 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, the U.S. government regularly stated in a variety of forums that Iran possessed a large undeclared stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) and a substantial production capability. After its ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, Iran declared that it had developed a CW production capability in the later stages of its war with Iraq (1980-88), but that it had destroyed this capability before 1997. [1] A single CW production facility was declared to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and, following a visit to the site by OPCW inspectors, certified as destroyed. Nevertheless, the U.S. government continued to assert that Iran was maintaining an offensive CW capability, in direct violation of its obligations under the CWC. This assertion was strongly supported and repeated by a wide range of retired officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private think tanks. [2]
The assessment that Iran possessed a secret CW stockpile and was seeking to enhance its quantity and quality through the acquisition of technical knowledge, precursor chemicals, and process equipment from abroad was regularly reinforced by new revelations of Iranian imports of dual-use chemicals and process equipment. The fact that the significance of these imports and attempted purchases depended on the presumed existence of a covert CW program was frequently overlooked. Since 2003, however, the U.S. intelligence community has progressively reduced the scope and certainty of its claims regarding an Iranian CW program, and U.S. officials have made fewer references to the existence of such a program. This shift in publicly stated assessments appears to have gone largely unnoticed and there has been little change in the judgments and assessments of members of Congress, NGOs, or private think tanks on the issue.
The primary objective of this essay is to outline the changing public statements of U.S. intelligence agencies regarding Iran’s CW program. Several possible explanations for the changes will be offered and some tentative conclusions drawn. At this time it may be difficult or impossible to draw firmer conclusions about the changes without access to classified intelligence assessments and records of the internal debates associated with the preparation of the unclassified public documents and statements. Although biological and chemical weapons are often discussed together, for the sake of clarity, this article will confine itself to CW assessments and will not address changes in assessments of Iran’s biological warfare activities and intentions.
1997 – 2003: Definitive Statements
Since 1997, an important source of public information on the state of Iran’s alleged chemical weapons program has been an irregularly released report, required under Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act and entitled Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (hereafter referred to as Sec. 721 reports). From 1997 to 2003 these reports were produced twice a year by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). From 2004 on, the frequency was reduced to an annual report, which is the responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
The very first Sec. 721 report released in 1997 clearly stated that “Iran already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them.” [3] This basic statement of fact was repeated in every report up to the end of 2002. The CIA’s assessment was supported and expanded upon by the Department of Defense (DoD). In the 1997 edition of its publication, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the DoD described Iran’s CW program as follows:Since the early 1990s, it [Iran] has put a high priority on its chemical weapons program because of its inability to respond in kind to Iraq’s chemical attacks and the discovery of substantial Iraqi efforts with advanced agents, such as the highly persistent nerve agent VX. Iran ratified the CWC, under which it will be obligated to eliminate its chemical program over a period of years. Nevertheless, it continues to upgrade and expand its chemical warfare production infrastructure and munitions arsenal.
Iran manufactures weapons for blister, blood, and choking agents; it is also believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran has a stockpile of these weapons, including artillery shells and bombs, which could be used in another conflict in the region. [4]
The main points of difference between the CIA and DoD reports were the DoD’s statements that Iran was actively manufacturing CW agents rather than simply holding a stockpile and that Iran was engaged in research on nerve agents.
From 1997 to 1999 there was little change in the CIA reports beyond adding language to the effect that Iran was a CWC state-party. Then, in its Sec. 721 report for the first half of 2000, the CIA introduced language on the estimated size of the Iranian CW arsenal, asserting that Iran “already has manufactured and stockpiled several thousand tons of chemical weapons.” [5] This report also continued the practice of making no reference to Iranian research on, or production of, nerve agents. Although no subsequent Sec. 721 report has included an estimate of the size of the Iranian CW arsenal, the figure was included in testimony delivered in September 2000 before the U.S. Senate by A. Norman Schindler, Deputy Director of the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) Nonproliferation Center. In his opening remarks, Mr. Schindler stated that “Iran has a large and growing CW production capacity, and already has produced a number of CW agents, including nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. We believe in addition that it possesses a stockpile of weaponized and bulk agent and we think that this amounts to actually several thousand tons.” [6] Mr. Schindler’s prepared written statement differed from his oral testimony by stating: “We believe [Iran] possesses a stockpile of at least several hundred metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent.” [7] In subsequent testimony delivered in October 2000, John A. Lauder, the Director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, stated that Iran’s CW stockpile amounted to “at least several thousand metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent.” [8]
Although the Sec. 721 report for the second half of 2000 dropped the reference to the size of the Iranian arsenal, it introduced the statement that Iran had “probably” produced nerve agents, an assertion that was less definite than that offered by Schindler and Lauder in their respective testimonies. [9] This new language continued to be used through the end of 2002. The CIA reports and testimony were supported by similar statements from other U.S. government agencies.
In January 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense released an updated edition of Proliferation: Threat and Response in which it stated, “Tehran has manufactured and stockpiled blister, blood and choking chemical agents, and weaponized some of these agents into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs. It also is believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran could employ these agents during a future conflict in the region. Lastly, Iran’s training, especially for its naval and ground forces, indicates that it is planning to operate in a contaminated environment.” [10] The equivalent CIA analysis of the same period stated that Iran “already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons — including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them.” [11]
In its report for the period January to July 2001, the CIA noted Iran’s continuing efforts to obtain “production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China.” However, the report introduced a new description of the purpose of this effort, stating that it was intended to “help Iran reach its goal of having an indigenous nerve agent production capability.” [12] This new language was included in all subsequent Sec. 721 reports. The exact nature of the indigenous nerve agent production capability was unspecified but could refer to the ability to manufacture the agents and all required precursors in-country, thereby freeing the program from the constraints of foreign export controls. Previous reports had simply stated that Iran was “seeking foreign equipment and expertise to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure” and chemicals “that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program.” [13]
In February 2003, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Vice-Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, stated that Iran “maintains a stockpile of chemical warfare agents and may have weaponized some of them into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs.” [14] By noting that Iran “may have” weaponized its CW agent stockpile, Vice-Admiral Lowell’s statement appears to represent the first public reduction in certainty regarding Iran’s possession of a CW arsenal on the part of U.S. intelligence officials.
Nevertheless, the generally high level of confidence in intelligence reports on Iran’s alleged CW programs seems to have informed public statements by at least one U.S. official. In a statement at the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 2003, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Mr. Stephen G. Rademaker, stated: “[t]he United States believes Iran already has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents. We also believe it has made some nerve agents. We have discussed our concerns with Iran, but those concerns have not been dispelled. Those concerns need to be resolved rapidly and in the most transparent and cooperative manner possible.” [15] Although the language used was consistent with that of the most recent CIA report on the matter, its repetition in the context of an OPCW meeting was unprecedented and provoked a forceful Iranian response. This statement was one of a series of similarly controversial statements made in international forums by U.S. officials. [16]
2003 – 2007: Declining Certainty
In the Sec. 721 report covering the first half of 2003, released in November 2003, we see the beginnings of a process of declining certainty associated with descriptions of Iranian CW activity and capabilities. The report states that Iran “likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents” retreating slightly from the previous bald assertion that Iran “has” a CW stockpile. [17] A further reduction is seen in the Sec. 721 report for the second half of 2003, released in November 2004. This report confines itself to stating that “Iran may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents.” [18]
Finally, in the most recent Sec. 721 report, publicly released in May 2006, but covering activities in 2004, all reference to stockpiles and delivery systems was removed. All that remained was the statement that Iran “continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could further Tehran’s efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents.” [19] Although Sec. 721 reports are supposed to be released annually, the DNI has not publicly released an update since May 2006, and it is therefore not possible to determine whether or not DNI has maintained or modified its 2004 position. The changes in the CIA’s public reports alone are insufficient to reach a conclusion about the wider U.S. intelligence community’s contemporary assessment of Iran’s CW program or its capabilities. Fortunately, although there have been no further releases from the CIA, we do have access to the assessments of at least two other U.S. government agencies for the period 2004 to 2007.
The 2004 and 2005 assessments by the DIA limited their descriptions of chemical and biological weapons activities to the general observation that“[n]umerous states have chemical and biological warfare programs. Some have produced and weaponized agents.” [20] Although the assessments made no specific reference to Iranian CW activities, they did state that: “[w]e judge Iran is devoting significant resources to its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.” [21] Based on the CIA’s Sec. 721 reports and previous statements by DIA, it seems reasonable to presume that Iran was one of the “numerous states” and that the WMD programs included a CW effort.
In February 2006, the DIA Director, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, testified that “we believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development.” [22] This statement, the first directly addressing Iranian CW activities since February 2003, was considerably less detailed than the previous statement and could be seen as implying that Iranian CBW activities are limited to development and do not include production, stockpiling, or deployment. Interpreting the 2006 statement’s meaning is complicated by the conflation of CW and BW capabilities.
 In January 2007, the DIA further limited its public assessment of Iran’s CW capability by merely noting that “Iran has a large and growing commercial chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability.” [23] The same statement firmly asserts that “Iran is pursuing development of biological weapons” and that “Russia continues research and development that could support its chemical and biological warfare programs.” [24] In this context, the absence of any statement alleging the existence of an Iranian CW program stands out and supports the inference that DIA no longer maintains that Iran possesses an active CW program that includes production or stockpiling of CW agents and munitions. At this point, the DIA appears to be drawing attention only to the existence of a latent capability for production of CW agents inherent in Iran’s rapidly developing civilian chemical industry.
Determining whether or not this DIA assessment reflects that of the wider intelligence community is complicated by the reduced frequency with which U.S. officials make any mention of, or allusion to, Iranian CW activities. One recent public statement that can be interpreted as an oblique reference to Iranian activities, and appears to support the DIA stance, was made in November 2007 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Paula A. DeSutter. In her statement before the OPCW, Ms. DeSutter noted that it was important for the OPCW:
… not to dismiss the possibility that some States Parties may have made preparations for possible future production of chemical agents, including retaining a CW production “mobilization” capability. This could take the form of designating existing industrial facilities for potential CW production, or, in the most alarming situation, deliberatively establishing dual-use facilities, under military or government control, that nominally are for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, but can be quickly converted to CW-related production if directed. [25]
This statement, which seems to have at least one and possibly more CWC states-party in mind, is a little stronger than the DIA statement but in essence draws the same conclusion, namely that a CWC state-party could possess a latent CW production capability. Of course, such latency is true of any state with a large chemical industry. Although DeSutter’s statement does not name Iran specifically, it is reasonable to infer that Iran is an intended subject of the statement. Despite its general tone and use of conditionals such as “may” and “could,” the statement is clearly not intended hypothetically. The reference to dual-use facilities is somewhat problematic, as no indications are offered concerning which dual-use chemicals might be seen as signs of a “mobilization” capability. Still, it is likely that the chemicals in question are listed in the CWC schedules or on the Australia Group control lists.
Possible Reasons for Change
It appears that the U.S. intelligence community and, more generally, the U.S. government has felt the need to make significant changes in its public representations of the Iranian CW program. One possible reason is that the intelligence available to U.S. analysts has changed, leading to a more cautious characterization of the Iranian program. This is a matter that is virtually impossible for those outside the intelligence community to judge. It may be noted, however, that the receipt of new information appears to have been the reason for the intelligence community’s December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate finding that Iran had ceased activities in 2003 specifically related to designing and building nuclear weapons. Thus it is possible that new data similarly underlie the modification of the U.S. assessment of Iran’s CW program.
An additional factor that undoubtedly contributed to the change, however, is the greater caution and care being applied to U.S. intelligence assessments after Operation Iraqi Freedom. The serious inaccuracies in the intelligence assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs prior to that conflict were revealed publicly in January 2004. From this point forward, the U.S. intelligence community may have sought to avoid the risk of repeating its error by overstating the certainty of intelligence regarding the Iranian CW program. Thus, even if the intelligence data in hand might not have changed, such caution would favor the inclusion of conditionals such as “may” or “possibly” that would indicate varying levels of uncertainty, and, possibly, in more recent reports the removal of all references to Iranian CW stockpiles. [26] It is noteworthy that these shifts began to appear in documents published in late 2004, well after the revelations concerning the intelligence failure in Iraq. [27]
This trend toward caution on the part of U.S. intelligence analysts was undoubtedly reinforced by criticisms directed at them by the commissions investigating pre-war U.S. intelligence efforts. [28] Indeed, in February 2005, in the wake of the commission reports, The Washington Post reported that “the intelligence community is conducting a broad review of its Iran assessments.” [29]
In September 2004, it may be noted, the U.S. intelligence community also revised its characterization of BW-relevant activities in Cuba, on the basis of more cautious analysis of pre-existing data. Abandoning a 2002 U.S. statement that Cuba had “at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort,” the new assessment offered the more cautious statement that the intelligence community continued to believe that “Cuba has the technical capability to pursue some aspects of an offensive biological weapons program.” [30] Reporting on the change, The New York Times quoted a U.S. intelligence official as stating that, “The new assessment is the product of a fresh, hard look at the reporting,” adding that new standards for judging intelligence were “exceptionally stringent in how we treat our sources, evidence and analysis.” [31]
Another possible, but less convincing, reason for the changes in presentation regarding Iran’s CW activities could have been the desire to fit CW into a broader political campaign concerning Iran’s WMD programs. For example, the Bush Administration might have desired to maximize the focus on Iran’s nuclear activities by reducing the attention given to other WMD, such as CW. This argument is not supported, however, by the character of reporting on Iranian BW activities, which continues to feature statements such as, “DIA believes Iran is pursuing development of biological weapons.” [32] Furthermore, pressure on Iran’s nuclear program would potentially be increased if it were seen as part of a larger pattern of Iranian non-compliance with international treaty obligations.
Conclusions
Although the more marked changes in the U.S. intelligence community’s assessments of Iranian CW activities began to be presented publicly in mid-2006, so far the new stance does appear not to have had a significant impact on public discourse in the United States, and it is unclear when it will begin to do so. At a House hearing in late January 2007, for example, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) made a point of reading onto the record her understanding of the Iranian CW program: “On chemical weapons, government, private, and intelligence sources report that Iran is pursuing a program to develop and stockpile these weapons. Reports state that Iran already may have stockpiled blister, blood, choking and nerve agents and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them, which they had previously manufactured.” [33] According to an October 2007 report by the Congressional Research Service, “official U.S. reports and testimony continue to state that Iran is seeking a self-sufficient CW infrastructure, and that it ‘may have already’ stockpiled blister, blood, choking and nerve agents—and the bombs and shells to deliver them.” [34]
None of these statements reflect the most recent positions adopted in unclassified briefings by the DIA or the DNI. It is possible that an updated DNI Sec. 721 report might have a greater public effect, as DNI reports appear to attract more attention than DIA reports. Even so, it is possible that the idea of Iranian chemical weapons has been so firmly established in the public mind that changes in publicly available intelligence will have no appreciable effect.
To the extent that they have addressed the question of Iranian CW activities at all since 2004, not all foreign governments and commentators have adopted the more cautious U.S. assessment. As recently as January 14, 2008, Israeli Military Intelligence research chief Brigadier-General Yossi Kuperwasser responded to a question from the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee asking whether Iran might provide chemical
weapons to Hezbollah by observing that “the possibility certainly exists.” [35] Kuperwasser’s statement certainly suggests that the Israeli government still believes that Iran has CW stockpiles.
Markus Binder – Independent Consultant
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 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] Itamar Eichner, “Iran Admits to Possessing Chemical Weapons,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, November 20, 1998, FBIS document FTS19981120000618.
[2] Examples of NGOs and think tanks publishing and testifying on the issue of Iranian CW programs include, but are by no means limited to, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), the Center for Strategic and Intelligence Studies (CSIS), GlobalSecurity.org, Jane’s Information Group, and the Wisconsin Project.
[3] Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2001), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/acq1997.html. [View Article]
[4] Department of Defense, Proliferation Threat and Response (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 27, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm#iran. [View Article]
[5] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2000 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2001), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/jan_jun2000.htm. [View Article]
[6] “Statement by A. Norman Schindler, Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services to Review Iranian Development of Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and to Assess U.S. Policy to Deter Iran Weapons Development, September 21, 2000, p. 11.”
[7] Ibid, p. 13.
[8] Statement by John A. Lauder, Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Russian Proliferation to Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs,” October 5, 2000, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/lauder_WMD_100500.html. [View Article]
[9] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 2000 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2002), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2000.htm.
[View Article]
[10] Department of Defense, Proliferation Threat and Response, p. 36, see source in [4].
[11] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2001), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2000.htm. [View Article]
[12] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2001 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2001), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/jan_jun2001.htm. [View Article]
[13] From 1997 to 1999 the phrasing “more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure” was used without change. For both 2000 reports the language adopted was “that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program.” From June 2001 the phrasing changed repeatedly as outlined above. Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 30 December 1999 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2000), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec1999.htm; [View Article] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2000, see source in [5].
[14] Vice-Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, “Statement for the Record before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” February 11, 2003, p. 12
[15] “United States of America National Statement to the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention by Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker,” April 28, 2003, http://www.opcw.org/cwcrevcon/doc/NAT/UnitedStates_s.pdf. [View Article]
[16] See for example, “Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons Convention RevCon Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,” November 19, 2001, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/janjuly/6231.htm. [View Article]
[17] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, November 2003), p. 3, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/jan_jun2003.pdf. [View Article]
[18] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2004, November 2004), p. 3, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/721report_july_dec2003.pdf.
[View Article]
[19] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 31 December 2004 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006), p. 3, http://www.dni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf. [View Article]
[20] Vice-Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” February 24, 2004, p. 8, http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/Testimony.pdf.; [View Article] Vice-Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” February 16, 2005, p. 10, http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/DIA_DR_WWT_20050216U.pdf. [View Article]
[21] Ibid.
[22] Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” February 28, 2006, p. 10, http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement24.pdf. [View Article]
[23] Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” January 11, 2007, p. 14, http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingid=2467&witnessId=5974. [View Article]
[24] Ibid.
[25] “Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Paula A. DeSutter,” United States Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, November 6, 2007, p. 3, http://www.opcw.org/docs/csp/csp12/en/c12nat04(e).pdf. [View Article]
[26] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 31 December 2004, p. 3, see source in [19]; Maples, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” January 11, 2007, p. 14, see source in [23].
[27] See, for example, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, p. 3, see source in [18].
[28] Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html; [View Article] Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html. [View Article]
[29] See Dafna Linzer and Walter Pincus, “U.S. Reviewing its Intelligence on Iran,” Washington Post, February 12, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17526-2005Feb11.html. [View Article]
[30] Steven R. Weisman, “In Stricter Study, U.S. Scales Back Claim on Cuba Arms,” New York Times, September 18, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/18/international/americas/18intel.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. [View Article]
[31] Ibid.
[32] Maples, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” January 11, 2007, p. 14, see source in [23].
[33] Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subject: Understanding the Iran Crisis, January 31, 2007.
[34] Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, CRS-2007-FDT-1218, October 29, 2007, p. 22.
[35] Gideon Alon and Uri Ash, “MI Official: Iran May Provide Hezbollah with Chemical Weapons,” Haaretz, January 16, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=453411&contrassID=13. [View Article]
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