At the end of 2007, the Russian military conducted a new series of missile launches: two launches
of the Sineva submarine-based strategic missile (SLBM) from a Delta IV class submarine, followed by the second test of the new RS-24 land-based, MIRVed (having multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) road-mobile strategic missile. Russian President Vladimir Putin called these launches, which took place just before the new year and Russian Orthodox Christmas, “pleasant and beautiful holiday fireworks.” [1]

The SLBM Launch
The Russian Navy conducted two launches of the Sineva (Russian designation “R-29RGU”), on December 17 and 25, from the Tula, a Delta IV class strategic, ballistic missile, nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN). The Sineva, a liquid-fuel MIRVed SLBM was built by the Makeyev Design Bureau in Miass, Chelyabinsk oblast. It has been under development since the late 1990s and was intended to replace the SS-N-23 (R-29RM) SLBM, whose warranty periods were set to expire. Work on the new missile accelerated in the early 2000s, and it officially entered service in early 2007 (see “Update: Russia’s Recent Test of New Submarine-Launched Missile Succeeds,” WMD Insights, September 2007). The Navy conducted both launches from underwater and, according to the official statement of the Navy’s Main Staff, in both cases “the front section of the missile arrived at the test range at the appropriate time.” [2]

The Tula, the SSBN that launched the missile, is a Delta IV-class strategic sub (the fourth to be built in this class) that entered service in 1987. According to Russian media sources, the Tula had recently undergone a major overhaul as part of a comprehensive program, adopted in 2004, to modernize and retain Delta IV submarines after two consecutive failed SLBM launches in 2004. [3] There is some evidence suggesting, however, that the program to extend the service lives of strategic submarines was adopted considerably earlier – at a meeting of the Security Council (a body of the Russian government similar to the National Security Council in the United States) in April 1999 – at the same time as the decision to begin development of the Bulava SLBM for the new Borey-class submarine. [4]

The two successful Sineva launches, no matter how routine, demonstrated that the program is very much on track, in contrast to the Borey-Bulava program, which continues to face multiple delays and whose Bulava SSBN experienced a series of failures in 2005-6, before its first fully successful test in June 2007. Former Chief of Staff of the Navy Viktor Kravchenko commented that the successful Sineva tests would allow the Navy to continue to rely on the Delta IV SSBNs, while the Bulava SLBM is being developed. [5]

The RS-24 ICBM Test
Of greater significance for Russian security, on December 25, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) test-fired the RS-24 for the second time. The RS-24 is a MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). [6] Following the pattern of the first test of the system in May 2007, the SRF conducted the recent test from a road-mobile launcher, its preferred mode of deployment for the new missile. [7] According to a statement by Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serduykov, the missile carried three warheads. [8] This is in contrast to the first test, which apparently only simulated multiple warheads. From as early as 1996, experts have speculated that the missile can carry up to seven light warheads. [9]

Although the RS-24 is a MIRVed ICBM, it is very similar to the single-warhead Topol-M in its general design and dimensions. The RS-24 is often considered a MIRVed version of Topol-M, but with a larger first stage to avoid violating the START I Treaty’s prohibition on increasing the number of warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles. [10] The ability to place MIRVs on the Topol-M, with minimal modifications of the missile, was openly anticipated as early as the mid-1990s by then-Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Vladimir Yakovlev and Topol-M’s chief designer Lev Solomonov, who stated that this was simply a matter of “time and money.” [11]

Speaking after the successful December 25 launch, SRF Commander- in-Chief Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov disclosed that he expected the SRF to adopt the RS-24 for full-scale deployment in approximately three years:
“[We] will need to conduct several more test launches, probably no more than five, before the RS-24 ICBM can be adopted. In terms of timing, this could take up to three years.” [12] Thus, the new missile is scheduled to enter service in 2010-11, after the expiration of the START I Treaty in December 2009, and would not be subject to its restrictions.

According to an anonymous SRF representative, the RS-24 is intended to replace the older liquid-fuel MIRVed RS-18 (SS-19) and RS-20 (SS-18) ICBMs and “in the future RS-24, along with the single-warhead ICBM RS-12Ms (Topol-M) will become the core of the strike assets of the SRF.” [13] The solid-fuel RS-24, however, will not fully substitute for liquid-fuel SS-19s and SS-18s, which have very large throw-weights. For that reason, the SRF continues to lobby for a new liquid-fuel MIRVed ICBM. In September 2007, former SRF Chief of Staff Colonel-General (retired) Viktor Yesin stated that the draft of the long-term plan for the SRF mentions the possibility of procuring a new liquid-fuel ICBM some time after 2012. If such a contract is awarded, said Yesin, the new missile should be ready for deployment seven to eight years later.

Yesin explained that the decision about whether the SRF will buy the new missile depends to a large extent on whether the United States decides to deploy a large-scale missile defense system capable of affecting Russia’s deterrence capability. According to Yesin, if the United States decides against deploying such a system, Russia’s currently planned and deployed solid-fuel ICBMs should be sufficient. [14]

Sergey Ivanov: No Plan to Increase Production of Strategic Missiles
At the end of 2007, the SRF provided fresh details on its acquisition of new strategic weapons. According to Solovtsov, the second unit – consisting of three road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs – entered service in the Teykovo missile division. (On the entry into service of the first unit in December 2006, see “Russian Strategic Forces Meet Success and Setbacks at Year End,” WMD Insights, February 2007.) Moreover, in 2007, the Tatishchevo missile division deployed four additional silo-based Topol-M ICBMs. [15] Solovstov also stated that the weapons and equipment for the third road-mobile unit, to complete a regiment, had already been produced, and the transition of the entire regiment from the Topol to the Topol-M ICBM would be completed in 2008. [16] The deployment of seven additional ICBMs in 2007 is consistent with the number deployed in previous years. Silo-based Topol-M ICBMs have been deployed at the rate of four per year for several years, and the first unit of road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs – also consisting of three launchers with missiles – entered service a year earlier.

Speaking at a meeting of the scientific and technical council of the Military-Industrial Commission, First Vice-Premier and former Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov responded to criticism from several Soviet-era leaders of defense enterprises by explaining that the Putin government objected to accelerated production of strategic weapons. “We believe,” he stated, “that we do not need 30 Topol-Ms a year. Of course, we would not mind having them, but this would mean that we would need to cut social programs, housing programs, and other things.” He added that the annual deployment of six to seven new missiles is sufficient for the SRF. [17] At the same time, Ivanov emphasized that “military capability, especially nuclear capability, should be sufficient if we want to be at a [safe] level or even merely independent. No one likes the weak, no one listens to them, everyone abuses them, and when we have parity, others talk to us differently.” [18]

His statement was widely interpreted as a call for restoring “parity” – approximate equality of Russian and U.S. nuclear forces – which was the guiding principle of Soviet nuclear policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Dmitriy Rogozin, Russia’s newly appointed Russian representative to NATO and former prominent member of the Duma, explained, however, that Ivanov “most likely” meant “strategic balance, which can exist at unequal levels of nuclear arsenals” rather than equality of strategic arsenals. [19]

Indeed, both the steady pattern of deploying only a limited number of new strategic weapons annually and the explicit rejection of calls for a radical increase in production indicate that the Russian government continues to practice restraint in its nuclear posture and procurement policy, notwithstanding its nationalistic and, occasionally, even threatening rhetoric. Rather, efforts appear to be concentrated on research and development programs to provide Russia with more modern armaments capable of ensuring robust deterrence with a minimum number of deployed nuclear forces.

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies