtaining Universality for the Biological Weapons Convention,” December 10, 2007, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/995B41AD4C51AEF4C12573B100535CEE/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Chair-071213.pdf. [View Article]
[18] For a discussion of the situation for each of these non-ratifiers and non-signatories see United Nations Office at Geneva, “Report of the Chairman on Universalization Activities,” December 11, 2007, BWC/MSP/2007/4, p. 1, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/92/PDF/G0764692.pdf?OpenElement. [View Article] According to Khan, representatives from Egypt, Israel, and Syria indicated that, while they all support the BWC’s aims and objectives, their “particular regional security circumstances” will prevent them from taking any action toward ratification “in the near future” (“Obtaining Universality for the Biological Weapons Convention,” pp. 6-7).
[19] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Bernhard Brassack,” December 10, 2007, p. 3, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/54/PDF/G0764654.pdf?OpenElement].
[20] “Role of the Implementation Support Unit,” see source in [7].
[21] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Address by Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter,” December 11, 2007, pp. 2, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/486E1D8BBF421708C12573B0003168A5/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-OPCW_071211PM.pdf. [View Article]
[22] Ibid., p. 3
[23] For a review of these efforts, see Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC),” Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/btwc.pdf. [View Article]
[24] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,” March 2006, http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f2n.html. [View Article]
[25] See the “Statements by States Parties and Signatories” section at United Nations Office at Geneva, “Meeting of States Parties (10-14 December 2007),” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/CA652A2BD8D94AF5C12573B4004211F1?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[26] United Nations Office at Geneva, “National Implementation Database,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/BBCCCC514AA386A3C1257355003AA13D/$file/BWC_
NID_Report-070912.htm#al. [View Article]
[27] Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams, “The Nexus of Globalization and Next-Generation Nonproliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 14, no. 3 (November 2007), pp. 468.
[28] United Nations Office at Geneva, “National Implementation of the BWC,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/74C574F0A6EEC10EC12572BC00334CC5?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[29] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Report of the Implementation Support Unit,” BWC/MSP/2007/3, December 4, 2007, p. 4, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/54/PDF/G0764654.pdf?OpenElement].
[30] “Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27 February 2006,” Official Journal of the European Union, March 7, 2006, p. L 65/51, http://www.euja-btwc.eu/files/20060227%20EU%20Joint%20Action_0.pdf. [View Article] According to the EU, “A joint action is a time-limited project that requires coordinated action by EU Member States whereby human and financial resources, know-how, equipment, and so on are mobilized to attain the specific objectives set by the EU Council. Joint actions also commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity” (Council of the European Union, “EU Joint Action in Support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” http://www.euja-btwc.eu/euja.
[View Article])
[31] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Assistance and Cooperation in the Framework of the Implementation and Universalisation of the BTWC,” December 10, 2007, p. 2, BWC/MSP/2007/WP.5,” p. 2, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/84/PDF/G0764684.pdf?OpenElement].
[32] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Bernhard Brassack,” December 10, 2007, p. 3, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/54/PDF/G0764654.pdf?OpenElement].
[33] “Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties,” p. 22, see source in [5].
[34] Some states have allowed their CBMs to appear in the unrestricted section; they can be seen at http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/CEC2E2D361ADFEE7C12572BC0032F058?OpenDocument.
[View Article]
[35] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Report of the Implementation Support Unit,” BWC/MSP/2007/3, December 4, 2007, p. 4, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/54/PDF/G0764654.pdf?OpenElement].
[36] See the first chart on United Nations Office at Geneva, “Report of the Implementation Support Unit,” BWC/MSP/2007/3, December 4, 2007, p. 14, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/54/PDF/G0764654.pdf?OpenElement].
[37] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by Portugal on Behalf of the European Union,” December 10, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1271FF22E935A262C12573AF00406F3B/$file/BWC_MSP
_2007_Statement-Portugal-EU-071210AM.pdf. [View Article]
[38] “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Valery Loshchinin,” December 10, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/01E3172679DE2226C12573AF00420D29/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Russia-071210PM.pdf.
[View Article]
[39] United Nations Office at Geneva, “JACKSNNZ Opening Statement,” December 10, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7E2F0B786A24939DC12573AF003 E70B9/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Canada-JACKSNNZ-071210AM.pdf. [View Article]
[40] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Report of the Meeting of States Parties,” advance copy, December 14, 2007, p. 5, http://www.bwpp.org/2007MSP/documents/MSP-CRP120071214.pdf; [View Article] see pp. 12-13 for additional recommendations on how State Parties can use regional and sub-regional cooperation to complement national BWC implementation measures.
[41] For example, a submission from Brazil stated that, “The emergence of the bioterrorism threat is a relevant concern of the international security community. It should not be invoked, however, in order to justify the extension, to new areas of biological studies, of restrictions which could negatively affect legitimate and peaceful transfers of knowledge, technologies, and assets.” (United Nations Office at Geneva, “Brazil’s National Program for the Promotion of Dialogue Between the Private Sector and the Government in Matters Related to Sensitive Assets (PRONABENS),” BWC/MSP/2007/WP.7, December 11, 2007, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/97/PDF/G0764697.pdf?OpenElement.)] The Indonesian delegation likewise stated that “our endeavors in strengthening the convention should not hamper the right of each Member State’s efforts to benefit from the development of biological agents for peaceful purposes.” (“Statement by the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia,” December 10, 2007, p. 2, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4CC4AE481FE57D40C12573AF004183D6/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Indonesia-071210PM.pdf
[View Article]
[42] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Cuba on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States,” December 10, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/19D324DD7ABE9012C12573AF003FF8BA/$file/BWC_MSP
_2007_Statement-Cuba-NAM-071210AM.pdf. [View Article] The statement elaborated: “For instance, appointing or establishing national authorities in charge of implementing the Convention requires personnel and resources to perform their duties. The same happens with the export and import controls, which also require adequate equipment and technology for detecting violations.”
[43] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by Jayant Prasad,” December 10, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/883F917D0E5CDD2EC12573B000318A0B/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-India-071210PM.pdf. [View Article]
[44] “Assistance and Cooperation in the Framework of the Implementation and Universalisation of the BTWC,” see source in [31].
[45] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by Lela Bakanidze, December 11, 2007, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1C14C2EDF34DC6C9C12573B000317727/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Georgia_071211AM.pdf. [View Article]
[46] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Brief for the Chairman — Opening Session,” December 10, 2007, p. 9, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/F96526E4AAC0586AC12573B100534C72/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Chair-071210.pdf. [View Article]
[47] These statements can be found under the subheading “Statements by Regional and International Organisations,” at United Nations Office at Geneva, “Meeting of States Parties (10-14 December 2007),” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/CA652A2BD8D94AF5C12573B4004211F1?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[48] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Information for NGOs,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/534333C00566693BC12571A20042B4AD?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[49] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Report of the Meeting of States Parties,” Advance copy, December 14, 2007, p. 3, http://www.bwpp.org/2007MSP/documents/MSP-CRP120071214.pdf. [View Article]
[50] These statements can be found under the subheading “NGO Roundtable Discussions with the Chair” and “Statements by Non-Governmental Organisations,” at United Nations Office at Geneva, “Meeting of States Parties (10-14 December 2007),” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/CA652A2BD8D94AF5C12573B4004211F1?OpenDocument.
[View Article]
[51] Some of these challenges are discussed in Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology,” The New Atlantis (Spring 2006), http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/12/tuckerzilinskas.htm.
[View Article]
[52] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Brazil’s National Program for the Promotion of Dialogue Between the Private Sector and the Government in Matters Related to Sensitive Assets (PRONABENS),” BWC/MSP/2007/WP.7, December 11, 2007, p. 2, [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/646/97/PDF/G0764697.pdf?OpenElement].
[53] United Nations Office at Geneva, “2007-2010 Intersessional Process,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F7C77C704B89856AC12572BC003225AC?OpenDocument. [View Article]
[54] Richard Guthrie, “The Fourth Day: Drawing Towards a Conclusion,” BioWeapons Prevention Project MSP Report #6, December 17, 2007, [http://www.bwpp.org/2007MSP/documents/2007-1214BWPPMSPreport06.pdf].
[55] “Statement by H.E. Mr. Ali Reza Moaiyeri, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” December 10, 2007, p. 2, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/5D6F11DC776B7B57C12573AF00401478/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Iran-071210AM.pdf. [View Article]
[56] Donald Mahley, “Statement by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties, Geneva, Switzerland,” U.S. Department of State, July 25, 2001, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/5497.htm.
[View Article]
[57] “Cuba on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States,” p. 2, see source in [42].
[58] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Valery Loshchinin,” December 10, 2007, p. 2, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/01E3172679DE2226C12573AF00420D29/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Russia-071210PM.pdf. [View Article]
[59] United Nations Office at Geneva, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Volodymyr E. Bielashov,” December 12, 2007,
p. 2, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/BC6B66162785277FC12573AF005ED703/$file/BWC_MSP_
2007_Statement-Ukraine-071212AM.pdf. [View Article]
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