 During Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s November 2007 visit to Moscow, Russian and Indian officials met to discuss the future construction of four new nuclear reactors in Kudankulam, located in India’s Tamil Nadu province.[1] The negotiations were conducted in the framework of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in the nuclear sphere, signed by head of Russia’s Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) Sergey Kiriyenko and India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) chief, Anil Kakodkar, on January 25, 2007. In addition to expansion of projects at Kudankulam, where Russia’s Atomstroyexport is currently building two 1,000-megawatt (MW) power reactors, the MoU covers eventual construction of up to 10 nuclear power units, some at other sites in India. [2]
Russian President Vladimir Putin, a guest of honor at India’s January 2007 Republic Day celebrations, reiterated his commitment to assist India’s burgeoning civilian nuclear program, while maintaining Russia’s nonproliferation obligations. Commenting to the Indian press, Putin declared:
We are ready to support our Indian friends while simultaneously complying with the obligations Russia took on in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For this reason we are holding talks with our Indian partners and with the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In any event, I consider that cooperation in this sphere is very promising. [3]
The proposed intensification of nuclear cooperation comes as Russia hopes for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to approve an exemption for India from the group’s guidelines. Since 1992, NSG rules have barred member countries from undertaking nuclear cooperation with states like India that are not recognized as nuclear weapons states under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) unless they place all of their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy (IAEA) inspections, an arrangement known as “full scope safeguards” (FSS). (Application of FSS in India would mean that none of the country’s nuclear facilities could be used to support India’s nuclear weapon program.) The United States has championed an exemption for India from the FSS rule in order to implement a joint statement on civil nuclear cooperation with India, signed by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush in July 2005. (For more on the U.S.-India nuclear deal, see “Commercial Motivations Add Impetus to Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement,” WMD Insights, May 2007.) Russia, which has been seeking to expand nuclear sales to India for many years, has strongly supported the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the required NSG exemption, which would permit all NSG members to open nuclear trade with India. [4] Meanwhile, Moscow has laid a solid foundation that would allow it to commence exports once NSG restrictions are finally lifted. [5]
Background
Moscow’s nuclear cooperation with New Delhi dates back to the 1970s, when the United States and Canada withdrew from the Indian nuclear market in the wake of India’s 1974 nuclear test explosion; Washington and Ottawa accused India of having improperly used their imports to produce plutonium for the test. In 1976, the Soviet Union, India’s long-time political patron, stepped in to supply heavy water needed for the operation of two Canadian-supplied reactors at Rajasthan.
In 1988, Moscow committed to construct two 1,000 MW reactors at Kudankulam. Consistent with the NSG rules at the time, Moscow required, despite Indian resistance, that the reactors be placed under IAEA safeguards. (There was no NSG requirement at the time that India place all of its facilities under the agency’s monitoring). Moscow also added a further restriction in the Kudankulam agreement by requiring that spent fuel produced in the Soviet-supplied reactors be returned to the Soviet Union, thereby ensuring that India would not have access to the plutonium it contained. [6]
In 1992, Moscow supported the strengthening of the NSG safeguards provision to restrict members’ future nuclear exports solely to countries with FSS. It took this step even though this threatened to cut off prospects for additional nuclear sales to India during the tumultuous decade following the break-up of the Soviet Union, when the Russian nuclear industry was desperately seeking to make ends meet. While Russia recommitted itself to the FSS provision at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference by agreeing to the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” adopted at the meeting, Russian nuclear officials have sometimes appeared to view the FSS rule as a hurdle to advancing the country’s civilian nuclear interests in India and have been accused of not always abiding by the letter of the FSS requirement.[7]
In February 2001, for example, Russia shipped 58 tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel to power two U.S.-built 210 MW boiling water reactors at Tarapur, in India’s state of Maharashtra. [8] Russian officials claimed that the transaction was exempt from the FSS rule under the rule’s safety exception. They argued that provision of the LEU was essential to forestall a potential safety hazard that would have arisen from India’s plan to use untested domestically produced mixed oxide (MOX) fuel if LEU fuel was not made available. [9] The shipment triggered a strong negative reaction from the NSG, and the United States offered up the harshest condemnation.[10] The pressure apparently worked, because in a December 2004 interview with the Hindu, Rosatom head Aleksandr Rumyantsev stated that Russia’s commitment to the NSG prevented it from providing further fuel supplies to Tarapur and that the 2001 shipment should not have been taken as a precedent for “usual cooperation.” In a discussion of the fuel problems Tarapur was facing, Rumyantsev lamented, “Yes, I know. This is the pain of my soul. But what can we do?” [11]
The construction of the Kudankulam reactors was seen by NSG countries to be in conflict with the FSS rule. On November 6, 2001, more than nine years after the FSS rule went into effect and after more than a decade of negotiation, Russian nuclear industry officials finalized plans with New Dehli for construction of two reactors at the Kudankulam site. To justify the project to their counterparts from NSG countries, Russian diplomats argued that because the initial Kudankulam agreement was signed in 1988, the reactor deal was not subject to the 1992 FSS requirement, noting that the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines state that the rule “does not apply to agreements or contracts drawn up on or prior to April 3, 1992.” [12] Some observers questioned whether the deal was eligible for the exemption, however, in view of the fact that it was not finalized until 2001.[13]
With the announcement of the U.S.-India deal in 2005, however, Moscow perceived potential for a profound shift in the position of NSG members towards nuclear cooperation with India. Thus, in 2006, even before the NSG decided whether or not to exempt India from the FSS rule, Rosatom officials agreed to supply 60 tons of LEU fuel for the U.S-supplied Tarapur reactors. Moscow may have hoped that the transaction would cement nuclear trade relations with New Delhi ahead of other potential nuclear vendors. The 60 tons of LEU fuel is a sufficient quantity of fuel to power the reactors until 2011. [14]
Thus, where India is concerned, in Russia’s nuclear export calculus the drive for nuclear
markets has often trumped nonproliferation. In a January 2007 statement, Rosatom head Kiriyenko summed up Moscow’s position, “Russia believes that India has an unimpeachable reputation in the nuclear nonproliferation sphere, and therefore we are going to push for an end to corresponding sanctions against India.” [15]
The NSG, it may be noted, has decided to defer consideration of the requested exemption until the IAEA and India reach an agreement on applying IAEA safeguards to India’s civil nuclear program; the country’s military program will remain outside the IAEA system. These talks have stalled because of India’s effort to condition the indefinite continuation of safeguards on its civil nuclear facilities on promises that it will have an uninterrupted supply of fuel for the facilities it places under IAEA monitoring. To date, the IAEA has rejected this stance, insisting that safeguards, once applied, must continue in perpetuity, even in the event of a fuel cut-off. [16]
Units 1 and 2 at Kudankulam Delayed “Amid the Usual Teething Troubles”
While Russia’s construction of Kudankulam units 1 and 2 has been heralded as the pinnacle of bilateral nuclear cooperation to date, the project has reportedly been plagued by delays. Upon conclusion of the Kudankulam agreement in 2001, the units were expected to go online in December 2007 and December 2008, respectively.[17] An Interfax  story from October 16, 2007, however, quoted Rosatom’s Kiriyenko as saying that the Russian government’s temporary loss of a controlling share in Atomstroyexport triggered setbacks at Kudankulam, further noting that, at India’s request, Atomstroyexport intended to speed up construction. [18] As of November 2007, the units showed a completion status of 82% and 72%, respectively. [19] On December 13, 2007, India’s Business Standard reported that the nuclear power station at Kudankulam had not yet begun even test operations and quoted officials from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) as faulting Russia for setbacks in transferring the essential equipment, which delayed start up of the units to December 2008 and 2009. “This is the first time we are setting up light water reactors of this size, amid the usual teething troubles,” an NPCIL spokesperson stated. [20]
Construction delays notwithstanding, the parties appear to be working out the mechanics of fuel supply for the units. Under a provision of the 2001 Kudankulam agreement, India will have the right to extract the plutonium from, or “reprocess,” spent reactor fuel, provided this is done in IAEA safeguarded facilities. [21] (This appears to be a significant departure from the terms initially agreed to in 1988, under which India was required to return spent fuel from the Kudankulam reactors to Russia.) [22] On November 28, 2007, India’s Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s office, Prithviraj Chavan, stated that Moscow gave a “sovereign guarantee” of a lifetime fuel supply for the reactors, to be covered by IAEA safeguards.[23] (Indian officials, however, have sometimes overstated the commitments made by the other party in bilateral nuclear understandings, and it is not clear whether, as Charon’s comment implies, Russia has relinquished the right to terminate fuel supplies if India conducts another nuclear test.) [24]
Rosatom officials have also approached New Delhi with proposals for India to invest in the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) at Angarsk in lieu of payments for fuel for Kudankulam. Reportedly these proposals have been conditioned on the NSG’s granting the FSS an exemption for India. [25] The IUEC is a mechanism to provide participating states assured supplies of nuclear fuel, with the intent of discouraging them from building indigenous enrichment facilities – facilities that could provide them the capability to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for
nuclear weapons. India’s status as a non-party to the NPT does not appear to preclude it from taking part in the IUEC, because Russia has left the participation criteria deliberately vague. (See “Russia Begins to Implement Initiative on International Uranium Enrichment Centers,” WMD Insights, December 2006/January 2007, and “Russia’s Nuclear Industry’s Domination of Former Enterprises Encounters Challenges,” WMD Insights, October 2007.)
Singh Survives “Concerted Attack” Over “Missing” Russian Reactors
After signing the November 2001 agreement for the two Kudankulam reactors that were exempted under the NSG guidelines, Indian nuclear officials reportedly began expressing interest in construction of two to four additional units at the Kudankulam site, much to the enthusiasm of their Russian counterparts. Russia’s then Vice Premier Ilya Klebanov reportedly indicated to the press that the parties would soon consummate an agreement.[26] However, because NSG members refused to rescind the FSS rule for India at Russia’s request, Moscow could not move forward with reactor sales without further compromising its nonproliferation obligations. [27]
While there have been some indications that Russian and Indian officials initially explored whether the additional reactors could be “grandfathered” under the 1988 agreement, this idea was dropped.[28] Therefore, Moscow’s discussions of additional reactor sales with New Delhi saw no real progress until the initiation and significant advancement of the U.S.-India deal, which opened the possibility of an open-ended NSG exemption for India. The January 2007 nuclear cooperation MoU, expressing Russia’s intention to proceed with discussions to build the reactors in Kudankulam, gave no indication that Moscow would consider commencing exports until NSG restrictions were lifted.
When Putin’s January 2007 visit yielded no visible progress on the reactors, India’s newspaper The Telegraph faulted New Delhi’s “self-induced fears of negative U.S. reaction” for obstructing conclusion of a more substantial agreement. The agreement, the paper argued, could reinforce India’s negotiating position with the United States on their detailed bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement because, “Moscow has offered India full transfer of nuclear technology, assured lifetime supply of fuel for the nuclear power plants and the freedom to reprocess the spent fuel – all restricted or prohibited under the Hyde Act [the December 2006 U.S. law that sets out requirements for the U.S.-India agreement].” Therefore, the paper continued, the Russian agreement could potentially “become a model agreement to negotiate with the other suppliers” and could strengthen India’s “bargaining position.” [29] A January 26, 2007, editorial in The Hindu similarly argued that, upon conclusion of the agreement, “Moscow, in effect, will be demonstrating its belief in the irrelevance of the NSG’s prohibitions for a country like India.” [30]
Moscow and New Delhi had been expected to solidify an operational construction agreement during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s November 2007 visit to Moscow. However, when Singh left Moscow empty-handed, commenting that “an inter-governmental agreement … [was] in progress,” he set-off a firestorm of speculation.[31] The Hindu reported that the Singh government had backed down from signing the agreement for additional reactors. The paper quoted Russian sources as saying that India’s refusal “came as a surprise” to the Russian delegation and that “the talks had been hard, but we thrashed out all details and took care of legal traps.” [32] On November 15, 2007, the Times of India reported that Singh told Putin that India wanted to wait until a “full and clear” NSG exemption materialized – and Putin reportedly agreed to wait. [33] Because of his perceived failure to sign the agreement, however, a December 4, 2007, issue of India’s The Asian Age reported that Singh “faced ‘concerted attack’” from members of India’s upper house of parliament (the Rajya Sabha). Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Yashwant Sinha argued that the Singh government had “come under U.S. pressure and did not sign the agreement,” even though Russia was ready to breach its commitment to the NSG – a charge that Singh was quick to rebut as “false propaganda.” [34]
A December 3, 2007 editorial in the Indian Express sided with Singh in dismissing the discussion of “missing Russian reactors” as a “gigantic self deception” and a “conspiracy theory.” The paper stressed that both Russia and France had admitted to facing the same NSG roadblocks in cooperation with India as early as 2004, and argued that the January 2007 agreement with Russia was signed as the Singh government tried to “appease the communists” and “create the optics of a special nuclear relationship with Moscow.” [35] The trade journal NuclearFuel revealed additional details of the November 2007 meeting in Moscow. Russian officials reportedly wanted the language of the agreement to stipulate its entry into force upon India’s acquisition of an NSG exemption, while Indian officials desired that the agreement “be written so as to be valid whether or not the NSG lifts sanctions.” NuclearFuel further quoted Russian sources as saying that the final decision to delay conclusion of the agreement was Russia’s, not India’s, decision. [36] Therefore, speculation and past Russian deviations aside, there is no evidence to suggest Moscow is now willing to break the NSG consensus on the India issue. Furthermore, the symbolic value for India’s future negotiations with the U.S. of inking a “firm” agreement with Russia for additional Kudankulam reactors appears to have been overstated for the time being.
Conclusion: Prospects for Russian-Indian Nuclear Cooperation
The Russian press has not yet offered a substantial analysis of the implications of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement for Russian-Indian nuclear cooperation. Instead, it has merely speculated that the delay in its finalization may potentially cause New Delhi to “turn [its] back on Moscow” and give priority to cooperation with Washington. [37] However, the Indian press has hinted that Russia should fear rivalry in the nuclear sector from a different competitor – France.[38] A January 2008 visit from French President Nicolas Sarkozy to New Delhi for the Republic Day celebrations was expected to yield a nuclear cooperation agreement, and France is reportedly ready to advance sales of as many as six reactors if and when the NSG restrictions are lifted. [39] Indian sources tried to exploit potential Russian anxieties surrounding the French President’s visit by suggesting that Moscow consider sending a high level official, such as Putin or Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov, to New Delhi just prior to the trip. [40]
However, prospects for a signed agreement with the French prior to the conclusion of the India-IAEA negotiations over IAEA safeguards appear to be dim. After French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner met with Indian officials in December to pave the way for Sarkozy’s visit, a top Indian Ministry of External Affairs official indicated that it would be unlikely the two countries would reach a nuclear accord during the Republic Day visit. A January 2, 2008, Hindustan Times article stated, “A Russia-type situation has been reached with the French on civil nuclear cooperation.” [41] On January 22, The Hindu, relying on “informed sources,” stated that while France and India had negotiated an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, they would not sign the accord until India concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and received a special exemption from the NSG.[42] Meanwhile, Zubkov’s visit to New Delhi has been slated for February. [43]
Moscow does not appear to be losing sleep over competition on the Indian nuclear market. Russian nuclear industry officials believe that the outcome of the U.S.-India deal will be positive for Russia, and the industry can “expect to gain 25-30% of the Indian nuclear energy market and build around 10 reactors.” [44] Moreover, while Russian commentators have highlighted the competitive advantage of Russia’s nuclear reactors, which “cost less than their Western counterparts, and are simpler and are easier to service,” they also note that, in any event, Russia’s export production capacity is limited.[45] Additionally, Moscow’s offers of joint work on fast neutron reactors and potential participation in the IUEC provide added incentives for New Delhi to pursue reactor purchases from Russia. [46]
In spite of inevitable problems in their nuclear engagement, prospects for Russo-Indian nuclear cooperation remain promising. Indian papers have complained that the delays in construction of Kudankulam units 1 and 2 and failure to reach a concrete agreement on four additional units jeopardizes the commitment by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India to generate as much as 20,000 MW by 2020. [47] However, since delays in joint projects have by now become a characteristic of the bilateral relationship, Russia appears to be comfortable holding out for the NSG exemption, which it unequivocally supports behind the scenes. Meanwhile, although New Delhi may ponder diversification in nuclear, defense, and other forms of cooperation, the idea of snubbing Moscow rarely, if ever, appears to register as a policy option. More than rhetoric of a strategic partnership built on indiscriminate economic transactions, Russia has offered India a broad friendship of equals, an offer which New Delhi knows that Washington will have difficulty matching. A 2007 editorial in The Hindu signaled that some Indian quarters will not forget Moscow’s loyalty, because “Russia’s nuclear
supply relationship with India has been
characterized by reliability, predictability, and constructive spirit.” [48]
Anya Loukianova – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
|
|
|
 |
 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “Russia Wants New Nuclear Contracts in India – Ivanov,” RIA Novosti, November 26, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071126/89638632.html. [View Article]
[2] “Rosatom and Atomic Energy Department of India Have Signed a Memorandum on Cooperation,” Federal Agency of Nuclear Energy press release, January 25, 2007, http://www.rosatom.com/en/news/3588_25.01.2007; [View Article] “Rossiya: desyat atomnykh reaktorov dlya Indii” [Russia: Ten Nuclear Reactors for India], RIA Novosti, January 30, 2007 [http://www.rosatom.ru/news/3632_30.01.2007].
[3] Interview for Indian Television Channel Doordarshan and Press Trust of India News Agency, President of Russia website, January 18, 2007, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/01/18/0726_type82916_117121.shtml. [View Article]
[4] See Siddharth Varadarajan, “India, Russia Inching Towards Fresh Nuclear Cooperation,” Hindu, July 12, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/2005/12/07/stories/2005120714050101.htm; [View Article] Siddharth Varadarajan, “No Place to Hide as Nuclear Deal Enters Last Lap,” March 24, 2007, http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2007/03/no-place-to-hide-as-nuclear-deal-enters.html. [View Article]
[5] Mark Hibbs and Ann MacLachlan, “NSG Won’t Allow More VVER Exports to India Without New Agreements,” Nucleonics Week, November 15, 2007; Mark Hibbs and Ann MacLachlan, “NSG Members Asked France, Russia About Their Negotiations with India,” NuclearFuel, December 3, 2007.
[6] See “India Nuclear Chronology:1988,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/2296_2819.html; [View Article] Neel Patri, “Gorbachev, Gandhi Sign Pact to Finance VVER-1000s in India,” Nucleonics Week, November 24, 1988; “The Agreement on the Construction of 4 Nuclear Reactors in India is a Serious Victory for This Segment of the World Market,” RIA Novosti, January 30, 2001, http://www.rosatom.ru/en/news/3638_30.01.2007. [View Article]
[7] See 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex, http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm; [View Article] Nuclear Suppliers Group, “Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers,” p.5, para. 4 (c), http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PDF/infcirc254r8p1-060320.pdf; [View Article] William C. Potter, “Remembering Nonproliferation Principles,” Breaking the Nuclear Impasse (Century Foundation Press: 2007), http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/nuclearpotter.pdf. [View Article]
[8] Vitaly Fedchenko, “O Nekotorykh Aspektakh Rossiisko-Indiiskogo Sotrudnichestva v Oblasti Mirnoy Yadernoi Energetiki” [On Certain Aspects of Russian-Indian Cooperation in Area of Peaceful Nuclear Energy], Yadernyy Kontrol, June 1, 2001.
[9] The safety rule exemption from the FSS states that nuclear transfers in the absence of FSS “should be authorized only in exceptional cases when they are deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities.” The rule is set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev 4, part 1, 4(b), see source in [7]; in December 2004, Anil Kakodkar was quoted in the Hindu as saying that LEU was “the preferred option” and that “we have sort of used [MOX fuel bundles] in Tarapur…. We have to reengineer the reactor core to make use of the MOX.” T.S. Subramanian, “Our Nuclear Power Programme is Not Vulnerable: Kakodkar,” Hindu, December 7, 2004, http://www.hindu.com/2004/12/07/stories/2004120708520100.htm.
[View Article]
[10] See Howard Diamond, “Russia, India Move Forward With Deals on Arms, Nuclear Power,” Arms Control Today, June/July 1998, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_06-07/irsjj98.asp; [View Article] “Russian Shipment of Low Enriched Uranium Fuel to India,” Department of State Press Statement, February 16, 2001, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/592.htm; [View Article] Mark Hibbs, “NSG Bracing For More Conflict with Russia Over Indian Trade,” Nucleonics Week, June 28, 2001.
[11] Amit Baruah and R. Ramachandran, “Russian Fuel for Tarapur Ruled Out,” Hindu, December 6, 2004, http://www.hindu.com/2004/12/06/stories/2004120606610100.htm; [View Article] see also Kakodkar comments on the Russian commitment to the NSG in: M. Ramesh, “Fast Breeder Reactor Projects Put on Fast Track,” Business Line, August 13, 2004, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/08/13/stories/2004081301990400.htm. [View Article]
[12] For a detailed discussion, see Vitaliy Fedchenko, “Kudankulam Nuclear Electric Power Plant and the Future of Russian-Indian Nuclear Trade,” Yadernyy Kontrol, January 29, 2001, OSC document CEP20020430000381.
[13] India: Construction of Koodankulam Begins,” WISE News Communiqué, October 19, 2001, http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/556/5331.html; [View Article] Mark Hibbs, “DAE May Reprocess Spent Fuel Under VVER Supply Arrangement,” Nucleonics Week, April 17, 2003.
[14] “Rossiya obespechit indiiskuiu AES Tarapur yadernym toplivom” [Russia Will Provide Nuclear Fuel to Indian Tarapur NPP], Rosatom Website, March 17, 2003; “Pervaya partiya yadernogo topliva dostavlena iz Rossii v Indiiu dlya dvukh energoblokov AES v Tarapure” [First Shipment of Nuclear Fuel Has Been Delivered from Russia to India for Two Units at the NPP in Tarapur], Rosatom Website, April 3, 2006; Siddharth Varadarajan, “Fuel for Tarapur Not Related to Nuclear Deal With the U.S., Says Manmohan Singh,” Hindu, December 5, 2005, http://www.thehindu.com/2005/12/05/stories/2005120516131400.htm. [View Article] While the U.S. position in response to the 2001 shipment was unambiguously negative, its 2006 criticisms surprised the Indian press. An editorial in the Navbharat Times on March 17, 2006, for example, speculated that the negative reaction was “a diplomatic U.S. maneuver” and argued that the protests were disingenuous because the U.S.-India deal recognized India as a “responsible nuclear power.” See “Our Ally Russia,” Navbharat Times, March 17, 2006, OSC document SAP20060317006007.
[15] “Russia Wants New Nuclear Contracts in India – Ivanov,” see source in [1].
[16] Confidential WMD Insights interview with knowledgeable foreign official.
[17] Fedchenko, “Kudankulam Nuclear Electric Power Plant and the Future of Russian-Indian Nuclear Trade,” see source in [12].
[18] “Atomstroyexport Accelerates Kudankulam NPP Construction in India,” Interfax, October 16, 2007, OSC document CEP20071016950231.
[19] See website of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, http://www.npcil.nic.in/kapp.asp. [View Article]
[20] Latha Jishnu, “Nuclear Hope Fades Over Russian Delays,” Business Standard, December 13, 2007, http://www.business-standard.com/common/storypage.php?autono=307417&leftnm=3&subLeft=0&chkFlg= [View Article] .
[21] Anil Sasi, “Russia Offers India Investment Option in Uranium Project in Siberia – in Lieu of Payment for Koodankulam Fuel Supplies,” Business Line, November 20, 2007, OSC document SAP20071120494007.
[22] Patri, “Gorbachev, Gandhi Sign Pact to Finance VVER-1000s in India,” see source in [6]; Hibbs, “DAE May Reprocess Spent Fuel Under VVER Supply Arrangement,” see source in [13].
[23] Sujay Mehdudia, “Lifetime Fuel for 2 Koodankulam Reactors,” Hindu, November 30, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/11/30/stories/2007113060510100.htm; [View Article] Anil Sasi, “Koodankulam: Russia Gets Okay for Nuke Fuel Supply,” Business Line, March 28, 2007, http://www.blonnet.com/2007/03/28/stories/2007032802301000.htm. [View Article]
[24] While the Kudankulam agreement placed no legal restrictions on India’s ability to conduct additional nuclear tests, Moscow had, nevertheless, continually asked New Delhi to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which Russia itself ratified in 2000. However, while Russian President Boris Yeltsin reportedly wrote personal letters to India’s Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee threatening to cut off defense-industrial cooperation, bilateral nuclear cooperation does not appear to have been used as leverage for an Indian commitment to the CTBT.
[25] “Russia Offers India to Make Investments in the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk,” RIA Novosti, October 31, 2007, http://www.rosatom.com/en/news/6781_31.10.2007; [View Article] Anil Sasi, “Russia Offers India Investment Option in Uranium Project in Siberia – in Lieu of Payment for Koodankulam Fuel Supplies,” see source in [21].
[26] Fedchenko, “Kudankulam Nuclear Electric Power Plant and the Future of Russian-Indian Nuclear Trade,” see source in [12].
[27] Mark Hibbs “Minatom May Make Safety Case for More VVER Exports to India,” NuclearFuel, May 1, 2000.
[28] Indrani Bagchi, “Delhi Says No More Nuke Deals Before Full & Clear NSG Waiver,” Times of India, November 15, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/India_says_no_more_nuke_deals_before_NSG_waiver/articleshow/2541753.cms
[View Article]; Ranjit Kuman, “India Retraces Under U.S. Pressure,” Navbarat Times, November 13, 2007, OSC document SAP20071113479009.
[29] Bharat Bhhushan, “U.S.-Wary Delhi Tiptoes on Russian Reactors,” Telegraph, January 24, 2007, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070124/asp/nation/story_7301393.asp. [View Article]
[30] “Fusion with an Old Friend,” Hindu, January 26, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/26/stories/2007012603351200.htm. [View Article]
[31] Mehdudia, “Lifetime Fuel for 2 Koodankulam Reactors,” see source in [23].
[32] Vkadunur Radyuhin, “India Fails to Sign Deal for More Reactors for Koodankulam,” Hindu, November 13, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/11/13/stories/2007111368671000.htm. [View Article]
[33] Bagchi, “Delhi Says No More Nuke Deals Before Full & Clear NSG Waiver,” see source in [28].
[34] Seema Mustafa, “PM Under Fire over Russian Reactors,” Asian Age, December 5, 2007, OSC document SAP20071205384009.
[35] “Red Herring,” Indian Express, December 3, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/245972.html. [View Article]
[36] Hibbs and MacLachlan, “NSG Members Asked France, Russia About Their Negotiations with India,” see source in [5]. For a contrary view, see “Delhi Might Turn Back on Moscow,” Kommersant, November 13, 2007, http://www.kommersant.com/p824476/r_1/Russia-India_summit_takes_place_while_Delhi_begins_turning_towards_Washington/. [View Article]
[37] “Delhi Might Turn Back on Moscow,” see source in [36].
[38] Sandeep Dikshit, “Senior Russian Leader to Visit India,” Hindu, December 19, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/12/19/stories/2007121958971200.htm. [View Article]
[39] “India, France Working on N-Coop Agreement,” Hindu, December 24, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200712241621.htm; [View Article] Bhhushan, “U.S.-Wary Delhi Tiptoes on Russian Reactors,” see source in [29].
[40] Sandeep Dikshit, “Senior Russian Leader to Visit India,” see source in [38].
[41] Amit Baruah, “No N-deal During Sarkozy Visit,” Hindustan Times, January 2, 2008, http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=159bc6a3-038c-4401-9941-48151f350724. [View Article]
[42] Sandeep Dikshit, “Pact with France Only After NSG Clearance,” Hindu, January 22, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/01/22/stories/2008012259901200.htm. [View Article]
[43] Russia Says ‘Nothing Prevented’ Kudankulam Atomic Power Deal,” Rediff, January 16, 2008, http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jan/16nuke.htm.
[44] Andrey Terekhov, “Milliardy pod voprosom” [Billions at Stake], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 18, 2007 [http://www.ng.ru/world/2007-10-18/9_kkk.html].
[45] Olga Akekseeva, “Mezhgosudarstvennyi Tok” [Interstate Flow], Gazeta.Ru, January 25, 2007 [http://www.gazeta.ru/2007/01/25/oa_229766.shtml].
[46] “Russia Can Build Fast Neutron NPPs in India if Sanctions Lifted,” RIA Novosti, October 25, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/world/20071024/85370024.html. [View Article]
[47] Jishnu, “Nuclear Hope Fades Over Russian Delays,” see source in [20].
[48] “Fusion with an Old Friend,” see source in [30].
|
|
