In November 2007, the Labour Party in Australia, led by Kevin Rudd, swept John Howard’s Coalition government out of office after 11 years. [1] Since the election, many analysts in Australia and elsewhere have speculated that the new government in Canberra will move closer to Beijing, potentially at the expense of Australia’s traditional allies, the United States and Japan. [2] The issue of such a shift in Australian foreign policy was most recently highlighted by comments made during a trip to Canberra by China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi. Following meetings with Yang on February 5, 2007, Australia’s foreign minister Stephen Smith noted that Canberra no longer supported a strategic multilateral dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, specifically due to the concerns expressed by China that such a dialogue appeared aimed at containing Beijing. [3]

The new prime minister has not hidden the fact that he is inclined to improve relations with Beijing and wants to avoid actions that could unnecessarily provoke China. [4] Rudd’s background has played into his policy towards China, as well as into concerns of those who see him as too close to Beijing. Rudd majored in Chinese Studies at Australia National University; upon graduation, he joined the Foreign Service and spent a number of years at Australia’s embassy in Beijing. As noted by many analysts, Rudd is the first leader of a major Western country to speak fluent Chinese (or any Asian language). [5]

While critics fear the movement towards Beijing may lead to a distancing from Washington and Tokyo, Rudd has tried to make clear his belief that strong relations with the United States and Japan are fundamental to Australia’s national and economic security. The question remains, however, to what extent a closer relationship between Australia and China could hinder Canberra’s cooperation with nonproliferation efforts – such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) – or other security-related mechanisms, particularly if the cooperation could alienate Beijing.

Australian Foreign Policy Under Howard
Although a number of domestic political factors led to the defeat of the Coalition government, former Prime Minister John Howard’s close relationship with the current U.S. administration did not help his re-election campaign. Under Howard, Australia was a strong supporter of U.S.-led operations in Iraq; Australian troops were part of the initial invasion and about 1,600 troops remain stationed in or around that country, including about 550 in combat positions. In September 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush referred to Prime Minister Howard as a good friend and “steadfast ally.” [6] Howard’s refusal to distance himself from certain U.S. policies during the Australian election campaign – despite the unpopularity in Australia of both Bush and the war in Iraq – appeared to validate the U.S. president’s faith in Howard. According to one analysis prior to the Australian elections, Howard’s “commitment to the U.S. alliance, based on strategy, values and personal loyalty to Bush, has been unwavering.” [7]

In addition to cooperation on Iraq, under Howard, the United States and Australia agreed to increase defense inter-operability and cooperation in many security-related fields, such as military procurement, intelligence sharing, and counter-terrorism. [8] Howard was a strong supporter of the PSI; under his government, Australia hosted two PSI maritime exercises and participated in about 20 PSI exercises elsewhere. [9] The Howard government was also supportive of the U.S.-India nuclear deal and agreed to sell uranium to New Delhi – a move that the Rudd government reversed shortly after winning the election.

Howard placed significant importance on Canberra’s relationship with Tokyo, and his government signed a joint defense declaration with Japan in 2007. The Howard administration was also part of a trilateral security arrangement with Japan and the United States, which included meetings among the three nations’ foreign ministers. [10] As part of this trilateral arrangement, Howard’s government discussed cooperation in missile defense with its U.S. and Japanese counterparts, which Australian officials deemed to be focused on countries like North Korea. [11]

Howard had also supported the so-called “quadrilateral” dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. A meeting of this group of four was held once in May 2007 on the sidelines of a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Manila, much to the discomfort of Chinese leaders, who sent demarches to all participating governments. [12] In an effort to calm Beijing’s concerns about the four-way discussions, the Howard government stated at the time that the dialogue was not related to a security alliance, but instead focused on trade, economic, cultural, and other issues. [13]

The attempt to placate the Chinese over the quadrilateral discussion highlighted Howard’s efforts to balance the concerns of his government’s different international partners. The Australian government under Howard viewed China as a key relationship and focused substantial efforts on increasing economic activity with Beijing. During the Howard administration, trade with China increased significantly, and China overtook Japan and the United States to become Australia’s chief trading partner at the end of 2007. [14] Although keen to strengthen overall relations with Beijing, the Howard government set limits on strategic cooperation with China. For instance, after Australia and Japan signed their joint declaration on security in 2007, Howard specifically ruled out a similar level engagement with China because it is not a democracy. [15] As one Chinese analyst noted, Australia’s relationship with China under Howard were “at times close” but also “at times, cautiously distant.” [16]

Rudd’s Balancing Act
The Rudd government, as with previous Labour governments in Australia, has stressed the importance of engaging Asia. Due to China’s importance regionally and internationally, the new Australian administration has placed significant focus on strengthening relations with Beijing in particular. Beijing has reacted positively to the election of Rudd, who is viewed as more understanding of China than previous Australian administrations. [17] In speeches before and after the November 2007 elections, Rudd referred to China as Australia’s “friend and partner.” [18] Rudd has also gained personal notoriety in China with the translation of his biography, which notes on its cover that Rudd is the “Australian premier who speaks Chinese.” The book has sold more copies in China than the original English version in Australia. [19]

In the first few months of the Rudd administration, the Australian government has clearly indicated that it is hesitant to become involved with any discussions that could potentially alienate China. In addition to the recent squelching of the “quadrilateral” discussions, Rudd has also opposed a binding security alliance with Japan due to concerns about China’s reaction, an apparent reversal of Howard’s 2007 bilateral arrangements with the country. Rudd has further noted that he was formulating a 50-year strategy for relations with China; while this strategy appears to focus primarily on economic cooperation, he has not ruled out future strategic cooperation. [20]

Rudd announced soon after his election that Australia would not sell uranium to India because it is not a party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – a reversal of Howard’s stance – signaling that the Liberal government would not remain in lock-step with the Bush administration on this issue. [21] Under a July 2005 agreement, Washington has proposed to end a nuclear embargo of India and to exempt it from U.S. and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) requirements that prohibit nuclear trade with states like India that have not placed all of their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. Although Australia, a member of the NSG, has now declared that it will not take advantage of such an exemption should it be adopted, Australia’s High Commissioner (Ambassador) to India, John McCarthy, has stated that this stance does not mean that Australia will oppose the NSG exemption when the group votes on the matter. [22]

Leaders in Washington and Tokyo have taken note of Rudd’s developing policy towards China, and some have viewed recent activities in Australia with concern. A January 2008 report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service notes that the U.S. government’s “key policy challenge in its alliance relationship with Australia will, according to some analysts, be to keep this staunch ally from shifting to a position where Canberra sees its role as a mediator between the United States and China rather than focused on working unambiguously with the United States.” The report further argues that the United States may need to counter “Chinese attempts to drive a wedge between the United States and Australia.” [23]

According to one Japanese media report, some in the Japanese government see Rudd’s election and Australia’s subsequent drift toward Beijing as a potential “setback in Australia-Japan relations.” [24] Furthermore, although Japan and Australia have had strong economic and security ties in the past, recent diplomatic and political uproar over Japanese whaling activities have soured relations in the short-term and made discussion of other bilateral issues more challenging. [25] The anti-Japanese sentiment surrounding the whaling controversy, combined with Rudd’s China policy, has some politicians in Tokyo worried about the strength of Australian-Japanese relations. [26]

While calling for engagement with Beijing, Rudd has, at the same time, not ignored China’s potential ability to destabilize the region with a build-up of military power and has made efforts to illustrate the importance of U.S.-Australia cooperation in stemming possible threats to regional security. Rudd characterized a potential nuclear arms race in Asia as a “core challenge” to Australia. Rudd noted in an interview that “China is modernizing its strategic nuclear arms and it’s engaging in general force modernization ….The challenge for the U.S. and the region is to engage China in substantive nuclear arms reduction talks.” He concluded that the “alternative is a nuclear arms race across the region, which does not serve Australia’s security interests at all.” [27]

Rudd’s government is aware of concerns regarding its policy toward China and has attempted to calm fears about a possible weakening of Australia’s ties with its major partners Japan and the United States. In his victory speech after beating Howard’s Coalition government, Rudd specifically singled out Washington by sending “greetings and thanks to our great friend and ally, the United States.” [28] Although not in agreement with the current U.S. administration on issues such as the Kyoto Treaty (which Rudd strongly supports), the U.S.-India nuclear deal (which Rudd is skeptical of), and the current policy with regard to Iraq, Australia’s Labour Party has traditionally supported the U.S.-Australian security alliance. [29] In January 2008, Rudd’s foreign minister Stephen Smith noted during a trip to Washington that the alliance between the United States and Australia forms the “fundamental basis” of Australia’s security. Smith further stated that the “nature of the alliance between Australia and the United States transcends governments and administrations.” [30] Rudd also supports the continuation of the trilateral strategic relationship between Australia, Japan, and the United States that was formed under the Howard government. [31]

Australia’s “New” Foreign Policy: The Same but Different
The new Australian administration appears to view itself as a potential bridge between its traditional allies, the United States and Japan, and its newer “partner”, China. Rudd has argued that Australia’s strong relationship with the United States means that his government “can play a very active role in the future development of Sino-US relations and help maintain a solid, peaceful, and prosperous future for Sino-US relations.” [32]

Rudd will need to carefully balance Australia’s key relationships – particularly with regard to China, Japan, and the United States – and it is unlikely that his government will make a fundamental shift away from Australia’s traditional allies towards China. Rudd’s government is likely to continue to work together with the United States and Japan on established security mechanisms, particularly PSI and counter-terrorism activities. Rudd has made it clear, however, that his government will look skeptically at new mechanisms that aim to contain China. Therefore, future cooperation on missile defense or binding security alliances with Japan will likely be a tougher sell under Rudd than his predecessor, since Beijing views these (and possibly the U.S.-India nuclear deal) as efforts to contain China. At the same time, Rudd’s ability to work as an intermediary among the major players in the Asia Pacific could be a useful tool for overall regional security.

Stephanie Lieggi – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies